1982

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV-67
FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK 09538

DECLASSIFIED

CV67/320:ljp
5750
Ser C-13
8 APR 1983

[redacted] (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (8))

logged

From: Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05D2), Navy Department, Washington, DC 20350

Subj: 1982 Command History (U)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12C

Encl: (1) Command Organization (U)
(2) Chronology (U)
(3) Narrative (U)
(4) List of Photographs (U)
(5) Photographs (U)
(6) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) Officer Social Roster, November 1982 (U)
(7) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) Primary and Collateral Duty Assignments (U)
(8) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) MED/IO Cruise Report 1982 ~~(C)~~

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (8) are forwarded.

D. BRUCE CARGILL

Copy to:
Director of Naval History

Reg. no. R010 412/160

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COMMAND ORGANIZATION - 1982

A. Commanding Officer:

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was commanded by Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, USN.

B. Location of Homeport:

Homport for USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) is Naval Base, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia.

C. Composition of Command:

I. Commander, Carrier Group FOUR and Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO utilized USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) as their flagship during 1982.

II. Carrier Air Wing THREE, commanded by Commander J. J. MAZACH, USN, was assigned to USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67).

a. Air Wing THREE Composition:

SQUADRON	COMMANDING OFFICER
HS-7	Commander R. K. WILSBACH
VF-11	Commander D. A. SHARER
VF-31	Commander W. V. CROSS II
VA-37	Commander L. A. FARR
VA-75	Commander E. D. WOLFGANG
VA-105	Commander R. G. BRODSKY
VS-22	Commander T. P. WINTERS
VAW-126	Commander J. W. BOOKHULTZ
VAQ-138	Commander W. H. HAWK

CHRONOLOGY
1982 COMMAND HISTORY

January

01-03	Holiday standdown and pre-cruise preparations.
04	Deployed from Naval Base, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia, for the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.
04-06	Conducted Air Wing THREE carrier qualifications (CQ) in Virginia Capes (VACAPES) operating area prior to transiting the Atlantic.
06-16	Transited Atlantic en route port visit Malaga, Spain.
09-10	Conducted SEA VENTURE operations.
17	Inchopped the Mediterranean.
17-21	Port visit Malaga, Spain.
21-22	Departed Malaga, Spain, conducted underway replenishment operations.
23-28	Exercise NATIONAL WEEK XXXI operations.
29-03 (Feb)	Transit en route Suez Canal.
31-01 (Feb)	Conducted bombing operations on AVGO NISI target complex.

February

03	Transited Suez Canal.
04-06	Red Sea transit.
06	Transited Straits of Bab-El-Mandeb.
07-10	Transited Gulf of Aden.
10	USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) announced as winner of the "Thomas Jefferson Award," for videotaped programming from the ship's entertainment studio.
11	Relieved USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) on station in the North Arabian Sea.
11-14	Transit/normal operations in North Arabian Sea.

14-16	Completed ASWEX 82-4U operations.
16	PASSEX with French Ship (FS) KERSAINT.
16-18	Routine North Arabian Sea operations and transit to Seeb, Oman operating area.
18	CODEL Cohen, Senator from Maine, visited the Battle Group.
19-21	Routine North Arabian Sea operations.
22-23	Exercise BEACON FLASH 82-4.
23	PASSEX with HMS SHEFFIELD.
24-28	Routine North Arabian Sea operations.
24	Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, Change-of-Command as Rear Admiral R. Byron FULLER, USN, is relieved by Rear Admiral Edward H, MARTIN, USN.

March

01-02	Conducted ASWEX 82-5.
01-18	Transit en route port visit Perth, Australia.
06	Crossed the equator; SHELLBACK initiation.
08-10	Conducted GONZOEX 82-2, in vicinity of Diego Garcia, with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64).
11	Crew BEEREX.
17-18	Conducted BEACON SOUTH 82-2 exercise in vicinity western Australia.
19-25	Port visit Perth, Australia.
26-08 (Apr)	Transit to North Arabian Sea.
29-01 (Apr)	Dual carrier Battle Group operations in vicinity of Diego Garcia with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64).

April

02-05	Exercise WEAPONS WEEK in vicinity Diego Garcia.
06-15	Routine operations in North Arabian Sea.

16-21	Conducted exercise DOUBLE TEAM ASW operations.
20-21	Exercise BEACON FLASH 82-5.
22-01 (May)	Transit en route port visit Mombasa, Kenya.

<u>May</u>

01	Coordinated training exercise for Kenyan VIPs.
02-06	Port visit Mombasa, Kenya.
07-12	Transit en route North Arabian Sea.
09	Coordinated training exercise for Somalian Presidential visit.
13-14	Secretary of the Navy visit to the carrier Battle Group.
15-20	Exercise DOUBLE TEAM ASW operations in North Arabian Sea.
19-20	Exercise BEACON FLASH 82-6.
28-30	Conducted Freedom of Navigation practice operations in North Arabian Sea.
31-01 (Jun)	Transited Gulf of Aden/Straits of Bab-El-Mandeb. en route Mediterranean.

<u>June</u>

02-04	Red Sea transit.
05	Northerly transit of Suez Canal.
06-18	Contingency Evacuation Support operations in East Mediterranean.
07	Announced as winner of the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, "Golden Mike" award for calendar year 1981.
18-20	Transit en route port visit Toulon, France.
21-23	Port visit Toulon, France.
24-26	Exercise DAILY DOUBLE.
26	Conducted air defense and war-at-sea exercises

	with the French Air Force and Navy.
27-28	Transit en route Malaga, Spain.
28-03 (Jul)	Port visit Malaga, Spain.

<u>July</u>

04	Outchopped from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic en route Norfolk, Virginia.
04-14	TIGER cruise and transit to Norfolk, Virginia.
12	Air Wing THREE fly off and return to home ports.
14	Homecoming Naval Base, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia.
15-16 (Aug)	Post cruise standdown and crew leave period.
23	Caribbean Basin Initiative Project Delegation visited the ship for tours and briefs.
25	Rear Admiral Richard K. FONTAINE, USN, and guests toured the ship.

<u>August</u>

17-20	Navy film crew embarked to film a Navy training film on hearing conservation.
17-27	Deployed to Virginia Capes (VACAPES) operating area for fleet carrier qualifications. Numerous guests and congressional delegates visited during this time frame.
27-21 (Sep)	Pierside Norfolk, Virginia, preparing ship for forthcoming ship's restricted availability period in Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia.

<u>September</u>

01-21	Continued preparations for ship's restricted availability period. Ship hosted numerous guests and dignitaries during this last opportunity to visit USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) before arrival in the yards.
21-24	Deployed to Virginia Capes operating area for fleet carrier qualifications.

24-29	Pierside Norfolk Naval Base completing preparations for the Change-of-Command for the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
30	Hosted over 3000 dignitaries at the Change-of-Command ceremony for Admiral Harry D. TRAIN, II, USN, and Admiral Wesley L. MCDONALD, USN, onboard the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67).

October

01-11	Continued preparations for yard period.
08	Hosted a tour and presentation for 100 members of Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron 131 (WW II).
12-14	Anchored at Whiskey Anchorage to offload the remainder of the ship's weapons inventory.
15	Dependents Day cruise and transit up the Elizabeth River en route Norfolk Naval Shipyard, berth 4, pier 5.
15-07 (Feb)	Intensive overhaul and rehabilitation period for all ship's spaces and equipment.
29	Rear Admiral Jerry O. TUTTLE, USN, Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT, shifted his flag from USS AMERICA (CV 66) to USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67).

November

06	Awarded fourth consecutive Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, award for being the most fuel efficient carrier in the Atlantic Fleet.
17-19	Shipwide personnel inspection and awards ceremony.

December

02	Ship informed of winning the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Silver Anchor" award for retention excellence, and ensured the ship would be in contention for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Golden Anchor" award for the best retention record.
24	Notified the ship won the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, "Golden Anchor" award.

31 USS JOHN F, KENNEDY (CV 67) won many major awards during calender year 1982, and awaited notification that "Super K" won the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Battle E".

NARRATIVE
1982 COMMAND HISTORY

The year 1982 was a big year for USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) and crewmembers. An entire deployment was completed, many accolades were received and numerous awards earned, the highest being the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, "Battle E." The deployment began on the first working day of the year, January 4th, and it concluded on 14 July 1982. During the course of the deployment, the ship passed from the operational control of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and back again creating many memories of long, hard work days and individual job satisfaction.

Deployment accomplishments are recounted in enclosure (8), a summary of all events that occurred during the ship's Mediterranean and Indian Ocean deployment in 1982. The following narrative further documents the visitation of distinguished visitors to the ship and all major events since the deployment.

Early on the morning of 4 January 1982, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) deployed from Naval Base, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia for six and one-half months of Mediterranean and Indian Ocean operations. The first distinguished visitor embarked as the ship departed the pier. The Comptroller for the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Joseph T. KAMMERER, observed flight operations and received carrier orientation briefings prior to departing on the ship's carrier onboard delivery (COD) aircraft late 5 January.

The ship was not opened to general visiting during the Malaga, Spain port visit, 17-21 January. However, numerous personal and invited guests did partake of "Super K" hospitality during the port visit. The Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, Rear Admiral Robert Byron FULLER, USN, the Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67), Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, USN, and the Chief of Staff, Carrier Group FOUR, Captain W. O. RENTZ, USN, made official calls on the following Spanish dignitaries during the morning of 18 January:

Coronel Julio SANCHO Gonzales, Chief of the Air Sector and Capitan de Navio D. Joaquin Lopez CORTIJO Y GONZALES Aller, Port Captain of Malaga; General de Division, Manual PUIG Rioboo, Military Governor, Malaga Province (1 star equivalent); Sr. Pedro APARICIO Sanchez, Alcalde (Mayor) of the City of Malaga; and Dr. Jose ESTEVEZ Mendez, Civil Governor of Malaga Province (2 star equivalent).

Late on 18 January, the following local dignitaries were invited aboard for lunch with the Captain and Admiral in the Flag Mess:

Dr. Jose ESTEVEZ Mendez, Civil Governor; General de Division, Manuel PUIG Rioboo, Military Governor; Coronel Julio SANCHO Gonzalez, Chief of Air Sector; Sr. Pedro APARICIO Sanchez, Alcalde of Malaga; Capitan de Navio D. Joaquin Lopez CORTIJO Y GONZALEZ Aller, Port Captain; Sr. Don Enrique LINDE Cirujano, President of the Deputation Provincial (Council) of Malaga; Sr. Don Juan de Dios JIMENES Molina, President of the Audiencia Provincial (High Court); Dr. Antonio Perez de la CRUZ Blanco, Rector of the University of Malaga; Sr. Don Guillermo MEDINA, President of the Defense Committee of the Congress of Deputies; Mr. Frederick PRUDY, American Consulate General, Malaga; and Ms. Bobbye AARON, American Consular Agent, Malaga.

On 19 and 20 January a total of 140 students from Cerrado de Calderon School, and specially invited guests from the USO organization, received a tour and carrier orientation briefings on the "Super K". Malaga became a favorite port of call for USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67), because of the warm and friendly reception the ship received. The President of the Defense Committee of the Congress of Deputies, Sr. Don Guillermo MEDINA, made an official visit on 20 January, for discussions and a tour of the ship. This was the last full day inport Malaga prior to the ship getting underway late on 21 January for Exercise NATIONAL WEEK XXXI, transit of the Suez Canal and several weeks of "blue water" operations in the Indian Ocean, prior to the next port visit in Perth, Australia. In all, the ship was underway 56 consecutive days between port calls.

The ship prepared for transiting the Suez Canal and Red Sea during the last week in January and the first part of February. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) made the southerly transit on 3 February with numerous Egyptian and U.S. Embassy staff members and guests onboard. USDAO Cairo and Egyptian guests:

Mr. Thomas J. CAROLAN and son Philip (Political Advisor to the Ambassador); Mr. and Mrs. David J. DUNFORD (Economic Advisor); Captain and Mrs. David J. SPERLING, USN (DATT/ALUSNA); CDR and Mrs. Christopher SEAL (UK Naval Attache); Mr. and Mrs. William HEDGES and son Dean (Embassy Cairo); Engineer Mohamed Baha El Dine El SAYED (Director of the Technical Office of the Chairman, Suez Canal Authority, (SCA); Mr. Mustafa SHALABY (Deputy Director of Public Relations, SCA); Mr. Al Azab Abdel Hamid El AZAB (Public Relations, SCA); Mr. Mohamed Abdel GHANI, (Counselor, SCA); Mr. Hosni NASSAR (Deputy Director of Transit Department, SCA); Captain Ali NASSAR (Deputy Director of Transit Department, SCA); Mr. Esson SHOUDT (Public Relations, SCA); Brigadier and Mrs. Wafik MESSIRI (Military Attache Branch); and Commander and Mrs. MADKOUR (Egyptian Navy).

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was the largest of the three aircraft carriers to have transited the Suez Canal since its widening and deepening in 1980.

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was underway the entire month of February in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea. The accolades continued to roll in from the previous calendar year. On 10 February, Mr. Benjamin WELLS, Principal Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), announced USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) as a winner of the 1981 Department of Defense Thomas Jefferson Awards Contest: 1st Place - Single Program from TV Series, "Barcelona: City of Romance," videotaped port brief. Mr. WELLS stated:

"I take this opportunity to congratulate you for a job well done. The selection of WJFK-TV as a winner in the Thomas Jefferson Awards Contest is a significant achievement and formal recognition of the outstanding work your staff accomplished during the past year. Please accept my sincere appreciation for your assistance in helping to keep the men and women of the Armed Forces well informed."

U.S. Senator William S. COHEN, (R-ME), Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and escorts, paid the ship a special visit on 19 February. Accompanying Senator COHEN were Mr. L. Wayne ARNY, Professional Staff Member (SASC); Mr. Drew HARKER, Research Assistant (SASC); and Dr. Jeffrey RECORD, Consultant (SASC).

"Pollywog" and "Shellback," were terms to be long remembered by all Battle Group crewmembers. On 6 March, the Task Force crossed the equator - an occasion that must be properly celebrated by all who enter the "Realm of King Neptune Rex" for the first time. Only ten percent of the crew had crossed the equator previously and, duty bound, each man did his part to rid the kingdom of all unwanted "Pollywogs". By the end of the day, 4,500 new "Shellbacks" had been initiated into "King Neptune Rex's Kingdom."

As the ship transited south in the North Arabian Sea en route to Perth, Australia, Rear Admiral Huntington HARDISTY, USN, Commander, Task Force SEVEN ZERO and Vice Admiral M. Staser HOLCOMB, USN, Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet, paid official visits in the vicinity of Diego Garcia. Rear Admiral HARDISTY accompanied by Lieutenant Commander (b) (6) [redacted], USN, remained the night of 8 March and departed to USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) on the afternoon of 9 March after conferring with Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN; Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet, Vice Admiral M. Staser HOLCOMB, USN, who had arrived early on 9 March; and the Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67), Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, USN.

Vice Admiral HOLCOMB remained with the KENNEDY Battle Group overnight, making visits to USS BARNEY (DDG-6), USS MEYERKORD (FF-1058), and USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27). Vice Admiral HOLCOMB departed the ship via carrier onboard delivery (COD) aircraft for the USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) early on 10 March.

Two "cool wet ones" were offered to each man on 11 March. Each crewmember of the ship, air wing and staff was authorized to drink 2 cold beers, served with a bar-b-que picnic, on the flight deck. The entire crew took the afternoon off to relax following 45 days of hard work. The fun was only just beginning as the ship continued en route Perth, Australia for the "best" liberty port in the Pacific.

On 18 March, 20 Australian visitors came aboard to observe carrier flight operations and receive ship orientation tours. Distinguished guests were:

Sir Frederick C. CHANEY, (The Lord Mayor of Perth); the Honorable Ian THOMPSON, (Speaker of the Legislative Assembly); Captain Dusty RHODES, USN (U.S. Naval Attache); Mr. W. T. BREWER, (Chief Manager, Bank of New South Wales); Mr. Gordon BAILEY, (Deputy Chief Manager, Bank of New South Wales); Mr. WINEMAN; Mr. R. Bernth JOHANSSEN, (Project Manager, Raymond Engineers); Mr. Jack EVANS, (National President of Australian Democrats); Ms. Martha CARBONE, (U.S. Consul); LCDR WHITTAKER, (Royal Australian Navy); LCDR Clive BLENNERHASSETT, (Royal Australian Navy, Operations Officer); Mr. Colin EVANS, (Tours); Mr. Graham STEWART, (Australian Fishing Industry Council); Mr. David BOERIGTER, (Commercial Officer of U.S. Consulate); Mr. Jack BOERIGTER, (National Board of Reformed Church of America); Mr. Carmelo N. MUSCA, (Film Crew); Mr. Johannes G. VERSLUIS, (Film Crew); Mr. Piercy PORTER, (Film Crew); Mr. Brian GOOTS, (Chairman of the Young Endeavour Group American Australian Association). All were treated to "Super K" hospitality and returned to Perth pleased with their visit.

The ship anchored outside Perth at the port of Fremantle on the morning of 19 March for a six day port visit. During this time, all possible hospitality and friendship was extended to each JFK sailor. This liberty port was outstanding and one of the finest in all the world. In all, over 5,000 visitors came aboard as invited guests or general visitors to the ship. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) did her part to foster international friendship and cooperation between the United States and Western Australia.

The Commanding Officer and Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, and their wives, hosted Mr. Steve LYNE, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia and party to a luncheon and orientation tour onboard the ship on 23 March. Accompanying Mr. Lyne were:

Mrs. Mary LYNE; Colonel [redacted], USAF, (CINCPACREP Canberra); Major [redacted], USAF, (Copilot); Ms. Martha CARBONE, (AMCONSUL Perth); Captain and Mrs. W. K. (Dusty) RHODES (USDAO Canberra); Mr. Harry MCALPINE, (Executive Officer, American Embassy); Mr. Richard STARR, (U.S. Desk Officer for Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs); Captain and Mrs. W. O. (Bill) RENTZ, (Chief of Staff, Carrier Group FOUR); Captain and Mrs. B. J. (Bernie) SMITH, (Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE); Mr. Dennis BUCHANAN, (Parmelia Hilton Hotel); Mr. David WINEMAN, (Parmelia Hilton Hotel); Mr. Barry MCGUIRE, (Parmelia Hilton Hotel); and Ms. Marjorie CHARLESON, (Western Australia Turf Club).

The 23rd of March was also a big day for Captain R. K. U. KIHUNE, USN, Commander, Destroyer Squadron THREE FIVE. He hauled down his pennant from USS ROBERT E. PERRY (FF-1073) and embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67). His tenure onboard was most rewarding for both his staff and the "Super K".

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) departed Perth on 25 March and conducted routine operations and exercises for the next 5 weeks. During this time the ship hosted the "Kemeny Sisters" during a tour of Task Group SEVEN ZERO PT NINE units, as they performed a pop rock musical presentation for all hands. The tour was sponsored by the Department of Defense and the USO. Members included: Miss Cheryl KEMENY; Miss Alexandria KEMENY; Mr. Vernie TAYLOR; Mr. Christopher TOELKEN; Mr. Kevin MCGUINESS; and Mr. Mark REICHARD. The sisters performed on each of the task group ships from 2-5 April before departing by COD to Diego Garcia. On 11 April, 1500 ship, air wing and staff personnel celebrated Easter Sunrise Services on the flight deck.

Rear Admiral Charles E. GURNEY, USN, Commander, Middle East Force, visited the task force 19 April. During his visit, hosted by Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN, Rear Admiral GURNEY made an appearance on the "Fathom" show, sponsored by WJFK-TV, and discussed "The Middle East and the Role of the MIDEAST Force." RADM Gurney made other brief stops while embarked to the USS MARVIN SHIELDS (FF-1066) and USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27), prior to departing the ship on 21 April.

On 1 May, Brigadier Cromwell O. MKUNGUSI, Kenya Army, Chief of Staff, Kenya Department of Defense, accompanied by Kenya DOD officials and members of the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office, embarked for observation of flight operations and carrier orientation tours. Other guests were:

Mr. Robert E. GRIBBIN, American Consul Mombasa; Mr. Leonard L. LEFTKOW, Counselor for Public Affairs; Mr. Duane C. BUTCHER, Counselor for Economic Affairs; Mr. Jim D. MARK, Counselor for Administration; Colonel Felix J. NJUGUANA, Kenya Air Force;

Colonel [redacted], USA, Chief KUSLO; Major WACHIRA, Kenya Military; Major MUTAI, Kenya Military; LCDR [redacted] USN, KUSLO Navy Liaison; Captain NGUYO, Kenya Military; and Mr. Chris SOPER, Advance Liaison.

Next to Mombasa, Kenya. While inport Mombasa 2-6 May, official calls were made to Mr. Luka GALGALO, Provincial Commissioner; Brigadier E. Simon MBILU, Commander Kenya Navy. Return calls were made by Mr. Luka GALGALO; Brigadier E. Simon MBILU; and Mr. William E. HARROP, American Ambassador to Kenya. The ship departed Mombasa on 7 May and transited northward toward the North Arabian Sea.

In reviewing the Mombasa port visit, Rear Admiral MARTIN remarked, "In viewing the smart appearance of the escorts standing out of Mombasa Harbor this morning, I thought what a fitting capstone they made to the superb effort by all units in conduct ashore and overseas diplomacy during the Mombasa port visit 1-7 May 1982. Initial review of your conduct ashore reports show no major incidents and amazingly few minor ones for the number of ships visiting. The words I received from several Kenyan officials and the American community in Mombasa convinced me that all of you returned the warm hospitality of our hosts in good style. You have gone far in making a lasting impression and many friends for the U.S. Navy."

En route the North Arabian Sea, an auspicious privilege occurred worthy of note: In what was the first visit by a Somali head of state aboard a U.S. warship, President Mohamed Siad BARRE, of the Somali Democratic Republic, visited USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) on 8 May. President BARRE arrived aboard the "Super K" to full honors, including Marine Honor Guard and a 21 gun salute from the guided missile cruiser USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27). The presidential party dined with Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN, Commander, Carrier Group FOUR, before proceeding on a tour of the ship's facilities. The distinguished guests reviewed aircraft flight operations from the Flag Bridge, and observed a coordinated training exercise in their honor from the flight deck. Accompanying the President were:

Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali SAMANTAR, Minister of Defense; Donald K. PETTERSON, American Ambassador; Abdi Warsame ISSAK, Minister of Labor; Mussa Rabile GOOD, Minister of Presidency; Hashi Abdalla FARAH, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Brigadier General Mohamed Ali ABOKAR, Director of Military Technology; Major General Aden Abdi DUALE, Commander of National Police; Major General Ismail Ahmed ISMAIL, Commander of Custodial Corps; Brigadier General Mohamed JABRIL, Chief of National Security Service; Colonel Abdulwahab MOHAMED, Commander Peoples' Militia; Colonel Farah Ahmed OMAR, Acting Commander of Somali Navy; Colonel [redacted] USA, Chief of Office of

Military Cooperation; Lieutenant Colonel [redacted], USA, U.S. Defense Attache; Yassim Haji ISMAIL, Presidential Press Advisor; Mohamed D. JAMA, Secretary to President; Terry C. EAKIN, ICA Director; and three escorts to the President. The President and his party departed the ship that afternoon.

The ship returned again to the Seeb, Oman operating area in the North Arabian Sea 13-14 May to receive the Honorable John F. LEHMAN, Jr., Secretary of the Navy; Captain P. D. MILLER, USN, Executive Assistant; and Commander [redacted], JAGC, USN, Staff Assistant. While embarked, the Secretary of the Navy also visited USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG 27), and USS MARVIN SHIELDS (FF 1066) for meetings with embarked personnel, observing air wing and battle group operations, participating in an A-6 flight and receiving situation briefings by the task group commander, Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN.

Prior to departing, Mr. Lehman honored the ship by conducting a special reenlistment ceremony on the hangar bay for 82 ship's company and air wing personnel. Upon concluding the ceremony, Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, USN, Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) awarded the Secretary a very special check in the amount of 105,360.57 dollars. The check was the composite of all monies donated to the Combined Federal Campaign by ship's company and airwing crewmembers. After departing, the Secretary of the Navy sent back the following message:

"I thoroughly enjoyed my time in "Super K". Every aspect of the visit program was perfectly executed, and administering the reenlistment oath to such a large and class group was a special privilege. Please pass to VA 75 my appreciation for a great flight. The COMM Gang who worked hard to get my message to Washington also deserve an outstanding grade. Best wishes for a continued successful deployment. JFK certainly lives up to her campaign button slogan 'The best in the Fleet.'"

Commodore John GUNNING, Commander, Sultan of Oman's Navy; Captain John De WINTON, Chief of Staff (Designate), Sultan of Oman's Navy; and Lieutenant Colonel [redacted], USMC, visited the "Super K" on 19 May. The ship had been operating closely with the Sultan of Oman's air forces, and the visit was intended to foster closer relations with his military representatives.

On 25 May, Commodore R. K. U. KIHUNE, USN, Commander, Destroyer Squadron THREE FIVE disembarked USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) and returned to USS ROBERT E. PEARY (FF 1073). Commodore KIHUNE had been embarked on the "Super K" since 23 March. On departing, the Commodore stated:

"I want to express my sincerest gratitude and true appreciation to all of the officers and men of JOHN F. KENNEDY and CVW THREE for the kindness, hospitality and support provided to my staff and I during our two month stay on "Super K". As a black shoe, I have come to recognize and appreciate the tremendously professional job that all of you perform under the most trying conditions of cyclic and night flight operations. The success of TG 70.9 ASW operations could not have been achieved without the complete and dedicated support of JFK and CVW THREE. Of particular note was the dedication and hard work of the flight deck crews not only during cyclic ops but every day that flight ops are conducted. I salute all of you and sail away from this experience with nothing but great respect for all of you."

The Miss Black America USO show entertained the battle group 25-29 May. Miss Pamela JENKS, Miss Black America; Miss Sandra ELMER; Miss Sandra HENDERSON; Miss Carla WILLIAMS; Mr. Kevin KENTWORTHY; and Mr. Jason PORTER contributed to the delight and merriment of the crew as the ending of the Indian Ocean portion of the deployment was drawing to a close.

While transiting the Red Sea, the following message was received from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral S. R. FOLEY, Jr., USN, and reflects similar accolades from the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and the Commander, Task Force SEVEN ZERO:

"I wish to extend my personal congratulations and appreciation to all members of KENNEDY battle group for their outstanding performance and dedication during your four month Indian Ocean deployment. The presence of KENNEDY battle group was a significant contribution towards peace and stability in an area of the world which is vital to U.S. interests. I am well aware of the many hardships and sacrifices involved in an Indian Ocean deployment. In the face of these difficulties, professionalism of those involved is indeed commendable and reflects highest tradition of United States Navy."

On 1 June, the ship transited the Straits of Bab-El-Mandeb and headed North in the Red Sea. The ship arrived Port Suez in mid-afternoon. The following guest embarked early on 5 June for the northerly transit of the Suez Canal:

Major General and Mrs. Ahmed FAKR, and son, Director Egyptian National Defense College; Captain and Mrs. [redacted], and son [redacted], DATT/ALUSNA; Mr. and Mrs. Stephen RICHTER, and son William, Political Advisor; Colonel [redacted], USA, Army Attache; Captain Moustafa SAID, Egyptian Military Intelligence; Major General Fouad Falah ZAKI, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Third Army; Major General Mohamed Kamel MONSOUR, Commander Third Artillery; Commodore Sallah Abd El WAHAD, Suez Naval Base Commander; Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Rafat NHMAM, and Major

Mohamed Abd El NHIM, Military Intelligence Suez; Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. [redacted] USAF; Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. [redacted], USAF; Major Muhamed Wahid ISMAIL, Military Branch; Lieutenant Colonel Gamel THABET, Military Intelligence; and Major Salah TAWFIK, Military Intelligence.

In total, "Super K" did a super job in the Indian Ocean, and the awards kept coming in. On 7 June the ship was notified that:

"USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) had won first place in the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Golden Mike Award Contest. It is the third straight year KENNEDY had won the sought after Internal Relations award -- winning over USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) and USS AMERICA (CV 66), taking second and third places, respectively. A message received by Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet follows in part:

"Congratulations to all winners. Your Internal Relations programs are indicative of the outstanding efforts that are being put forth to keep our AIRLANT personnel fully informed of the importance of the Navy mission and that of COMNAVAIRLANT."

The ship continued en route to an expected port visit to Haifa, Israel 6-11 June. Many ship and air wing members were psychologically preparing to greet their wives and sweethearts. Unexpectedly, the ship was directed to assume a modified location off the coast of Lebanon. Israel had attacked full thrust at Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fortifications throughout southern Lebanon, and the anticipated port visit was cancelled. Word was passed from Haifa that all dependents were safe and would soon return home. Though disappointed, all crewmembers made preparations for the possible evacuation of U.S. and other foreign nationals from Beirut, Lebanon. The ship remained on station until relieved on 17 June by USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69). The Commander, Carrier Group FOUR and his staff departed "Super K" on 17 June, and the Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO, Rear Admiral David M. ALTWEGG, USN, and his staff embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67). Rear Admiral ALTWEGG remained embarked until 12 July, at which time he disembarked for the return transit to Charleston, South Carolina.

The ship continued a westerly transit of the Mediterranean en route Toulon, France, arriving for a 21-23 June port visit. The ship got underway on 24 June, for Exercise DAILY DOUBLE Operations 24-28 June. On 22 June, the Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO and Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67), accompanied by Mr. Roman GARCIA, American Consul to Marseille, France, made official calls on: Contre Admiral (RADM) SOULET, Assistant Maritime Prefect; the Mayor of Toulon; and the Prefet of the Var. Return calls were made that afternoon onboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67).

As the ship made preparation for Exercise DAILY DOUBLE, Commander LABASSE, FRN; Captain R. MORVILLO, ITN; Lieutenant Colonel F. ANDRETTA, IAF; Lieutenant Colonel A. D. AMBROSIO, IAF; Major [redacted], USMC; and Major F. FRANCO, IAF embarked as NATO liaison officers for the exercise. At this same time, Captain G. F. STREETER, USN, Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO FOUR, embarked from USS DEWEY (DDG 45) for three days as the Acting Commander responsible for the conduct of anti-surface warfare (ASW) operations during Exercise DAILY DOUBLE.

For the remainder of the cruise, the ship took on an academic air as U.S. Naval Academy Midshipmen arrived for a 4 week midshipmen training period to further refine their professional development, reinforce their academic programs, instill a sense of pride in their identification with the Navy, and to peak their interest in fleet operations. The major goal was preparing the midshipmen for commissioned service through active participation in the duties and responsibilities of a junior officer.

As Exercise DAILY DOUBLE concluded, the ship transited en route Malaga, Spain for the final port visit of the deployment, 28 June - 4 July. Everyone was eager to hit the beach or meet family members and friends who would be transiting back to Norfolk on USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) TIGER CRUISE. In all, approximately 260 "Tigers" made the trans-atlantic crossing.

During the return transit, one tragedy befell the ship. Late on the night of 5 July, during a storm, four crewmembers were washed overboard. Three of the four were recovered, but one man was presumed lost at sea. The Commanding Officer had special praise for the officers and men of USS CLARK (FFG-11) for successfully recovering the three men. This deed, "Epitomized the highest degree of shiphandling, seamanship and professionalilsm."

On 12 June, Rear Admiral ALTWEGG and his staff disembarked, while Air Wing THREE aircraft flew to their home airfields, thus ending their long deployment. Prior to arrival at Naval Base, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia, the following was received from the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet:

"After six months of arduous sea duty, my personal congratulations to the KENNEDY/AIR WING THREE team for its sustained outstanding performance the vanguard of America's naval defenses in the Indian Ocean and the Med. The JFK/AIRWING combination proudly displayed once again their professional determination and flexibility. Having chalked up an enviable record during its 45,000 mile voyage, transiting the Suez Canal in both directions, clearly demonstrating, both to our allies and adversaries alike, our nation's continued resolve to be prepared to go in harms way on all the oceans of the world if in our nation's interest. As you make the turn for the final leg of your journey home, having completed another very successful and productive deployment in true KENNEDY style, you can be assured that the thoughts and well wishes of your family, many friends and a grateful nation are with you. Welcome home. VADM KILCLINE."

Once again, KENNEDY sailors and KENNEDY families were reunited in a very emotional gathering.

The ship remained in a standdown status from 15 July through 16 August. Numerous guests visited "Super K" during the standdown, the most distinguished of which were:

23 July - The visit of the Caribbean Basin Initiative Project Delegation: The Honorable Winston DOOKERAN, member of Trinidad and Tobago Parliament (House of Representatives) and lecturer in economics, University of the West Indies; Senator O'Brien TROTMAN, Minister of State, Barbados and Deputy of the Senate; Mr. Trevor L. BOOTHE, Director of External Relations, Jamaica National Investment Promotion Limited; Mr. Mohadeo JAGHOMAN, President, Southern Division, National Union of Government and Federal Workers, Trinidad; Mr. James MATHESON, Head of Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guyana; Mr. Jai PARASRAM, News Director of Trinidad and Tobago Television, Current Affairs Director, Senior News Editor and Senior English Master, Couva Private Grammer School; Mr. Mark RICKETTS, lecturer in economics and business administration, College of Arts, Science and Technology, News Analyst, Radio Jamaica Limited, contract writer with Bankers Association of Jamaica, free-lance writer from "Daily Gleaner," (Jamaica's principle newspaper); Ms. Virginia HESEL, State Department Escort and Mr. William PAGER, State Department Escort.

25 July - Rear Admiral Richard K. FONTAINE, Mr. and Mrs. HAYDEN, and Ms. HAYDEN, came aboard for an orientation tour of the ship.

During the 17-27 August fleet carrier qualifications (FCQ) period in the Virginia Capes (VACAPES) operating area, various congressional delegation representatives visited the ship to observe underway carrier operations. Among these distinguished visitors were an artist, film crew and naval analysts. The following is a listing of some of these guests:

17-20 August - Navy Training Film Crew: Mr. Francis ZIMMERMAN, GS-11, Film Director, NAVAVCEN; Mr. Richard D. WELSH, GS-11, NAVAVCEN; Mr. Detlev PETERS, GS-11, NAVAVCEN; [redacted], Sgt, USMC, NAVAVCEN; PH3 [redacted], NAVAVCEN; Mr. John PAGE, GS-12, Technical Advisor, NAVENVIRHLCEN, Norfolk, VA; and Mr. Joseph CUCHIARA, GS-13, Client Representative, NSHS

Bethesda, MD, for filming a naval training film on hearing conservation.

17 August - Mr. Frank ZUCARRELI, Combat Artist, CHINFO, for observation of flight operations.

17-27 August - NISC Analysts: Mr. Jerry P. HIGMAN, Mr. Harold C. MEDVEDEFF, Mr. Donald R. MCMILLIAN, and 1st Lt [redacted] USAF, for carrier flight operations and construction requirements for possible comparison of U.S. and Soviet carrier development.

17-18 August - Mr. Arthur R. CANNON, Chairman of the Board, Oliver B. Cannon and Son, Inc; Mr. David SPAIN, Mr. Robert CURTIS; Mr. Willi FENSKE, President Intra-Rota, Inc; Mr. W. B. CARPER, Jr., Vice-President; Mr. Herbert VANDERYTT, Vice President; Mr. Wayland DENTON, Vice-President; Mr. Peter BOLTON, Division Manager; Mr. Joe WEIGL, General Counsel; Mr. Michael WEISE, General Counsel; Mr. Philip SEAY, Engineer; Mr. Warwick LLEWELLYN, Project Engineer; Mr. David ASKEW, Sales Coordinator; Mr. Arthur ROBERTS, Chief Engineer; Mr. Stanley WILLIAMS, Sales Engineer; Mr. Stuart FORG, President, Stuart Ford Agency, Manakin-Sabota, Virginia; Mr. Leo MAYNES, Comptroller, Molins Machine, Richmond, Virginia; Mr. Paul THOMPSON, Senior Law Partner, Hunton and Williams, Richmond, Virginia; and Mr. Charles WHITE, Freelance Commercial Artist, Manakin-Sabot, Virginia.

18-19 August - Distinguished Visitors/Media Visit: Mr. David K. MCCLOUD, Senior Executive Assistant, Virginia Governor's Office; Mr. Charles B. WALKER, Energy Advisor to Governor ROBB; Delegate C. Richard CRANWELL, Mr. Charles W. SNYDOR, Jr.; Dr. George MITCHELL; and Mr. John H. PRICE.

18-19 August - NAVCRUITDIST Pittsburg, Pennsylvania: Dr. George MITCHELL, Executive Director World Affairs Council; Mr. Thomas PURNER, Chairman of the Board, Matthews International; Mr. [redacted] LCDR, USNR, Past President, Navy League and CDR R. E. TREIS, Commanding Officer, NRD Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

19-20 August - Distinguished Visitors: Mr. William P. PARKER, State Senator, City of Chesapeake Rep; Mr. T. Ray HASSLE, Chairman of the Board, Peoples Bank of Chesapeake; Wing Commander John D. FEESEY, RAF; MAJ [redacted], USAF; MAJ [redacted], USAF; MAJ [redacted], USAF; MAJ [redacted], USAF and CAPT [redacted], USAF.

20-21 August - Distinguished Visitors: Mr. Dennis ECLART, Member of House of Representative (PA); Ms. Emily RAY, Legislative Assistant to Rep. WATKINS (OK); Mr. Tim KERNA, Administrative Assistant to Rep. LONG (MD); Mr. Ivan SINCLAIR, Administrative Assistant to Rep. HIGHTOWER (TX); LTCOL [redacted]

[redacted] USMC, OLA Escort; CDR [redacted], USN, OLA Escort and Mr. Dean GODSON, Civilian International OLA.

21-22 August - Reserve Public Affairs Center Contingent: CDR [redacted] USNR; JOC [redacted] USNR; JOC [redacted] USNR; PHI [redacted], USNR; JO2 [redacted], USNR and JO3 [redacted], USNR.

21-22 August - Distinguished Visitors: Mr. Paul EMERSON, Military Legislative Assistant to Rep FOGLIETTA (D-PA); Ms. Margo CARLISLE, Staff Directore, Senate Republican Conf.; Mr. Jay BEHUNCHIK, MLA to Senator RUDMAN (R-NH); Ms. Robin DECK, MLA to Rep EDWARDS (R-AL); Ms. Michelle VAN CLEVE, MLA to Representative KEMP (R-NY); Mr. Tony MACRIS, American Security Council; Mr. Charles WOLLERTON, Staff, Representative CONTE (R-MA) and CAPT [redacted], USN, OLA Escort.

22-23 August - RADM Joseph F. FRICK, USN, COMNAVBASE Norfolk; Mr. Harry SENN, Professor, University of Miami; Mr. Charles LINDSAY, Publisher of Glider and Weather Articles and Mr. John MCCLOUD, President, Tidewater Soaring Society.

22-23 August - Forbes Magazine: Mr. James MICHAELS, Editor, Forbes Magazine; Mr. Tom BLOUNT, Vice President, Corporate Programs, ANA; Mr. William McKenzie JENKINS, Jr., President, Dixie Manufacturing; Mr. James B. TAYLOR, President Canadair Aircraft Corp; Mr. Grant DOVE, Executive Vice President, Texas Instruments; Mr. George POWELL, President, Lourdes Industries, Inc.; Mr. Patrick HENRY, District Attorney, Suffolk County, New York; Mr. Peter D. DAGROSSA, President, Gull Airborne Corp and CAPT R. C. GENTZ, USN, Escort.

Regarding JFK's performance during the fleet carrier qualifications, the Skipper of the F-4 Training Squadron had this to say:

"During 3 tours in the F-4 Rag, a CAG OPS and CO/XO tour, I have been closely involved with numerous CQ evolutions. AIR OPS and the Air Boss worked as a professional team not adversaries, CATTC and the flight deck are without equals, totally professional and unflappable. The OINC's were prepared and needed no help or advise from anyone. The DETS conducted themselves as seasoned carrier airdales from walk aboard through flight ops.

In summary the entire ship; CAPT, XO, AIR DEPT, OPS, Supply, AIMD, conducted the evolution in an expeditious manner with zero turmoil. If ALCON met the JOHN F KENNEDY standard the AIRLANT OINC concept could go away."

The ship returned to Norfolk and remained pierside through 21 September when "Super K" again deployed for three days of fleet carrier qualifications in the Virginia Capes (VACAPES) operating areas. During the September inport period, numerous guests were invited to visit the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67):

12 September - Jewish Group Visit: 158 people visited in conjunction with "Jewish Pride in the Navy".

13 September - Japanese Visit: LTCOL Y. IYODA, JASDF Training Liaison Officer; LTCOL H. YASUMATSU, Programmer; Major M. OZAWA, WSO; Major M. YAMAMOTO, WSO; Major S. MIYAMOTO, Pilot; Major H. AOYAMA, Pilot; CAPT K. SATO, WSO; CAPT O. TOMITA, WSO; CAPT M. DASUYA, Pilot; Mr. D. F. KING, INFO Spectrum, Inc; Mr. G. M. SKURLA, Grumman Aerospace Corp; Mr. R. STROLLO, GAC; Mr. A. J. BAGLIORE, GAC; Mr. H. C. ALLEN, GAC and LCDR [redacted], NAVAIR POC.

14 September - Four Cities United Way "Kick-off" Luncheon: Mr. Sam HILL, President, Four Cities United Way; Mr. Frank REYNOLDS, ABC News Anchorman and party of six; RADM Joseph F. FRICK, COMNAVBASE Norfolk, Virginia, and over 900 general visitors. The ship responded to the maximum extent possible to seat and serve all guests. After the Luncheon, all remaining guests were invited to a tour of the flight deck.

15 September - United Kingdom/U.S. Army Officer Delegation: MAJGEN John OBLINGER, USA, HQ TRADOC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments; BRIGGEN Claude IVEY, USA, HQ TRADOC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine; LTCOL [redacted], USA, HQ TRADOC, Director International Army Programs; LTCOL [redacted], HQ DARCOM, Standardization Group, London, England; LTCOL [redacted], HQ DARCOM, Chief of Staff, International Branch; LTCOL [redacted] TRADOC, London, England; LTCOL [redacted], HQ TRADOC, International Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine; MAJ [redacted] Secretary, U.S. Delegation; MAJGEN Robert PASCOE, Assistent Chief of the General Staff for Operational Requirements, BRIGGEN Greg READ, Chief of Staff, ARMEX; COL [redacted], COL International, ARMEX; COL [redacted], COL Combat Developments, ARMEX; and LTCOL [redacted], International Office, ARMEX.

Regarding the extremely high number of visitors to "Super K", Vice Admiral KILCLINE, USN, Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, stated:

"The number of visitors we have had for carrier orientation visits this summer has been unusually high (over 250 at sea). There have been two results: Added responsibilities for you and an assurance that there have been many distinguished individuals whose increased level of knowledge and opinion about carrier aviation should prove to serve us well in the future.

I am fully aware that these visits require of your ship and crew one more type of special effort and skill and that they add to days that are already full. However, the hospitality which you and your crew have rendered and the excellent tours and briefings you have provided demonstrate you understand their importance."

Perhaps the biggest day of the year for USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was 30 September. The change-of-command for Admiral Harry D. TRAIN, II, USN, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet was attended by thousands of guests, as Admiral TRAIN stepped down and Admiral Wesley L. MCDONALD, USN, took the reigns. Dignitaries came from all over the United States and the world for the occasion. Many commanding officers from local commands played vital roles, ensuring that the festivity was successful. As the new Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral MCDONALD attributed all involved with the event for its success:

"The success of today's most impressive change of Command ceremony was due to the hard work and dedication of the many men and women of your Commands who contributed their time and considerable talents. They are all to be congratulated for their splendid performance. Well Done."

On 8 October, USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) hosted a tour for about 100 members and relatives of the World War II era Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron 131. These visitors lent an air of nostalgia to the ship, and the ship greatly impressed these "ancient warriors".

Early on 12 October, the ship departed pier 12 for Whiskey Anchorage to off load the remainder of the ship's weapons inventory, completing preparations for the transit up the Elizabeth River. Preparations were completed, and all special guests embarked on the ship transited the Elizabeth River on 15 October. Embarked for the occasion were:

Vice Admiral and Mrs. KILCLINE, Commander, Naval Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet; CAPT JEWELL, Chief of Staff, COMNAVAIRLANT; Mrs. D.B. CARGILL, wife of the Commanding Officer; The Honorable and Mrs. Louis JONES, Mayor, Virginia Beach; Mr. William RACHELS Jr, President, Norfolk Chamber of Commerce; The Honorable and Mrs. William GUERRY, Norfolk Circuit Court Judge; Mr. and Mrs. Robert PENTRESS, Senior Vice President, Bank of Virginia, Virginia Beach Office (Nominated as President of 1983 Virginia Beach Chamber of Commerce); Mr. and Mrs. Michael SAVVIDES, Mr. SAVVIDES being the Virginia Beach Junior Chamber of Commerce's, First Citizen of the year and Proposed President of 1984, Virginia Beach Chamber of Commerce; Dr. and Mrs. William MAYER, President Eastern Virginia Medical School; Mr. and Mrs. George BARNETT Jr, Executive Director, AMRED Services, YMCA, Portsmouth and hundreds of ship's company family members and guests. From 15 October through 7 February 1983, the ship was moored at berth 4 pier 5, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, undergoing extensive rehabilitation of all ship's spaces and equipment.

On 29 October Rear Admiral Jerry O. TUTTLE, USN, Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT broke his flag in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) after having disembarked USS AMERICA (CV 66).

The rewards continued to come in November, for past jobs well done. Notification was received on 6 November that USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was commended, for the fourth consecutive year, "The most fuel efficient aircraft carrier in the Navy. Innovative engineering practices and strong command support resulted in reducing underway fuel consumption rate by 19 percent, which provided a cost savings of more than $1,000 per underway steaming hour. This exemplifies the results attainable with an enthusiastic and innovative energy conservation program." These statements were made by Admiral Wesley L. MCDONALD, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In his message to the ship he praised: "Congratulations on selection as the most fuel efficient carrier in the Navy. Your enviable record of being the best in fuel conservation since 1979 is a most meaningful achievement. Interest, innovativeness and dedication by KENNEDY personnel have contributed substantially to Navy readiness through direct cost savings. Good On You."

The Commanding Officer held a shipwide Awards Ceremony and Personnel Inspection 17-19 November. Letters of Commendation, Navy Achievement Medals, Navy Commendation Medals, Meritorious Unit Commendation Medals and Meritorious Service Medals were awarded to those crewmembers for services rendered onboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) or other commands.

In December, this fine ship and crew continued to receive accolades and rewards, such as the following from Rear Admiral Jerry O. TUTTLE, USN, Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT on 20 December:

"Whereas it is general knowledge the remarkable gains "Super K" has made this past year in retention, the fact that you only have single digit UA's might not be recognized. Your most noteworthy achievement crushes the myth that ships in SRA must experience increased absenteeism and reinforces the thesis that discipline and retention are inseparable bedfellows, success of which is determined solely by leadership. Congrats on your extraordinary accomplishments."

At the beginning of December, the ship also received notification that USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) had won the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Silver Anchor" Award Contest. This award is given to the finalists in competition for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Golden Anchor" Award Contest. The award highlights those commands that have done the most to retain top notch naval men when they reach the end of their obligated service. All recipients of the "Silver Anchor" award are automatically placed into the competition for the "Golden Anchor" award for the best retention statistics.

Before the year's end, the ship earned one more major award; for the best all around retention statistics in the entire Atlantic Fleet. On 28 December Admiral Wesley L. MCDONALD, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet forwarded the following to the Commanding Officer:

"Congratulations to the officers and men of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY on winning the CINCLANTFLT Golden Anchor Award for retention excellence during FY-82, this award represents the culmination of an intense effort on your part directed toward retaining those top quality personnel needed to achieve and maintain a high degree of operational readiness. Well Done."

The total effort of each and every man assigned to USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) throughout calender year 1982 was without equal. Notification in early February 1983 highlighted the contribution of all during calender year 1982; winner of the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet "Battle E" award: USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67).

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Spanish dignitaries in Malaga, Spain; 18 January. Rear Admiral R. Byron FULLER, USN, Commander, Carrier Group Four, USN, and USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, USN, in attendance on the flight deck.

2. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) transiting Suez Canal on 3 February.

3. Farewell to Rear Admiral R. Byron FULLER, USN, and hail to Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN, as Commander, Carrier Group FOUR; 24 February.

4. Shellback initiation on the flight deck; 6 March.

5. Rear Admiral Huntington HARDISTY, USN and Rear Admiral Edward H. MARTIN, USN, on the Flag Bridge; 8 March.

6. RADM Huntington HARDISTY, VADM M. STASER HOLCOMB and RADM Edward H. MARTIN IN THE Flag Cabin; 9 March.

7. Australian dignitaries on the Flag Bridge; 18 March.

8. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) outside Fremantle harbor; 19 March.

9. American Embassy, Perth, Australia, visitors with RADM Edward H. MARTIN and Captain D. Bruce CARGILL on the flight deck; 23 March.

10. The "Kemeny Sisters" performing on the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY in the Indian Ocean; 4 April.

11. Easter Sunrise Services on the flight deck; 11 April.

12. RADM Charles E. GURNEY, USN, Commander Middle East Forces, and RADM Edward H. MARTIN,USN, COMCARGRU FOUR, in the Flag Cabin; 19 April.

13. Kenyan VIPS on the Navigational Bridge with Captain D. Bruce CARGILL, 1 May.

14. Wog Beauty Queens with the Command Master Chief; 7 May.

15. President Mohamed Said BARRE, President of Democratic Republic of Somalia, and his escorts on the flight deck with RADM Edward H. MARTIN and Captain D. Bruce CARGILL; 8 May.

Enclosure (4)

16. Secretary of the Navy, Honorable John F. LEHMAN, Jr., receiving combined USS JOHN F. KENENDY, CVW-3 and COMCARGRU FOUR Combined Federal Campaign donation from Captain D. Bruce CARGILL; 14 May.

17. Commodore John GUNNING, Commander, Sultan of Oman's Navy, and his Chief of Staff, Captain John De WINTON, on the Navigational Bridge with Captain D. Bruce CARGILL; 19 May.

18. Miss Black America, USO Show, live on the flight deck of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67); 26 May.

19. RADM Edward H. MARTIN receiving plaque from Egyptian VIPs during northerly transit of Suez Canal in the Falg Cabin; 5 June.

20. Captain D. Bruce CARGILL receiving plaque from Contre Admiral (RADM) SOULET, Assistant Maritime Prefect, Toulon, France, with the Mayor of Toulon and RADM David M. ALTWEG, USN, Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO looking on; 22 June.

21. Captain CARGILL describes JFK activities to distinguished visitors; 26 July.

22. Carribean Basin Initiative Project Delegation receives farewells from Captain D. Bruce CARGILL; 23 July.

23. Virginia congressional delegation visits USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67); 12 August.

24. Guest of Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Vice Admiral KILCLINE, USN, are invited into the Captain's Inport Cabin during their tour; 17 August.

25. Captain CARGILL with Rear Admiral Joseph F. FRICK, Mr. Harry SENN, Mr. Charles LINDSAY and Mr. John McCLOUD on the Navigation Bridge; 22 August.

26. Admiral Joseph F. FRICK and guest at the "FOUR Cities United Way" luncheon; 14 September.

27. Captain D. Bruce CARGILL,USN, hosting the change-of-command ceremony for the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Commander in Chief Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet; 30 September.

28. The Mayor of Virginia Beach and his wife talk with Captain CARGILL during transit down Elizabeth River; 15 October.

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MED/IO CRUISE REPORT 1982

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV-67

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ENCLOSURE (8)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV-67
FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK 09538

CV67/301:bl
3500
Ser C-42
30 JUL 1982

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From: Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Deployment Report

1. (U) This report is provided to disseminate information concerning the first Mediterranean/Indian Ocean/Mediterranean deployment of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. The purpose of the report is to assist other Atlantic Fleet units in planning for similar future deployments.

D. B. Cargill

D. BRUCE CARGILL

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COMFLTWING ONE
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COMHSWING ONE
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COMMATVACWINGSPAC
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USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

PERIOD	EMPLOYMENT	LOCATION
04JAN-05JAN	ISE	VACAPES
06JAN-16JAN	ENROUTE	MALAGA
17JAN-21JAN	PORT VISIT	MALAGA
22JAN-23JAN	OPS	WESTERN MED
24JAN-28JAN	OPS	TYRANIAN
22JAN-28JAN	NATIONAL WEEK	
29JAN-29JAN	TRAINING ANCHORAGE	AUGUSTA BAY
30JAN-31JAN	OPS	IONIAN
01FEB-02FEB	OPS	EASTERN MED
03FEB-03FEB	TRANSIT	SUEZ CANAL
04FEB-06FEB	OPS	RED SEA
07FEB-08FEB	OPS	GULF OF ADEN
09FEB-02MAR	OPS	NORTH ARABIAN SEA
11FEB-11FEB	TURNOVER FROM CONSTELLATION NAS	
14FEB-16FEB	ASWEX 82-4U	
16FEB-16FEB	PASSEX FRENCH NAVY	
22FEB-23FEB	BEACON FLASH 82-4	
23FEB-23FEB	PASSEX ROYAL NAVY	
01MAR-02MAR	ASWEX 82-5U	
03MAR-07MAR	ENROUTE	DIEGO GARCIA
04MAR-04MAR	PASSEX ROYAL NAVY	
06MAR	CROSS THE LINE	
08MAR-10MAR	OPS	VICINITY DIEGO GARCIA
08MAR-10MAR	GONZO EX	
09MAR-09MAR	TURNOVER TO CONSTELLATION VIC DGAR	
11MAR-18MAR	ENROUTE	FREMANTLE
17MAR-18MAR	BEACON SOUTH 82-4	
19MAR-24MAR	PORT VISIT	FREMANTLE
25MAR-29MAR	ENROUTE	DIEGO GARCIA
29MAR-29MAR	CV-CV ADEX 82-6	

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PERIOD	EMPLOYMENT	LOCATION
30MAR-01APR	DUAL BG OPS	DIEGO GARCIA
01APR-01APR	TURNOVER FROM CONSTELLATION VIC DGAR	
02APR-05APR	OPS	DIECO GARCIA
02APR-05APR	WEAPONS WEEK	
06APR-10APR	ENROUTE	NORTH ARABIAN SEA
11APR-28APR	OPS	NORTH ARABIAN SEA
13APR-14APR	ASWEX 82-7U	
16APR-19APR	DOUBLE TEAM	
20APR-21APR	BEACON FLASH 82-5	
29APR-01MAY	ENROUTE	MOMBASA KENYA
02MAY-06MAY	PORT VISIST	MOMBASA KENYA
07MAY-12MAY	ENROUTE	NORTH ARABIAN SEA
08MAY	SOMALIA FLYOVER	
11MAY	SHELLBACK CEREMONY	
13MAY-31MAY	OPS	NORTH ARABIAN SEA
13MAY-14MAY	SECNAV VISIT	
18MAY-19MAY	BEACON FLASH 82-6	
24MAY-25MAY	ASWEX 82-8U	
01JUN-01JUN	OPS	GULF OF ADEN
02JUN-04JUN	OPS	RED SEA
05JUN-05JUN	TRANSIT	SUEZ CANAL
06JUN-18JUN	OPS	EAST MED
19JUN-20JUN	ENROUTE	TOULON FRANCE
21JUN-23JUN	PORT VISIT	TOULON FRANCE
24JUN-27JUN	OPS	WESTERN MED
24JUN-26JUN	DAILY DOUBLE	
28JUN-03JUL	PORT VISIT	MALAGA SPAIN
04JUL-13JUL	ENROUTE	NORFOLK
04JUL-14JUL	TIGER CRUISE	
14JUL	MOOR	NOB NORFOLK

AIR OPERATIONS

1. ~~(C)~~ Flight Operations: USS JOHN F. KENNEDY conducted 110 days of flight operations after departing Norfolk on 4 JAN 82 until OUTCHOP from Sixth Fleet on 4 JUL 82. JFK/CVW-3 flew a total of 19,929 hours and conducted 8985 arrested landings and 1224 helicopter landings. Air Operations were conducted in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, North Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean as well as during both TRANSLANT evolutions. The typical I.O. flying day consisted on the average of 80 to 85 fixed wing sorties, which is considerably less than normally experienced in the SIXTHFLT. The flying OPTEMPO in the I.O. is a result of striking a balance between force defense and aircrew training to maintain aircrew readiness and aircraft readiness. Experience has shown that 80 to 85 fixed wing sorties per day has proved sufficient to provide force defense and adequate primary mission training within the existing SEVENTHFLT logistic pipeline. In order to maintain pilot carrier landing proficiency and aircrew readiness at an acceptable level, 10 day and 6 night traps per pilot per month is considered to provide an optimum balance between aircrew readiness and aircraft material condition/supply support. The following table of statistical data provides an analysis of flight hours and landings accumulated during USS JOHN F. KENNEDY's 1982 combined Sixth/Seventh Fleet deployment.

CVW-3 STATISTICAL SUMMARY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
DAY TRAPS	956	941	1019	974	962	757	5609
NIGHT TRAPS	605	698	451	662	688	272	3376
TOTAL TRAPS	1561	1639	1470	1636	1650	1029	8985
DAY HOURS	2057.4	2533.7	2627.0	2522.7	2336.7	1682.2	13,759.7
NIGHT HOURS	1146.9	1281.9	793.7	1164.9	1280.3	501.3	6,169.0
TOTAL HOURS	3204.3	3815.6	3420.7	3687.6	3617	2183.5	19,928.7
DAY HELO LDGS	141	179	186	191	131	146	974
NIGHT HELO LDGS	45	47	37	50	38	33	250
TOTAL HELO LDGS	186	226	223	241	169	179	1224
DAY HELO HRS	219.2	327.0	299.8	283.7	216.2	236.7	1582.6
NIGHT HELO HRS	115.6	110.4	76.1	109.7	60.0	53.9	525.7
TOTAL HELO HRS	334.8	437.4	375.9	393.4	276.2	290.6	2108.3
FLYING DAYS	19	21	19	20	19	12	110

2. (U) LOGISTICS SUPPORT

a. I.O. LOGISTICS/PAX INFO AND PROCEDURES: Since commencement of Indian Ocean operations in 1979, various channels of logistic support have been established and subsequently modified to meet changing requirements. Present logistic support between Diego Garcia and MODLOC is achieved through a combination of three channels of resupply, each providing unique logistic support to the battle group.

b. MLSF shuttle between the NAS (Northern Arabian Sea) and Diego Garcia: provides bulk cargo support and lower priority mail/pax transfer.

c. Weekly/twice monthly C-141 flights to Masirah: provides priority mail and pax transfers required by the Battle Group as well as first class mail. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY utilized an embarked VRC-50 C-2A to transfer priority mail/pax to meet the C-141 at Masirah and transfered mail/pax to the Battle Group. The remainder of the C-141 load was sealifted to the BG by a scheduled service force ship.

d. Daily US-3A/S-3A logistic flights between Battle Group and Diego Garcia: for daily rapid air support of mail/pax required by Battle Group. High priority material too large for transfer by US-3A/S-3A was transferred via the Masirah C-141.

3. (U) GENERAL LOGISTICS: In view of the I.O. deployment, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY deployed without an embarked C-1A. VRC-50 embarked a C-2A with two pilots and a detachment of 14 maintenance personnel for the major portion of the I.O. deployment. The aircrews were not night qualified and were utilized for the transfer of passengers/mail to arriving C-141 flights to Masirah as well as the transfer of DV's to/from the Battle Group and liaison personnel in support of scheduled I.O. exercises. Maximum ranges for the C-2A are as follows:

a. Ship to Shore - 1126 NM (no wind, 95 degrees F, 55K aircraft wt, alt FL250)

b. Shore to Ship - 530 NM (Enables bingo back to departure field with second climb to altitude) In general the services provided by VRC-50 were outstanding in every respect. The aircrews were highly motivated and extremely responsive to every USS JOHN F. KENNEDY tasking.

4. (U) Logistics Statistics: Following pax/mail/cargo was transferred during this deployment:

	PAX *	MAIL	CARGO
Received	4,367	362,081 LBS	448K LBS
Shipped	6,043	202,973 LBS	345K LBS

* Includes BG transfers

5. ~~(C)~~ US-3A OPERATIONS: One of the most sensitive areas of Indian Ocean operations involved the flight following of the US-3A and C-2. Because of extremely poor HF communications (whether over the Indian Ocean coordination net or Clark airways/Diego Garcia Tower), flight following the US-3A from Gonzo Station to Diego Garcia or the C-2 from JFK to Seeb/Masirah/Thumrait becomes a tedious task. In most cases

FLTSATSECURE was utilized between JFK and Diego Garcia for US-3A flight following. Following is a brief summary of the standardized safety of flight procedures and flight following procedures for TF 70 aircraft conducting extended overwater flights in support of I.O. Battle Group operations. Flights in excess of 600 NM require an operable HF radio, a functioning inertial navigation system (if installed) and adherence to prescribed procedures. Failure of the HF radio or INS prior to the approximate halfway point shall normally cause the flight to be aborted. Exceptions to this policy for operational necessity require authorization from the Task Group Commander. Strict compliance with published procedures is mandatory as enroute navigation aids, suitable divert fields and long range SAR capabilities are extremely limited. Flight plans and accurate manifests are required for all logistic flights. As a minimum, flight plans include call signs, endurance, route of flight, reporting points, destination and estimated time enroute. Manifests shall be filed with responsible authority at the point of origin clearly identifying embarked crew/passengers by a minimum of name/rate/SSN/organization. Promptly after take-off, flight crews establish HF radio contact with the departure facility, requesting that facility to assume flight following responsibility. Flight crews provide position reports to the facility maintaining flight following responsibility as follows:

- Upon arrival at (or CPA of) the following points of the standard GONZO MODLOC/Diego Garcia transit:

DUCK	18-00N/63-00E
MOHAWK	13-00N/64-55E
TINKER	08-00N/66-50E
BULLIT	03-00N/68-35E
BERT	02-00S/70-20E

or, - Hourly on all other routes.

At a minimum, position reports consist of the following:

- Position (range & bearing from CPA), time, altitude, fuel state
- Next reporting point, ETA
- Update destination ETA, as required

At the aircraft commander's discretion, once communications have been established with the next controlling authority, flight following responsibliity may be shifted. To accomplish this shift, the new controlling authority is advised that their flight guard is requested. Once this guard is accepted, the previous controlling authority is notified that their flight guard is no longer required.

a. ~~(C)~~ Lost Plane Procedures:

-- Fifteen minutes past the predicted time of a position report or ETA, a voice search is commenced on all available frequencies. All other stations utilizing common frequencies are queried, including Clark airways, Diego Garcia, and ships in company. The parent command is notified of its aircraft being overdue.

-- When an aircraft becomes 60 minutes overdue, the destination or parent CV established itself as the local SAR Commander. If not already airborne, tanker and E-2 aircraft are launched if the situation warrants. CTG 72.8 will be requested to launch the ready alert aircraft from Diego Garcia. Other commands will be requested to assist within their capabilities. A search area of probability shall be established based upon the last reported position, fuel considerations, filed or normal flight plan and all other available information. Appropriate voice, message or OPREP 3 reports shall be made to higher authority.

b. ~~(C)~~ The US-3A remains the only COD aircraft capable of transiting the 2000 NM from Diego Garcia (DGAR) to the North Arabian Sea (NAS). There are currently two US-3A's in theater, the actual cargo capacity and configurations of which is dependent upon CVBG range from DGAR. The following guidelines were established from US-3A NATOPS and VRC-50 SOP.

Range	Configuration	Cargo Capacity
Up to 1400 NM	2 Cargo pods	ABT 6000 lbs
1400 - 1700 NM	1 pod/1 drop tank	ABT 5000 lbs
1700 - 2000 NM	2 drop tanks	ABT 4000 lbs

The US-3A MEDEVAC capacity is single litter, 1 pax and one loadmaster. CTG 70.0 promulgates a monthly US-3A logistic schedule by message, and subsequent overhead times are provided by the CV. CV position (range and bearing) from DGAR as well as geographic coordinates must be provided to VRC 50 DET/TF 70 DGAR DET. US-3A aircrews are not qualified for night carrier landing, and whenever possible extra touch and go landing were scheduled to facilitate landing proficiency.

6. ~~(C)~~ LOGISTIC AIRCRAFT LOAD CAPABILITIES:

TYPE A/C	PAX	PAX W/LUGGAGE	MAX LOAD (LBS/CUBE)	NOMINAL RANGE (NM) (SHORE TO SHIP)	SPEED
C-1A	8	8	3000/120	300 (700 TO SHORE)	165
C-2A	26	22	8000/670	500 (1000 TO SHORE)	240
SH-3H	3-4	3	500/-	100	100
SH-3G	13	8-10	2600/-	100	100
CH-46	19	19	5000/550	80	120

US-3A	5	5	5460/270	2150	335
(NO TANKS/NO PODS)					
US-3A	5	5	5460/270	2500	325
(2 TANKS/NO PODS)					
US-3A	5	5	7460/450	1800	310
(2 CARGO PODS)					

7. ~~(C)~~ DV Movement: Another area of concern in the Indian Ocean was the flight following of DV's movements by helo or C-2. Flight following was accomplished by utilizing an airborne E-2 to maintain radio/radar contact with the DV aircraft as long as possible.

8. ~~(C)~~ CATCC:

a. (U) CATCC completed a total of 4648 case III approaches as follows:

MODE I	250 REQUESTED	191 RECEIVED
MODE IA	123	
MODE II	2502	
MODE III	578	
ASR/SPN-41	1254	

9. ~~(C)~~ EQUIPMENT:

a. ~~(C)~~ The CATCC/DAIR system continued to perform superbly. During the period OCT 81 - MAR 82, the JFK CATCC/DAIR system was evaluated under OPEVAL CNO PROJECT 295-2-OT-IIIC. The entire OPEVAL entailed 3236 operational hours with less than one tenth of one per cent attributed to down time or reduced material condition. This system proved the strongest link of all CATCC equipment.

b. (U) A new addition to the CATCC was the installation of the 15G21 trainer. It has proven to be a definite asset in providing hands on training to CCA and Air Ops personnel. During scheduled no fly days, simulated case III recoveries kept old hands on-the-step and provided valuable control experience for non-rated personnel.

c. ~~(C)~~ Communications: During JFK's last SRA, all of the ship's URC-9 UHF transceivers were replaced by WSC-3 LINE-OF-SIGHT UHF transceivers. This provided a quantum jump in reliability over the URC-9. CATCC operated with four patchable radios set up for approaches one and two, marshal and departure. Two dedicated hard wired WSC-3's were used as back up radios. The nineteen buttons were channelized with a special "CATCC" channelization plan made up of squadron common freqs, strike eagle, UHF guard, logistics control and the normal CATCC control freqs. The channelized squadron common freqs proved extremely effective for enabling aircraft to squadron rep-conversations or other than normal control freqs.

10. (U) CATCC/AIR OPERATIONS PERSONNEL: It was felt prior to deployment, that limited air operations scheduled in the Indian Ocean environment would seriously curtail the already established training program. To the contrary, CATCC 67 enjoyed a most productive cruise. In all three branches, a superb record of qualifications was attained. Additionally and surprisingly, many personnel achieved quals in two, and sometimes all three of those branches. This made for an extremely flexible CATCC. The following qualifications were attained:

	MARSHAL	DEPARTURE	APPROACH	FINAL	CCA SUP
QUALS ATTAINED THIS CRUISE	10	9	4	6	2
PREVIOUS QUALIFICATIONS	3	4	5	5	1
TOTALS	13	13	9	11	3

	AIR OPS SPECIALIST	AIR OPS SUP	15G21
QUALS ATTAINED THIS CRUISE	19	12	28
PREVIOUS QUALIFICATIONS	11	9	0
TOTALS	30	21	28

	AIR TRANSFER OFFICER (ENLISTED)
QUALS ATTAINED THIS CRUISE	6
PREVIOUS QUALIFICATIONS	3
TOTALS	9

EQUALLY IMPORTANT, NON-PROFESSIONAL QUALS INCLUDED:

ENLISTED SURFACE WARFARE SPECIALIST	1
ENLISTED AVIATION WARFARE SPECIALIST	2
GENERAL DAMAGE CONTROL	42
DIVISION DAMAGE CONTROL P.O.	5
3M MAINTENANCE MAN	42
3M WORK CENTER/GROUP SUPERVISOR	7
3M DIVISION OFFICER	1

Emphasis was placed on qualifying newly reported controllers, with the purpose of crew continuity. As with other CATCC teams, problems of rotation and separations were a fact of life. It was certainly imperative that the "apprentice" controllers acquire qualifications.

11. (U) Airspace and Divert Fields.

a. (U) Mediterranean: Throughout the Mediterranean portion of the deployment, the three major divert fields approved for night instrument meteorological conditions were Palma de Mallorca, NAS Sigonella and

Souda Bay, Greece. Other divert fields utilized for Day/VFR conditions were Decimomannu, Hyeres, Murcia/San Javier, Antalya, Naples (Capodichino) and RAF Akrotiri. All airspace requirements in the Med are found in FLIP publications and the Air Force Foreign Clearance Guide. TCA's/CTA's are found on low level FLIP Charts. Greece is the most sensitive nation and in particular, operations in the Athinai Fir require advisory or positive control (new guidance). Direction for airspace/divert requirements can be found in the COMSIXTHFLT/CTF 60 OPORDER 4000. Particular attention should also be noted in requesting diplomatic clearances for country overflight, even when filing an ICAO flight plan (See FCG).

b. (U) Red Sea: Airspace is monitored by CINCUSNAVEUR and COMIDEASTFOR and usage requires advisory or positive control of aircraft in order to ensure CPA requirements to land. The Jeddah TCA takes up a major portion of the available flying room to the north. There are no diverts approved in the Red Sea. Caution should be taken during night operations to ensure marshalling aircraft maintain specified CPA's to land.

c. (U) Indian Ocean: Airspace is wide open when compared to the Mediterranean or Red Sea. Caution should be exercised when flying near the DHOFAR ADIZ or in the Gulf of Oman area. Operations in the Indian Ocean were basically blue water as divert fields were out of range except in the North Arabian Sea. Diverts available include Seeb, Thumrait, Masirah, and Salalah. Operations in the Indian Ocean and in the vicinity of Diego Garcia are guided by directives set forth in the Indian Ocean Standard Operating Procedures, a supplement to the Seventh Fleet Oporder 201.

d. ~~(C)~~ Suez Transit/Helicopter Operations: On both transits of the Suez Canal, special preparations were made on the flight deck in order to ensure the security of CVW aircraft. Specific instructions were requested of, and issued by USDAO Cairo concerning precise times, altitudes and position markers along the Suez transit route where helo ops could be conducted.

12. ~~(C)~~ BLUE WATER OPERATIONS. Continues to be the policy of both CTF 60 and CTF 70. Simply stated, Blue Water Operations is a policy of committing an aircraft at the time of launch to return/land at the ship from which it launches. This policy can be modified to land aircraft ashore only in emergency situations involving mechanical failures to aircraft or ship systems where risk to aircrews or damage to aircraft would be lessened or averted. Diverting an aircraft at bingo fuel as a routine policy is NOT in consonance with CTF 60 Blue Water Ops policy and is impractical in NAS operations. In-flight refueling should always be the alternative to a bingo for low fuel state aircraft. If divert fields are available, they should be requested for the area of CV ops in accordance with applicable area directives (i.e. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD

4000). The field should be checked by "rainmaker" aircraft on the first day cycle as well as the first night cycle to confirm operating hours, weather, and facilities available. In view of continuous blue water operations without divert fields available, there cannot be any relaxation of fuel management emphasis. Aircrews were continually briefed to recover as close to maximium trap fuel weight as operationally feasible. Sound fuel management in each CVW-3 aircraft, by necessity, went hand in hand with the most strict and effective control of airborne tanker assets. The following JFK/CVW-3 blue water ops policy was standard operating procedure:

-- every CVW-3 aircraft arrived on the ball with max trap fuel (if operationally feasible), but no less than that required for two passes plus "tank" fuel states stipulated below for day/ night operations:

	DAY	NIGHT
F-14	2.0	2.5
A-7	1.5	2.1
A-6	2.5	3.0
EA-6	2.5	3.0
S-3	1.5	2.0
E-2	NA	NA

-- aircraft which did not meet this criteria would immediately notify approach control for tanking prior to arriving in the landing pattern.

-- primary/CATTC squadrons reps continually monitored fuel status for the purpose of providing recommendations concerning tanking requirements considering pilot experience, ball performance, pattern anomalies, weather and other factors/conditions peculiar to the recovery situation. Alert tankers were maintained for each recovery. If an aircraft is diverted, an immediate (or higher) precedence message must be sent to the divert field (info to normal addees on a standard SIXTHFLT divert alert message). Decision to divert ashore requires concurrence of embarked CTF/CTG. Precut divert messages were maintained in AIROPS during NAS Operations in view of the time sensitive nature of notifying the appropriate authority. The general format is a follows:

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
FROM: USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV67)
TO: USDAO MUSCAT OMAN//
DATT//NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO: CINCPACFLT HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF SEVEN ZERO

CTG SEVEN ZERO PT XXX

UNCLAS//N03120//
SUBJ: EMERGENCY AIRCRAFT DIVERT

1. ACFT CALL SIGN VVAC XXX ONE NAVY (TYPE ACFT) DIVERTED TO (THUMRAIT/MASIRAH/SALALAH) BECAUSE OF (TYPE EMERGENCY).

2. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (NAME) FIELD IS XXXXXZ.

3. REQUEST ADVISE ORIG BY IMMEDIATE MSG OF ARRIVAL TIME AND AIRCRAFT/AIRCREW STATUS.

PRECEDENCE: FLASH
FROM: USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67)
TO: ADMINSUPU BAHRAIN
INFO: CINCPACFLT HONOLULU HI
COMSECONDFLT
CTF SEVEN ZERO
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT XX
UNCLAS//N03120//
SUBJ: EMERGENCY AIRCRAFT DIVERT

1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION OF BAHRAIN ACC DUTY SUPRVISOR ICO EMERG AIRCRAFT DIVERT TO SEEB INTL IN PROGRESS.

2. FOR ACC DUTY SUPERVISOR: REQUEST URGENT CONTACT OF SEEB INTL:

A. ACFT CALL SIGN: VVAC XXX, ONE USN (TYPE ACFT) DIVERTED FROM USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. ESCORT ACFT VVAC XXX, ONE USN (TYPE ACFT), WILL RETURN ORIG AFTER SAFE LANDING OF VVAC XXX.

B. ROUTE OF FLIGHT (LAT/LONG OF ACFT, ALT, TIME, ROUTE)
C. ESTIMATED FUEL ON BOARD ON ARRIVAL: XXXX LBS
D. SOULS ON BOARD.
E. REASON FOR DIVERT.
F. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED.

STRIKE OPERATIONS

1. (U) After a brief workup period off VACAPES where the air wing was flown aboard and refreshed, the deployment began. KENNEDY and IKE conducted dual CV BG Ops. JFK conducted flight ops daily. KENNEDY in-chopped to Sixth Fleet without any turnover briefs. Although experienced people were onboard, some changes had been made and a short session of briefing would have been useful.

2. (U) Med operations included a National Week exercise involving KENNEDY, IKE and NIMITZ. During the brief period of Med operations, maximum use of targets and low levels was a primary objective. Pachino target and Sardinian and Sicilian low levels were scheduled easily. Capo Frasca target was used during National Week and no-ordnance Spanish targets were tasked. Enroute to Suez, Avgo Nisi was employed for two days. Extra precautions are required when using Greek airspace and targets as well as ordnance target requests.

3. (U) JFK transited the Suez Canal southbound on 3 Feb 82. Flight operations were conducted in the Red Sea, although airspace is somewhat restricted particularily near the Jeddah TCA. Multiple service hops were flown and all aircraft remained under positive control.

4. ~~(C)~~ A one day turnover was conducted with CV64 in the North Arabian Sea. Initially, the number of flying days was simply limited by 85 sorties per day because of parts/supply considerations. Later, a 3500 hour per month limit was imposed as well. Although 18-20 flying days per month were normally scheduled, flight ops were conducted nearly every day because of US-3/S-3 logistics flights, Helo logistics and alert launches for IIAF P-3 and May aircraft. We never had a fixed rotating scheduled for fly days/no fly days because of the unusual logistics requirements of the IO, numerous exercises, and known "May Days". From Suez to Suez, there were 78 days of TACAIR cyclic ops and 43 days of no fixed wing flights (except S3A/US-3A). This includes 11 days inport. A daily dawn patrol was required (Helo SSC inside 30 NM in early AM).

5. ~~(C)~~ Various exercises in the I.O. provided outstanding training opportunities:

a. ~~(C)~~ ASW. Dedicated SSN services during three two-day ASWEX'es provided excellent and realistic ASW training for CVW-3 and all ASW platforms. Real time ASW was conducted prior to Beacon Flash exercises; Double Team involved detecting, localizing and constructively destroying sub targets in the exercise area. This resulted in several 4-5 day around-the-clock ASW evolutions.

b. Beacon Flash. This exercise provided the best air wing training of the cruise. The three exercises were gradually improved as the SOAF representatives became more familiar with our procedures and their confidence in the situation increased. Low levels, use of Thumrait target, DACT, jamming and opposed strikes were conducted. Strike Operations was (and should be) represented at all the pre-exercise briefings. Areas of concern are low level routes, airspace restrictions, target useage, precise EA6 instructions/tasking, type ordnance in the target and DACT arrangements. We used only MK76 and Zuni rockets because EOD services are required if live ordnance or inerts are used. Unfortunately, an A7 jettisoned a rocket pod with rockets on the target and the ships EOD had to be sent in along with the post-exercise debriefers to dispose of the ordnance. Be sure to "check six" on all overland missions.

c. ~~(C)~~ Weapons Week. KENNEDY's four day Weapons Week was held 02-05 April off Diego Garcia. The exercise was well-organized and very well-supported by all participants. Significant prior arrangements are required and again Strike Operations should attend the pre-exerçise conference at Diego Garcia. Major events of KENNEDY's exercise were arranged as follows:

2 APRIL. NSSM-EX: None Fired
WASEX vs LCCM Hull: MK82, LGB

A-A MISSILEX: AIM 9G

3 APRIL. MINEX: MK58 Smokes

SHRIKEX vs Barrel Target (emitter)

WASEX vs Barrel Target: MK20, MK82

A-A MISSILEX: AIM 7E

SEPTAR-ex

4 APRIL. A-A Missilexes: AIM 9G (Backup), AIM 9L, AIM 7E

Standard ARM vs LSSL (Emitter)

WASEX vs LSSL/Range Boat: MK82/83

5 APRIL. MINEX/SAREX: MK58 Smoke

WASEX vs LCCM: MK82

When the hulks were sunk, remaining scheduled ordnance was expended on smokes. Low levels were flown thoughout the exercise. All in all, it was a very good training exercise and one of the few opportunities to fully exercise the Weapons Department. A summary of ordnance expended is as follows:

682 MK82
34 MK83 (Live/Inert)
2 MK84
4 MK83 LGB
32 MK20 Rockeye
124 MK58
70 MK76
3 ATM-45A-6
3 AIM-9G
4 AIM-9L
6 AIM-7E
1 AGM-78 Aborted due to weak emitter

Air-to-Air gunnery was not scheduled because of possible FOD hazards at Diego Garcia.

d. (U) Beacon South. This could have been a good training opportunity but because overflight clearances were not obtained, the exercise was simply an exercise for surface units.

6. (U) I.O. pubs were picked up 60 days prior to deployment from COMNAVSURLANT. The most important publication for us was the I.O. SOP which, by the way, was revised during the cruise. Of particiliar interest are alert conditions (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie), Dawn Patrol, daily OPSUM reports, PASSEXES and no-notice missile loads (scheduled on no-fly days by CTF 70.)

7. ~~(C)~~ On 5 June 1982 JFK again transited the Suez Canal; this time in a north bound direction anticipating a port visit in Haifa, Israel the following day. That visit was cancelled in the early morning hours of 6 June due to an Israeli attack on the PLO in Southern Lebanon. JFK reversed course and steamed to a Modloc south of Cyprus, here CVW-3 conducted limited flight ops on alternating days. The intent was to maintain a readiness posture and proficiency while at the same time conserving to the maximum extent possible all fuel reserves as well as minimizing any adverse impact upon the support capability of our logistic pipeline. This effort evidently was successful since the Op Ready Rate of the airwing actually improved over what had been seen in the Indian Ocean; a place where supply support is generally acknowledged to be somewhat better than in the Med. Joining the JFK BG were a number of amphibious units attached to CTG 68.3. The support of these units was the real reason for the JFK BG's presence. The intent was that the U.S. Navy stand by to conduct a Non-combat Evacuation Operation (NEO) of American citizens living in Beirut. Initialy JFK's major concern was one of readiness to exercise sea control particularly in light of a continuously increasing Soviet presence in the area. JFK remained in the sea control mode from 7-14 Jun. Meantime Contingency (NEO) Air and Load Plans were layed out on the grease board in Strike Ops and carefully tweaked with inputs from all Key Players. (See enclosure 1). While we did not expect to attempt a non-permissive evacuation, one

major concern was that a permissive operation might very suddenly become non-permissive. This is what we wrote our contingency Air and Load Plans to support.

8. ~~(C)~~ Shortly before midnight on 14 Jun 82, the JFK BG and TG 68.3 were ordered to proceed at best possible speed to a point just off shore from Beirut. The Task Groups were instructed to be in a position from which the operation could commence by 0600 the following day. Contingency Air and Load Plans were issued and preparations were made for a day of cyclic combat operations commencing at 0600. At 0400 aircrews went into a brief and hold status. JFK remained in this readiness posture until the morning of 18 Jun when we were relieved by the USS EISENHOWER. The NEO Ops commenced five days later.

9. ~~(C)~~ A transit to Toulon, France was conducted from 18-21 Jun 82. On 20 Jun, CVW-3 expended 183 of the 200 MK 82's which had been built up for the previous contingency. The bombs were dropped in three cycles on smokes which were 3 NM abeam the CV. A check of submarine op areas was made before selection of a drop zone. An advisory message was sent to alert all NATO members of the ordnance action in accordance with ATP1 Vol I and C6F OPORD 4000. Bombs were fuzed instaneous to limit underwater shock.

10. ~~(C)~~ Upon arrival Toulon, France, on 21 June, a coordination meeting was conducted with the French Navy at CEC-Med. This proved to be a valuable part of preparing us for our up coming interaction with the French in Exercise Daily Double.

11. ~~(C)~~ Exercise Daily Double, a major NATO exercise, only saw 2½ days participation by JFK. This was a rigorous evolution, involving continuous HHH/ASW ops. The French assisted JFK via a bi-lateral supporting agreement. The objective in Daily Double was to secure local sea control and then support a simulated land battle in Northern Italy. Target sorties were tasked by 1st ROC (under 5 ATAF) based upon sortie availability messages which were provided by JFK 48 hours ahead of time. Tasking messages arrived at JFK about 2300 each evening, which meant that the Air Plan actually had to be written before the message came in. The Airplan was written based upon what we had said would be available the day before. This did not prove to be a significant problem since 1st ROC tasked exactly what JFK had said would be available. However, there was significant difficulty for air crews in preparing for the first and second event strikes; the first of which was launched at 0545. Had real world target study, weaponeering, weapons break out, weapons build up, weapons strike up, aircraft release checks, and weapons loading all been a part of this exercise, the ship/CVW team would have been severely pressed to respond to all tasking in the time allowed. A frustrating problem of the exercise was the normal handling delay associated with receiving the tasking message. Most Message centers at the time were swamped with an unprecedented number of messages. This was in part due to the East Med activity which commenced simultaneously with JFK's entrance in Daily Double. It became apparent that it is

necessary to brief one's Communications folks as to which specific messages are essential. For Strike Ops, the air tasking messages were the only ones that absolutely had to be delivered without delay and should come through the bunny tube. In reality these were the only messages that the strike team wanted to have delivered that way. It was useful to ensure that both CVIC and Flag knew of our immediate requirement for the tasking message in Strike Ops since it usually got to one of these spots expeditiously. The format for the message is described in the Ace reporting secret supplement 80-50 and will require some study for those who have not used it before.

12. Following Daily Double, JFK enjoyed a port visit in Malaga, Spain (28 Jun-3 Jul) before returning to CONUS on 14 Jul.

SUNRISE	0439	SORTIES	
SUNSET	1902	DAY	NITE
MOONRISE	170150		
MOONSET	1318		
MOONPHASE			

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV-67
AIR PLAN

DATE 16 JUNE 1982
TIME ZONE BRAVO(-2)
VAR 2 E

0409		START 1 (1+45)	2 (3+30)	3 (5+15)	4 (7+00)	5 (8+45)	6 (10+00)	7 (11+45)	8 (13+30)	9 (15+15)
VF 11 RR3 / RED RIPPERS 050 / F14A 100 A	1 ALT 5 / 1 ALT 15	4 CAP	2 ALT 15	2 CAP	4 ALT 15	4 CAP	2 ALT 15	2 CAP	4 ALT 15	4 CAP
VF 31 RR4 / BANDWAGON 051 / F14A 200 B	1 ALT 5 / 1 ALT 15 / SUCAP	2 CAP	4 CAP	2 ALT 15	2 CAP		4 ALT 15	4 CAP	2 ALT 15	2 CAP
VA 37 RR5 / RED FALCON 052 / A7E 300 C	1 ALT 15 / 1 ALT 30 / SUCAP	2 CAS / 1+15 / 2 CAS / 1 1H ALT 5 / 1 ALT 30 TKR	3+00 2 ALT 15 / 2 CAS 15 / 2 ALT 15	2 CAS / 4+45 2 ALT 15	6+30 2 ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2 ALT 15	2 CAS / 2ALT15 / 2 CAS	9+30 2ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2ALT15	2 CAS / 11+15 / 2 CAS	13+00 2ALT15 / 2 CAS	2 CAS / 14+45 / 2 CAS
VA 105 RR6 / CANYON PASSAGE 053 / A7E 400 D	1 ALT 30 / SUCAP	2 CAS / 1+15 2ALT15 / 2ALT15 / 1 ALT 15 TKR	2 ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2 CAS	2 CAS / 2ALT15 / 4+45 2ALT15	2ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2 CAS	2 CAS / 2ALT15 / 8+15 2ALT15	2ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2 CAS	2 CAS / 2ALT15 / 2ALT15	2ALT15 / 2 CAS / 2 CAS	2 CAS / 2ALT15 / 2ALT15
VA 75 RR1 / FLYING ACE 048 / A6E /KA6D 500 E	1 ALT 15 / 1 ALT 30	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / HARPN / AWG-21 / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR / 1 TKR	2 SUCAP / 1 TKR
VS 22 RR9 / VIDAR 016 / S3A 700 F	1 ALT 30	1 ASW/SSC / 1 SSC	1 ASW/SSC	1 ASW/SSC / 1 SSC	1 ASW/SSC	1 ASW/SSC / 1 SSC	1 ASW/SSC	1 ASW/SSC / 1 SSC	1 ASW/SSC	1 ASW/SSC / 1 SSC
VAQ 138 RR8 / RAMPAGE 076 / EA6B 610 G	1 ALT 30	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW	1 EW
VAW 126 RR7 / CLOSEOUT 054 / E2C 010 H	1 ALT 30	1 C³	-15	1 C³	-15	1 C³	-15	1 C³	-15	1 C³
HS 7 RR2 / DUSTY DOG 049 / SH3D 730 I	1 ALT 15	1 PG/ASW / 1 ALT 10		1 PG/ASW		1 PG/ASW	1 ALT 10 / 1 PG/ASW			
CAROLINE AIR OPS / COD/VOD 128 / OTHER J K										
LAUNCH/LAND		19 / 13	16 / 19	16 / 17	14 / 17	18 / 15	16 / 19	16 / 17	14 / 7	

ENCLOSURE (1)

U.S.S. JOHN F. KENNEDY CV-67

ORDNANCE LOAD PLAN

DATE: 16 JUNE 82

EVT	SQUAD	NO ACFT	LAUNCH	TYPE ORDNANCE	FINS	RACKS	FUZE	DELY/FUZE SETTING	REMARKS
1A1	VF-11	4	0+00	2 AIM-7F,4 AIM	9L				
				FAMMO,30 MK46,	30 R	R-129			
1B1	VF-31	2 ▲	0+02	2 AIM-7F,4 AIM	9L				
				FAMMO,30 MK46,	30 R	R-129			
1C1	VA-37	2	0+00	8 MK-82	CON	MERS	M904	0.1/6 SEC	
				2 AIM-9L,FAMMO			MK344		
				10 POET,20 MK-	46,30	RR-129	(2,.1,	3,4)	
1C2	VA-37	2	0+00	8 MK-82	CON	MERS	M904	0.1/6 SEC	
				FAMMO, 10 POET			MK344		
				20 MK46 30 RR	129(2	,.1,3,4)			
				2 AIM-9L					
1D1	VA-37	2 ▲	0+00	8 MK-82	CON	MERS	M904	0.1/6 SEC	
				2 AIM-9L,FAMMO			MK344		
				10 POET,20 MK46					
				30 RR-129(2,.1	3,4)				
1E1	VA-75	2	0+00	6 MK-20				1.2	
				60 RR-129(4,.1	8,4)				
1F1	VS-22	1 ▲	0+00	2 MK-46 TORP					
				2 MK-20					
1F2	VS-22	1	0+00	2 MK-46 TORP					
				2 MK-20				1.2	
1I1	HS-7	1 ▲	0+00	1 MK-46 TORP					
				1 ALE-37				1/4 SEC, D	
				(CONTINUE FOR SUBSEQ	UENT EV	ENTS)			

NOTES:

1. ALL EA-6B - 60 MK46
2. SH3 ALRTS: 1 MK46 TORP
3. 1 A6E ALERTS:2 AGM-84 / 1 A6E:2 AGM-78
4. F-14 ALERTS: 0/2/4/FAMMO
5. A7 I.N. Alert: 4 AGM 45-6, 2 AIM 9L

A-7E CAS LOADS:



COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER

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   b. Enlisted
3. Training
4. Operations
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   b. Mediterranean Sea (22 Jan-3 Feb)
   c. Red Sea (4 Feb-6 Feb)
   d. Indian Ocean (7 Feb-1 Jun)
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7. Special Exercises/Operations
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1.(U) General. CIC embarked on the current deployment in a high state of readiness. Extensive training inport and type training improved internal communications flow; CIC was ready for sea.

2. ~~(C)~~ Personnel.

a. Officers. Approximately one-half of the officers reported onboard between the end of the previous cruise and the commencement of the current one. Schools and simulator training received at Dam Neck allowed these new arrivals to enter the type training cycle at least minimally prepared. Schools such as NTDS User and CIC Watch Officer were very beneficial for those new officers in order to perform satisfactorily as Surface Watch Officers and SWC's. Likewise, OOD Advanced Tactics and Rules of the Road were found to be useful to all officers assigned to CIC.

Tactical Action Officers (TAO) were few, with only three fully qualified. All three gained their experience during the type training evolution and proved themselves capable of handling any situation during the course of the deployment. Considering the long underway periods encountered in the Indian Ocean; however, CIC would have been better served with four qualified TAO's. This would allow more time for each to complete CIC related projects while still maintaining watch continuity.

b. Enlisted. Throughout type training and the deployment the manning level averaged sixty Operations Specialists (around 85% of NMPC) and an average of twelve Electronic Warfare ratees (100% of NMPC). Newly reported personnel were absorbed into the watch rotation and given thorough training before being given full watch station responsibilites. Manning levels remained adequate to permit a three section watch rotation.

A shortage of senior supervisory personnel was a deficit CIC could ill afford. With only one chief petty officer and two first class petty officers in the OS rate on board, many of the supervisory duties fell to second class petty officers who were not adequately prepared for such reponsibilities. The senior personnel were overly tasked with running the division plus standing twelve hours of watch daily.

3. ~~(C)~~ Training. An ongoing program of both officer and enlisted training enhanced skills and knowledge of experienced personnel as well as developing necessary skills in new personnel throughout the deployment.

The officer training program consisted of scheduled lectures in AAW, ASW and ASUW.- Geared toward PQS for Surface Warfare; the intent was to educate the officer, from whatever department, in the elementary tactics and weapons applicable to each type of warfare. Similarly, lessons on shipboard sensors, intelligence collection and CIC equipment dissiminated information to them on the capabilities and limitations of the ship in warfare.

Enlisted training was conducted by the watch supervisors of the various modules. Lectures, quizzes and on-the-job training were all part of the program designed to develop the junior, non-rated personnel. To further enhance the skills of all personnel they were periodically rotated through the various watch stations. This course of action better served CIC in that all watchstanders acted as a check on each other; since they are cognizant of the duties of watch stations outside their own.

4. ~~(C)~~ Operations.

a. Translant (6 Jan-16 Jan). Conducted in company with USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, this period proved valuable in getting an early look at dual carrier operations. Specifically, a good data base for coordinating flight operations; ship movements; CAP control; surface screens and surveillance, as a dual carrier battle group, was collected. Naturally, problems arose; but these were rectified either through intership communications or through intervention by the embarked staff.

Flight operations were conducted on alternate days by each carrier with limited interaction; i.e., control of EISENHOWER CAP by KENNEDY controllers and vice versa. Assigning codewords to all aircraft control frequencies between the two carriers eliminated confusion and delay in handovers and allowed flexibility in selecting frequencies for better communications between ships and aircraft. Establishing a common "card of the day" for air activities maintained security while allowing information to be accurately passed to any ship in the battle group. Publishing this information days in advance eliminated confusion and guesswork.

During the early morning hours CIC was involved in numerous exercises designed to upgrade and maintain battle readiness. Use of video simulation (VSS) on NTDS sharpened air and surface tracking skills and improved coordination in AAW, ASUW and link management. Publications exercises (PUBEX) helped the CIC team achieve a working knowledge of pertinent operations orders and instructions.

b. Mediterranean Sea (22 Jan-3 Feb). Following a port call in Malaga, Spain, the initial part of the underway period was spent as an autonomous battle group conducting training to retune proficiency.

Use of exercises outlined in FXP-2 and FXP-3 provided the means to bring CIC up-to battle readiness.

Operations in the central and eastern Mediterranean were conducted with increased alertness due to movements in the proximity of Libya and the Athens TCA. Tapeing all CAP and strike control frequencies avoided what could have been an embarrassing situation with regards to Libyan claims of an airliner being intercepted by an F-14. Data retrieval of both voice tapes and CIC logs removed all doubt concerning the incident. Likewise the use of data extract when operating in the sensitive eastern Mediterranean, especially in the vicinity of the Athens TCA, can be invaluable in reconstructing air activity should allegations of TCA or other airspace violations be directed at the ship.

c. ~~(C)~~ Red Sea (4 Feb-6 Feb). Adjustments to the control of aircraft in the confined airspace of the Red Sea as compared to the relatively open airspace of the Mediterranean were easily accomplished despite initial concern. AIC, strike and E-2 controllers were thoroughly briefed on standoff distances and TCA locations. Special attention was paid to air operations in the vicinity of the Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) TCA. Additionally, there are numerous islands well offset from the mainland of Egypt and Saudi Arabia which aircrews were specifically briefed to avoid.

Surface traffic was heavy the entire length of the sea. Augmentation of the surface tracking team with personnel from D&T during the hours of darkness provided an extra margin of safety and lessened the load for the watch team. Using three personnel to obtain maneuvering board solutions and two trackers, accurate, timely information plus recommendations were passed to the bridge.

Air traffic was minimal; mostly originating from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. All air traffic observed followed the published air routes.

For passage of the Bab el Mandeb straits at the southern end of the Red Sea extra precautions were taken within CIC to meet any contingency. NATO Sea Sparrow batteries and the WLO station were manned; EW reviewed procedures for the use of ECM equipment and all personnel were briefed on the PDRY order of battle. Surface traffic in the vicinity of the straits was surprisingly light. Soviet and third world surface activity began to develop around the battle force as the transit progressed. Specifically, a Soviet ALLIGATOR class vessel trailed for the majority of the passage. Five other unidentified units originating from the PDRY coast closed from the stern to within 15nm. As the battle force passed Perim Island, an OSA II was encountered. His efforts seemingly were identification of the battle force only.

d. ~~(C)~~ Indian Ocean (7 Feb-1 Jun). Operating under SEVENTH Fleet rules was more restrictive than under those of the SECOND or SIXTH Fleets. Daily changing call signs for both ships and aircraft and the use of those call signs on both clear and covered nets was cumbersome at first. It was essential to list the daily call signs for the aircraft on a status board and have the controllers and SWC's become thoroughly familiar with these prior to assuming the watch. Having to designate specific bombing areas on a daily basis was also troublesome. Such is required whenever a friendly submarine is operating in the immediate vicinity and is required even if the only ordnance to be expended are MK-76 practice bombs. Good coordination is required between CIC and the ASWC to make the selection of the bombing area reasonable.

The bulk of the operating time was spent in the North Arabian Sea (GONZO STATION) and with the territory came the weekly reconnaissance flights by Soviet IL-38 MAY aircraft staging out of Aden, PDRY. They ventured as far east as 1200nm from Aden to reconn the battle group, but did not fly north of 20 degrees North latitude even when the battle group operated there. Deceptive tactics were observed only once when the pair split early (outside 500nm) to attempt to close the force from west and north. Launching the E-2 when the MAY aircraft were 800nm away and the F-14's when they were 500nm away proved the best combination for a successful 200nm intercept. This method allowed time to rectify aircraft problems, if any, and still conduct the intercept and escort properly.

Iranian P-3F flights were a common occurrence, but their activity was centered around the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Interest was generated toward battle group reconnaissance only if the battle group operated in the Gulf of Oman.

The French and Pakistanis comb the North Arabian Sea occasionally. Although they did conduct reconnaissance of the battle group they did not loiter in the fashion of the Soviets.

Surveillance by Soviet surface units was limited to that of AGI's. Characteristic of their operation was showing up in the early morning hours and leaving under the cover of darkness several days later.

Commercial air traffic was sporatic and, given the few airways in the area, could be found travelling in any given direction. ESM correlation was infrequent, but almost all of the airliners would operate mode III and mode C IFF continuously. The SEVENTH Fleet Indian Ocean S.O.P. has specific guidance for classifying unknown contacts as commercial air.

Surface traffic was also light throughout this part of the deployment.

With minimal air and surface traffic to contend with, spotty Soviet surveillance and plenty of air space, CIC heavily scheduled and completed required competitive exercises. By preceding each compex with one or two readiness training exercises the grades achieved were excellent.

One publication used extensively in WESTPAC is AKAC-874 which is the equivalent to the NATO publications AMSA-1601 (PELE) and AMSC-608 (NUCO). This is an all encompassing publication used for authentication and information normally sent via NUCO groups. This one does take some getting use to; therefore, time should be spent on instruction and practice for those personnel who will be using it.

"Homemade" codewords for ship and airwing information exchange are not authorized in the SEVENTH Fleet. Instead AMSA-132 is to be used. Most of the information necessarily codeworded for Med operations is addressed in this publication and that which is not can be covered with spare lines.

e. Red Sea (2-4 JUN) .Northbound transit of the Babel Mandeb straits was again marked with third world/Soviet interest; however not of the same intensity as previously. One small patrol boat took cursory interest in the battle group passage. Conducting a transit at the same time was a Victor class SSN which was overtaken on the surface due to the battle group's higher SOA.

Like the previous transit the surface traffic was dense and continuous causing CIC to augment the surface tracking team with personnel from other modules.

Comments previously made in paragraph 4c were applicable to this transit as well.

f. Mediterranean Sea (6 JUN - 3 JUL) - Seven hours away from anchoring in Haifa, Israel, the battle group was ordered to remain at sea indefinitely due to the Israeli action in southern Lebanon. Modlocked at a point 150 NM from the Lebanese coast the battle group prepared for evacuation operations should they have become necessary. As the action in southern Lebanon intensified Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean increased.

The battle group involvement in the evacuation contingency plan went smoothly up through and including the on station relief by the EISENHOWER battle group.

5. ~~(C)~~ CIC Modules

a. Display and Decision (D&D). Having a good working knowledge of current operations orders, opgens and allied publications is essential for watch officers to perform effectively in the Mediterranean and

Indian Ocean. Getting them involved in pubexes is a good way to achieve this end. Likewise, practicing with the SEVENTH Fleet authenticator tables is a must before using them operationally.

The TAO's kept their hand in training by being involved in battle group TAO pubexes, using NWP 12-5 and various operations orders. These were very useful and enjoyable.

Since CIC had numerous exercises to be prepared for daily; one or two officers were given responsibility to insure all pertinent messages and requirements were met. Assignment was given well in advance of the date of the exercise. The same was done with preparation of daily brief sheets for flight operations. Here two officers who were not heavily involved in watchstanding, were assigned to write the briefs and to insure all pre-exercise criteria was met for each event.

AXP-4 and AXP-5 were used extensively for battle group operations and exercises as well as interservice exercises with the French and British navies.

b. Detection and Tracking (D&T). Throughout the course of the cruise air tracking occasionally suffered from a lack of practice. Although tracking during major exercises was adequate; the sheer volume of air contacts was burdensome. The fact that the Video Simulation System (VSS) was inoperative for the entire deployment further detracted the tracking skills of D&T. With numerous slack periods in the Indian Ocean extensive training was conducted on LTRAN, voice procedures (APP-1 and RUTH), NTDS link maintenance, radar equipment and Soviet tactics. The benefits reaped from this training were high grades in competitive exercises and a logrithmic increase in individual professional knowledge. Having worked separate AAW C&R and link coordination nets during SIXTH Fleet operations; running a combined net was difficult at first when the battle group chopped to the SEVENTH Fleet. Eventually the conflict was sorted out with "AW" assuming some of the link management duties and keeping these secondary to AAW reports. During dual carrier operations in the Indian Ocean link management became a nightmare. With up to eight ships in the link at any one time, the number of bogus tracks increased in proportion to the air activity. Assigning units sectors for tracking and reporting responsibilities would have, no doubt, eliminated much of this but was not done by the AAW commander.

c. Surface/SSSC

The Surface and SSSC modules operated a coordinated effort throughout the cruise. Surface handled all contacts out to 20 NM from the battle force and SSSC kept tabs on all activity from 20 to 200 NM from the battle force. Heavy emphasis was placed on use of the DRT during multi-ship operations and when Soviet units were present. With concern for INCSEA violations or possible accusations by Soviet units, the DRT would have become the primary source of data recovery had it been necessary. Maintaining an accurate SSSC picture out to 200 NM was achieved by use of a manual SSSC plot as well as NTDS. This allowed track information reconstruction into NTDS should that system momentarily fail or have to be reloaded. Aircraft reporting of contacts was simplified by use of a reporting code which broke down as follows:

ALPHA: Range and bearing of contact from SSSC reporting point
BRAVO: Pseudo-PIF of the contact
CHARLIE: Contacts' course and speed
DELTA: Time contact discovered.

By transcribing this data to paper for the TAO and CVIC, contacts of interest can be kept track of without having to sift through the rest of the merchant traffic and a permanent record is available for later reconstruction.

d. Air War. AIC's and ASAC's were involved in much more than aircraft control. Their duties included composition of the daily air coordination message, preparation of display charts (showing airways, standoff areas and warning areas) and coordination of ship exercises involving aircraft. When not involved in these tasks they were busy attending lectures on aircraft weapons systems and tactics to expand their knowledge and make them a more integral part of the overall ship/airwing weapons team. Nearly all of the AIC's and ASAC's were new to their role when the ship got underway for type training. Short periods of temporary duty to airwing fighter squadrons while the ship was involved in SRA helped them greatly and gave them confidence during the initial at-sea periods. Each AIC now has over 1000 intercepts on average and ASAC's have extensive training and actual experience in ASW.

e. Electronic Warfare - All personnel assigned to the module were on their first enlistment; though most had experience from the previous deployment. To help offset the lack of expertise and provide for skilled supervision, a chief petty officer was ordered in on temporary duty. Though the module was rich in talent, it initially lacked the confidence to make rapid evaluations of detected signals and perform the duties as the electronic warfare coordinator. Training through numerous exercises, self-study and guidance from supervisors began to correct these deficiencies. By mid-cruise the module had the confid-ence and credibility it needed to perform effectively. High marks in all compexes and major exercises, such as Weapons Week, were the results of this training.

EMCON policy for the Indian Ocean was "Bravo Minirad". Simply put, this condition allowed for use of an emitter provided it was necessary. Keeping control of the battle force emissions under this condition, at times, was difficult. Tacans and radars not required for a mission were more often left radiating than voluntarily secured. Of course, as the units became accustomed to the policy, violations became far less frequent. With severe ducting conditions on the Indian Ocean judicious control of friendly emitters became essential to keep passive locating of the battle force at a minimum.

Having the MUTE system on board helped greatly in rapidly reducing own ship emissions. To keep it effective, use was controlled by the TAO.

The module was also outfitted with MITSI (ULQ-16); which was utilized successfully to identify the majority of the non-friendly emissions detected.

Performance of the WLR-1 was outstanding once a faulty antenna was replaced. Detection ranges were increased in band 10 through an experiment by maintenance personnel which involved the removal of the 160MHZ in-line amplifier from between the tuners and converter and placing it between the band 10 antenna and tuner. This modification is currently undergoing processing as a beneficial suggestion.

Maintenance of all module equipment was handled by a maintenance section. All PMS, repairs and troubleshooting was performed by this team. Organized as such, increased availability of equipment over the previous deployment, continuity in troubleshooting and repairs and a rapid response to equipment failures were enjoyed.

f. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

(1) ~~(C)~~ Operations: JFK operated under the OPCON of SECOND, SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleet during this deployment. In each area of responsibility (AOR) the CWC organization was used by the Battle Group. Coordinated two carrier battle group operations were conducted during the CONUS-MED transit and while in the Mediterranean Sea. Highlights of each phase of the deployment are presented below. Specific emphasis is given to the Indian Ocean operations.

(a) (U) CONUS-MED Transit:

1. ~~(C)~~ USS JOHN F. KENNEDY and USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER conducted a dual CV battle group transit to the Mediterranean Sea. MPA support was provided while transiting the Bermuda and Lajes AOR. The Canadian armed forces augmented the MPA support with the CP-1140 Auraro aircraft.

2. ~~(C)~~ ASW operation enroute included SWAI-1-82 and Sea Venture. While no contact was generated on the TOI in either operation, the planning and coordination involved in the excecution of each exercise placed the ASWM and ASW squadrons on the step for upcoming MED and IO operations.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Mediterranean Sea Operations: ASW operations in the Mediterranean Sea progressed at a hectic pace. Major ASW operations during the period 21 JAN - 02 FEB 82 included Exercise NATWEEK XXXI and numerous real world prosecutions. Between 26 and 31 Janauary, five SITSIX prosecutions were conducted. Initial detection in each case was made with non-acoustic sensors: visual, ESM, and MAD.

1. ~~(C)~~ NATWEEK XXXI exercised the two CV battle group in a triple threat environment. ASWC was located on IKE and took total tasking authority for fixed wing ASW assets. Minimal communications between ASWC and CV67 ASWM, presented a significant C3 problem in being able to properly brief and task continuing flights in a rapidly changing environment. The lesson was well learned in this exercise as ASWC was retained onboard JFK in all future operations. On two subsequent occasions a DESRON Staff was embarked to preclude a repeat of this problem.

2. ~~(C)~~ The ESM Preflight Inserted Data (PID) package developed by the ASWM proved highly successful in correctly identifying snoop series intercepts in the Mediterranean environment. The details of the JFK PID was forwarded upon request by CTF 66 for analysis and possible incorporation in future inchop data packages.

~~(c)~~ Indian Ocean Operations

1. ~~(C)~~ JFK commenced operations in the Indian Ocean on 8 February 1982. Turnover with USS CONSTELLATION was completed on 11 February. An extensive ASW turnover package prepared by the CV-64 ASWM and the recent CTF-72 and Indian Ocean VP experience of three CV-67 ASWM Watch Officers helped smooth the transition from SIXTH Fleet to SEVENTH Fleet operations. Additionally, CTF-72 assigned a permanent liaison officer TAD to the OTC to coordinate battle group MPA support requirements and planning.

2. ~~(C)~~ It was apparent from the start that CVBG ASW operations had significantly changed from what was expected. The relatively stationary MODLOC in the Gonzo Operating Area (GOA) had been replaced with a set of dispersed MODLOC points. ASW emphasis was to provide close in ASW protection to the CVBG concentrating the search within nominal weapons/surveillance range. The current operations present an interesting and challenging ASW planning problem exercising both moving and stationary PIM ASW defense operations.

3. ~~(C)~~ CTG 72.8 provided MPA support for all CVBG operations. MPA operations in the Indian Ocean are impacted by geographic and diplomatic constraints placed on operations from litoral sites. Optimum use of these assets requires close coordination between the CVBG and CTG 72.8. To facilitate this coordination, CTF 72 provided a permanent VP Liaison Officer (VPLO) TAD to the ASWC and OTC. He interfaced directly with the OTC, ASWM, ASWC, and CTG 72.8 to coordinate VP scheduling and tasking. His assistance in this area was extremely

beneficial and was well received by all concerned.

4. (U) In concert with the VPLO program, during the period 5-13 March one officer and two acoustic analysts were cross decked to CTG 72.8 and provided a similar insight in CV-ASWM Operations, tactics, limitations and goals. This provided the ASWM a valuable personal insight into the constraints experienced by I.O. MPA. The exchange of ideas and the cooperative attitude that was fostered between both units warrants continuation of this program. Unfortunately operational commitments on JFK prohibited further cross-deck exchanges.

5. (U) Commander, Destroyer Squadron THIRTY FIVE embarked in JFK on 25 March while inport Perth Australia and assumed the duties of ASWC and Screen Coordinator. Because of the limited space in CV-67 ASWM available to support an embarked ASWC Staff, Flag Plot was established for their use. The ASWM functioned as the principle advisor to the staff in all matters relating to ASW aircraft employment. Onstation aircraft control and squadron liaison functions were retained by the ASWM. To support the ASWC operation, one officer and one AWC were sent ADDU from the ASWM to the staff. This arrangement provided the ASWC with two additional watch standers experienced in CVBG ASW operations and provided the module with a close working knowledge of the operations of a staff in surface ship tasking and planning.

6. ~~(C)~~ Submarine operations with the CVBG are conducted in associated direct support in accordance with NWP-25. CTF-74 retains operational and tactical control of SSN's and provides movement and tasking instructions by numbered operations directives to the SSN's. The ops directives serve the purpose and are in lieu of formatted submarine patrol areas assignment messages in NWP-25. When assigned, SSN assets were well integrated into the battle force posture. As with MPA assets, the key to successful SSN employment was coordination. The staff Senior Submarine Adivsor (SSA) was the liaison point of contact with CTF 74. The SSN (DS) procedures are well documented and should be thoroughly reviewed prior to inchop.

7. ~~(C)~~ Major Exercises: JFK participated in regularly scheduled ASW exercises designed to increase indiviudal unit readiness and exercise overall CVBG ASW command and control. Major exercises included ASWEX 82-4(U), 82-5(U), 82-7(U), and 82-8(U). Additionally, one PASSEX was conducted against the French Submarine AGOSTA. The ASW problems were structured in a modular format providing individual unit qualifications as well as multi-platform coordination exercises. Each ASWEX culminated in a free play interaction. ASWEX 82-4(U) and 82-5(U) provided training in choke point ASW operations. ASWEX 82-7(U) and 82-8(U) exercised ASW area sanitization and stationary MODLOC defense in rehearsal of tactics for operation DOUBLE TEAM. An important aspect of each exercise was the free exchange of information between all units, especially the SSN. The lessons learned from each exercise were invaluable in future plannig both in the IO and Mediterranean AOR.

8. ~~(C)~~ Operation DOUBLE TEAM is a real world ASW problem conducted during major exercises such as BEACON FLASH. JFK participated in operation DOUBLE TEAM prosecutions on two occasions, and in each operation the stated goals of the operation were met or exceeded. Operation DOUBLE TEAM is the ultimate test of the CVBG ASW posture testing the entire C3 structure from planning through implementation while operating against real world TOI.

9. ~~(S)~~ Communications: Support of ASW operations in the IO required maximum utilization of communications assets available to the ASWM. The following ASW circuits were guarded continuously:

a. ~~(C)~~ ASCONNET A, (273.1 MHZ NESTOR) primary ASW command and control circuit.

b. ~~(C)~~ NAVY RED (240.8 MHZ NESTOR) battle group NESTOR tactical circuit.

c. ~~(C)~~ Helo control (382.7 MHZ VOICE) primary ASAC helo control circuit.

d. ~~(C)~~ IO Maritime Patrol NET (17983.5 KHZ VOICE/CRATT) MPA coordination and tasking.
With only one TTY, the ASWM was unable to maintain continuous guard on the VP Shore Hop circuit. The IO maritime patrol circuit proved to be an acceptable alternative. The SOSAT circuit was guarded in Flag Comm.

(d) Mediterranean Sea Operations

1. ~~(C)~~ JFK transited the Suez Canal on 5 June and returned to the Mediterranean Sea. Initiation of hostilities in Lebanon and subsequent implementation of the Non-combatant Evacuation Order (NEO) placed immediate emphasis on ASW in the Eastern Mediterranean area of operations. Applying lessons learned from ASWEX and operation DOUBLE TEAM, the JFK as ASWC devised and implemented battle group ASW plan. Severly constrained by available budget OPTAR, ASW aricraft flight hours were allocated to optimize ASW coverage. A successful prosecution and constructive kill of the primary TOI resulted.

2. ~~(C)~~ Commander, Destroyer Squdron TWENTY FOUR embarked JFK on 23 Jun for 3 days as ASWC during Operation DAILY DOUBLE. As in the Indian Ocean operation, Flag Plot was established for their operations. The command relationship established with COMDESRON 35 was again implemented with unqualified success. Both Orange TOI, the USS RAY and FS DAPHINE were located and constructively killed in the exercise.

(2) (U) ASW Planning Teams

(a) ~~(C)~~ A major factor contributing to the successful ASW operations in the Indian Ocean and subsequent was the establishment of the ASW planning team. Prior to mid March, JFK operated the ASW Planning Board under the guidance of COMNAVAIRLANTINST C3120.16. This board provided the necessary forum to disseminate feedback on lessons learned from previous operations and to discuss and to establish goals for upcoming events, however little could be accomplished in the area of operational planning. Additionally it was desired to involve the junior officers in the ASW squadrons in the planning phase of battle group operations to enhance their understanding of the total ASW problem. To achieve this goal, several ASW planning teams were formed, each tasked to develop a battle group ASW plan imploying all available assets while considering current operational constraints. The first team was specifically tasked to develop the battle group transit ASW plan from Perth, Australia, to GOA. The ASWC and OTC enthusiatically received the planning team concept and established a continuing program. Subsequent to that initial planning team brief, every major ASW event has been analysed and planned by an ASW planning team, including ASWEX 82-7(U), ASWEX 82-8(U), both operation DOUBLE TEAM prosecutions and the Mediterranean NEO and DAILY DOUBLE operations. In each case, the overall plan was as enthusiastically received as the first.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The composition of each team included HS, VS, VAW and ASWM personnel. These personnel were supplemented by representatives of the remaining CVW-3 squadrons, ASWC staff and OTC staff to answer questions and provide additional expertise in specific areas. Each plan was presented to the ASWC to critique and modify as required. The final operational plan was then presented to the OTC for concurrence. The utlimate affect of the efforts of the planning team has been to foster a new cooperative attitude among all of the ASW players in the battle group with excellent results.

(3) (U) ENVIRONMENT

(a) ~~(C)~~ ICAPS continues to prove itself to be an indispensible aid to effective ASW environmental analysis, providing accurate and timely inputs for mission planning and contact prosecution. JFK promulgated daily ICAPS predictions to the battle group providing forecasts tailored to both the available sensors and the TOI.

(b) (U) Of significant note in the use of ICAPS, the forecast is only as accurate as the input parameters. Bathymetric data is available from organic battle group assets on a regular basis. In-site ambient noise data, however, is currently available only from properly configured MPA assets. JFK routinely tasked P3 mission to provide ambient noise data. A need exists to measure ambient noise with battle group assets.

(c) (U) Two problems were encountered with the use of acoustic forecast data that are worthy of note for future planning:

1. ~~(C)~~ The ICAPS water mass atlas does not cover the Indian Ocean south of 20 degrees south latitude thus prohibiting ICAPS use for that area.

2. ~~(C)~~ The fleet Numerical Weather Central, Monterey, CA. TASSRAPS model does not provide towed array predictions for south latitudes.

(4) (U) References: All ASWM officers should be thoroughly familiar with the following written guidance prior to deployment:

(a) COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 4000
(b) CTF 60 OPORD 4000
(c) AXP-1 (NATO Procedures are used for all exercises in 6TH FLT)
(d) CTF 60 Standing OPGEN GOLF
(e) Med ASW Reference Manual with current new Newsgrams

Additionally, the following references are important for CV's operating in the IO:

(f) COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201
(g) CTF 70 IO SOP
(h) Submarine Services Guide (CTG-74 010633Z APR 82)
(i) NWP 25

(5) (U) Personnel: The ASWM is manned with six officers and 23 enlisted personnel including 18 AWs and five DPs. A further breakdown of enlisted personnel is as follows:

	AW	DP
E7	1	0
E6	4	1
E5	5	2
E4	4	1
E3 and below	4	1

While enlisted manning was numerically sound, experience and training backgrounds were less than adequate. Of the assigned AWs, only 9 of 18 (50%) have attended the prerequisite ASWM schools; only 6 (33%) received this school enroute to JFK. 9 (50%) were designated aircrew prior to arrival. New personnel are predominently direct "A" school or HS/HSL RAG inputs with no acoustic analysis experience. Further only 4 (22%) personnel are fully qualified as ascoustic analysists having had previous experience as P-3 SS1 Operations. Significant progress and alleviation of this shortfall in PQS qualification has been achieved through on-the-job training.

(6) (U) TTC Maintenance: ~~(C)~~ The ASWM has complete responsibility for maintenance and issuing of the S-3A Transportable Tape cassettes (TTC). This maintenance is performed in the ADP Module by the ASWM DP personnel. Maintenance of the TTCs in ASWM provides rapid turn around of down TTCs. Additionally, minor repair actions can be performed upon return allowing timely recovery of recorded inflight mission data. The following is a summary of TTC transactions through

15 June 1982:

(a) ~~(C)~~ 855 TCCs issued
733 Mission
122 Maintenance

(b) ~~(C)~~ 652 mission TTC issues resulted in good load for an 89% success rate.

(c) ~~(C)~~ 92 TTCs were returned with the tape ran past BOT/EOT (Tape ran off the reel). This was 11% of all issues. 77 (83%) of these failures were salvaged for data extraction and reissue.

(d) ~~(C)~~ 30 Tape packs had to be replaced for a 3% replacement rate. Tape packs were replaced for the following reasons:

1. ~~(C)~~ Tape damage - 15

2. ~~(C)~~ Checksum errors - 15

(e) ~~(C)~~ 16 Isobelts required replacement.

(f) ~~(C)~~ 7 TTCs were returned as BCM.

6. ~~(C)~~ NTDS

a. General. Deployment to SIXTHFLT and SEVENTHFLT will be uniquely different with respect to operations and NTDS. SIXTHFLT is characterized by many major exercises including PASSEXES with NATO and other Allied forces, and routine data collection requirements. SEVENTHFLT will consist of sustained operations with few large scale exercises and no data collection requirements. In either fleet the primary emphasis is functional and operable equipment, links and sensors, dependable NTDS programs and systems, and a continuous well managed and coordinated Link 11 picture. Hence, an up-to-date, clear, concise and meaningful tactical picture is the goal.

b. NTDS Program. Full systems capable operational and related systems interface are required and must support all warfare areas.

Geographical navigation data (i.e. lines and points) for representing coastal boundaries, warning and restricted areas/airspaces, airways, opareas, navigation aids, etc. are very essential. Recommend building a library of tapes to cover all areas. Geographical navigation information can be obtained from fleet OPORDS/SOPS and FLIP documents. Interface with embarked staff and air ops concerning restriction and area requirements. Lastly, recommend program reload 1-2 hours prior to flight operations to avoid unnecessary program faults due to heavy track load and program age.

c. NTDS Coordination. The AAWC is primarily responsible for the tactical picture. But ASUWC plays a significant role as well. At times the ASWC will be involved specifically during ASWEXes. So the bottom line is managing your warfare commanders and coordinators. Remember a meaningful tactical picture is the goal. During multiple CVBG operations, coordination is a must. Great emphasis and effort is required managing the tactical picture. Finally, review all the fleet OPORDS and publications. Here are a few:

- SIXTHFLT/SEVENTHFLT OPORD
- IO SOP
- SIXTHFLT/SEVENTHFLT TAC MEMO on DATA LINKS
- ADAPT 11
- ADAPT 14

d. NTDS Maintenance. Good maintenance, particularly PMS, is the foundation for maintaining systems and equipment operability. In the MED maintenance will be performed while inport or at training anchorage. In the I.O., maintenance must be performed on a planned schedule promulgated by the AAWC via message. Establish good rapport with system technicians. Closely monitor systems and equipment to quickly determine malfunctions and to effect timely corrective action. Recommend developing a system for trouble reporting and quality assurance. Every morning by 0730 a systems/equipment status report was submitted to the staff (when embarked). Therefore, know your systems and confer with the EMO.

e. Technical Support. MOTU 6 in Naples and MOTU 13 in Subic Bay, P.I. are the only support units available. They are glad to assist in any way possible. All it takes is a request. The battle group command highly encourages using technical support services. The MOTU's have limited software expertise. Any software NTDS related support will have to be requested from FLTCOMBATDIRSSACT, San Diego, CA by message. Transportation in the I.O. is good with Diego Garcia as the routing point.

f. Data Link and IFF Reliability Performance Report. A daily message report consisting of Link 11, 14, 4A and Mode IV IFF performance was submitted to the battle group commander by 0730. This report covered the previous day operations. Each fleet has separate reporting procedures with SEVENTHFLT being more extensive. Data Links and IFF performance receive high interest. Therefore, ensure that personnel are using these systems to the maximum, keep accurate records and have them advise you immediately when problems occur so corrective action can be effected. Review each fleet's requirements carefully and design forms/logging procedures that will allow OS's to easily but adequately record the information necessary. One last item, when P-3's chop to the battle group, you must include their Link time and IFF check in the report.

g. Link 11/14. The AAWC was responsible for the data Links and promulgated the basic guidance via OPGEN BRAVO and LIMA. Data Links are expected to be continuously operable with 95 percent the desired goal. Links were mostly HF but UHF will be utilized depending on the type of operations and capability of other TDS units. In the MED a separate Link coordination net using ADAPT II X-ray codes was SOP. In the I.O. a common AAW/Link net was mostly the standard on which AKAC-132 was used for coordination. Ducting, a characteristic of the I.O., yielded extended HF/UHF ranges. Ensure TRK SUP passes aircraft line-up and PU's to NCS. PU's change daily from AKAI-16 in SIXTHFLT while a permanent PU is assigned in SEVENTHFLT. The AAW will generally designate 2 Link 14 transmit units with each on separate frequencies. Proper track management and identification is a continual job that requires constant attention. Maintaining close coordination with TRK SUP and system technicians will greatly enhance Link Performance.

h. Link 4A/Mode IV IFF. AIC, especially strike controller for IFF, was responsible for operating, monitoring and checks. JFK and VAW-126 achieved excellent Link 4A success. Highly encourage the AIC's to utilize it. Mode IV performance was lower than desired primarily due to the poor performance of transponders. The VAW/VF Squadrons were also required to perform Mode IV checks. Strike controller routinely coordinated with airborne E-2 when performing checks. Additionally, Mode IV checks were performed on surface units.

i. Data Collection. CIC is normally designated coordinator for the ship's data collection efforts since it is the focal center of all exercises/operations and provides the most information. NTDS DX is invarable required.

7. ~~(C)~~ Special Exercises/Operations

a. BEACON FLASH - This exercise was conducted three times with the Omani Air Force during the Indian Ocean portion of the cruise. It involved little CIC coordination or planning. The majority of the exercise consisted of low level flights flown by the airwing and opposed by the Omanis. Probably the biggest concern to CIC was keeping aircraft out of the DHOFAR TCA and providing suitable communications with

"THUMRAIT RADAR" before the aircraft crossed the beach. The latter coordination was performed by the E-2 or an S-3.

b. BEACON SOUTH - This one never really got off the ground. Intended to be a US/Australian exercise involving OTH and attack of the battle group by the Australian Air Force and Navy surface units plus opposed low levels by airwing aircraft over Western Australia and a war-at-sea exercise only the Australian Navy came to play. Their force however was limited to two fast patrol boats. This could have been a good and interesting exercise had it gone off as planned.

c. DAILY DOUBLE - A NATO exercise involving four carriers, this one was hampered by the actions in Lebanon and SIXTH Fleet's response to same. Operating in relatively tight quarters northwest of Corsica extra attention was paid to aircraft movements. The airwing conducted low level flights over northern Italy in response to NATO tasking. Raids by Italian air units against the CVBG were scheduled but were never fully developed. Only minimum aircraft were encountered. Surface operations were conducted jointly with Italian units. The three combatants which jointed the battle group for the duration of the exercise were highly capable and professional. Some communications problems did exist and kept reoccurring but were not considered detrimental to operational readiness or coordination. A crosstell net was established prior to the exercise with the intent of exchanging air tracking information; however, nothing of value ever was exchanged throughout the course of the event. Poor atmospheric conditions coupled with a shift of HF frequencies on a day/night basis hampered reliability of the circuit.

d. NATIONAL WEEK - Operating in the central Med and supported by USS EISENHOWER operating in the western Med this exercise proved valuable in exposing good and bad points of dual carrier operations. Positive aspects were found in maintaining link 11 over distances of 200 NM and even further with E-2 support. Similarly, exchange of surface and air contact reports were continuous and reliable allowing ample time to respond as necessary. The link at times was saturated and numerous dual designations were constant but not unmanagable. Turnover of CAP between the two battle groups occurred frequently and smoothly. By having airwing aircraft who were to be under EISENHOWER control check in on their "strike" frequency and vice versa an added measure of flexibility in using the asset was realized. In this manner the aircraft could be properly vectored and turned over to the controller within the battle group as necessary should a change in mission or station occur. Exchange of aircraft mission data, fight plans and daily codewords were a continuous problem. Timely message traffic could have resolved much of this. Tasking, at times, was vague requiring a call to the OTC or warfare commander to get clarification. Likewise, flexibility was a must during the course of this exercise. With strike groups going great distances to conduct their mission keeping fuel in the air or on alert was must. Communications between ships and aircraft was ragged. Had a set of common frequencies been established for various missions this could have been resolved. Instead most aircraft under control of a cruiser or destroyer found they had to use the fleet tactical net to establish comms.

e. WEAPONS WEEK - An intense, high paced evolution. This exercise involved conventional ordnance delivery, air-to-air missile shots and surface-to-air missile shoots. Scheduling was tight for all units and the airwing. The evolution went well with the exception of the NATO Sea Sparrow missile shoot which failed for a number of reasons. Some big factors were the long range for drone flight, resulting in less than ideal drone control; high altitude of drone flight for any radio control at all and attempting to fire between aircraft launch/recovery cycles.

Another problem was the lack of a plane guard destroyer being available when needed. If helo assets were unavailable due to maintenance problems it meant calling a destroyer off his scheduled event for plane guard duty. Even with one helo available a destroyer was required to be within 10 NM to conduct air operations. Scheduling one unit for this duty on a daily basis would have eliminated this problem.

8. ~~(C)~~ Equipment Reliability

a. Radars - The SPS-49 provided consistent service, despite Indian ocean SEA temperatures which at times reached 87 degrees F. Detection ranges in the Mediterranean averaged over 200 NM while those in the Indian Ocean were around 180 NM due to the severe ducting encountered. In fact the radar was plagued by ducting in the Indian Ocean degrading it at times to almost useless. The SPS-48C was available around 60 percent of the time. Maintenance and parts problems were frequent. During the Indian Ocean portion of operations this radar provided better air tracking and detection than the SPS-49. Fortunately, neither radar required antenna cleaning of sand and dirt as past Indian ocean deployers had reported as being necessary. The SPS-10 worked well with minimal down time.

b. Radios - All communications equipment in CIC operated properly with no severe problems or malfunctions encountered.

INTELLIGENCE CENTER (CVIC)

1. ~~(C)~~ USS JOHN F. KENNEDY deployed from Norfolk, Virginia for Mediterranean and Indian Ocean (IO) operations on 4 January 1982. TYT I, II, III and Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) were conducted from 6 October to 11 December 1981. KENNEDY's predeployment standdown, time normally used for last minute arrangements, details and supply purchase, was conducted over the Christmas and New Year's holidays. The crew was obviously glad to be home for the holidays, but the last minute arrangements were particularly difficult due to both crew and shore establishment leave/standdown periods. Nevertheless, KENNEDY's departure on 4 January found CVIC as ready as possible for deployment. CVIC was undermanned in the IS rating throughout workups, but several arrivals just prior to deployment brought personnel manning up to NMP. A heavy emphasis was placed on cross training within work centers for assigned IS's during the deployment. Personnel assignments, including air wing IS's TAD to CVIC, were generally as follows:

ONBOARD RATE	MSI	MSN PLAN	SUPPLOT	ADMIN	S&R	TAD
ISC	1	0	0	0	0	0
IS1	0	0	1	1	0	1
IS2	1	1	0	0	0	0
IS3	2	1	1	0	0	0
ISSN	2	4	2	0	0	1
YNSN	0	0	0	1	0	0
DPC	0	0	0	0	1	0
DP1	0	0	0	0	0	1
DP2/3	0	0	0	0	3	1
TOTAL:	6	6	4	2	4	4

2. ~~(C)~~ Chronology.

DATE	EVENT
4 Jan	Depart Norfolk
6-15 Jan	Dual CVBG CONUS-MED transit with USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
8 Jan	BEAR D surveillance of dual CVBG
9-10 Jan	SEA VENTURE ops
17 Jan	Inchop MED
17-21 Jan	Malaga, Spain port visit
23-28 Jan	Exercise NATIONAL WEEK XXXI
31 Jan - 1 Feb	AVGO NISI tgt complex ops
3 Feb	Suez Canal transit
4-6 Feb	Red Sea transit
9 Feb	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
10 Feb	AN-12/CUB transit Aden-Tashkent IL-38/MAY transit Aden Tashkent

11 Feb	AN-12/CUB transit Tashkent-Aden
	IO turnover with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64)
12 Feb	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
13 Feb	Four Indian JAGUAR's and one CUB transit Oman-India
14-16 Feb	ASWEX 82-4U
16 Feb	PASSEX with FS KERSAINT
18 Feb	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
	Iranian P-3 surveillance of CVBG
	CODEL Cohen, Senator from Maine, visit to CVBG
19 Feb	Iranian P-3 surveillance of CVBG
22-23 Feb	BEACON FLASH 4-82
23 Feb	PASSEX with HMS SHEFFIELD
24 Feb	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
25 Feb	AN-12/CUB transit Tashkent-Aden
26 Feb	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
1-2 Feb	ASWEX 82-5
	NAL-1-I exercise
2 Mar	IL-38/MAY transit Aden-Tashkent
	IL-38/MAY transit Tashkent-Aden
	AN-12/CUB transit Aden-Tashkent
4 Mar	PASSEX with HMS ACTIVE
5 Mar	AN-12/CUB transit Aden-Tashkent
6 Mar	SHELLBACK initiation
8-10 Mar	GONZOEX 82-2 vic Diego Garcia/Dual CVBG ops with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64)
11 Mar	BEEREX
17-18 Mar	BEACON SOUTH 82-2
19-25 Mar	Glorious Perth
29 Mar - 1 Apr	Dual CVBG ops vic Diego Garcia with USS CONSTEL-LATION (CV 64)
2-5 Apr	WEAPONS WEEK vic Diego Garcia
12 Apr	AN-12/CUB transit Tashkent-Aden
13 Apr	NAL-2-I exercise
	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
16-21 Apr	Exercise DOUBLE TEAM ASW ops
20-21 Apr	BEACON FLASH 82-5
20 Apr	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
27 Apr	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
1 May	Coordinated training exercise for Kenyan VIPs
2-6 May	Mombasa port visit
9 May	Somalian presidential visit
	Flyover/TARPS of Somalia
10 May	Socotra surveillance
11 May	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
12 May	Two pair IL-38/MAYs surveil CVBG during Aden-Tashkent North/South transits
	AN-12/CUB transit Tashkent-Aden
13-14 May	SECNAV visit to CVBG

15-20 May	Exercise DOUBLE TEAM ASW ops
18 May	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
19-20 May	BEACON FLASH 82-6
19 May	AN-12/CUB transit Aden-Tashkent
25 May	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
28-30 May	FON practice
1 Jun	IL-38/MAY surveillance of CVBG
	CVBG transit Bab-El-Mandeb
2-4 Jun	Red Sea transit
5 Jun	Suez Canal transit
6-18 Jun	East MED evacuation/contingency support ops
21-23 Jun	Parlez-vous Francais/Toulon
24-26 Jun	Exercise DAILY DOUBLE
26 Jun	DACT and WASEX with French
28 Jun - 3 Jul	Costa del Sol/Malaga
4-14 Jul	MED-CONUS dual CVBG transit

3. ~~(C)~~ Mission Planning. Mission Planning served as the focus for televised cyclic operations briefing, debriefing, nuclear mission planning, and contingency target planning. In addition, intelligence briefings, pre-sail briefings, CAG "back-in-the-saddle" briefings and training presentations were periodically presented via the CVIC closed circuit TV. In summary, Mission Planning served both for transmission of information and generation of plans. Officers working in Mission Planning were Air Wing Intelligence Officers, while enlisted personnel were a mix of ship's company and air wing Intelligence Specialists (IS). Mission Planning was supervised by an air wing IS during the day and a ship's company IS at night. These supervisors managed the television system, maps and charts, and graphic support. An Intelligence Officer was also on duty continually while at sea.

a. (U) Briefings. The CVIC CCTV brief was a point of direct contact between the ship/air wing team and was the best known product of CVIC, particularly cyclic events briefs. After undergoing some growing pains, a briefing format was developed which best served the needs of all aircrews. The Intelligence Duty Officer also acted as ASW briefer and presented the ASW briefing two hours (+) prior to launch. The time between the ASW brief and the regular cyclic event brief was used to present short threat or recognition briefs. At one hour forty-five prior to launch, the cyclic brief began. It consisted of a short situation update, notes pertaining to the event, a brief of the operating area and a detailed operational briefing. This was followed immediately by a presentation directly from Supplemental Plot (SUPPLOT), where the surface surveillance situation was maintained. Pre-event briefings were also available from Air Operations and Meteorology, but were shown on separate channels and were not an integral part of the CVIC brief.

b. (U) Debriefing. Debriefing was accomplished by two teams of intelligence officers who were responsible for taking debriefs from aircrews, providing immediate feedback to CIC and SUPPLOT, writing daily summaries, making inputs to reports for exercises, and Intelligence Report (IR) writing for high interest evolutions such as Soviet surveillance flights. Daily summaries consisted of an event summary which outlined the sequence of occurrences during a given event; and a Daily Air Operations Summary, an excutive summary of the day's highlights.

c. ~~(C)~~ Nuclear Mission Planning. For the first time, Mission Planning Folders (MPF) were stripped by the FAISC's at Cecil Field and Oceana. Although this reduced the number of charts required, folders still required some correction and revision as planning was completed by aircrews. KENNEDY/CVW-3 developed extensive Nuclear Mission Planning experience. All MPF's were debriefed to the embarked staff prior to ORE. Three NAL-2-I exercises, a short notice planning exercise involving three MPF's, and an exercise AGLOW CHARLIE involving five MPF's emphasized the necessity for planning expertise and cooperation between all sections of the CVIC.

d. ~~(C)~~ Conventional Mission Planning and Contingency Operations. CVIC participated in a number of conventional contingency strike planning evolutions as well as planning for Freedom of Navigation (FON) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in response to the Israeli/Lebanon/Syria conflict. The most important factors were cooperation and communication between Mission Planning, Storage and Retrieval (S&R) and Multi-Sensor Interpretation (MSI) to support the needs of the operators. Familiarity with plans and operational directives was imperative. The SAO package was used extensively for area and target orientation and check point photography. A wealth of information is available from the FOSIC/FOSIF/FIC's, who expeditiously provided data upon request.

e. ~~(C)~~ Maps, Charts and Graphic Supplies. Because the cruise was split between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, a complete stock of charts for both areas was required. In addition to the standard allowance (ensure you have the latest list for the IO), recommend at least 250 extra ofthe following high use charts: MEDITERRANEAN - GNC 4/3; JNC21/22/33/34; ONC G-1/H-4/F-2/G-2; TPC G-1 (A, B, C, D)/G-2 (A, B, C)/K-2 (C, D)/G-54 (D). INDIAN OCEAN - GNC 12/15/16; JNC 35/36/51/52/53; ONC J-7/K-6/M-8/-12/R-11. Hydrographic charts 61610, 61611 and 61612 were necessary for Weapons Week at Diego Carcia. Charts used for Suez Canal transits were HO 56082 and 1:50,000 series P773, Sheets 5787 II/5786 II/5785 IV/5885 III/5884 IV. Check for the latest charts in print for operations in the Perth, Australia area. Also check for the availability of AMS charts and TACTA's for known contingency areas (major Mideast/North Africa/IO targets and the Beirut, Lebanon area). During the cruise, one IS was responsible for keeping the chart vaults in order, but all Mission Planning IS's were trained to locate charts on short notice. A system for maintaining a running inventory of charts using the NIPS computer is being developed.

f. (U) CVIC Closed Circuit TV. The SXQ-8 Video Briefing System, which was installed shortly before deployment, has been a very versatile system. A few problems were encountered; the primary cameras (RCA Model TK-76 Color Camera) were down for a good portion of the cruise due to power supply card failure and repeated fuse failures. Cause analysis is incomplete at this time. Remote errors have repeatedly occurred on the HAZELTINE System Channel Selector as a result of lock-up of remote station microprocessor. This can be remedied by resetting power to the coax-drivers (40 volt line). Dual image in the horizontal plane is caused by failure of the video processing integrated circuit in JVC Model Video Monitor. We suggest that spares be acquired for at least the above integrated circuit boards plus spare system control boards for SONY VO2860A Video Cassette recorders. Part numbers for most can be found in Navy stock by utilizing the microfiche listing. The CCTV system was operated by CVIC IS's and maintained by EC Division of EMO.

4. ~~(C)~~ Storage and Retrieval (S&R). Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) was up and operational throughout deployment. The new NIPS area file (NAF) format and message processing system have been exceptional improvements and significantly increased the utility of the system. During the deployment, NIPS played an important role in providing information for training, planning and tactical briefs for the ship, air wing, and embarked flag. Digitized data base use was moderate to extensive throughout the deployment in support of Mediterranean/Indian Ocean contingencies. Due to the NAF format, significant time savings were evident in the building of tactical area files and the retrieval of data. The mini-data base (aperture cards and microfiche) was relied upon extensively for information requests. Though the NIPS system is not new to CVIC personnel, the increased flexibility derived from service change 112 created new interest and usage of the NIPS system by all concerned.

a. (U) Message Processing System. The NIPS Message Processing System (MPS) feature was the most utilized function of the system. All personnel in CVIC and others from various divisions of Operations Department used MPS for RAINFORM, OPREP, IPIR, MIJI reports and a variety of other messages. All IIRs produced by CVIC were formatted, keyed and maintained on the NIPS message processing system. Most of the IIRs were created in message form and transmitted to paper tape for encryption and transmission by the Communications Department. Mission Planning maintained daily cards-of-the-day, link cards, codewords and basic outlines for briefs in MPS, facilitating the production, updating and distribution of these formatted documents. Various forms, formats, sample messages and procedures were also maintained in the MPS sample message file for reference material. All messages were saved daily by dumping to magnetic tape; forty tapes were set aside and utilized to maintain a historical file for at least thirty days. The tapes were used in a rotating manner. This reduced the keying of messages lost to cold starting or inadvertant deletion of messages from the system.

Prior to deployment, data processors from ASWM normally keyed and maintained RAINFORM PURPLES for the VS and HS squadrons on the ASWM computer; however, the NIPS message processing system was found to be more flexible than the ASWM computer system. All RAINFORM PURPLES and other ASWM messages were keyed on the NIPS MPS, which facilitated cross training for the data processors in ASWM/ADP on the MPS. Messages created using the MPS were transmitted to paper tape by S&R for further transmission by the Communications Department. Before a message was transmitted to paper tape, it was copied, thus enabling a rerun if the tape broke or did not completely transmit to paper tape. If not copied the message is lost and must be rekeyed; this problem will be corrected when the retransmit feature is functional. Transmission of messages to paper tape reduces the time required for Communications to process messages and speeds the output of messages originating from CVIC. Though four DDI and printers were utilized, the addition of more terminals and printers would further enhance the flexibility of the system. Additionally, expanding the storage capacity of the MPS, with a limited word processing capability included, would significantly enhance system utility.

b. (U) Math Support System. The math support system was used throughout the deployment for determining UTM, distance and bearing, elasped time calculations, dead reckoning of contacts for quick conversions and preparation of RAINFORM messages, IIRs and various other reports.

c. ~~(C)~~ Satellite Vulnerability. Upon receipt of CHARLIE elements from NAVSPASUR and ship's positional information from the Navigation Department, Soviet satellite vulnerability reports were produced for use by the CVBG. Vulnerability reports were produced in three to four day increments and distributed via message to the task group. As satellite vulnerability reports cannot be produced through the NIPS message processing system, close coordination with the Communications Department was required to correct superfluous data generated by the RECSAT utility. Communications personnel generated the messages from the NIPS paper tape after review by communications and S&R personnel. If the RECSAT messages were output to the MPS, all corrections could be made in S&R, thus saving valuable time. This change has been proposed for the forthcoming NIPS software service change (SSC 113). In addition to the satellite vulnerability report, S&R was tasked with CLUSTER STAR and CLUSTER BROWN collection. This required coordination with several other divisions on the ship. CLUSTER STAR collection was completed for COSMOS 1355 and CLUSTER BROWN collection for COSMOS 1365 from 9 May to 30 May and 19 May to 19 June 1982, respectively.

d. (U) NIPS Hardware. NIPS hardware was very reliable throughout the deployment, with only minor problems. The extensive work done on the system during workups by Mr. Dick Cowell and Mr. Ron Kelly of NESEADET solved major problems prior to deployment. Minor problems with the system during the deployment included:

(1) (U) One DMS unit failure during the first-half of the deployment. Parts were available after minimum delay, and the unit was quickly repaired by DS personnel in CVIC.

(2) (U) One of the OL-170 (MUX) units experienced temperature problems during the first-half of the cruise. If the temperature approached 70 degrees, the display on the DDI's to which it was connected became irratic and then inoperative until the temperature was lowered. The system had to be warm started once the temperature fell below 65 degrees to restore the DDI's is to operational status. This OL-170 (MUX) was not operational in the latter part of the deployment due to power supply problems and lack of parts receipt. The remaining OL-170 (MUX) had two bad plates which precluded more than 3 DDI's from being connected.

(3) (U) The RD-295 (Model 1540) magnetic tape unit performed satisfactorily during the beginning of the cruise, but developed intermittant problems apparently caused by ship vibration, particulary during flight operations. This problem has existed since prior to the last COH period, and could be solved by replacement with the newer model 1840.

(4) (U) There were minor problems with the AR-155A during the deployment; however, this had minimal impact due to extensive use of a 3M 500 reader-printer. Viewing and printing of michrofiche publications from the mini-data base were accomplished on the 3M 500. Although the 3M 500 saved time and is not as expensive to operate, the AR-155A must be used to print the larger negatives on aperture cards. With extensive AR-155A use, supply delays can be anticipated for paper, bulbs and repair parts. It is recommended that an ample supply be ordered well in advance of deployment.

e. (U) NIPS Area Files (NAF). The newly implemented NIPS Area File (NAF) format saved many hours of computer time. The NAF format made it easier to query against a given country for any item of data without having to search through several record type files. Support from the FIC's in the production and distribution of updates to the NIPS data base was excellent throughout the deployment. The NDX files, received from both FIC's, were not used.

5. (U) CVIC Administration.

a. (U) Responsibilities. CVIC Admin was manned by one officer (O-3), who is also the S&R Officer, and two enlisted (1-E6/1-E3) personnel. The Admin Officer's duties included: Assistant Top Secret Control Officer (ATSCO), Alternate COSMIC/ATOMAL Control Officer, Alternate Tight Control Officer, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Proficiency Certifying Officer for Operations Department, Armed Forces

Courier Service (ARFCOS) Coordinator, Sealed Authentication System/ Emergency Action Procedures (SAS/EAP) Officer, Ship's NWP Custodian, Division CMS User Custodian and Alternate Command Historian. A library of intelligence publications, directives, manuals and operation orders (OPORDS) was maintained for use by ship and air wing intelligence personnel. CVIC correspondence was received, typed and disseminated through the Admin office. Classified material was received, controlled, accounted for and distributed in accordance with applicable security directives. CVIC Admin also functioned as the Classified Material Control manager for the Operations Department.

b. (U) Publications.

(1) (U) Prior to deployment, KENNEDY received two preconfigured packages of NATO publications from COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH via ARFCOS and Registered Mail. Although seldom used during the deployment, the NATO pubs are vital when higher authority directs exercise/actual operations with NATO forces. These publications were returned to COMSTRIKEFOR-SOUTH.

(2) (U) COMNAVSURFLANT provided an "Indian Ocean" package of unclassified and classified Pacific Fleet instructions and OPORDS which were separated and distributed internally via memorandum to cognizant departments/divisions. These were returned to COMNAVSURFLANT upon out-chopping from the Indian Ocean.

(3) (U) Intelligence reference documents, both classified and unclassified, were maintained in the CVIC Admin reference library. Joint Imagery Interpretation Keys (JIIKS), DIA manuals, Air/Navy/ Ground/Electronic/Missile Orders of Battle (OB) and the Fleet Intelligence Collection Manual (FICM) were but a few of the myriad publications and documents available. Documents were maintained in hardcopy and/or microfiche. The Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) mini-data base was used extensively to augment publications held in CVIC Admin.

c. (U) Admin Operations.

(1) (U) Admin provided normal administrative support to all sections of CVIC. Correspondence was accomplished in accordance with SECNAVINST 5216.5 (series) as modified by command policy. A review of publications and documents maintained was conducted, resulting in a reduction of approximately 25% of inventory. This was a continuing action to ensure outdated and non-essential materials were purged. All Intelligence Office instructions were reviewed and updated as required by CVIC Admin.

(2) (U) All ship's Top Secret and NATO material was stored in

CVIC Admin, and controlled in strict compliance with applicable directives.

(3) (U) KENNEDY was designated a Subregistry for receipt and control of NATO publications under the Central U.S. Registry. Accordingly, a complete inventory of NATO publications was conducted in compliance with USSANINST 1-69.

(4) (U) CVIC Admin prepared and videotaped a briefing on NATO classifications and NATO document handling procedures (to include COSMIC/ATOMAL information). The 15-minute briefing serves to indoctrinate personnel granted access to NATO material and provides a simple, efficient method for accomplishing annual reindoctrination in forum. Upon completion, personnel sign or revalidate their indoctrination oaths.

(5) (U) CVIC Admin is assigned a block of registered numbers by the ship's Postal Office for direct control of classified mailings. This was extremely beneficial to CVIC and the Registered Mail postal personnel when CVIC was required to disseminate multiple copies of several IIR's via hardcopy due to communication MINIMIZE postures.

(6) (U) CVIC Admin was normally operated from 0700 to 2400 daily, with personnel on-call around the clock. Although initially manned with an O-3/E6/E3, the E3 was assigned TAD to S-2 for most of the deployment. A Yeoman Striker (E3) on temporary duty from Strike Operations was assigned during the latter half of the deployment.

d. (U) Supplies.

(1) (U) Office supplies and equipment were requisitioned well in advance of deployment. During standdown, following TYT and ORE training, the Fleet Servmart, NAVSTA Norfolk, was used extensively to purchase expendable supplies depleted during workups. Open purchase of essential items not readily available through the supply system was accomplished immediately prior to deployment. Division personnel volunteered their off-duty time and private vehicles to ensure these supplies were obtained.

(2) (U) Supply use throughout the deployment was moderate. High use items, such as glue and typewriter correction tape, were identified early in the cruise. Strict management of these highly consumable supplies ensured product availability. Supplies normally available through the ship's supply were fairly easy to obtain while in the IO. Nevertheless, supplies that had to be forwarded to the ship often took months to arrive. Although most open purchase items were ordered during workups, shipment to the IO was a major factor when items were not received prior to deployment. Stockpiling and monitoring supply usage during workups provided the basis for cruise supply requirements. Serv-

mart proved to be the best source for maintaining required levels of most highly consumable items needed in CVIC. Air Wing Intelligence Officers often augmented CVIC supply with items frequently used for briefs and special projects. Advance planning and proper management during workups should ensure acquisition of minimum essential supplies prior to deployment. The following is a list of high use items and recommended quantities for a normal MED/IO deployment.

QUANTITY	ITEM
25 gal	Rubber Cement
15 bxs	Viewgraph Transparencies (clear & rainbow colors)
4 bxs (300 shts ea)	Poster Board
150 rms	Xerox Paper (8x10½)
150 rms	Xerox Paper (8x14)
60 bxs (6 per)	Selectric II & III Typewriter Ribbons
150 bxs (4/6 ea)	Selectric II & III Correction Ribbons
10 bxs (10 per)	Easel Pads
20 bxs (4 per)	3M 500 Reader/Printer Paper
40 rls	Acetate, clear (adhesive)
20 rls	Acetate, clear (non-adhesive)
20 rls	Acetate, matte (non-adhesive)
20 bxs (ea)	Envelopes, franked (all sizes)
20 bxs (ea)	Envelopes, unfranked (all sizes)
200 shts (ea)	CHARTPAK Transfer Letters (various sizes)
300 rls	CHARTPAK (matte, gloss, pattern) Tapes (various sizes & colors)
50 ea	Weems Plotter
100 ea	Lined Writing Tablets
50 pk	Viewgraph Pens (assorted colors)
40 bxs	Folders, file (8x10)
40 bxs	Folders, file (8x14)

NOTE: The Selectric II and III typewriter elements are not interchangeable. Appropriate elements for each should be obtained prior to deployment.

(3) (U) A limited number of maps and charts are available from the DMA Branch Office, NAS Norfolk. However, high use mission essential charts must be requisitioned well in advance of deployment (a minimum of three months is recommended). Regular requisitions submitted by CVIC during workups arrived two days and one day, respectively, prior to deployment. The combined orders totaled eight (8) pallets and over 10,000 charts. Chart replenishment in the IO was very timely. Charts were ordered via the MILSTRIP system by message to: DMA Office,

Pacific, Hickam AFB, HI; info: DMA Branch Office, Cubi Point, RP. Detailed instructions for chart requisition and format are contained in "DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products," section 2. Chart delivery averaged 3-4 weeks throughout the deployment. Newly revised/issued CINCLANTFLTINST 3169 (series) promulgates Atlantic Fleet requirements and establishes procedures for requisitioning special and high use charts for deployment and operations.

e. ~~(C)~~ SAS/EAP. Throughout the deployment, a trained and experienced Command Reaction Team (CRT) was tried and tested in an extremely flexible environment. Prior to departing CONUS, efforts were made to ascertain correct references and materials for handling Sealed Authentication Systems (SAS) in the Mediterranean and Pacific operating areas. This effort was hindered by the Christmas leave period on the ship and at cognizant shore commands. Additional problems resulted from a major SAS resupply effort ongoing concurrently with revisions to necessary instructions in both theaters of operation.

(1) ~~(C)~~ While enroute the Indian Ocean, KENNEDY did not receive benefit of a Mediterranean turnover with another carrier. This adversely affected ship's capability to respond to COMSIXTHFLT EAM's, as KENNEDY had not received major changes to COMSIXTHFLT reporting procedures. The problem was quickly identified and resolved. Advance liaison with CTF SIX ZERO prior to departure from the Indian Ocean ensured adequate turnover for Mediterranean operations during the latter portion of the deployment.

(2) (~~C~~) Similar problems were encountered upon inchopping the Indian Ocean. The ship maintained a copy of the CINCPACFLT EASOP, but was not on distribution for changes to the manual. Again, the problem was quickly identified and resolved during turnover with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64).

(3) (~~C~~) CINCPAC also maintains an Emergency Action Procedures (EAP) manual, which was received upon initial supply of PACOM SAS materials. Unfortunately, this manual had been superseded prior to KENNEDY inchopping the Indian Ocean. Seven weeks were required to receive the new manual.

(4) (U) The majority of problems could be avoided if carriers deploying to the IO were provided required SAS materials and effective procedures/instructions prior to departing CONUS. KENNEDY did not receive the complete PACOM package of SAS materials until midway through the IO deployment.

(5) ~~(C)~~ Standardization by Fleet CINCs of Navy-wide Tactical Nuclear EAPs is highly desirable for units transiting between different fleet areas of responsibility. It is recommended that a single NAVEUR/LANTFLT/PACFLT EASOP for Tactical Nuclear Operations be implemented.

Annex A, to reference (b), paragraph 5.e.(6) below, identifies the most detailed and restricted control procedures used by USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. These procedures are expected to be complied with while under operational control of CINCPACFLT and may require major revision to local EAP instructions for LANTFLT carriers deployed to the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, it is recommended that procedures in Annex A to CINCPACFLT EASOP be adopted Navy-wide; or alternatively, LANTFLT units properly respond to CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT EAMs operating with local procedures established under guidance contained in the CINCLANT EAP Manual, Vol I; and JCS Pub 13.

(6) (U) Reference documents for CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) are:

(a) (U) JCS Pub 13, Vol I, dtd 1 April 1982

(b) (U) CINCPACFLT Emergency Action Standard Operating Procedures (EASOP), dtd 25 September 1979, current thru CH-5

(c) (U) CINCPAC Emergency Action Procedures (EAP), Vol I, dtd 10 August 1981, current thru CH-3

(d) (C) CINCPAC ltr, ser S176, dtd 8 April 1981, which identified effective and reserve editions of USCAS-100.

(e) (~~C~~) CINCPAC ltr, ser S177, dtd 9 April 1981, which identified effective and reserve editions of USCAS/USCXS-70 (CINCPAC 230017Z Mar 82, revised effective editions and eliminated the reserve editions of USCXS-70, effective 011600Z Apr 82.

(f) (~~C~~) ALL USCAS/USCXS-78 series editions were received onboard KENNEDY without designation of effective and bulk reserve editions.

(7) (U) Reference documents for CINCLANT/CINCUSNAVEUR Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) are:

(a) (U) CINCLANT Emergency Action Procedures (EAP), Vol I, ser T-74, dtd 11 August 1981.

(b) (U) CINCUSNAVEURINST S3010.1L, CINCUSNAVEUR Alert System, dtd 1 December 1979.

(c) (~~C~~) CINCLANT 072000Z Jan 82, established effective and bulk reserve editions of USCAS/USCXS-67 SAS materials.

(d) (~~S~~) CINCLANT 072222Z Apr 82, updated effective and bulk reserve editions of USCXS-67 SAS materials.

(e) (~~S~~) COMNAVAIRLANT 200821Z NOV 81, updated effective and bulk reserve editions of NATO SAS materials.

(8) (~~C~~) USS AMERICA's Intelligence Cruise Report described PACOM area SAS procedures. By following those examples and having possession of reference material cited in paragraph 5.e(6) above, KENNEDY had very few problems in the Indian Ocean. Required reporting procedures are fully described in the CINCPACFLT EAP Manual, Vol I, Chapter 5, paragraps 4 and 7.

(9) (~~C~~) Pacific related authenticators will be provided either during turnover operations with the relieved CV/CVN, by priority shipment from FLETRACEN San Diego (at the direction of CINCPACFLT), or by special tasking. If no turnover will occur, it is recommended that arrangements be made in advance with CINCPACFLT for delivery of SAS materials prior to departing CONUS. It is also recommended that deploying units notify CINCPACFLT and FLETRACEN San Diego for forwarding materials to NAVCURSERVDET Diego Garcia, for ultimate delivery to units in the Indian Ocean.

(10) (~~C~~) Prior to inchopping the Indian Ocean, a message ARFCOS Form 10 should be provided to FLETRACEN San Diego and NAVCURSERVDET Diego Garcia designating individuals authorized to receive Two-Man Control (TMC) material.

6. (~~S~~) SUPPLOT. Supplemental Plot (SUPPLOT) served as the ship's all-source fusion center for all contacts gained by force air, surface and subsurface units, as well as information reported by GENSER, Special Intelligence (SI) and SCI traffic. This information was used to generate a current tactical intelligence picture of the LANT, MED and IO as appropriate. SUPPLOT was directly responsible for providing the embarked flag, Commanding Officer, Operations Officer, SSES, CIC and ASWM with information on all significant intelligence developments within the ship's area of interest.

a. (~~C~~) Location. Following the last deployment, SUPPLOT was relocated to SSES spaces to enhance communications with SSES analysts, improve all-source message traffic handling and improve ability to graphically display units in ship's area of interest. This move, although impacting on the space available in SSES, significantly increased SUPPLOT's ability to provide timely and accurate intelligence to shipboard users.

b. (U) Manning. While at sea, SUPPLOT was manned 24-hours a day by two 12-hour watch teams composed of one officer and two enlisted personnel. Inport, SUPPLOT was manned by appropriately trained and cleared personnel from the duty section 24-hours per day. The senior SUPPLOT officer acted as "Ops Officer" responsible for the training and supervision of two officers and four ship's company IS analysts, as well as providing quality control on all SUPPLOT products and reports. Air Wing Intelligence Officers (AIO's) filled one of the watch officer positions on a six-week rotational basis. Air Wing augmentation adds to the professional development of the AIO's and lessens the watchstanding burden of the ship's company officers. As such, AIO augmentation of SUPPLOT is highly recommended. During KENNEDY's participation in east Mediterranean contingency support operations resulting from, the Israeli/Lebanon conflict, SUPPLOT was augmented by two AIO's to monitor the geopolitical/military situation on a 24-hours a day basis. A written summary was updated three times daily for distribution to the Commanding Officer, embarked flag, air wing and selected ship's company personnel.

c. ~~(C)~~ SSC. The SSC picture was updated and briefed from SUPPLOT prior to each flight event as part of the regular cyclic event brief from Mission Planning, using the CCTV system. Units of interest within 300NM, including Battle Group disposition, were briefed using information from own force sensors as well as all-source traffic monitored by SUPPLOT. This information was briefed showing range and bearing from the ship, and was plotted on the ship's SSC grid overlaid on an appropriate scale chart of KENNEDY's current operating area. The plot was updated by own force sensor reports from CIC, pilot debriefs from Mission Planning and incoming all-source message reports. Own force contacts on Soviet or other high interest units were first passed from CIC via the 12MC and followed up with a handwritten report. To ensure information flow was complete, SUPPLOT passed fused locating data on an event-by-event basis to debriefers, MSI and CIC.

d. ~~(C)~~ External Support. External information for plot maintenance came from several sources: LTAC (in the Atlantic), MTAC (in the Mediterranean), FOSIF/FOSIC reporting, other ships' and squadrons' RAINFORM, HFDF, SELOR RED reports, and various SI/SCI products.

e. (~~C~~) RAINFORM Reporting. RAINFORM report formulation (other than OSIS reports from MSI and RAINFORM PURPLES from ASWM) was assigned to SUPPLOT. In accordance with guidance from higher authority, RAINFORM reporting in the Indian Ocean differed from MED/LANT as follows: REF, UNIT, RELPO, and FORCE lines were required for IO RAINFORM reports. Two REF lines were used. Inserted after the MSGID line, the first was for the appropriate tasking directive under which the ship was operating. Used was flag's Schedule of Events message, while other ships used TG SEVEN ZERO IO SOP or OPGEN INDIA. The second REF line was for the last RAINFORM of the same type (i.e., last SITSIX for the present SITSIX, last BEEPER BELL for the present BEEPER BELL, or the last BEIGE SNOW for the present BEIGE SNOW). For the initial RAINFORM of each type a LAMP line is used after the first REF line saying: "INITIAL SEVENTHFLT

RAINFORM RED/WHITE/SITSIX/OSIS RED, etc." The UNIT line was placed before the NAV/SUB/AIR line to report ship's own posit as close to the time of event as possible. The RELPO line is not used with BEARING and TIME lines due to the redundacy involved. Finally, the FORCE line is placed just prior to the NARR line to report the ships in company, or the Battle Group designator, depending on the number of ships in company. RAINFORM BLACKS are required in the IO. BLACKS are used to summarize the day's reporting on any submarine contacts as well as air surveillance evolutions. BLACKS are not written for surface contacts. Two flagwords are required for special IO RAINFORM reporting; "BEEPER BELL" is for AGI contacts and "BEIGE SNOW" for any Soviet (not Iranian P-3) air contacts. These flagwords are inserted before the MSGID line. CTF SEVEN ZERO promulgates a write in addee listing for RAINFORM's. Indian Ocean RAINFORM AIGS were:

310: AIR CONTACTS

7680: SITSIX CONTACTS

9292: SURFACE CONTACTS

9293: OSIS REPORTING

(1) ~~(C)~~ Guidance/instructions found to be particularly helpful in proper RAINFORM reporting were:

LANT/MED:	CINCLANTFLT/CINCUSNAVEURINST S3820.4 (series) "Intelligence Collecting and Reporting"
MED:	CTF 60 "RAINCONREG and BLUE Forces Reporting Guidance messages
IO/PACFLT:	TG 70 IO SOP CINCPACFLTINST C3431.1C "RAINFORM Formatted Message Reporting System" CINCPACFLTINST S3820.12A "PACFLT Intel Collecting and Reporting Manual" CINCPACFLTINST S3430.8F "Surveillance of Foreign Intel Collectors"
ALL AREAS:	OPNAVINST C3431.1B "RAINFORM Formatted Message Reporting System"

(2) ~~(C)~~ SUPPLOT RAINFORM reporting was accomplished in accordance with the appropriate OPGEN INDIA as promulgated by the embarked flag. This included the requirement to act as the Battle Group "Intelligence Guard Ship" for all units within 50NM of KENNEDY.

(3) ~~(C)~~ SUPPLOT initiated over six hundred (600) RAINFORM reports on Soviet and other countries' surface, subsurface and air contacts in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean during the deployment. Of note, 257 were written in a ten-day period, from 7-17 June 1982, in the east Mediterranean resulting from increased Soviet presence during the Lebanon crisis.

f. ~~(C)~~ Message Traffic. Traffic monitored in SUPPLOT was held on various message "boards." Boards were selected for use depending on topic and event. The following boards were maintained: OPINTEL (OSIS type individual reports), Geopolitical, Air, Submarine, Own Force Ops, FOSIC/FOSIF Summaries, Scientific & Technical, COLOP/Significant MERSHIP activity and several other SCI boards depending on current operations. Messages of historic significance were retained in an alphabetical filing system, which was reviewed periodically for file maintenance.

g. ~~(C)~~ ECLIPS. Plagued by a myriad of technical and parts problems, ECLIPS was unusable for most of the deployment. Also, no MTAC/LTAC equivalent exists in the Indian Ocean, degrading an operable ECLIPS, which is primarily designed to work with automated inputs.

h. (U) Internal Communications. The 12MC, shared with SSES, continued to be the fastest two-way secure voice communications mode on the ship. As such, it was used to exchange information with the Flag, Commanding Officer, Intelligence Officer, CIC and ASWM.

i. ~~(C)~~ Surveillance Flights. Throughout the deployment, BEAR and MAY surveillance flights against the Battle Group were the highest interest evolutions. They provided SUPPLOT's greatest challenge in properly supporting the ship and embarked flag with timely alerting data. This was particularly important in view of the 200NM intercept rule normally used in both LANT and IO operations. Ample warning is usually available. At the first indication of Soviet air activity, an air activity form, figure (1), and a chartlet were distributed to flag and appropriate ship's personnel depicting the estimated time the reconnaissance aircraft would be at 800NM, 600NM, 400NM, 200NM, etc, and the expected flight path. Once distributed, constant monitoring of the plot was maintained, with periodic SOA's computed to determine if the aircraft were maintaining the estimated speed. If a significant change was noted, a new air activity form was completed and distributed. A new chartlet was not made unless a significant change in the route was estimated. Once within radar/ESM range of the Battle Group, one person (normally a qualified SUPPLOT watch officer or the CAG IO) was positioned in CIC to coordinate the flow of information to and from SSES/SUPPLOT/CVIC. In SUPPLOT, one IS was used to maintain the plot and handle incoming message traffic, one IS was used to write RAINFORM reports (when the Aircraft were around the ship, the SUPPLOT "Ops Officer" often assisted to allow faster generation of RAINFORM reports). The SUPPLOT watch officer was used to monitor normal traffic and route outgoing RAINFORM messages through the "chop" chain. Finally, the SUPPLOT "Ops Officer" coordinated the entire evolution. SUPPLOT was fortunate to have an operational NTDS console in SSES. SSES' CTM or another qualified operator maintained track continuity on the aircraft using the NTDS console. KENNEDY's SSES Mid-Cruise Report contained complete details on IL-38/MAY activity during that portion of the cruise.

j. ~~(C)~~ OPINTEL Support. Shore based OSIS nodes provided superior support throughout the deployment. In the Atlantic, tailored intelligence support, arranged with FOSIC DET CLF prior to deployment, provided timely and accurate support to the Battle Group. Direct all-source reporting of air activity was particularly helpful in management of the air problem. Additionally, prior to deployment, FOSIC DET CLF informally provided historical background data on BEAR activity in the Atlantic; these were in the form of analyst "WANG" files and provided an excellent background for the air problem. FOSIF Rota provided exceptional predeployment information via their "INCHOPPER" messages. These were provided without request and proved to be invaluable. They were also very responsive to any and all wirenotes. Deploying to the IO for the first time, SUPPLOT was helped considerably by the early receipt of FOSIF WPAC intelligence products. This was arranged for by the embarked flag. FOSIF WPAC also responded expeditiously to wirenotes. Additionally, IO turnover packages from USS AMERICA and USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) were of great assistance in helping SUPPLOT to get up to speed quickly.

k. ~~(C)~~ SAO Packages. Because of the size of both the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean SAO packages (5 cruise boxes), SUPPLOT was used to store this valuable all-source asset.

CLASSIFICATION ____________ DATE/TIME OF PRODUCTION ____________

FROM: SUPPLOT
TO: BRIDGE; OPS OFF; FLAG INTEL; CAG; INTEL OFF; TAO; SSES; MSN PLNG

ASSUMED/OBSERVED GROUND SPEED: ____________

LAUNCH TIME: __________ LOCAL

	ESTIMATED	WORST CASE
1. IF RECONNOITER CV67:	(ALL TIMES LOCAL)	
A. EXPECTED OVHD	__________	__________
B. EXPECTED TIME AT 200NM FM CV67 (INTERCEPT)	__________	__________
C. THREAT AXIS: __________ T	__________	__________
D. ARR 1400NM (SUPPLOT NOTIFY ALCON)	__________	__________
E. ARR 1000NM (F-14, EA-6B, E2C, S-3 IN ALERT 30)	__________	__________
F. ARR 800NM (F-14, EA-6B, E2C, S-3 IN ALERT 15)	__________	__________
G. ARR 600NM (launch E-2C, EA-6B, S-3; BACKUP E2C TURNING ON DECK; F-14 ALERT 5)	__________	__________
H. ARR 500NM TAO CONSIDER LAUNCHING 2 F-14 WITH RUN OUT AT 360KTS (6NM/MIN) TO CONDUCT INTERCEPT AT 200NM: TKR ALERT)	__________	__________
I. ARR 400NM	__________	__________
J. ARR 200NM (INTERCEPT)	__________	__________
K. ARR 100NM	__________	__________
L. TOT CV67	__________	__________

2. IF DIRECT TO ESTIMATED DESTINATION ( ):

A. TIME OF CPA ________________________

B. BEARING/DISTANCE OF CPA __________ T/ ____________________ NM

C. RECOVERY TIME AT DESTINATION____________________________

3. AIRCRAFT DATA:

A. CALLSIGNS:_________/_________/_________/_________/_________

B. SIDE NBRS:_________/_________/_________/_________/_________

ORIGINATOR:____________

____
CLASSIFICATION

Figure (1)

7. ~~(C)~~ Multi-Sensor Interpretation (MSI). Addition of a TARPS squadron (VF-31) to Carrier Air Wing THREE, embarked USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, significantly enhanced capabilities of the MSI section. The VF-31 TARPS PI Officer functioned as MSI supervisor while the air wing was embarked and two VF-31 TARPS IS personnel were TAD to CVIC and integrated into the MSI team. Normal manning included the TARPS PI Officer, an ISC as Leading Chief of OZ Division and section supervisor, and five IS personnel (to include the two VF-31 IS's). MSI section's personnel manning level was adequate, except for lack of DSIATP trained personnel for most of the deployment. This, coupled with junior, inexperienced personnel, necessitated extensive training with emphasis on SSC procedures, Fleet SAO package and the MIIS system. Additionally, the only CVIC DSIATP trained IS was transferred from SUPPLOT to MSI during the latter portion of the deployment and significantly increased the photographic interpretaton skill level of the MSI team. It should be emphasized that the familiarity with imagery handling and analytical expertise gained at DSIATP is considered essential for selected MSI personnel.

a. (U) SSC.

(1) ~~(C)~~ MSI personnel were responsible for interpretation and reporting of 873 rolls of 35mm film acquired by CVW-3/CV 67 assets. Ongoing quality control measures included contact printing and evaluation for intelligence value, camera technique, exposure control and angle of acquisition, with photo critique sheets being forwarded to squadron aircrews. This program resulted in measurable improvement in photo quality from the air wing.

(2) (U) MSI arranged for all CVIC IS personnel to fly with HS-7 to become familiar with carrier operations and photographic collection on contacts near the Battle Group (BG).

(3) (U) SSC Photography was processed, analyzed and reported as appropriate throughout each event. Results were summarized in a daily SSC analysis sheet provided to appropriate ship and embarked staff personnel. In an effort to improve air wing handheld photographic quality, a "Photo of the Day" was selected from daily missions using the following criteria:

(a) (U) Information of immediate intelligence value.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Contribution to U.S. Navy understanding of new improved Soviet bloc weapons and/or electronic systems.

(c) (U) Object centered on frame.

(d) (U) Correct exposure.

(e) (U) Sharp image focus showing good detail.

(4) (U) At the end of each month, all "Photo of the Day" selections were reviewed to determine a "Photo of the Month." The squadron aircrew whose photo was chosen received an 8x10 color photo of the task group presented at an informal ceremony, complete with cake and other "fun" prizes.

(5) ~~(C)~~ During KENNEDY's participation in GONZOEX 82 near Diego Garcia, eight Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships were photographed. These photos were forwarded to the Commanding Officer, Military Sealift Command. MSI also assisted CTG 72.8 at Diego Garcia in the interpretation and select printing of over 50 units observed by U.S. P-3 aircrews. A quality improvement program was initiated to inform the P-3 squadron intelligence officer and crewmembers of deficiencies in film handling and possible defects in camera equipment. This program greatly improved the quality of CTG 72.8 reconnaissance photography.

(6) (U) Bridge books for various operating areas were produced by MSI personnel and distributed to the Flag, Commanding Officer and Signal Bridge. Photos included all Indian Ocean littoral major surface force combatants and fighter/attack aircraft, as well as French, British, and SOVINDRON units. Bridge books of MED deployed Soviet units were also produced with changes as they occurred. The MED bridge books also contained NOB/AOB photography of those littoral countries adjacent to KENNEDY's immediate operating areas.

(7) ~~(C)~~ MSI produced an Indian Ocean turnover photo book for USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) during turnover operations in the vicinity of Deigo Garcia prior to KENNEDY's transit to Perth. Photos consisted of all contacts photographed while KENNEDY was on station in the northern Arabian Sea. Soviet, Indian and Iranian aircraft and surface units were included, as well as all merchant traffic. Additionally, seven turnover books, including TARPS planning materials and photos of Somalia, Diego Garcia, Oman, Socotra, Kenya, as well as SUPPLOT and CVW-3 Intelligence Team materials, were sent to USS RANGER (CV 61) prior to north bound Suez transit.

(8) ~~(C)~~ A BM-1 sonobuoy was recovered during one MAY surveillance evolution and an indepth photo package assembled for IIR reporting. Using the Ship's Medical Department x-ray equipment, negatives/prints were produced of components within the sonobuoy.

(9) ~~(C)~~ Through an intelligence exchange program, photos of all Soviet and Iranian contacts encountered were provided to the embarked flag for intelligence exchanges in accordance with Indian Ocean SOP.

(10) ~~(C)~~ To further enhance MSI awareness of future possible

contacts that might be encountered, all messages (GENSER) showing locating data on surface contacts were reviewed daily by all hands. Close liaison with SUPPLOT was also maintained. Using SCI message traffic, a decompartmented daily update of all AOB/NOB of major airfields and naval bases in the ship's area of interest was also maintained in MSI.

b. (U) Reporting.

(1) ~~(C)~~ MSI was responsible for RAINFORM OSIS RED and OSIS WHITE reporting. Over 820 OSIS contacts were reported during the deployment. The NIPS message processor was used for preparation and dissemination of OSIS reports.

(2) (~~C~~) MSI directly supervised production and dissemination of 40 Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). High interest reports were:

(a) (C) SOVNAV activity during NATIONAL WEEK

(b) (C) Suez transits

(c) (C) Iranian P-3F

(d) (C) IL-38/MAY surveillance overflights (14)

(e) (C) IL-38/MAY IO survellance summary

(f) (C) Indian task group

(g) (C) BM-1 sonobuoy

(h) (C) Kenyan military visit to KENNEDY

(i) (C) Soviet activity during EASTMED ops

(3) (~~C~~) Sample addees for KENNEDY Indian Ocean IIRs follow:

DIA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMNAVINTCOM WASHINGTON DC
NFOIO SUITLAND MD
NISC WASHINGTON DC
NOSIC SUITLAND MD
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA

FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA
FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
FITCLANT NORFOLK VA
FOSIC PAC PEARL HARBOR HI
FOSIF WESTPAC KAMISEYA JA
FOSIF ROTA SP
FLTINTSUPPCEN WESTPAC CUBI PT RP
USDAO (APPROPRIATE COUNTRY)
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTF SEVEN TWO
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
CTU ONE SIX EIGHT PT ONE PT ONE
CTU ONE SIX EIGHT PT ONE PT TWO
USS MIDWAY
USS CORAL SEA
USS FORRESTAL
USS SARATOGA
USS RANGER
USS INDEPENDENCE
USS KITTY HAWK
USS CONSTELLATION
USS ENTERPRISE
USS AMERICA
USS NIMITZ
USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
USS CARL VINSON

(4) Sample addees for KENNEDY MED IIRs follow:

DIA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVINTCOM WASHINGTON DC
NFOIO SUITLAND MD
NISC WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA
FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA
FITCLANT NORFOLK VA
FOSIC DET CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
FOSIF ROTA SP
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT

USDAO (APPROPRIATE COUNTRY)
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG ONE SIX EIGHT PT THREE
USS FORRESTAL
USS SARATOGA
USS INDEPENDENCE
USS AMERICA
USS NIMITZ
USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
USS CARL VINSON
COMCARAIRWING THREE

(5) ~~(C)~~ Over 275 35mm MERSHIP negatives were forwarded to NISC during deployment under the auspices of the Uncoded MERSHIP Program conducted in accordance with CINCLANTFLT/CINCUSNAVEURINST S3820.4.

c. (U) Equipment.

(1) (U) The three MSI Richards light tables functioned exceptionally well throughout the deployment.

(2) (U) The APPS system continued to have vibration problems and was disassembled and stored because of its lack of use. The MIIS system was operational throughout the deployment although used infrequently. MIIS was used primarily for training and to support contingency planning.

(3) (~~C~~) The NIPS message processing equipment was used extensively for message and IIR production during this deployment. Due to one communications MINIMIZE period, all IIRs over a three week period were processed using this equipment. IIRs were put into message format, multiple copies made, and then mailed via registered mail by CVIC Admin.

d. (~~C~~) Fleet SAO Package. The SAO package was a valuable contingency support tool. Four (4) separate support packages and three (3) updates were received onboard prior to and during the deployment. Although distribution tends to be automatic, informal liaison with FICEURLANT is recommended to ensure proper receipt. A representative from FICEURLANT, along with CVIC personnel, transferred USS EISENHOWER's Indian Ocean SAO package to KENNEDY at Pier 12, Norfolk, prior to deployment. The Mediterranean package was also received from FICEURLANT prior to deployment. Two Indian Ocean support packages were received via ARFCOS from FICPAC and FISC WESTPAC. Indian Ocean imagery from the two photo centers differs in coverage and format. Following IO outchop, FICPAC and FISC WESTPAC packages were returned via ARFCOS. Throughout deployment, over 500 manhours were expended in search/production of 32 installations and check points. The monthly SAO training report provided a brief description of training accomplished in accordance with the Fleet SAO program Letter of Instruction. One DSIATP trained IS, with assistance from "last cruise" experienced personnel, trained current MSI personnel in exploiting this valuable intelligence tool. The SAO package was used to provide basic intelligence support to SUPPLOT, embarked staff, and air wing.

e. (U) TARPS. VF-31 personnel were successfully integrated into the MSI section of CVIC during Caribbean workups. TARPS planning and utilization was further enhanced by the arrival of a Recon Coordinator in early March. Normal daily TARPS planning, tasking and exploitation was managed from CVIC by the TARPS IO (double-hatted as MSI Officer) in consultation with the Intelligence Officer, Strike Operations and appropriate VF-31 personnel.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Limited availability of MED/IO overland routes resulted in TARPS primary utilization (very successfully) as an SSC platform.

(2) ~~(C)~~ There are overland training routes appropriate for TARPS missions in northern Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Greece, Australia, Oman and Diego Garcia. Obtaining clearance as early as possible for conducting these missions is essential. BDA low-levels in northern Italy during exercise DAILY DOUBLE were the only MED routes flown. TARPS mapping missions over the Lancelin target complex in Australia were scheduled, but last minute clearance complications forced cancellation of flights during operations near Perth. Low-level missions for both Oman and Diego Garcia were successfully flown and provided valuable training for all personnel. Additionally, USS CONSTELLATION was able to obtain diplomatic clearance to fly TARPS over Kenya in conjuction with Mombasa port visit, but missions were cancelled due to poor weather. KENNEDY attempted to obtain the same diplomatic clearance but was denied due to time frame restrictions.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Timely processing and exploitation of TARPS imagery is a direct result of the amount of footage exposed. During normal operations with either SSC flights or limited overland missions, the photo lab was able to process TARPS at an average of 28 feet per minute, allowing the photo interpretors access to the film for timely first phase readout. The only time delays arose during periods of multiple overland missions. The average SSC mission involved approximately 1100 feet of film, while average overland missions involved 1900 feet of film.

(4) (U) TARPS sensors were primarily utilized as follows:

(a) (~~C~~) KS-87 serial frame camera:

(1) Point photography of SSC contacts.

(2) Point photography of turn points on low-level

navigation routes.

(3) BDA of SSC targets.

(4) BDA of overland targets.

(b) (~~C~~) KA-99 panoramic camera:

(1) Coverage of SSC targets.

(2) Coverage of turn points on low-level navigation routes.

(3) High altitude mosaic's on land targets.

(4) BDA of SSC targets.

(5) BDA of overland targets.

(c) (~~C~~) AAD-5 infrared line scan sensor:

(1) Day/night heat images on SSC targets.

(2) Heat images of turn points on low-level navigation routes.

(3) Day/night heat images on overland or SSC BDA.

(5) (~~C~~) MSI provided duplicate positive KA-99 and AAD-5 film of all Soviet naval and other selected units of interest to NISC and COMMATVAQWINGSPAC based on tasking by higher authority.

(6) (~~C~~) TARPS imaged Diego Garcia Island with high resolution KA-99 film, and a framed mosaic was provided to the Commanding Officer of the naval facility.

(7) (~~C~~) During a flyover of Somalia as part of the visit of President Siad Barre to the CVBG, TARPS photography was obtained of several target areas. The first IPIR in corporate memory was sent reporting the photographic interpretation results to DIA. A highly complimentary message response was received from DIA, praising the first "real world" IPIR produced in the Navy's new age of tactical reconnaissance.

(8) (~~C~~) Neither the VF-31 TARPS officer nor the two TARPS IS's arrived with any indepth photo interpretation training. Valuable TARPS exploitation experience was gained during workups in Puerto Rican operating areas. With OJT from limited overland routes and normal SSC

evolutions, the MSI TARPS shop reached an acceptable level of experience shortly after inchopping the Indian Ocean operating area. Of note, the only CVIC person with any IPIR writing experience was the ship's Assistant Intelligence Officer, who vaguely recalled his AFAITC training during the "YANKEE TEAM/BLUE TREE" RECCE days in Vietnam. Detailed IPIR reporting is apparently no longer taught prior to arrival in the fleet. It is strongly recommended that the TARP's Photo Intelligence Officer and at least one Intelligence Specialist attend DSIATP prior to checking into TARPS squadrons. Additionally, a tactical reconnaissance course specifically oriented towards exploitation of TARPS in the carrier environment should be developed at either the F-14 RAG, NIPSTRAFAC or FITCLANT/PAC to properly train IS personnel prior to arrival in the fleet. The present lack of tactical RECCE experience in CVIC makes overland TARPS processing/reporting a very time consuming evolution.

8. (U) Photo Lab. OP Division operated three separate workcenters: CVIC Photo Processing, SITE TV/Radio, and the Aviation Photo Lab. Manning remained a problem area due to the requirement to operate the ship's TV/Radio station with Photographers rather than Journalists and Interior Communications Technicians. Manning during the deployment was as follows:

BASIC

GRADE	ALWC	NMP	ONBOARD
PHCS	0	0	1
PHC	1	2	1
PH1	2	3	2
PH2	4	4	5
PH3	7	8	4
PHAN	5	8	9
TOTAL:	19	25	22

At sea, the lab operated on a 24 hour-a-day basis. The crew was divided into two twelve hour shifts. Five men were assigned to CVIC Photo Processing, four to SITE TV/Radio, and ten to the Aviation Photo Lab. Three individuals were assigned administrative/support roles (LCPO/supply/camera repair).

a. (U) CVIC PHOTO PROCESSING. Dirt in the water lines leaving to the EH-38 film processors was a problem early in the cruise. Additional in-line filters solved this problem. While no major sensitometric problems developed, lack of a consistent cold water supply caused an adjustment of processing speeds. Some minor problems were experienced with processing film from TARPS missions. Film support arms and tracks from a Richards light table were mounted on the EH-38 magazine support table to accommodate the large reels of the KA-99 camera. It is important to have tension on the support arms to prevent the film from mistracking. Fixer replenishment rates were increased to compensate for developer carry-over caused by the increased processing speeds required by TARPS. All CVIC Photo Processing personnel were trained to produce dupe positives and negatives from TARPS imagery. Guide pins were removed from most of the tubes in the dryer boxes to help eliminate/prevent scratches (Pins on the two top and bottom tubes on the entrance side were not removed). This did not affect dryer box transport or tracking. Both roll and sheet paper were used for print requirements. Sheets of 8x10 Polycontrast RC II paper track through the machines with no problems. Three EH-38s were converted to "D" models and the forth is awaiting parts to complete it's conversion. One machine is used for 35mm SSC and 16mm FLIR film and two machines for TARPS. CVIC production figures were:

ORIG PROCESSED		DP/DN PROCESSED		PRINTS PROCESSED 8x10	ROLE
16mm FLIR	= 2325'	70mm	= 800'	14,650	10" = 6500'
35mm	= 873 (rolls)	5" (TARPS)	= 15,800'	CHEMISTRY USED (gal)	
70mm	= 705'	9.5"	= 580'	Aeroflo ER	= 680
5" (TARPS)	=61,300'	6.6"	= 2,000	Starfix	= 1,240

b. (U) Aviation Photo Lab. The main lab provided general still photographic support to the ship, air wing, embarked staff and ships in company. The workload remained heavy throughout the cruise with over 2,000 job orders completed. Typical jobs included: Damage to aircraft, ordnance and equipment; criminal investigations; intelligence support; documentation (reenlistments, awards, PAO, cruisebook, etc); and special events. Special events included VIP visits (such as SECNAV, COMSEVENTHFLT, the President of Somalia, etc), crossing the Equator ceremonies, beer day, and passages through the Suez Canal. Aerial photos were shot of the ship in each port visited. Mounted and framed copies were presented to local dignitaries during official calls. A request has been submitted to change two PH0000 NECs to PH8288 (Aerial Cameraman). There were no major maintenance problems in the main lab during the cruise. The continuing lack of chilled water slowed black and white production, but this problem should be corrected in the upcoming SRA. Black and white print processing was done in trays. A Royal Print processor is onboard and being installed. Color print production utilized a Pako DC-24XL mini-printer, Chromega enlarger, and Kreonite processor. Film processing was accomplished with the Imagemaker processor. Production figures follow:

BLACK & WHITE PRINTS	COLOR PRINTS	COLOR SLIDES
24,400	10,950	13,500

c. (U) SUPPLY. Receipt of supplies that were ordered was a problem area. Response time for some supplies ordered through NSC Norfolk was lengthy, especially for high usage items such as 35mm Technical Pan Film and 10" black and white roll paper. Supply chits were often cancelled by NSC Norfolk for no apparent reason and without notifying the ship. Standard stock items ordered through NSC Subic Bay during the deployment were received with little or no delay. The ideal situation would be to have everything you think you will need for the deployment onboard before you leave CONUS. Supply expenditures during the cruise are cited below.

B&W FILM (rolls)	
PX135	920
TX135	390
FX135	70
PX120	410
TX120	265
TP135	60

COLOR SLIDE FILM (rolls)	
ER135	805
ED135	240
EPY135	160
EL135	7
KR135	20
5071-135	14

COLOR NEG FILM (rolls)	
VPS135	375
VPS120	230
CG135	18

COLOR NEG FILM (box)	
VPS 4x5	3
FPL 4x5	3

B&W NEG FILM (box)	
8x10 (250 sht)	155
11x14 (50 sht)	8
16x20 (50 sht)	5

B&W PAPER (rolls)	
10x500'	16
8x500'	1
5x350'	10
5x500'	1

COLOR PAPER (box)	
8x10 (100 sht)	124
11x14 (50 sht)	14
16x20 (50 sht)	4

COLOR PAPER (rolls)	
8x500'	2
5x350'	10

COLOR PRINTS CHEMICALS

Developer (gals)	200
Bleach/Fixer	200

C-41 PROCESS CHEMICALS

Developer (gal)	52
Stabilizer	60
Fixer	60
Bleach (A&B)	110

B&W CHEMICALS (gal)

D76	105
D19	5
Dektol	200
Rapid Fix	210
Acufine	8

E-6 PROCESS CHEMICALS

1-gallon kits	35

CVIC CHEMICALS (gal)

ER Developer	680
Starfix	1,240
ER Starter	10

DUPE STOCK (rolls)

2430/5x500	16
2430/70mmx500	1
2402/5x150	3
2422/5x500	4
2422/6.6x500	4

d. (U) SITE System - WJFK Radio/TV. WJFK operated two television channels (one entertainment/information and one training) and four radio channels. Entertainment programming was supplied by the American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) and the Navy Motion Picture Service (NMPS). General Navy informational programming was supplied by CHINFO. National and international news and internal information was disseminated via WJFK produced programs such as "Captain's Call," "WJKF Evening News," and the Command Master Chief's daily interview/talk show "Fathom." Training programming was scheduled in conjunction with the ship's Training Department and consisted of previously obtained audio-visual training materials. WJKF was manned 24 hours-a-day at sea. Entertainment/informational programming was on the air twelve hours in the evening. Training programs were broadcast as requested by departments and squadrons. Radio was on the air 24 hours-a-day. Prerecorded tapes played "easy listening" and "country and western" music on two channels. A third channel was manned by volunteer disc jockeys broadcasting a mixture of rock, soul, pop and jazz. Live AFRTS broadcasts were provided on the fourth channel whenever Communications Department antennas and equipment were free to receive them. Special events were broadcast live. A few of these special events were: SECNAV mass reenlistment ceremony, two USO shows and both transits of the Suez Canal.

GEOPHYSICS

1. (U) Weather conditions along USS JOHN F. KENNEDY's track during the entire deployment was generally excellent. The most significant weather was experienced while operating in the vicinity of Diego Garcia and in the Western Mediterranean. In the vicinity of Diego Garcia, heavy rainshowers associated with the inter-tropical convergence zone reduced visibilities to near zero along with gusty surface winds. In the Western Med, haze and dense fog patches restricted visibilities to 1 to 3 miles and to near 1/8 mile in dense fog patches. During port visits, boating was hampered in Mombasa, Kenya, because of heavy rainshowers and a moderate southeasterly swell of 3 to 5 feet and again in Toulon, France, due to dense fog.

2. (U) Communications and data reception was generally good except for the Northern Arabian Sea. Facsimile signals originating from NOCC Guam were poor to fair with an occasional over-ride tone noted. The availability of a Diego Garcia frequency (where the signal is relayed from Guam) is at times some improvement, however this area is still in need of reception improvement. Teletype reception was adequate except while operating in the Med. Channel 15 (LMOO) was frequently poor due to SYNC problems between ship and shore. During periods of minimize, circuit restoration was more complex/lengthly.

3. (U) The Upper Air Program was exceptional with only minimal equipment problems. This in turn, provided an excellent input to IREPS which was well received and utilized by the entire task group. In order to further enhance the usefulness of the IREPS product, it is recommended that: (1) pre-deployment training be conducted for ships in company and squadron on use of IREPS (2) tailored IREP packets be prepared for each ship and squadron demonstrating the ducting effects on own radars and comms as well as platforms of interest (3) since height and strength of the duct varies throughout the day, schedule weather balloon launches at least twice a day whenever feasible.

4. (U) NOAA 6 and 7 provided excellent satellite coverage. Because of sparse meteorological data, it especially served as a valuable product in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean. Soviet met sats were copied periodically, but proved to be of little use primarily because coverage is extremely skewed on 20% of the outer edges of each pass, making gridding nearly impossible. Also transmission times were very erratic Using the HP 9845 and past tracking data, the ship is able to project tracking data with enough accuracy to copy Met 1-30 when needed.

5. (U) Obtaining Bathythermograph Data has been poor at best. Prior to deployment, we were able to borrow a portable BT recorder and launcher from NEOC Norfolk, however the recorder has had numerous maintenance problems. A dire need still exists for permanant operative BT recorder/launcher to be installed onboard.

6. (U) Supplies have not been a problem this deployment, however, an abundant amount of the high consumable meteorological supplies were obtained prior to deploying. This is highly encouraged to all ships preparing for extended deployments. In particular, Upper Air Consumables, facsimile paper and SMQ-6 (RO-402) paper. Miscellaneous hard to get minor consumables were easily obtained from NOCD Diego Garcia, who responded in a timely manner.

ELECTRONICS MATERIAL BRANCH

1. (U) RADAR

a. ~~(C)~~ AN/SPS-10F - The SPS-10 proved to be fairly reliable during the deployment. Supply stocks of TR, ATR tubes, local oscillators and magnetrons were depleted during the cruise. Several ATR's were drawn from stock in non-RFI condition and material discrepancy reports were filed. The rotary joint failed, resulting in a CASREP, and the replacement unit did not contain the SPS-65 modification kit. The modification kit has been requisitioned via ANORS. The longest SPS-10 downtime was the result of synchro amplifier failure; a total of 18 hours. Also of note is repeated failures of the A4 circuit board in the clutter suppressor section. The last one replaced has been operational for approximately 60 days without failure.

b. ~~(C)~~ LN-66 - The LN-66 Navigation Radar has averaged approximately two failures per month. One antenna drive failure was experienced, a stripped gear in the drive coupling. As seems the norm for this radar, heavy usage of TR tubes and local oscillators was required to keep it operational. Most casualities were minor and easily repairable. This unit has become invaluable for alongside and navigational maneuvers.

c. (~~C~~) AN/SPS-65 - The SPS-65 has been of limited usefulness this cruise as it's only been operational 4 days out of 192. Plagued with poor technical documentation and logistics support, large amount of troubleshooting time resulted. Many problems were removed from the system but the rotary joint failure on the SPS-10 effectively stopped all troubleshooting efforts. At the time of rotary joint failure, the SPS-65 was experiencing IF problems, with troubleshooting hampered by lack of proper extender boards. ER division 2M personnel manufactured a suitable replacement and troubleshooting continues as situational requirements allow.

d. (~~C~~) AN/SPS-48C - The SPS-48 has been available for approximately 93% of operational requirements. Two CASREP's (March and April) were initiated during the cruise. The first was for two PFN views and the second for a first stage TWT and IFF rotary joint. Of the four PFN views received during the deployment, one was non-RFI and one was marginal and subsequently failed. Other TWT and amplitron casualties were experienced but were resolved readily with onboard and in-space spares. The remainder of the downtime is attributed to loss of one coarse temperature correction oscillator and one 36 KVA circuit breaker. Repeated thyratron failures were suffered in tube types Jan -8613, Jan - 8354, Jan - 8951, and Jan - 7390. The first IFF rotary joint received on the April CASREP was defective, arriving onboard with damage sustained during shipment. A defective part report was submitted and the Indian Ocean battle group SPS-48 tech rep reported this to be a common problem. The I.O. technical support worked out well during our stay. Although he provided mainly OJT for the ship, this training was extensive. He was readily available and was requested by several surface combatants experiencing casualities.

e. (~~C~~) AN/SPS-49 - The AN/SPS-49 has been extremely reliable (99%), undergoing very few major failures. The high seawater temperatures caused difficulties upon I.O. inchop and both heat exchangers were necessary at one point. An internal plate failure in one heat exchanger was corrected by ship's force while inport. A final PA was lost early in the cruise. Other failures include one trigger amplifier and one deck modulator tube. One major antenna fault was corrected by replacement of the microswitches in the antenna pedestal.

f. (~~C~~) SB-1505 - Switches have been overhauled on a regular basis. Two switches are inoperative and two others do not select positions consistently. Unit is scheduled for a Class B overhaul during the upcoming SRA.

g. (~~C~~) MARK XII IFF - The Mark XII IFF system has been relatively trouble free. The SPS-10 IFF was unavailable the last two and one-half months of the cruise due to rotary joint difficulties with the SPS-10/SPS-65

h. ~~(C)~~ REPEATERS - The AN/SPA-74 repeater has been inoperative the majority of the cruise. Yoke driver failures is the prime cause of downtime. The balancing of E-W and N-S driver circuits appear to be the root of our problems. Matched 2N2212's yielded some limited successes. The equipment consumed innumerable 2N2212 and 2N697 transistors in attempts to rectify the problem. Maximum operational availability since the first failure has been about 15 days. The AN/SPS-25 and AN/SPA-18 repeater failures have been minimal and all easily corrected by onboard spares.

i. (~~C~~) AN/SPN-41 - The SPN-41 was placed in a CASREP status twice since departure CONUS. The Elevation transmitter failed and also the control motor for the roll gear train. In both cases parts were readily available and the system restored in less than three weeks. A rupture in the Elevation dome cooling coil resulted in overheating while operating in the Indian Ocean, but the system was available at night after cooling down. The designation of the spare transmitter as an in-space spare, rotated monthly into the equipment, is considered a positive step toward increased system reliability.

j. ~~(C)~~ AN/SPN-42A - The AN/SPN-42A ACLS equipment has been in the spotlight an extensive part of the past six months. The CASREP in effect at the beginning of the second quarter was finally closed out. Repeated loss of "A" side tachometer motors was halted by a complete pedestal swapout during the Mombasa port visit in early May. This was accomplished with NNSY and NESEA technical support. ACLS certification flights were subsequently flown and the system certified on 10 May. With the exception of previously documented DSS problems, "A" side has performed flawlessly. "B" side has suffered two magnetron casualties and two local oscillator failures, all of which were corrected. Uncertain lock-ons, caused by moisture accumulation in the waveguide, was resolved with a nitrogen purge. Heavy RF interference with Link 4A has been experienced when the system is operated above 308 MHZ. DLM interference seems to increase exponentially above this frequency. Operation below 305 MHZ has been excellent, although at times a major undertaking; securing such a frequency within a limited comm plan has been worth the effort. Ship's force has been unable to isolate the interference to date.

k. ~~(C)~~ AN/SPN-43 - The AN/SPN-43 Marshall radar performed perfectly the first five months of the cruise. At the end of May, it experienced a falure of the fault detector board followed shortly thereafter by the high voltage transformer for the transmitter. The system was operational for two days at reduced output (5 KV) before the transformer finally failed. Other problems involved small component failures in the high voltage section and replacement of a weak magnetron.

l. ~~(C)~~ AN/SPN-44 - The SPN-44 doppler radar is now CASREPed for a high voltage transformer. Other failures during the cruise were confined to a failed magnetron and a blown transistor in the magnetron overcurrent circuit.

m. ~~(C)~~ AN/TPX-42 -The TPX-42, outside of KCMX failures and NTDS program drops, has operated at 99% availability. The majority of downtime was directly due to KCMX interface problems the first half of the cruise. A minor problem which surfaced was the inability to display bingo field ranges in excess of 999 miles. Indian Ocean op area/logistics flights often exceed this value. The system has proved very reliable and a definite asset to safe CATCC operations. In addition, the newly installed CATCC/DAIR equipment was tested and the OPEVAL (CNO PROJECT 295-2-OT-IIIC) concluded successfully.

n. ~~(C)~~ SINS - The SINS system has operated extremely well for the first time in three years, expecially in the inertial section. One period of system inaccuracy was the result of various problems in the data output console, latitude gear train and bountiful mode word problems. All but the console were repaired with parts available onboard. EM Log performance, an important factor in system damping, ranged from poor during the early portion of the cruise to good towards the end. March and April saw almost exclusive use of the dummy log. Random and apparently unrelated CP-642B computer faults continue to hamper long-term runs. It is considered a necessity that the scheduled upcoming computer swapout be accomplished during SRA.

o. ~~(C)~~ AN/SRC-40 - The AN/SRC-40 experienced a variety of power supply problems early in the deployment. An inoperative +70V power supply was restored with an onboard spare 1A12 card. A +5V power supply failure required technician rework of a non-RFI card received out of supply stock. The second half of the cruise saw replacement of one transmitter and two synthesizers. Supply support has been excellent in this regard. RF alignment data was available approximatley 98% of SINS on-line time.

p. ~~(C)~~ AN/SRN-19 - The AN/SRN-19 had remote display capabilities only about 50% of deployment. After repair of the damage caused by a lightning strike prior to cruise, the remote display unit operated for 3 months with intermittent problems. This was finally isolated to cabling and new wire has been requisitioned for its replacement.

q. ~~(C)~~ AN/SRN-9 - The AN/SRN-9 was available 100% of the entire cruise. Our main problem was interference effectively negating many satellite passes. This interference was first encountered upon Indian Ocean inchop and disappeared just after the Suez transit back into the Mediterranean Sea. Source has been identified at various times and posits to be the bottom three channels of the E-2 APPS radar, surface combatant SPS-40 radar emissions and high UHF termination bleedover. This problem caused extensive delays in updates to SINS and thus adversely affected accuracy.

r. ~~(C)~~ The following equipments posed no significant problems during the cruise. Infrequent failures were readily corrected by stocked spares.

AN/UQN-1H
AN/SRN-12
AN/SRN-38
AN/URN-20

2 (U) Data Systems

a. (U) NTDS

(1) (U) Chilled water to the NTDS CP-642A computers remained at 64-66 degrees while in the Indian Ocean. It was discovered early in the cruise that if care was not taken to ensure that all chilled water connections on the CP-642A computers were on tight, the flow of water could be restricted without causing a leak.

(2) (U) For approximately the first half of the cruise the KCMX experienced random intermittent faults and stops. This was an extremely frutrating problem because the trouble always seemed to rectify itself when technicians began troubleshooting. Mr. Kent Warhol, MOTU THIRTEEN Tech Rep, discovered an intermittent power supply. The system has been

constantly operational since repair.

(3) (U) Logistic support for the SSW-1D Signal Data converter has been particularly poor. Long lead times on PCB's and modules has prevented 100% availability.

(4) (U) NTDS system tech assist and training provided by Mr. Jim Young, (MOTU FIVE) and Mr. Kent Warhol, (MOTU THIRTEEN), proved to be invaulable. Many minor, but troublesome, problems were cleared up as a result of the expertise and training provided by this team.

b.(U) SINS

(1) (U) SINS - CP-642B computer faulted frequently during the deployment. Although some memory problems were isolated, the usual case was that no problem could be found after a fault or stop. Two memory chassis' were replaced. Replacement memory chassis' were readily available from NSTR prepositioned assets. Support from NAVSEATECHREP St. Paul was excellent in all respects. Long lead time for UYA-6 +12V power supply prevented proper operations for most of the cruise.

c. (U) CV-ASWM

(1) ~~(C)~~ Parts support for the Fast Time Analyzer and Automatic Data Processing systems was not as good as could be desired. Only 7 of 45 requisitioned MTR PCB's for ready spares have been received. It is strongly recommended that all steps possible be taken to ensure that adequate spares are onboard prior to deployment.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Problems were experienced with the transmit/receive PCB for the DMTC after the latest field change was installed. NADC Warminster has reproduced the problem in the laboratory and is in the process of correcting it. For the present, ensure that assy #30-14856 is installed in slot A103.

(3) (U) Suggest keeping air conditioning and chilled water on when in port. It was our experience that when a constant temperature was maintained fewer start up failures resulted.

(4) (U) Equipment air filters, especially those near the deck, will warrant cleaning more frequently than called for by PMS schedules.

(5) ~~(C)~~ ICAPS parts support from NAVSEADET was excellent. A message request for parts brought instant response.

3. (U) Weapon Systems

a. ~~(C)~~ NATO Seasparrow. Throughout the deployment complete anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) was maintained at the cost of keeping system number three in a constant CASREP status. System three has been used to support both system one and two due primarily to poor logistic support and long lead times. As the deployment concluded system three required only one part for complete restoral. During the deployment in the Indian Ocean, high sea water inlet temperatures were encountered thus disabling the systems. This problem will be rectified once the new fresh water cooling system is installed during the upcoming SRA.

b. ~~(C)~~ CHAFFROC - CHAFFROC system number two has been successfully fired on two separate occasions. System three required the launcher hydraulic pump to be rebuilt. Four of the five local control panel cables required rewiring and had to be rerouted due to wiring errors left over from COH 80.

c. ~~(C)~~ Vulcan Phalanx (CIWS) MK 15 MOD 1 - The CIWS system has been inoperative for the entire cruise and has not functioned correctly since its installation during SRA 81. Every system/subsystem, except for the gun itself has had at least one casualty. Poor onboard part support and technical documentation has hindered reliability and availability. In the course of performing preventive maintenance it was found that the use of Dry Film Lubricant (NSN 9150-00-231-6689) acts as an excellent corrosion control agent, cutting gun maintenance man hours in half. A DCAP has been submitted. In addition, all check valves should be cleaned and checked, particularly the ones not covered by PMS. An air filter in front of the portable support equipment (PSE) was found to be extremely dirty and clogged by dirt. This air filter is not covered by PMS. Again, a DCAP has been submitted to cover this filter.

d. ~~(C)~~ During the entire deployment SAM Division personnel manned the Weapon Liaison Officer's console (WLO) during flight operations. The Ship's Weapons Control (SWC) Officer and the WLO worked harmoniously together in the detection, designation and assignment of all inbound air targets. The WLO and the Radar Set Control (RSC) operator gained valuable training and learned to work as a team during these tracking drills.

4. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

a. (U) All UHF and HF Communications Systems performed and functioned superbly throught the whole deployment. No operational commitment has been lost or any communication requirement degraded due to equipment limitations or availability. Some specific equipment casualties contributing to maintenance problems were the CU-1169 coupler, balanced modulator, and TGC module for the AN/SRC-16. ON-143 red black interface caused distortion in the receiver and transmit function of the NAVMACS system, however this system has functioned extremely well. The most contributing factor for the extremely high reliable communications is attributed directly to the change out of all AN/URC-9 family UHF tranceivers with the AN/WSC-3 line of sight UHF transceiver. This swap out provided a significant improvement in UHF Communication in both equipment reliability and maintenance. In the area of HF Communication the complete rework of all the AN/URT-23 HF transmitters during SRA-81 prior to deployment played an important part in the high reliability of HF Communications.

5. (U) SUMMARY.

a. (U) Overall, the Electronic equipments and systems used to support Combat Systems performed extremely well. No problems indigenous to the Indian Ocean environment were apparent, other than high inlet water temperatures. With innovation and foresight, the minor heat related problems were easily resolved. No dust storms were encountered however it is highly suggested that an ample supply of cheese cloth be taken by all deploying Indian Ocean ship's to cover filters etc. The fervent pace of Indian Ocean carrier operations has forced preventive maintenance hours to a minimum on virtually all electronic systems. Operator personnel have accomodated maintenance technicians as much as could be expected, however the real life scenario did not. Lack of needed inport time hampered some preventive and corrective maintenance actions which has also contributed to the equipment strain. Supply support was excellent in the Indian Ocean despite the lengthy logistics chain. Extra care should be provided to packaging of parts sent to Indian Ocean deployed units. On no less than five occasions CASREP parts were received damaged due directly to poor packaging and handling. Embarked staff was extremely helpful, all that was required was to make our needs known. In all, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY responded to and provided a total of 18 electronics related technical assistance calls to ships in company. Prior to deployment every effort should be made to get your supply stock up to date, fill up your PEB's and try to have the correct number of required NEC techs onboard.

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CARRIER AIR WING THREE COMPOSITION

SQUADRON	NUMBER/TYPE AIRCRAFT	COMMANDING
VF-11	10/F-14A	CDR D. A. SHARER
VF-31	10/F-14A (3 TARPS)	CDR M. N. MATTON CDR W. V. CROSS
VA-37	10/A-7E (6 FLIR)	CDR L. A. FARR
VA-105	10/A-7E (6 FLIR)	CDR D. V. RAEBEL CDR R. G. BRODSKY
VA-75	9/A-6E 5/KA-6D	CDR J. S. MOBLEY CDR E. D. WOLFGANG
VS-22	10/S-3A	CDR R. C. ASBELL
VAW-126	4/E-2C	CDR G. M. WITZENBURG CDR J. W. BOOKHULTZ
HS-7	6/SH-3H	CDR D. A. WRIGHT CDR R. K. WILSBACH
VAQ-138	4/EA-6B	CDR D. H. KRIEGER CDR W. H. HAWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMANDER CARRIER AIR WING THREE

1. (U) General

a. ~~(C)~~ Carrier Air Wing THREE was deployed for a total of 191 days of which 166 days or 87% were spent at sea. Of those days at sea, 129 days or 78% were operating days. The greatest portion of Air Wing operations occurred in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea in conjunction with various beneficial and highly successful operations. A total of over 22,074 flight hours and 9,225 carrier arrested landings were accumulated during deployment.

2. (U) Operations

a. ~~(C)~~ Carrier qualification refresher training was conducted off the VACAPES on 4 and 5 January prior to commencement of the Translant. The Air Wing operated for a total of seven days during the crossing. A four day inport period in Malaga, Spain was followed by light tasking but long hour day participation in National Week XXXI along with the USS EISENHOWER (CV 69) Battle Group. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) was positioned at Port Said awaiting entry into the Suez Canal on 3 February 1982. Red Sea operations included only two days of light operations prior to passing the Bab el Mandeb Straits and INCHOP to COMSEVENTH FLEET.

b. ~~(C)~~ The four months of Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea operations included several CV versus CV Air Defense Exercises, Dual Battle Group Ops with USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64), and PASSEX's with participation by the French Navy, Royal Navy and Australian Navy. The most beneficial exercises with respect to Air Wing training and readiness maintenance included the three highly successful and increasingly complex Beacon Flash Exercises and Weapons Week 82-2. Beacon South, although potentially another superb exercise, never materialized due to a variety of reasons. Extensive prior planning, close coordination, careful execution and follow up spell success for the above mentioned exercises. Ensure that during BG turnover a CVW representative gets his hands on as much information as possible concerning the existing Indian Ocean exercises and those newly conceived. Both Beacon Flash and Weapons Week enabled the Air Wing to regain, maintain or even improve readiness in many of their primary mission areas. Areas such as Shrike, Walleye, EW (for Attack and Fighter aircraft), certain ASW qualifications and SAR wet crewman qualifications became degraded during our deployment. Carrier Air Wing THREE returned to the Mediterranean Sea in better shape, with respect to training/readiness, than when we left.

c. ~~(C)~~ The JFK/CVW-3 schedule consisted of five or six days of flying with two maintenance/replenishment days thereafter. Depending on location in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea, alert launches for Soviet Mays or Iranian P-3 aircraft generally upset that schedule. We attempted to maintain 85 sortie days and 3500 hour fixed wing months, when possible. Surge operations in support of exercises, contingencies ~~or~~ as directed by higher authority were common and provided for greater than the 3500 hour limit. Although the Air Wing could handle the surge operations, several consecutive days of long flight operations would impact upon aircraft availability. It was felt that maintaining an even pace of approximately 85 sorties per day was a key factor in maintaining our superb mission capable rate and the ability to rise to any contingency tasked.

d. (U) Although port visits are few and not always to everyone's liking, the flying during this portion of our deployment was unbeatable. The airways, so bothersome in the Mediterranean Sea, are practically non-existent in the Indian Ocean; FIR's, TCA's, or restricted areas present no problems. The weather during our deployment from early February until late May was superb, VMC with only occasional cloud build up primarily around land masses (in particular Diego Garcia). Blue Water operations have been in effect during the entire deployment. This type operation presents problems when aircrews go over the fourteen day limit without a night landing and the nearest land and divert field is greater than 400NM away. Careful scheduling of night time and aircrews by both CVW and Squadrons OPS will alleviate this problem; however, unexpected medical groundings or emergency leave cases will cause concern.

e. (U) The remainder of this portion of the JFK/CVW-3 End of the Cruise report consists of information and guidance considered pertinent by this Staff and Air Wing squadrons. All inputs are presented to assist Air Wings in preparation and planning for future deployments.

3. ~~(C)~~ ASW Operations

a. (~~C~~) VS Operations. ASW operations for VS commenced with operation SEA VENTURE. Familiarity with CINCLANTFLT Instruction S3120.24B by ASW Module and the Air Wing ensured proper briefing and execution of this evolution. The most significant restriction to ASW Ops during the CONUS-Med transit and operations in the Mediterranean itself was the low sonobuoy allocation. This forced a higher reliance on nonacoustic sensors, particularly RADAR and ESM. Indian Ocean operations on the other hand were characterized by acoustic search, particularly when intelligence indicated the possibility of subsurface Targets of Interest (TOI) operating in proximity to the battle group. Operations in the Indian Ocean provided the much needed Alpha and Whiskey qualifications which prevented ASW readiness from reaching rock bottom even with a high turnover of aircrew. Unfortunately the lack of extorp targets in the Indian Ocean prevented the squadron from maintaining an M3 PMR in ASW. The highlight of VS operations were in support of the last two Beacon Flash exercises. COMSEVENTHFLT has established the requirement to provide ASW protection to the CVBG during exercises such as Beacon Flash. This requirement has been named Operation Double Team. During both Operation Double Team evolutions, all Soviet TOI's estimated to be operating against the battle group were successfully located and constructively killed. VS found one of two TOI's during the first Double Team and gained a constructive kill. During the second Double Team operation, VS-22 tracked one TOI for over twelve hours gaining numerous constructive kills.

Operations in the Mediterranean enroute to CONUS again relied heavily on non-acoustic sensors with the E-2/S-3 skimmer/scrapper role utilized for the diesel threat. Throughout the deployment, the squadron stressed the importance of checking all sensors on every flight and maintained a strong FMC/MC rate. Particular attention was devoted to Data Link and the utilization of the APX-76. Both items are required reporting items in SEVENTHFLT.

b. ~~(C)~~ HS Operations. The Kennedy Battle Group did not have a DD-963 or FFG-7 class ship assigned except for a few months in the Indian Ocean. This impacted HS DLQ qualifications throughout the cruise. During the CONUS-MED transit and throughout the cruise, USNS ships were used in an attempt to keep the HS squadron proficient. During Mediterranean operations, the Soviets provided some ASW for HS. However, no dedicated submarine services were available until INCHOP to the Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean operations provide several ASW operations by U. S. submarines, however, most of the ASW exercises have definite objectives assigned which do not always provide the amount of Alpha services required to keep the helo crews proficient. On numerous occasions, ASW datum was beyond the reach of the helo crews. This had a significant impact on ASW readiness points for HS-7. The lack of extorp targets was the next most significant detractor. HS was always employed as part of the inner screen for real world ASW operations. During the first operation Double Team, HS-7 teamed up with one of the smallboys to locate and constructively kill one of two Soviet Targets of Interest employed against the Kennedy Battle Group. During plane guard duties, the SH-3 was still utilized as an ASW asset, and when the situation warranted, provided dipping services on both port and starboard stations of the carrier as well as MCJR of barriers aft of the carrier when trailer operations were suspected. As with any helo squadron, HS-7 was tasked on numerous occasions to provide logistic services to the battle group. To minimize the impact of logistics, the ship set up a time period, usually in the early morning, during which most, if not all, logistic tasking was completed for that day. This optimized the use of the logistic helo and greatly reduced the number of times the helo was unexpectedly called off station to perform a logistic run. During dedicated ASW exercises, the H-46 helos from the supply ships were tasked with all logistics.

c. ~~(C)~~ ASW Contingency Planning Teams. The establishment and utilization of the ASW Contingency Planning Teams has been the major factor in the success and coordination of ASW operations. Prior to mid-March, ASW coordination and planning onboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) had been accomplished through the ASW Planning Board as outlined in COMNAVAIRLANTINST C3120.16. This board, consisting of CVW ASW Ops, VS, HS, ASW Module, CIC and Flag representatives, had worked very effectively during the type training. In an effort to involve VS, HS, and ASW Module personnel in battle group ASW concepts and provide junior officers experience in ASW battle group problems and contingency briefing similar to TACAIR, several contingency teams were formed to help plan future ASW events. The first team was tasked with developing a plan to employ surface, subsurface and air units during battle group transit from Perth, Australia to Gonzo station. Subsequent to the Perth, Australia port visit, the same plan was presented to COMDESRON THIRTY-FIVE who joined the Kennedy Battle Group in Perth to act as the ASW Warfare Commander. The brief was presented to inform the DESRON Commander of VS and HS capability, demonstrate the ASW expertise of personnel onboard, and provide the opportunity to discuss tactics and coordination between air ASW assets with the ASWC for future operations. The end result was an enthusiastic and cooperative approach to all future ASW operations. Scheduled battle group movements were broken down into phases and assigned to contingency teams to develop the ASW tactics that would be employed to protect the battlegroup. These teams included representatives from all air warfare communities, whenever feasible, plus surface and module personnel. The teams would plan the battlegroup ASW tactics, present them to the DESRON Commander who would critique, modify and formulate an operational plan based on the proposed tactics. After modification, the same team presented the revised plan to the CARGRU Commander which represented the cumulative efforts of all ASW expertise onboard the carrier. Those modifications requested by the CARGRU were incorporated and the plan was put into operation. The cumulative effect of viewing ASW from a battlegroup point of view, including surface and subsurface units, and attempting to integrate ASW with AAW and ASUW, basically developed by junior officers from all warfare areas, produced a new sense of cooperation with excellent results.

4. (U) <u>Maintenance</u>

a. (U) The CVW-3/AIMD/Supply Department team worked well together throughout the deployment by emphasizing immediate resolution of problems and communication between all levels of each organization. Twice-weekly meetings were oriented toward "big picture" topics, and they were beneficial in keeping all concerned current with proposed operating schedules, replenishment evolutions, and capabilities/perturbations within each unit.

b. (U) The difficulties of combating the corrosive environment in the Indian Ocean have been well publicized. Fortunately, CVW-3's deployment to that area took place during the best time of the year and conditions were relatively mild. Fresh water was plentiful and, except during transits of the Suez Canal, washing of aircraft was performed as required. Two CVW-3 Internal Corrosion Audit Teams were formed shortly after embarkation, and audits of all squadrons were accomplished prior to the mid-deployment visit by the COMFAIRWESTPAC inspectors. The preparatory effort was worthwhile, for each squadron received an overall grade of SATISFACTORY. Aircraft material condition evaluations ranged from GOOD to EXCELLENT. One area that requires much more attention, however, is that of aviator's equipment. Every squadron was cited for shortcomings such as frayed and faded harness webbing, items in survival vests improperly secured, and petroleum contaminated equipment.

c. ~~(C)~~ Fleet Air Western Pacific Repair Activity at NAS Cubi Point, R.P. provides a depot level repair team to embark in each Indian Ocean CV. The team is directly controlled by the CVW Maintenance Officer and consists of Planner and Estimator (Team Leader) and two metalsmith repairmen. Their services were utilized on an almost continuous basis during their assignment aboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY and their assistance was invaluable.

d. ~~(C)~~ A very successful D-704 maintenance program established with AIMD and squadron personnel provided a consistently reliable inflight refueling capability to supplement the KA6D's. Emphasis on thorough maintenance at the intermediate level included running all hydraulic pumps on the HCT-10 hydraulic test stand and performing an actual fuel transfer check on every D-704 before certifying it ready for use. Meticulous attention to servicing and maintenance procedures at the organizational level resulted in unprecedented reliability of installed "stores." COMFAIRWESTPAC exchanged newly reworked D-704's for several of the oldest ones in CVW-3 custody, another factor which enhanced the favorable mission capability of the "Buddy Stores."

e. ~~(C)~~ The logistic support rendered by COMNAVAIRPAC and COMFAIRWESTPAC to Indian Ocean battle groups is extraordinary. Expeditious response to daily requests for assistance via paragraph 6 of the Aircraft Material Readiness Report provided a steady flow of critically needed material. Vigorous use of paragraph 6 is encouraged by CNAP/CFWP and with good reason. They read it carefully and act quickly to resolve problems cited therein.

5. ~~(C)~~ Ordnance

a. ~~(C)~~ CVW-3 expended the following ordnance during the deployment: (4 JAN 1982 to 14 JUL 1982).

20MMHEI	37,250	NW40/RR171 CHAFF	166
20MMTP	93,346	ROCKEYE	32
MK83 LGB	7	MK84 SUS	131
MK82 TP BOMBS	978	SONOBUOYS	4,060
MK83 TP BOMBS	33	MK45 PARAFLARE	352
MK84 TP BOMBS	2	5" ROCKETS	160
MK82 INERT BOMBS	252	ATM9G MISSILE	3
MK83 INERT BOMBS	22	AIM9L MISSILE	4
MK76 PRAC BOMB	13,238	ATM7E MISSILE	6
MK106 PRAC BOMB	24	ATM45 MISSILE	3
MK46 DECOY FLARE	853	MK58/25 MARINE MARKERS	2042
NW20/RR129 CHAFF	12,366		

b. ~~(C)~~ For Carrier Air Wing THREE to be so successful in ordnance expenditure, both the assets to deliver the weapons and the personnel and means to load/configure our platforms had to be continuously exercised and evaluated. The following actions and attention to those areas of concern ensured 100% readiness capability to deliver ordnance on target by CVW-3.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Conducted F14 Rapid Rearm monthly. Loaded four F14's with 2 X 2 X 4. Optimum load time 30 minutes per aircraft.

(2) ~~(C)~~ No Notice Missile Loads were scheduled monthly on no fly days by

the embarked staff. Required four F14's to be configured, release checked, loaded 2 X 2 X 4, aircraft turned and missiles tuned/moated. From execute message to missile tuned required 1.5 hours for first two aircraft and three hours for all four aircraft.

(3) ~~(C)~~ <u>F14 Aft Phoenix Rails</u> were not routinely flown, however, all aft rails were cycled through during the F14 Rapid Rearm, No Notice Missile Exercises and 28 day release checks. All aft rails were found to be RFI when exercised.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Conducted Air Wing/ship <u>Conventional Ordnance Loading Exercises</u> (CONLOADEX) monthly. Primary emphasis on mines and exotic ordnance. Utilized squadron Gunners and CPO's as inspectors for each load. Critique lists were provided the squadron and Air Wing Ordnance Officer.

(5) ~~(C)~~ <u>Immediate Rapid Rearm System</u> (IRRS) continued to be the most expeditious, safe and reliable method for loading ordnance. Experienced 1.5% hung bomb rate when IRRS was employed and 3% hung bomb rate when the hand load method was used.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Conducted an <u>Air Wing inhouse NTPI</u> on the fifth month of the cruise. Proved to be excellent opportunity to reemphasize nuclear weapons safety and handling techniques.

(7) ~~(C)~~ Utilized an <u>Integrated Arm/Dearm Team</u> with a squadron Gunner assigned to each team. The Integrated Arm/Dearm Team concept has proven to be the most efficient use of personnel and assets.

(8) ~~(C)~~ Emphasized <u>20MM expenditures</u> thoughout the deployment. Exercised the guns weekly. Standardized the aircraft loads to 250 round belts. Common failed items were drums (partitions), and chutes.

6. (U) <u>Administration</u>

a. (U) The Air Wing Office was adequately manned with a staff YNC, YN3, and YNSA, along with a YNSN TAD from VS-22. The additional YN was necessary to provide continuity of operations around the clock, and allowed flexibility in work schedules during periods of high demand. The flexibility allowed the YNC to act as Administrative Assistant and not simply as the senior yeoman, thereby lessening the Administrative Officer's burden during flight operations.

b. (U) The staff YNC maintained direct control over 28 typewriters issued by Supply. Three per squadron and one for the staff provided sufficient resources, although most squadrons brought two additional typewriters with them. Each command also brought CPT 8000 Word Processing Equipment, and supply support was arranged, through the staff YNC, directly to COMNAVAIRLANT. During periods of poor supply support, squadrons and the Air Wing Office time-shared their equipment. It should be noted that a substantial pack-up parts kit be prepositioned aboard and at least two squadron technicians be schooled in system repair prior to deployment. Duplicating equipment was provided by (CV 67) Communications in the form of one Xerox 2600 or 3100 photocopier for each squadron and a 3100 for the Air Wing Office. Power supply problems affecting use of the CPT 8000 equipment were solved by providing isolation transformers for all photocopiers. Maintenance support was a critical item throughout embarked operations. All support was provided by Communications Department technicians and was limited, at best. Though response time was superb, a lack of sufficient parts and depth of experience required trouble calls on an average of one every three days. By the end of the deployment, there was a 30% total failure rate and major parts cannibalization program to maintain the remaining 70%. There was no contractor support available in the Indian Ocean and very limited support in the Mediterranean Sea. Overall, both word processing and duplicating equipment were utilized at or beyond their designed capacities.

c. (U) All staff administrative supplies were purchased utilizing ship's OPTAR. An account was maintained by the staff AZ, with a budgeted dollar amount assigned early in work-ups. Purchase of all squadron damage control equipment was also charged to this account, and spending practices had to be continually monitored. Budgetary cut-backs, required nearing the end of the deployment, demanded careful supervision. This, however, did not impact operations, as substantial stocks were brought aboard when first embarked.

d. (U) Early coordination between the ship's Personnel Officer and Squadron and Staff Administrative Officers prevented problems from developing in establishing funding data and closing out claims. Each squadron maintained its own TEMADD log and was provided TANGO numbers from the ship's Personnel Office after TAD requests were approved. To avoid duplication of effort the Air Wing Office did not maintain a master log. The master log was maintained by Personnel, with each squadron assigned a pre-designated block of TANGO serial numbers. The Personnel Office dealt directly with squadrons if less than two weeks had elapsed since completion of the TEMADD. After two weeks the Staff YNC maintained daily pressure on the squadron to fullfill its obligation. The direct liaison worked very well and overdue claims were rare. Again, early coordination and cooperation were the keys to success.

e. (U) The CARGRU Staff assigned one of its own staff officers as overall Personnel Transfer Officer. This provided the ship and Air Wing with an impartial arbiter in logistic/personnel movement decisions, since transportation assets were limited in the Indian Ocean. Port call requests were required one month in advance and routed through the Air Wing YNC for administrative tracking. After the port call was approved, the CARGRU "ATO" established off-ship movement priorities and fed these back to the Staff YNC for squadron notification. The entire system worked extremely well and utilized MSLF ships as well as COD services for both people and parts.

f. (U) All awards were routed through the Staff Administrative Officer. An awards memo was generated with multiple example enclosures to provide all squadrons with both a standard format and standard lead-in and ending lines. With careful planning and guidance from past award write-ups, an effective yet simple format and wording frame-work can be developed. All awards were reviewed by one of two staff officers, providing continuity of citations. Additionally, rather than generate an unwieldy awards board, the following maximum quotas were established:

NAMS - 5% of personnel (proofed and voted on by Air Wing Staff Awards Board, then delivered to COMCARGRU as approving authority)
COMCARGRU Letters of Commendation - 5% of personnel
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY Letters of Commendation - 10% of personnel
COMCVW-3 Letters of Commendation - 10% of personnel

The quota system required each squadron to establish its own awards board. Also, no Letters of Appreciation were accepted. They are just as well handled at the squadron level, and because they provide no points toward advancement are an unnecessary paperwork burden on an already substantial project. The entire end of the cruise program, from start to finish, required six weeks.

7. (U) Intelligence

a. (C) The Air Wing intelligence team consisted of 11 intelligence officers (IO's) and four Intelligence Specialists. Two IO's were provided by the Medium Attack and TARPS F-14 squadrons, with the remaining squadrons providing one IO each. Two Intelligence Specialists (IS's) were provided by the TARPS F-14 squadron and one each by the A-6 and S-3 squadrons. Multi-sensor Interpretation (MSI) was under the direction of the TARPS Intelligence Officer and the two TARPS Intelligence Specialists were also assigned to MSI. All Air Wing IO's were assigned ADDU to the ship's Intelligence Center.

b. (C) Although we began the cruise with very little deployment experience, intensive predeployment activity exercised the team in all aspects of carrier air operations and laid a sound foundation from which to build during the cruise. For daily flight operations two duty officers, two briefers and four debriefers (divided into two teams) ran the daily schedule. These duties rotated approximately every two weeks with all IO's qualified to perform any of the duties. This set-up allowed a great deal of flexibility in providing an IO to specifically support a planning evolution. One IO manned a full-time watch billet in Supplemental Plot (SUPPLOT) which rotated approximately every 30 days. The prospective relief for the SUPPLOT watch split his time between part-time duty officer watch in Mission Planning and indoctrination in SUPPLOT. This SUPPLOT watch system has the advantage of providing squadron Intelligence Officers full-time experience in Operational Intelligence analysis and reporting. On no-fly days, which frequently took the place of port visits in the Indian Ocean, the day was divided up into four-hour Intelligence Duty Officer (IDC) watches which allowed maximum flexibility while ensuring Mission Planning was manned at all times.

c. ~~(C)~~ The key word for operations in a Med-IO-Med cruise is flexibility. There are considerable differences in operational procedures between Sixth Fleet and Seventh Fleet. Starting well in advance will ensure thorough familiarity with all applicable OPORDER's and instructions. The tempo of operations ranged from intense during real-world contingency operations in the Eastern Mediterranean to fairly relaxed during non-flying days. We were never totally relaxed as we were in an alert posture during virtually the entire cruise. Support to daily air operations consisted of normal briefing and debriefing, preparing numerous kneeboard cards to cover daily operations as well as special exercises, and the preparation of summaries and reports on the day's events. A short current intelligence brief was presented prior to each event brief. Special debrief sheets and kneeboard cards were developed to support specific reporting requirements.

d. (U) Indian Ocean operations involve an abundance of air intercept operations, primarily against Soviet MAY's. The preparation of the detailed narrative for Intelligence Reports on MAY surveillance flights was rotated among the Air Wing Intelligence Officers. Detailed debriefs are essential for preparing these reports, as well as MIJI, Incident-at Sea reports and other operational reporting.

e. ~~(C)~~ ASW planning was accomplished by planning boards, similar in composition to strike planning boards. The two ASW IO's were members of the ASW boards. Initially the VS and HS IO's worked strictly ASW briefing and debriefing, however, in an effort to broaden everyone's experience and provide more flexibility a training program was initiated to qualify all IO's to brief ASW. The duty officers then assumed the daily ASW briefing responsibility.

f. ~~(C)~~ Eight Strike Planning teams were assigned within the Air Wing. An IO was assigned to each team. The fleet SAO package was used extensively to provide target orientation and threat analysis support. This was received very positively by planning teams. All contigency targets for OPPLAN 4106 were planned and debriefed prior to the end of work-ups. Having the strip charts prepared by the FAISC's greatly facilitated the planning evolution.

g. ~~(C)~~ TARPS proved to be a very versatile system for both overland and maritime reconnaissance collection. Overland opportunities were few during the cruise, so maximum training was scheduled on those available. An aggressive 35MM program provided numerous surface contact photos, as well as shots of all air escort evolutions. The LB-31 was not tasked, nor extensively used during the cruise.

8. (U) <u>Air Wing Safety</u>

a. (U) The extended at-sea periods, characteristic of Indian Ocean operations, create some unique safety problems. The complacency in the middle of a long at-sea period, the heightened anticipation of entering your first port in two months, and the sinking morale as you leave port for the next two months, are all situations that arise 2-3 times each deployment. The best way to handle these problems is through constant attention by the Air Wing Safety Officer of the Day and squadron safety personnel as well as scheduling "All Hands" safety reviews.

b. (U) The Air Wing Safety Officer of the Day was the cornerstone of the safety program. The designated Safety Officer was visible on the Flight and Hangar Decks throughout the day. At the completion of flight operations he would debrief with the Air Officer and draft a memo containing positive comments as well as discrepancies noted. This memo was then distributed by the Air Wing Safety Officer to ensure widest dissemination throughout the ship and Air Wing.

c. (U) An "All Hands" safety review was conducted after leaving each port. This allowed aircrews and maintenance personnel a day to get organized before commencing flight operations. The topics and conduct of the safety review were left to the individual squadrons, with the Air Wing Staff providing an initial short brief on CVIC-TV.

d. (U) Another problem brought about by long at-sea periods was slippery conditions on the Flight Deck. Each day at sea was spent either flying or conducting underway replenishment, which left little time for large scale flight deck scrubs. A program of scrubbing small sections of the Flight Deck every day was developed. This helped to improve the condition of the Flight Deck and decrease the number of crunches.

e. (U) Blue water, no divert, flight operations presents a special problem for airborne emergencies. Barricade engagements become much more likely and all aircrews, LSO's, and CATCC/Pri-Fly observers should be well briefed on barricade procedures. This Air Wing flew the first barricade engagement in the 15 year history of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY when an A-7 experienced an unsafe nose gear. The aircraft received less than class "C" damage. Other emergencies that may require prior thought are no flap aircraft on light wind days, landing gear barberpoled with no wheels warning light and no other unsafe indications, launch bar down or unsafe, and inability to retract or jettison a refueling hose.

f. The class "A" mishaps experienced during the deployment were:

28 JAN 82	HS-7 class A - FM 01-82
	Helo crashed on USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27) while conducting transfer operations. One minor injury.
6 FEB 82	VF-11 class A - FM 01-82
	F-14 lost at sea during ACM due to flat spin. One minor injury.

24 FEB 82 - VAQ-138 class A - FM 01-82

Two ALQ-99 pods departed aircraft during control reversal maneuver. No injuries.

26 MAR 82 HS-7 class A - FM 02-82

Helo lost directional control, landed in the water and sank. No injuries.

9. (U) Landing Signal Officer

a. (U) Because of the long periods at sea, there were ample flying days, though each day was somewhat short. To spread the "pickle" time around we kept the team leaders backing-up most of the time, and let the younger LSO's wave as much as possible. The results were gratifying; six new Air Wing quals, and nine new squadron qualifications. In addition, two LSO's were field-qualified and two new LSO's were brought under training. We worked blue water ops most of the time and this made the probability of a barricade engagement much higher. All LSO's and aircrews should be thoroughly briefed on barricade procedures, and the barricade recovery bulletin should be readily available.

b. Maintaining night currency in the Indian Ocean was not as much of a problem as it was in the Mediterranean Sea, but with no diverts available you need to be careful about letting people go over 14 days without a night trap. Touch and go's on E-2's and S-3's whenever possible is a good idea to keep them proficient. Flying dual piloted and double cycles they get less ball time than everyone else. The COD pilots (US-3 and C-2) also need max touch and go's. They never get enough landings to be at their best and any ball time you can give them is well worth the extra time.

10. (U) Community Inputs.

a. (U) Fighters

(1) (C) This deployment has been a unique and challenging one for the VF-11 RED RIPPERS and VF-31 TOMCATTERS, comprising a mixture of real-world and exercise commitments. The outstanding success of the squadrons during their first F-14 deployment can only be attributed to careful preparation and a total commitment to professionalism by all hands. Stressing combat readiness and FMC/MC aircraft availability, all operational commitments were met or exceeded.

(2) ~~(C)~~ NATIONAL WEEK was an international 5 day war-at-sea exercise. The Fighter's main contribution was long range CAP (150NM). Many problems with Vector Logic concepts were ironed out during this week. Most CAPs were relieved on station, causing the fighters to make the tail end of the reco-

veries. The squadrons' resources were somewhat pressed with a continual Alert 5 and Alert 15 commitment.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Beacon Flash 82-4, 82-5 and 82-6. Each of these exercises consisted of two days of intensive overland operations. All aircrews had the opportunity to participate in a variety of realistic missions including Low-Level Navigation, TARPS, Strike Escort and DACT. The majority of these missions were opposed by Jaguars and Hunters from the Sultan of Oman Air Force (SOAF). These aircraft were flown by experienced pilots who proved to be extremely aggressive and worthy adversaries. The realistic airborne threat and rugged desert terrain provided some of the most realistic combat training ever encountered. TARPS coverage of all the low-level routes was permitted, with the exception of Thumrait Airfield. You can look forward to some of the best flying possible. Push for maximum over-the-beach sorties. Caution: The key to the continuation of these outstanding exercises is strict compliance with the prescribed ROE and course rules. Much meaningful and eye opening training was accomplished during these 3 exercises over Southern Oman.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Weapons Week (Diego Garcia)

(a) ~~(C)~~ This four day exercise consisted of a two day missilex, Low-Level Navigation, TARPS mapping and a limited amount of strafing. Air-to-Air Gunnery was planned with F-14's towing banners from Diego Garcia. Unfortunately, this evolution had to be cancelled because of the FOD hazard at Diego Garcia. The largest single exercise for the squadrons was the missilex during which six AIM-7E's and four AIM-9L's were successfully fired. MQM-74C targets augmented with Luneberg lenses and flares were launched from Diego Garcia. Drone control was at times erratic but generally satisfactory. Telemetry recording was accomplished aboard USS WHITE PLAINS. E-2C coordination and range control were the keys to success here.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Several mapping missions over Diego Garcia were flown to obtain imagery of the atoll and base complex. Low-level routes north of Diego Garcia were designated utilizing small atolls as check points. These low-levels were a welcome change from CAP/AIC missions. Because of the limited availability of floating targets, very little strafing was accomplished. Push for your fair share of strafing time on these targets.

(5) ~~(C)~~ Contingencies. Contingency plans were developed, practiced and refined throughout the deployment. These missions included TARCAP, Strike Escort, Freedom of Navigation, Long Range CAP, TARPS and TARPS Escort.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Alert Commitment. The F-14 alert posture was a function of battle group position and current intelligence information. On non-flying days, alert Alpha (1 ALERT 5, 1 ALERT 15 per squadron) was set during daylight hours. Alert Bravo (1 ALERT 15, 1 ALERT 30 per squadron) was set after sunset. On flying days, Alert Alpha was set from 30 minutes prior to sunrise to the first event launch. The CVBG was frequently surveilled by Soviet IL-38 Mays and occa-

sional Iranian P-3's. Intercept was required at 200NM with continous escort inside a 200NM radius from the battle group. The vast majority of intercepts were conducted against Soviet Mays operating from Aden. These usually occurred on Tuesday and Thursdays. Intelligence information always allowed intercept by 200NM. No alert launches occurred at night.

(7) ~~(C)~~ Combat Air Patrol (CAP). While changes in location and potential threat ultimately dictated the required defensive posture, normally two medium range (100-150NM) CAP stations were manned during flight operations. On-station relief was required only when a real world threat existed. Single aircraft CAP stations were the norm and AIC between CAP aircraft was conducted whenever possible. Normal alert and CAP loadout consisted of 1-1-1 with external tanks and fammo.

(8) ~~(C)~~ Training and Readiness. ACM qualifications were easily maintained because of an aggressive, continuing Air Wing ACM program between the F-14's and the A-7's. Optimum training was achieved on 1+15 or 1+30 hour cycles, normally on the first event each day. At lease three full engagements could be accomplished with the external tanks configuration without needing additional tanking. YO-YO ACM cycles were occasionally scheduled. BEACON FLASH provided the most realistic and enjoyable ACM training. The Hawker Hunter was an outstanding MIG-17 simulator and the Jaguar provided realistic training against MIG-21/MIG-23 type platforms. Also, A 1 vs MANY exercise consisting of 7-9 F-14 and A-7 aircraft provided excellent training in a multi-bogey environment and was extremely beneficial to all players.

(9) ~~(C)~~ EW/MAS. Excellent work with the EA-6B's enhanced EW training and readiness. Scenarios ranged from simple comm and noise jamming to sophisticated deception techniques. A-7's equipped with ALQ-167 PODS were opposed on two occasions, but POD operational difficulties precluded any realistic training.

(10) ~~(C)~~ Air-to-Ground Gunnery. An aggressive program of Air-to-Ground Gunnery was pursued throughout the deployment. It was the squadrons' policy to strafe whenever possible during daytime sorties. Although plagued by a lack of suitable targets, an imaginative approach produced satisfactory results. Alternate targets utilized included CV and small boy wakes, smokes dropped by A-6's, grasslines, and floating debris. Additionally, limited strafing opportunities were available during weapons week and BEACON FLASH exercises.

(11) ~~(C)~~ TARPS. The VF-31 TOMCATTERS were the first Atlantic Fleet Squadron to deploy to the Indian Ocean with the Tactical Air Reconnaissance POD System (TARPS). Assets consisted of three block 110 F-14's and three TARPS PODS. TARPS PODS were carried only on dedicated TARPS missions and downloaded for all other sorties. All TARPS aircraft were configured with external tanks and AIM-54 rails on stations 3 and 6. Normal loadout with the POD configured was

0-1-1 and fammo.

a. Tasking. A total of 97 TARPS sorties were flown in five mission areas:

SSSC	53	(47 day, 6 night)
Low-level RECCE	15	(13 day, 2 night)
Air-to-Air	9	
Mapping	7	
Strike/Minex BDA	13	

In addition, 25 TARPS low-level training sorties were flown utilizing the TARPS computer program without the POD actually loaded. One reconnaissance mission of Diego Garcia consisted of a section of TARPS aircraft that conducted a round trip in excess of sixteen hundred miles, demonstrating the long range tactical reconnaissance capability of the CVBG.

b. Real world TARPS tasking consisted of SSSC, Air-to-Air coverage of overflight aircraft, reconnaissance of soviet anchorages at Socotra Island, mapping missions (Diego Garcia, Australia and Kenya), and overland targets during BEACON FLASH. The mapping missions of Australia and Kenya were fully planned but were cancelled at the last minute due to difficulties in obtaining diplomatic flight clearances. Planning information for these missions is available upon request.

c. Aircrew Training and Qualification. Routine operations called for 1-2 TARPS sorties per day utilizing all three sensors. Limited night IR work was done due to the lack of suitable targets. Mediterranean and Indian Ocean contingency planning for TARPS was extensive. Long range mapping missions also required extensive planning and coordination with the ship. Maintaining qualifications in accordance with CNALINST 3500.42E in the RECCE area requires careful planning and scheduling.

d. Because of the non-availability of overland training routes except during BEACON FLASH and in the vicinity of Diego Garcia, an innovative approach to aircrew training was required.

(12) ~~(C)~~ TRANSPAC OF REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT. Due to the loss of aircraft 101 in a flat spin accident on 6 February 1982, it was necessary to ferry one of FITRON ELEVEN's remaining aircraft at NAS Oceana to the Indian Ocean. The aircraft was flown as far as NAS Cubi Point, Republic of the Phillipines by a VF-84 aircrew, where it was met by a VF-11 aircrew on 25 march 1982. Due to problems with maintenance support and Air Force KC-135 scheduling, it was 30 days before it was flown to Diego Garcia on 24 April 1982. Another 15 day delay, due to a typhoon in the area and USAF coordination problems, was encountered in Diego Garcia before flying aboard the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY on 9 May 1982.

The following are recommendations and lessons learned for future transfer of aircraft to squadrons deployed to the Indian Ocean:

a. Maintenance support for the F-14 is paramount. The F-14 should not be flown anywhere unless parts and personnel are readily available to perform required maintenance. The main factor in the successful launch of aircraft BUNO 159438 from NAS Cubi Point was the arrival at Cubi of Carrier Air Wing NINE in USS CONSTELLATION and the subsequent maintenance assist from VF-211/24 personnel.

b. (U) Light Attack

(1) (~~C~~) During this 1982 deployment the VA-37 "Bulls" and VA-105 "Gunslingers" were able to maintain, and in some areas increase, the readiness posture in their primary mission areas. Employment of the Corsairs included strike, AAW, SSSC, photo and battle group service missions. Exercises such as Beacon Flash (82-4, 5, 6) and Weapons Week 82-2 made it possible for continued training in ordnance delivery, low-level navigation and coordinated strike tactics.

(2) (~~C~~) National Week XXXI was a five day exercise with planned long range strikes against simulated Soviet SAGS, land targets (low-levels over Sicily), and long range minex of Pachino. The entire evolution was hampered by poor weather, extremely long distances and confusion created by tasking. Limited squadron training in support of PMA was realized during this exercise.

(3) (~~C~~) Beacon Flash. We participated in three of these exercises with the Sultan of Oman Air Forces (SOAF) and progressed from flying low level routes dictated by SOAF to planning and flying routes we chose. Our strike leaders were given great latitude in planning coordinated strikes against either Thumrat Airfield or Rubkut Target Range (all were opposed by Hunter and Jaguar aircraft). We enjoyed use of a "free play" area during our last exercise, with airspace available from the surface to FL200. Low-level routes culminating in ordnance deliveries at the range utilizing MK76 PB, 20MM and 5" ZUNIS during daylight hours and MK76 and paraflares at night were permitted. The Hunters and Jaguars which opposed our morning coordinated strikes were flown by superb pilots who routinely intercepted low level strikes from below. In many respects, Beacon Flash is reminiscent of Red Flag exercises. The SOAF placed very few restrictions (primarily in the form of prohibited areas) on the Air Wing, but it is very important to abide by their rules to insure future participation in this exercise. One Beacon Flash per month will greatly assist maintenance of Training and Readiness standings. Although normally limited in sortie numbers, the CARGRU staff permitted surge ops during Beacon Flash realizing the invaluable training available.

(4)(~~C~~) Weapons Week. Four days of intense War-at-Sea Exercises, low-levels, ordnance delivery and a missilex utilizing MK80 series, LGBs, AIM-9H, Shrike and MK76 brought all pilots back up to speed in live ordnance carriage and delivery. Four Sinkex hulls ranging from a 157' LSSL to 54' LCM were available for target use. Weapons Week requires much coordination between your CVW OPS officer, the embarked staff and Diego Garcia personnel. Be prepared with plans and scenarios to ensure max training.

(5) (~~C~~) Configuration. Both A-7 squadrons maintained two aircraft configured with a D-704 and two AERO-1D tanks. During all Indian Ocean operations both a KA-6D and a KA-7E were continuously airborne. Both squadrons were FLIR configured (6 A/C each) with five pods per squadron. Normal stores load out consisted of 1 MER/TER/1 Drop Tank.

(6) (U) Miscellaneous Items of Interest

(a) (~~C~~) Proper operation of Mode IV is and will continue to be of foremost importance.

(b) (U) Mode I ACLS was a high visibility item. The A-7's led the way in useage and when channel A of the SPN-42 went down, PAX River sent parts, a representative and pilot to repair and recertify the equipment.

(c) ~~(C)~~ Both squadrons utilized the MARK Function on smokes to practice OTS/LOFT, achieving good results.

(d) ~~(C)~~ A-7 night SSSC missions were routine with successful results. Boresights and parts support were the major problems for FLIR systems usage.

(e) ~~(C)~~ Ensure several functioning Walleye trainers aboard for deployment. If they go down, it is possible to receive replacements even in the I.O.

c. Medium Attack

(1) (U) The routine in the Indian Ocean was to fly approximately 19 days a month with no fly days being scheduled during transits and on UNREP days. The air wing was limited to 3500 hours/month by the CARGRU so we would not exceed our logistic support available in the IO. On a normal flying day, we had six events consisting of 10-12 A-6E's and six tankers. Flight Ops usually ran from 1200-2200 giving 3 day and 3 night recoveries. Night time averaged 36%. Night currency never became a scheduling problem. With the high availability of aircraft we could count on 15 of the 16 sorties making it out giving us 33 hours per day. The weather played a major role in our operations. During our 75 fly days (1179 sorties) in the Indian Ocean, only one event was cancelled due to thunderstorms. The normal weatner was 20 sct, 250 sct, 7H, airtemp 84°F, seatemp 83°F - 24 hours everyday. The one cancelled event was a passing thunderstorm which made the weather in the groove WOXOF. Two additional KA-6D's were launched (for four airborne) and everyone was tanked while the ship steamed for clear weather.

(2) ~~(C)~~ There is an obvious lack of targets in the Indian Ocean. The FLIR enables the B/N to track the MK58 smoke as pilots have been doing with visual dive bombing for years. We were fortunate to have several ships in company which could trail a larne. If a larne/wake was unavailable for radar bombing it was found that system attacks could be adequately performed on the MK58 smoke. Several different types of attacks can be performed using the pilot boresight designate with a FLIR hand off. The first are the obvious high and low angle dives (20°-40°). These attacks yielded good results if the B/N has the laser on as the pilot rolled in and designated. This attack could also be used at night, though limited by squadron SOP to a 20 degree dive. Another attack used with success was the straight path (actually a general fly-through) with a B/N FLIR hand off. This worked well both night and day and offered the B/N a good deal of tracking practice. Good laser feedback was received when sea states were low (usually available in the I. O.) and straight path altitudes were above 1500 AGL. In most cases the B/N was able to spot, track, and hand off the MK58 at 4-5NM. The FLIR was also very valuable for target identification on SSC missions. It is the only method of identifying contacts at night and could also save a lot of time during daylight missions, by allowing target ID at greater ranges than possible visually. Altitude is a major factor in FLIR detection and identification in the I. O. due to the high humidity. Relative humidity below 10,000 feet MSL was usually 85-95% with FLIR detection ranges at less than 10NM. The relative humidity above 15,000 feet MSL was never greater than 19% and FLIR identification ranges were commonly 25NM or better. Minimizing the slant range through areas of high relative humidity is critical.

(3) ~~(C)~~ The Beacon Flash exercise over Oman was the only low level navigation training available during the deployment to the Indian Ocean. The "no holds barred" flying offered over the Oman desert enabled aircrews to experience the 420-480 kt, 50-100 feet AGL flight regime unavailable in CONUS. Both visual and system navigation procedures were used on the several different low level routes that were flown. For each exercise, four routes were prepared by the Air Wing and submitted to the Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) for approval. Two of the routes were designed as day/night navigation flights and two as entry/exit routes to Rubkut Target. Actual RTI was very limited due to the lack of radar significant build up in the desert. However, occasional terrain features did allow B/N's to practice their long unused radar navigation abilities. VTR was used to gain RSP of the coast in and turn points. Three coordinated strikes were flown each day during each two day exercise, with each attack squadron having one lead per day. Several different coordinated tactics were investigated against opposing SAM's (Rapier) and fighters (Jaguar and Hunter). A high speed, low altitude ingress with a split followed by a closely timed attack from multiple quadrants was used to avoid acquisition radars and to complicate the target defense problem. A high altitude ingress with fighter escort was used to avoid the Rapier envelope (10,000 feet AGL). Although this style of attack minimized the Rapier threat, it increased the air to air threat on ingress and egress. It was found that a low altitude, high speed, multi-axis attack gave the Omani defense the most training. However,

any aircraft that made it through the fighter screen was easily "handed off" to the optical tracking, mobile Rapier sites. The Rapier is an extremely good, low altitude, point defense system, as was shown in the very graphic video tapes played at the joint debrief. Two or three strikes in quick succession (15-20 minutes apart) could overwhelm the Omani defense, although USN attrition would be high without a dedicated MIG SWEEP. The professionalism and airmanship of the SOAF contract pilots was impressive. The debriefs by the SOAF offered concise criticism and comment on the USN tactics employed. Overall, the strikes yielded the best training this squadron has received since Red Flag. The squadron did emphasize low altitude navigation training in preference to MK76 work at the target. Flying over the desert offered a unique variety of sights and experiences. Although the desert doesn't offer a lot of visual cues for navigation, it does offer a good challenge in DR and limited radar terrain navigation.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Weapons Week. During April 2-5, the squadron participated in CTF 70's "Weapons Week" at Diego Garcia. CVW-3 exercised its TACNOTES and expended a variety of conventional ordnance/missiles. All aircrews were able to deliver some form of live ordnance. VA-75 dropped MK82 and MK83 bombs, MK83 inert Paveway I LGB"s, MK20 Rockeye, and fired the AIM9G sidewinder, and the AGM Shrike. We attempted to shoot the AGM78 Standard Arm (live warhead) on a target hull, but the emitter was too weak to provide a missile handoff. The STARM was returned to the ship. Targets for the CVW strikes were small ship hulls of varying sizes (LST's). Two emitters were provided - one for the STARMEX and one for the SHRIKEX. Daily low level navigation routes through the islands were available and a MINEX area at Diego Garcia was designated on the eastern beach. Coordinated strikes at the airfield (no ordnance) and MINEX's at the beach were flown coupled up with a SAREX with crew implant. Instructions for Weapons Week are contained in a standing CTF 70 message LOI, a CTF 70.1 OPORD and are amplified by individual CVW LOI's for each event. Squadrons are tasked to write these and they are published as a package the week prior.

(5) ~~(C)~~ DCM. Shortly after Weapons Week, the squadron aggresively pursued a DCM training program to get all squadron aircrews qualified for dissimilar DCM. Using a core of five instructor pilots, who had been through either the VA-45 Adversary Program or the Top Gun School, the squadron conducted ground and flight training to ensure adequate coverage of the basic DCM maneuvers.

(6) ~~(C)~~ The squadron flew the ALQ-167 jamming pod on three separate flights. The ALQ-167 and associated training and maintenance manuals are an I. O. cross deck item. It is simple to use and easy to configure. Each flight was prebriefed in CIC and flown in company with an EA6B. In the debriefs, CIC was unable to distinguish the ALQ-167 jamming from the EA6B jamming. A-7's also carried the ALQ-167 against F-14 CAP. Although valuable RIO training is possible, the multi-modes of the F-14 radar permit easy jam avoidance. The ALQ-167 is strictly a service flight.

(7) ~~(C)~~ AWG-21. AWG-21 system utilization averaged approximately 80 hours per month. All VA-75 crews were trained and qualified in the AWG-21. Aircrew training peaked during the Mediterranean transit due to system saturation by Soviet emitters. In the I. O., however, training was limited to the IDENT mode and friendly emitters due to the lack of Soviet combatants present. The Standard Arm, along with the Harpoon, was integrated into the Air Wing War-at-Sea TACNOTE and continuously practiced throughout the deployment. ATM-78 training missiles were carried periodically throughout the deployment and provided valuable training for the flight and ordnance crews. The capability of the system to hand-off rotating radars to the ATM-78 was investigated and reported by secret message to COMMATWING ONE.

(8) ~~(C)~~ Tankers. CVW-3 normally flew one KA6D and one KA7 per cycle. Excess fuel was always available above and beyond scheduled tanking requirements. As the Air Wing became more proficient with the Blue Water operations and the fuel dump became a funding problem, the following actions took place.

(a) First KA6D's were light loaded to 22.0, then finally 20.0. All scheduled giveaway came from the KA7.

(b) Second, the KA7 became the spare for the KA6D, and the KA6D remained at 20.0. No fuel was scheduled on the Air Plan.

(c) Finally, selective light loading to 16.0 for the last event KA6D and/or double cycling the next to last event KA6D, would absorb giveaway fuel that had slowly built up throughout the day due to consolidation. KA6D's landed always near max trap and the average daily tanker dump was about 3000#. In order to achieve this result, Air Operations constantly monitored and managed fuel loads, and actively pursued a fuel conservation program.

d. (U) Antisubmarine Warfare.

(1) (U) VS.

(a) ~~(C)~~ Data Link. Close coordination between the VS squadron and CIC greatly enhanced the ability to maintain the Link 11 Net. VS-22 was able to increase Link 11 success rates from 44% at the beginning of the cruise to over 75% for the last three months of the cruise. The SLU and HF Coupler in the S-3A were the major contributors to unsuccessful Link 11 operations, accounting for 50% of the equipment failures.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Mode IV Interrogation. The requirement to report the S-3A capability to interrogate MODE-IV IFF was generated during the last three months of the cruise. The success rate rose from 21% in April to over 60% in June 1982.

(c) (~~C~~) Day/Night Carrier Landing Currency. The 1982 Med/I. O. deployment has reduced the usual problems of day/night carrier landing currency to a relatively effortless chore. The extended at-sea periods and relatively short in-port periods have contributed to this ease of operations. Except in cases where individuals exceeded the 14 day limit between night landings, no major problems existed. When individuals exceeded this limit, usually due to medical grounding, the requirement for a divert field posed a problem. Since the majority of the underway time was spent conducting Blue Water operations, these individuals were further delayed while awaiting the availability of a divert field. Our greatest asset in maintaining currency was the willingness of CV Strike Operations to cooperate with the squadron. When necessary, we were allowed the flexibility to adjust the air plan to meet our currency requirements. One such innovation was the ability to gain a day "touch and go" landing, mid-cycle on a double cycle sortie, and return to a night carrier arrestment. This allowed for greater flexibility in maintaining currency, while causing minimal impact on the daily air plan. Additionally, the use of a touch and go and trap on day sorties provided the flexibility for a pilot to be eligible for a night landing on two successive nights.

(d) (~~C~~) Alerts. While operating in the Indian Ocean, VS-22 was tasked with alert 15 aircraft whenever alert "A" was set. To accommodate this tasking, aircrew personnel were required to be in the Ready Room, in full flight gear, for the duration of their alert. Alert 30's allowed flight crews to stand their alerts in their rooms. This necessitated the implementation of the "FULL SYSTEMS TURN", completed every eight hours, to ensure flight crews of FMC alert aircraft and to negate unnecessary delays when the alert was required to launch. Furthermore, squadron duty officer watches were split to two 12 hour watches daily, allowing quick reaction when it was necessary to launch an alert aircraft. The alert was launched on an average of six times per month in response to operational tasking.

(e) ~~(C)~~ Inflight Refueling. VS-22 received favorable services from CVW-3 tanker capable aircraft. In every case, time permitting, in-flight refueling (IFR) practice was made available, allowing VS-22 pilots to maintain day/night currency. In an effort to contribute to CVW-3 fuel conservation, VS-22 participated in fuel consolidation. The S-3A aircraft's ability to effect carrier arrestment at fuel weights of approximately 7000 pounds allows the S-3A to bring aboard fuel that would otherwise have to be dumped by tanker aircraft. The only problem encountered during this deployment concerned S-3A IFR adaptability with A-7 tanker configured aircraft. Due to the loss of a starboard leading edge flap while conducting IFR on an A-7 tanker aircraft, VS-22 was restricted from tanking on A-7 aircraft (except in emergency situations) pending the outcome of an engineering investigation.

(f) ~~(C)~~ Utilization of Squadron Assets. VS squadrons have always wrestled with the problems of extended around-the-clock operations and the effect of those operations on flight crews and the maintenance of aircraft.

VS-22 operated around-the-clock for six and seven consecutive days on two different occasions maintaining two FMC S-3A's on station at all times. The following data reflects the success of squadron asset scheduling.

	QUALS ALPHA	QUALS WHISKEY	SORTIES SCHEDULED	SORTIES FLOWN	TOTAL HRS	ASW CONTACT HRS	CONSTRUCTIVE ATTACKS
Double Team 1-82	12	20	56 (6 days)	55	232.4	4.7	2
Double Team 2-82	85	244	76 (7 days)	75	264.2	31.4	22

Squadron aircrews, supplemented by three S-3A qualified officers (1 CVW-3, 1 ship's company, and 1 CARGRU FOUR), were organized into six flights with two crews per flight. A standard rotation was set-up with one flight having the duty and the remaining five flights on a rotational schedule. The mean sortie was four hours with a standard deviation of 0.5. With two aircraft airborne and one aircraft on alert 30, it was necessary for one crew from each flight to stand the alert on the cycle prior to their launch. This rotational schedule allowed for a minimum of fourteen hours between flight debrief and next alert for crew rest. Additionally, this type of scheduling required five aircraft be provided by maintenance. VS-22's maintenance department routinely provided seven mission capable aircraft, allowing for maximum flexibility in utilizing the alert 30 when operational tasking dictated.

(g) ~~(C)~~ Training Readiness. The paucity of joint ASW exercises, alpha service periods, and lack of raked target ranges in the Indian Ocean were overcome through aggressive pursuit of Soviet subsurface contacts and innovative tactics designed to overcome facility limitations. Highly successful operations against Soviet Type I and Type II submarines as part of "Operation Double Team" enabled VS-22 to increase readiness in both ASW and Command/Control readiness areas during April-May 1982 time frame.

(h) ~~(C)~~ Mining. To maintain Mine Warfare proficiency, crews utilized either geographic points surrounding Diego Garcia or surface escorts as ingress points for combined CVW-3 mining exercises. MK-58 marine smoke markers were utilized in lieu of practice mines while F-14 TARPS photography was employed for post strike analysis of drop accuracy. While operating in the Arabian Sea during May 1982, VS-22 led, for the first time ever, a combined CVW-3 open ocean MINEX. Each MINEX permitted squadron mission planners to maintain skills in mine warfare planning.

(i) ~~(C)~~ ESM. Electronic support measures (ESM) training was enhanced by narrowing ALR-47 preflight detection bands to optimize location of hostile emitters. The squadron was specifically cited by Commander Task Force 66 during early February 1982 in the Mediterranean for the quality of its EW reporting.

(j) ~~(C)~~ NWT. In the area of nuclear weapons training readiness, VS-22 maintained three loading teams which loaded/wire checked monthly to maximize training proficiency. A mid-cruise CVW-3 inhouse NTPI proved invaluable to updating administrative programs, correcting minor loading procedural errors and exchanging ideas among each nuclear-capable squadron.

(k) ~~(C)~~ TORPS. The conditional prohibition against open ocean torpedo exercises severely hampered squadron efforts to raise ASW readiness. Without the capability to gain A-37-U (TORPEX) qualifications, VS-22 flight crews arriving during the cruise were prevented from meeting the 75% combat readiness level in the primary mission area of ASW. A solution to the MK-46 EXTORP reliability problems and removal of current restrictions against their use on other than simulated targets would greatly aid deployed squadron ASW training. Substantial acceleration of CNO project 837-OT-I, Expendable Mobile Training Target (EMATT), for fleet introduction in FY 83-84 vice FY 85 would greatly enhance the operational readiness of all fleet ASW platforms. The EMATT would allow VS/HS squadrons the opportunity to obtain the A-37-U qualification virtually at will.

(l) ~~(C)~~ Sensor Operators. Enlisted ASW sensor operators continue to arrive in the squadron without FRS documentation of ASW qualifications earned while in VS-41. A continuing effort by FRS personnel to ensure transmittal of documented Alpha qualifications would eliminate requalification and enhance ASW PMA. Hand carried documentation would be the most efficient method of receiving notification for the squadron.

(m) ~~(C)~~ Intelligence. Intelligence training for general recognition and threat knowledge as well as briefings on geopolitical and regional topics of concern were presented as a regular portion of aircrew ground training sessions. Aircrew hand held 35MM photography was responsible for seven USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) including several very significant finds of Soviet arms-carrying vessels. This number (7) represents nearly half of the surface ship IIR's produced by CVIC. Photography of surface shipping by VS-22 comprised 60% of that photography forwarded to the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) and updating of ship publications.

(2) (U) HS Squadron.

(a) ~~(C)~~ Multiple CV Coordination in the Med. Experience with National Week in January demonstrated the magnitude of the coordination problems when trying to operate up to three CV's at a time in the Med. ASW tasking was not communicated clearly, the threat was always in excess of 200NM from the JFK and, consequently, very little ASW time was logged. Part of this problem was undoubtedly the choice of an ECHO II as the only threat.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Transit Time. Because of the defensive nature of the CV's ASW posture, it was difficult to get the CV close enough to the contact area to put helicopters on station. When the scene of action was within 50NM, tranist times measured 45% of the total leaving, typically, less than two hours to operate on station for a double cycle flight. Proposed solutions to this problem were: triple cycle flights with HIFR on station, remote basing, and moving the CV in closer. Only the latter proved workable under the circumstances.

(c) ~~(C)~~ IO Water Conditions. The SLD in the IO ranged from 180-400 feet. During the initial months in the IO it was frequently 350-400 feet. Below the layer was a strong negative gradient. These water conditions gave excellent surface duct propagation yielding ranges in excess of 3500 yards for a target in the layer. When the target went deep, however, ranges decreased to well below 1000 yards due to the inability of the AQS-13B sonar to put the hydrophone a significant distance below the layer. (By contrast, DICASS buoys set at 1000 feet yielded ranges for a deep target out to 5000 yards.) When active targets went deep, it was necessary to break dip so often and at such short ranges that minimum HOVERTAC ranges could not be attained unless, by good fortune, the helo managed to land within the CIRCLE SEARCH drop envelope. Poor ranges below the layer under IO water conditions were directly attributable to the length of the SH-3H sonar cable which often could not penetrate deep enough to get minimum HOVERTAC ranges before losing contact.

(d) ~~(C)~~ False Targets. The IO has an abundance of marine life and the problem of false contacts appearing on helo and DD/FF sonars was significant. Echoes of sharp, "metallic" quality were often obtained on contacts later evaluated as NONSUB. Common characteristics were: no MAD verification; slow, steady course and speed (usually 0-4 knots); inability to confirm with a second helo or, at times, by a second dip on a different bearing; eventual slow dissipation of the target; no passive LOFAR signature. IO ASW operations are characterized by a large number of false active contacts mostly due to marine biologics.

(e) ~~(C)~~ KY-82 NESTOR. The KY-82 NESTOR circuit proved both an asset and a liability. A high rate of "drop-synch" and unintelligible transmissions forced the ASW operations to operate on clear channels. It is impossible to conduct effective ASW in the clear without giving away vital tactical information. Rapid, clear exchange of tactical information among all platforms at the scene of action and with the OTC is essential to good datum prosecution. There is clearly a great need for a reliable, clearly readable secure voice system.

The KY-28 has no provisions for storage of two sets of codes as does the KIT-1A secure IFF. This caused a serious problem when the day changed. Attempts were made to delay the change until a lull in the action but, invariably, someone on the curcuit would get lost and it would take some time before everyone came up on the right code. Recommend a two code capability installed on any future NESTOR system.

(f) ~~(C)~~ Logistics. Logistics proved a major problem at the outset of the cruise with several ASW sorties lost during scheduled exercise periods. Air Ops and the ATO tightened up the scheduling of log flights and the productivity of the logistics helo doubled. When serious attention was given to log scheduling, all log runs were made by the first launch of the day and nothing was carried without clearance from Air Ops. Anyone transferring to a DD in the morning had to RON until the next morning before he could return. This policy eliminated further conflicts with the ASW mission as long as it was adhered to. H-46 aircraft assigned to MSLF ships in the force were pressed into logistics service to carry a larger share of the load. This policy came out of a flag ASW briefing where it was suggested as a way to maximize ASW use of the SH-3H. The LAMPS SH-2's were also used for many of the personnel transfers to small decks not certified for the SH-3H.

Statistics:

Total log time 445.5 hrs (20.8 %)

Passengers carried	1388
Lbs cargo	62,495
Lbs mail	36,979

(g) ~~(C)~~ ASAC Control. ASAC frequency was also the frequency used for most BG logistics missions. When ASW operations were heavy and operating on clear channels, log ops on the same frequency overloaded the circuit. This was solved by designating a separate log control net during ASW operations. Most ASAC controllers are trained to control helos by vectors to mark gate, etc. When OVERRIDE control was desired, we requested jump-dip range and bearing only and used TACNAV dip-to-dip NAV capability. The DTD navigation function in the Rev. C-1 TACNAV program was not usable. Although the idea behind it was good, the software which implements it needs much improvement. (Suggestions for improvement were submitted to the SCRB conference.) Best results with the DTD navigation were obtained with a standard FTP at Screen Center with the hook, scale in 0.5NM/inch and vector depressed. Copilot/TACCO called out range at 1000 yard intervals above 1000 yards and 100 yard intervals below. The pilot lined up on the BDHI and shot an alternate approach to arrive at checkpoints of 40 kts G/S/400 yards; 30 kts/300 yards; 20 kts/200 yards, etc. Once the approach began, line up on the #2 needle was controlled by lateral stick beep (feet off the pedals). With this procedure, pilots routinely made the dip point quickly within 50-100 yards. The lack of a more sensitive BDHI bearing and range readout within the pilot's scan impaired dip-to-dip navigation.

(h) ~~(C)~~ Alerts. In the IO, above 4 degrees North latitude, the ship set alert APLHA from 30 minutes prior to sunrise until 30 minutes after sunset and alert BRAVO at night. For the helicopters, alert ALPHA was alert 5 and alert BRAVO was alert 15. During the month of February, HS-7 pilots averaged 50 hours of flight time per pilot but, when alert 5 and 15 periods were added, that figure rose to 110 cockpit hours per pilot per month. Nine crews were insufficient to support IO operations effectively. Quick reaction of the alert helos was hampered by the requirement to fit into the fixéd wing deck cycles. Several alert helo launches were delayed, cancelled or launched on cold datums because of conflict with fixed wing operations.

(i) (~~C~~) Standard Training Scenarios. For ALPHA services, VS-22 and HS-7 worked up a standard training scenario and ran it repeatedly during designated training periods. This plan consisted of two datum positions 45NM apart. The exercise COMEX'ed at one point and the sub went sinker beneath the helo. At COMEX the helo flew outbound 15NM and returned to conduct a DATUMEX. The S-3 held over the FINEX point and started inbound at COMEX. When available, surface ships were stationed along the sub's track. FINEX was three hours after COMEX and the sub had to be within 5NM of the FINEX point at that time simulating a torpedo boat. As the exercise progressed, tactics went from datum prosecution to open ocean search to last ditch stand and screening operations around the FINEX point. Up to one half-hour after FINEX, COMEX was declared at the last FINEX point and the sub snorkeled back toward the first point. This allowed all units to get passive tracking work. Upon conversion to active, the sub went sinker and evasive to arrive within torpedo shot range of FINEX at FINEX time. This half of the exercise was run preferably by S-3's while the SH-3H returned for HFCS. These two scenarios could be repeated over and over again as different units cycled on station. Frequent use of a standard ASW problem guaranteed a maximum of contact time, realistic training and COMPET completion for all units involved while, at the same time, eliminating much of the confusion and delay caused by normal exercise start-up procedures. The increased familiarity among aircrews with this sort of problem allowed them to concentrate more on the ASW tactics and try different approaches under similar circumstances.

(j) ~~(C)~~ Inner-Screen. DOUBLE TEAM operations verified the importance of the active inner screen in defense of the BG. After MODLOCK sanitization was complete, a passive perimeter was set up consisting of SSN(DS), VP, VS and surface units. The inner screen consisted of a smallboy and HS helos. The vast majority of contacts generated by the inner screen were active. A POSSUB 3 was detected by active dipping sonar and subsequently attacked in less than 10 minutes using the same sensor. The danger to the CV posed by an inner zone threat will not permit the kind of time necessary to localize and attack from passive sensors. This experience reinforced the importance of a layered ASW defense around the CV and the need for a close-in active screen of surface units and dipping sonar. Crew and aircraft limitations constrained us to one helo in the active screen most of the time.

(k) ~~(C)~~ Round-the-Clock Operations. HS-7 went into round-the-clock flight operations several times. During DOUBLE TEAM operations we went for six days with one airborne and one in alert as a pouncer. This appeared to be the optimum tasking for six aircraft and nine crews and could have been continued indefinitely.

(l) ~~(C)~~ MCJR Pattern. For some ASW scenarios, HS-7 established a standard MCJR pattern on the 120 degree R at 10NM and 2000-4000 feet. From this position a delousing sonobuoy pattern of up to eight buoys laid astern the CV could be monitored for the full three hours without interfering with air operations. During transit, this tactic should be used twice daily. It is recommended to split the work between HS and HSL when available.

(m) ~~(C)~~ Small Deck Operations. During the cruise, a DD-sized deck was available for a limited time only while USS SPRUANCE (DD-963) was attached to the BG. She was reluctant to use her deck for HS DLQ operations because the flight quarters personnel were limited to one shift and could not respond at all times. Because of the difficulty in tracking small deck qualifications by the complex and confusing criteria in the NATOPS manual, HS-7 developed a simpler, more realistic policy for small deck quals and submitted them as a change to the NATOPS manual. We tracked initial quals and currency of all pilots efficiently and kept day/night DLQ qualifications current throughout the latter half of the cruise.

(n) ~~(C)~~ Passive vs. Active. The need to gather a maximum of intelligence from submarine contacts limited the majority of real-world ASW operations in the IO to passive tactics. This caused a significant increase in the utilization of MCJR. As with all relay systems, MCJR was limited by communications and coordination problems. The need to perform post flight analysis (PFA) on S-3 mission tapes limited the MCJR time available since the same equipment used for MCJR is also used to conduct PFA. The addition of the SDC system will greatly enhance the participation and usefulness of the SH-3H in the IO ASW operations.

(o) ~~(C)~~ 10NM Planeguard Pattern. The use of the 10NM planeguard pattern proved to be very advantageous providing flexibility not seen before. The PG aircraft was cleared to operate anywhere within 10NM except in the airspace within 20 degrees of the BRC ahead of the ship and 20 degrees of the FINAL BEARING astern out to 5NM. Altitudes were restricted to 400 feet and 200 feet within 5NM on the port side. ASW training, screening and MCJR operations were greatly enhanced. DLQ, logistics and HIFR operations were conducted by the PG helicopter routinely within 10NM.

(p) ~~(C)~~ SAR. The following rescues were performed during the period 2 January through 14 July 1982:

a. F-14 crash - one pilot, one RIO.
b. SH-3H crash at sea - two pilots, three aircrew

Of total flight hours flown, 953.8 were flown in support of SAR/Planeguard (44.5 %).

(q) ~~(C)~~ SAREX. Two combat SAREX's were flown to Diego Garcia during Weapons Week. Multiple open ocean opposed SAREX's were conducted with all Air Wing squadrons.

e. (U) Airborne Early Warning (VAW).

(1) ~~(C)~~ Significant modifications to existing Indian Ocean SOP allows the embarked CARGRU much greater flexibility in battle group operations and the airwing can expect to operate throughout the Indian Ocean. With the recent change to I.O. battle group force levels, the requirement to MODLOC at specified geographic positions, i.e. "Gonzo" or "Kermit" stations, for designated line periods with required on station relief has been relaxed. This allows for more frequent movement of the battle group with a slight change of pace on a more frequent basis. Current CTF 70 policy of intercept and escort of all Soviet and third world aircraft within 200nm of the battle group is in effect.

(2) (U) Tempo of operations. The attempt to plan an average flying schedule of six days on, two days off, combined with numerous early morning alert launches (usually one of the two off days) provides an abundance of flight time. VAW-126 averaged two day and two night recoveries per normal flying day. With continual effort for day touch & goes and night trap/cat/trap (on the initial night recovery), all E-2C pilots stayed marginally night current. This problem should be addressed at the beginning of the cruise with a firm policy established.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Alerts. The E-2Cs will always be in 30 minute alert. Expect to launch the alert aircraft (usually between sunrise and 0900) each Tuesday and one other day per week. In order to avoid surprises, develop good liaison with SESS and CIC to provide a "heads-up" as soon as possible.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Soviet and other third world aircraft. The IL-38 Aden based Mays always fly in pairs. They usually conduct SSC and ASW enroute to surveil the battle group and may split prior to or after being intercepted. Turnover days have two launching from Tashkent and two from Aden with the actual turnover taking place around the Gulf of Oman. Following the May turnover is usually a Cub or Candid out of Karachi flying airways, but deviation to surveil the battle group is possible. While operating close to the Gulf of Oman, expect to intercept Iranian P-3's conducting SSC operations. Two sections of Indian Jaguars and one Indian Cub were also intercepted while the battle group was in the vicinity of Indian airspace. French Atlantic ASW aircraft also conducted infrequent

SSC/ASW operations throughout the North Arabian Sea. These flights are usually composed of a single aircraft (non-squawking). "Heads-up" type information is not available on these flights and they can surprise the battle group, especially during periods of intense ducting.

(5) (U) AEW considerations.

(a) ~~(C)~~ As the monsoon season approaches, the I.O. presents some very challenging atmospheric conditions. The intense trapping and ducting layers previously documented by other squadrons, significantly impacts the E-2C Weapons System. Although the trapping layers are normally limited to a surface duct with another duct at two to three thousand feet, elevated layers above FL 200 were also experienced. It was usually mandatory to station under these elevated layers to maintain long range low level AEW coverage. IREPS data from METRO was updated on a daily basis, however, the elevated ducts were usually detectable as haze layers.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). Although the I.O. is relatively free from the EMI common throughout the Mediterranean, a substantial amount of EMI was experienced emanating from the southern Oman coastal area. All ten APS-125 radar channels had interference at least 15 db above noise with channels six and three experiencing levels approaching 50 db. Investigation into the problem postulates the interference may be caused by a new UHF communication relay network within the DHOFAR ADIZ. After direction by higher authority, VAW-126 verified that channels one, two, five and six caused disruptions and interference to Omani communications. These channels are not to be used in this area. We expect that specific guidance concerning this problem will be promulgated and become a mandatory turnover item. The only other areas in which significant EMI was experienced was in the Muscat/Seeb, Oman area (chan 5) and in the Karachi, India area (chan 10).

(c) ~~(C)~~ It should also be mentioned that there are numerous airliners (many do not squawk) throughout the North Arabian Sea especially in the Gulf of Oman area. They can usually be identified by their altitude, speed and the fact they are on airways.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Scheduled Operations. During the two one month operating periods in the Mediterranean and the four month extended deployment to the I.O., the JFK and CVW-3 participated in an extensive number of exercises. VAW-126 provided command and control for all events and helped ensure the battle force met the demands each situation presented.

(7) ~~(C)~~ National Week XXXI. This Mediterranean exercise was designed around totally coordinated "Blue" dual carrier battle group operations (JFK and IKE) against "Orange" assets primarily provided by the NIMITZ battle group. As was expected, problems experienced in the coordination of this multi-battle group evolution combined with geographical artificialities, seriously detracted

from the overall realism of the exercise. However, the command and control problems experienced at all levels adequately simulated a "real world" operation and the lessons learned by all players were valuable.

(8) ~~(C)~~ BEACON FLASH. This two day exercise is conducted in the Southern Oman coastal area. Thumrait airfield offered the best I.O. opportunity to practice CV power projection ashore. VAW-126 coordinated all tactical communications and liaison between the Airwing/CV and the Omani Air Force providing clearance for each aircraft prior to going "feet dry". The E-2C crews also provided bogey calls to strike leaders, assisted in navigation update for aircraft on low levels and directly coordinated with Omani ATC personnel to de-conflict civilian traffic. Expect an Omani Jaguar to proceed overwater and attempt to intercept the E-2C. This was accomplished on each BEACON FLASH and E-2C vulnerability should be addressed even in practice evolutions such as these.

(9) ~~(C)~~ Dual CV Operations. Conducted in the general vicinity of Diego Garcia, VAW-126 played a major role by providing aircraft control and assisting in the overall coordination of these dual battle group exercises. Long range CAP stationing along with long range Alpha Strikes and Minexs were conducted in both CV versus CV and dual CV scenarios. As anticipated, the CV versus CV exercises provided meaningful training for the CV/CVW airwing team. Utilizing the Vector Logic Concept of autonomus F-14 control, the exercise constraints directed the simulated removal of the E-2C. This accentuated the following observed shortcomings with present Vector Logic procedures:

(a) ~~(C)~~ Establishment and maintenance of the Vector Logic Grid in EMCON conditions (no TACAN reference) is difficult to achieve for the F-14 (even with "up" inertial systems). Non-CAINS KA-6D Tankers were given A-7E "Pathfinder" escorts to assist in maintaining distant tanking stations with marginal results.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The pre-determined tanking scheme (required to provide sufficient tankers to sustain long range CAP for extended periods of time prior to engagements) cannot be maintained without the real time fuel management direction normally provided by the E-2C.

(c) ~~(C)~~ Unassisted F-14 target acquisition/engagement success in high/low multiple raid scenarios is less than adequate (estimated 50 to 75 percent). This success dwindles to almost nil when the low state F-14 spends inordinate amounts of time looking for a tanker.

(d) ~~(C)~~ Ability of a BG commander to maintain the tactical picture concerning CAP states, detected bogies, engagement status and heads-up/"Bittersweet" situations is totally inadequate. Although "Vector Logic", in concept, presupposes an independently fought "outer air battle" monitored by ALPHA WHISKEY, this seldom occurs in the exercise environment.

(e) ~~(C)~~ The problems noted above increase significantly as the time required for grid maintenance increases.

(NOTE: These areas merely highlight major problems (also addressed by other VAW commands) associated with Vector Logic scenarios even with full E-2C participation).

(10) ~~(C)~~ Weapons Week. Scheduled about mid-cruise in the vicinity of Diego Garcia, weapons week demonstrated the overall utility and worth of the E-2C. Designated the range control officer, the E-2C crews coordinated all airwing, CV and surface exercises and provided continual interface with Diego Garcia tower. Almost without exception, each aircrew was tasked with simultaneous support of more than one major coordinated air wing evolution. Direct control was provided for all Missilexs, Wasexs, Minexs, Sarexs, and low level routes.

(11) ~~(C)~~ DOUBLE TEAM. Although not specifically tasked, the E-2C provided direct support in the form of communication relay, Link-11, and "pop-up" surface target prosecution. Of increasing importance, this type of ASW sanitization effort may soon preceed all PACFLT CV battle group movements as they move into new geographic MODLOCs.

(12) ~~(C)~~ BEACON SOUTH. This exercise initially scheduled with the Australians, had the possibility of providing superb training in all offensive and defensive warfare areas of the battle group. Due to many external factors it was cancelled immediately prior to the Perth port visit.

(13) ~~(C)~~ Freedom of Navigation (FON) practices. Planning, briefing and coordinating these two exercises proved to be one of the highlights of the cruise thus far. VAW-126 took the lead for the CVW-3 FON brief for COMCARGRU FOUR and key CV-67 players. The initial FON concept of operations brief was followed by two practice evolutions which fully employed the entire battle group in a simulated FON scenario. Although the specifics exceed classification of this report, all battle group CCC capabilities were exercised, including real time tactical fusion of "special" information. The following specific lessons learned highlighted by this exercise are applicable to any major coordinated battle group operation in which both "Blue" and "Orange" surface and air assets must be provided from within the same battle group:

(a) ~~(C)~~ The launch sequence may seriously hinder the exercise. The E-2C must launch first, followed by "Orange Air" if at all possible.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The simulation of "Orange Air" contributed to many problems. Orange aircraft on RTF profiles (as exercise non-players) were intercepted which confused the overall command and control of the exercise. Also, the added burden of controlling both "Blue and Orange" assets significantly impact the workload of the E-2C controllers.

(c) (~~C~~) The use of a single primary FAD net for CAP control requires mandatory circuit discipline. ALPHA WHISKEY/ALPHA BRAVO must monitor this control net for real time information. The present procedures of periodic CAP state reporting must be tailored to the minimum required for effective tanking management.

(d) (~~C~~) In order to keep the confusion at a minimum, JANAP 119 call signs should be utilized by all aircraft and CAP states should not be encrypted.

(e) (~~C~~) CAP must maintain stations until vectored.

(f) (~~C~~) Night rules of engagement must be addressed and discussed. Night engagements are difficult to simulate.

(g) (~~C~~) For Command and Control purposes, HF Link-11 is required in dispersed battle group formations. The requirement also exists for an HF AAWC&R net backed up by a UHF LAAW net (two SWCs required).

(13) (U) Miscellaneous.

(a) (~~C~~) LINK ELEVEN. Taking the lead, VAW-126 has continually worked and conducted the necessary liaison to help solve the battle group Link-11 problems. This has inlcuded sending representatives to the surface combatants, a full-time CIC watch officer and pre and post flight debriefs concerning Link-11 problems. These efforts must be continued throughout the deployment as new units join and others detach from the battle group.

(b) (~~C~~) Complacency. As the I.O. deployment settled into a routine, complacency became a major concern. The twice weekly alert launches with ensuing May intercepts and escort at 200 nm from the battle group became mundane even with the added challenges imposed by extreme haze and intense trapping layers. In order to keep the readiness of the airwing at a high level, numerous inhouse exercises were planned and practiced including Case III, HCAs, WASEXs, EWEXs, and AAWEXs.

f. (~~C~~) Electronic Warfare Squadron.

(1) (~~C~~) PASSEX's. These exercises with FN KERSAINT, HMS SHEFFIELD, and HMS ACTIVE provided excellent ESM/ECM training for our crews and solid ECCM training for the ships. All three ships provided excellent jamming effectiveness feedback along with requests for more exercises.

(2) (~~C~~) BEACON FLASH. VAQ-138 is the first EA-6B squdron permitted to actually jam in Oman. The SOAF requested specific jamming support for BEACON FLASH 82-5. Yellowjacket Prowlers flew opposed low-level escort jamming sorties against the Rapier ACQ/Marconi S-600 GCI/HF radars at Thumrait Airfield and provided jamming demonstrations for these radars. An ECMO observer was placed ashore to observe and coordinate the demonstrations. Good effectiveness on

GCI/HF radars and extremely limited effectiveness on the Rapier system was observed. High class radar scope photography of radar scope with jamming was provided by the SOAF. Strikes flown with and without fighter support for the EA-6B readily illustrated the necessity of providing fighter support for the EA-6B.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Red Sea Transit. Normal flight operations during the Red Sea Transit provided ECMO's with real world intercepts of Spoonrest, Flat Face, and Barlock radars.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Gonzo 82-2/CV versus CV ADEX. Yellowjacket ESM missions assisted in early warning of USS CONSTELLATION Battle Group ASCM attack simulation. Positioning of EA-6B's was in the threat sector 100NM from ZZ offset from the E-2C. Prowlers also supported quick reaction strikes against the USS CONSTELLATION Battle Group surface forces.

(5) ~~(C)~~ CVW-3 Weapons Week. The Yellowjackets played a key role in CVW-3's live firing of Shrike and Standard Arm. Prowlers detected and localized the target emitter, a DPT-2 beacon afloat, and then sanitized the firing range, ensuring that no emitters other than the target were radiating within the ARM's acquisition.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Freedom of Navigation Practice. Prowlers simulated EP-3 aircraft and provided anti-GCI jammer capability for the FON practice.

(7) ~~(C)~~ Camel Station. Flight operations in the Eastern Mediterranean provided ECMO's with a dense real world emitter environment including Soviet and Free World land, ship and airborne emitters.

(8) (U) Training. Maintaining ground training in accordance with COMMATVAQWINGPAC's training plan was easily accomplished due to non-flying days filled with AOM's. WASSEX's and MASEX's were plentiful. Carrier escorts frequently requested JAMEX's for their radar operator training. This in turn provided ESM/ECM training for Yellowjacket crews as well. The three BEACON FLASH exercises provided low level flight and power projection training. Without these exercises it would have been impossible to maintain proficiency in those two areas.

CVW-3 STATISTICS (GENERAL)

MEDITERRANEAN/INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYMENT 1982

MONTH	FLYING DAYS	HOURS D/N/T	CV LANDINGS D/N/T	SORTIES D/N/T
JAN	19	2276.9/1282.5/3559.4	1097/650/1747	961/613/1574
FEB	21	2860.8/1393.2/4254.0	941/698/1639	1001/643/1644
MAR	19	2926.7/869.8/3796.5	1020/452/1472	1065/404/1469
APR	20	2806.4/1274.6/4081.0	974/662/1636	1039/592/1631
MAY	19	2552.9/1340.3/3893.2	1075/627/1702	962/688/1650
JUN	11	1930.0/560.3/2490.3	757/272/1029	733/227/960
TOTAL	109	15353.7/6720.7/22074.4	5864/3361/9225	5761/3167/8928

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLIGHT HOUR EXPENDITURES

CVW-3

1 JAN 82 - 31 MAY 82

	EXPENDITURES	FLY DAYS	HOURS FLOWN	EXPENDITURES/ DAY	HOURS/ DAY	CPH/DAY
JAN	3710.3K	19	3559.4	195.3K	187.3	1042.71
FEB	4470.0K	21	4254.0	212.9K	202.6	1050.84
MAR	3878.7K	19	3796.5	204.1K	199.8	1021.52
APR	4311.4K	20	4081.0	215.6K	204.1	1056.34
MAY	4210.9K	19	3858.9	221.6K	203.1	1091.09
JUN	2429.3K	11	2490.3	220.8K	226.4	975.27
TOTAL	23010.6K	109	22040.1	211.1K	202.2	1044.02

COST/FLT HR

F-14	$1708	A-7	$931	E-2	$542	EA-6	$1452
A-6	$1386	S-3	$543	SH-3	$210		

*These totals and individual aircraft cost/flt hour reflect four months in the I.O. and two months in the Mediterranean. I.O. operating costs were generally higher and, therefore, increased overall cost/hour.

*Total hours flown do not reflect shore hours.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARRIER AIR WING THREE
MISSION CAPABILITY
(JAN 82-JUN 82)



CARRIER AIR WING THREE
D-704 AVAILABILITY
(JAN 82-JUN 82)



FIGHTER SQUADRON ELEVEN FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	9	9	9	9	9	9	
1ST TOUR 132X	9	9	9	9	9	9	
2ND TOUR 131X	3	3	3	3	3	3	
2ND TOUR 132X	2	2	2	2	3	3	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	3	3	3	2	2	2	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	19	21	19	20	19	12	110
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL HRS	324.2	459.2	399.8	400.7	478.2	260.4	2322.5
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	324.2	459.2	399.8	400.7	468.2	260.4	2312.5
OTHER FLT HRS	0	0	0	0	10.0	0	10.0
TOTAL SHIBOARD HRS	324.2	459.2	399.8	400.7	443.9	260.4	2288.2
SHIP DAY HRS	213.7	311.9	318.7	286.0	312.0	210.3	1652.6
SHIP NITE HRS	110.5	147.3	81.1	114.7	131.9	50.1	635.6
SHORE DAY HRS	0	0	0	0	34.3	0	34.3
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	25.0	35.3	30.8	30.8	36.9	20.0	178.4
AVG CREW DAY HRS	16.4	24.0	24.5	22.0	26.6	16.2	129.7
AVG CREW NITE HRS	8.5	11.3	6.2	8.8	10.1	3.8	48.7
TOTAL TRAPS	186	213	178	199	216	135	1127
DAY TRAPS	119	125	123	138	138	104	747
NITE TRAPS	67	88	55	61	78	31	380
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	14.3	16.4	13.7	15.3	16.6	10.4	86.7
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	9.1	9.6	9.5	10.6	10.6	8	57.4
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	5.1	6.8	4.2	4.7	6.0	2.4	29.3
BOARDING RATE	91	94	93	96	94	97	94
DAY BOARDING RATE	94	91	95	98	95	96	95
NITE BOARDING RATE	86	97	90	91	92	100	92
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	198	234	206	223	221	133	1215
DAY SORTIES SKED	121	146	151	146	149	108	821
NITE SORTIES SKED	77	88	55	77	72	25	394
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	88	91.	86	89	100	94	92
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	88	95	90	95	107	96	95
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	87	85	76	79	88	84	84
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	174	214	178	199	222	125	1112
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	107	139	136	138	159	104	783
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	67	75	42	61	63	21	329
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

FIGHTER SQUADRON THIRTY ONE FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	8	8	8	8	8	8	
1ST TOUR 132X	9	9	9	9	9	9	
2ND TOUR 131X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
2ND TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	4	4	4	4	5	5	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	5	5	5	5	5	5	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	19	21	19	20	19	11	109
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL HRS	381.0	536.7	493.2	485.9	449.0	263.0	2608.8
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	381.0	533.6	491.4	482.1	444.8	263.0	2595.9
OTHER FLT HRS	0	3.1	1.8	3.8	4.2	0	12.9
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	381.0	536.7	493.2	485.9	449.0	263.0	2608.8
SHIP DAY HRS	241.2	362.1	390.2	346.5	305.9	214.0	1859.9
SHIP NITE HRS	139.8	174.6	103.0	139.4	143.1	49.0	748.9
SHORE DAY HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	29.3	41.3	37.9	37.4	32.1	18.8	32.8
AVG CREW DAY HRS	18.5	27.9	30.0	26.7	21.9	15.3	23.4
AVG CREW NITE HRS	10.8	13.4	7.9	10.7	10.2	3.5	9.4
TOTAL TRAPS	216	254	215	243	229	140	1297
DAY TRAPS	129	143	147	149	141	107	816
NITE TRAPS	87	111	68	94	88	33	481
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	16.6	19.5	16.5	18.7	16.4	10.0	97.7
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	9.9	11.0	11.3	11.5	10.1	7.6	61.4
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	6.7	8.5	5.2	7.2	6.3	2.4	36.3
BOARDING RATE	94	95	97	96	98	99	97
DAY BOARDING RATE	98	96	98	96	99	98	98
NITE BOARDING RATE	90	95	96	96	96	100	96
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORITES SKED	204	257	220	254	227	135	1297
DAY SORTIES SKED	117	145	148	152	136	101	799
NITE SORTIES SKED	87	112	72	102	91	34	498
TOTAL SORTIES COMPL	97	99	97	96	97	96	97
DAY SORTIES COMPL	97	99	99	98	98	95	98
NITE SORTIES COMPL	95	99	94	92	97	97	96
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	197	254	214	243	221	129	1258
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	114	143	146	149	133	96	781
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	83	111	68	94	88	33	477
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATIONS ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ATTACK SQUADRON THIRTY-SEVEN STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X-	9	9	9	9	9	9	
1ST TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2ND TOUR 131X	4	4	4	4	3	3	
2ND TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	3	3	3	3	3	3	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	17	19	19	19	18	11	103
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL HRS	525.5	531.9	496.1	564.5	529.7	332.3	2980
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	523.5	513.5	485.4	550.1	513.2	326.2	2911.9
OTHER FLT HRS	2.0	18.4	10.7	14.4	16.5	6.1	68.1
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	525.5	531.9	496.1	564.5	529.7	332.3	2980
SHIP DAY HRS	337.3	327.8	364.2	383.9	342.9	263.4	2019.5
SHIP NITE HRS	188.2	204.1	131.9	180.6	186.8	68.9	960.5
SHORE DAY HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	32.9	33.2	33.1	35.3	35.3	22.2	192
AVG CREW DAY HRS	21.1	20.5	24.3	24.0	22.8	17.6	130.3
AVG CREW NITE HRS	11.8	12.7	8.8	11.3	12.4	4.6	61.7
TOTAL TRAPS	267	263	246	278	265	176	1495
DAY TRAPS	164	144	169	159	154	133	923
NITE TRAPS	103	119	77	119	111	43	572
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	16.7	16.4	16.4	17.3	17.6	11.7	96.1
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	10.3	9.0	11.3	9.9	10.2	8.9	59.6
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	6.4	7.4	5.1	7.4	7.4	2.9	36.6
BOARDING RATE	94	96	99	96	94	97	96
DAY BOARDING RATE	95	97	99	99	94	99	97
NITE BOARDING RATE	90	94	98	90	94	92	93
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	280	279	249	283	267	163	1521
DAY SORTIES SKED	181	171	185	194	175	134	1040
NITE SORTIES SKED	99	108	64	89	92	29	481
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	93	95	90	98	96	99	95
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	93	93	98	97	96	99	96
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	92	98	102	100	98	99	98
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	259	263	246	277	255	162	1462
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	168	158	181	188	167	133	995
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	91	105	65	89	88	29	467
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ATTACK SQUADRON ONE ZERO FIVE STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	11	11	11	11	11	10	
1ST TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2ND TOUR 131X	3	3	3	3	3	3	
2ND TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	3	3	3	3	2	2	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	JAN	**FEB**	**MAR**	**APR**	**MAY**	**JUN**	**TOTAL**
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	17	19	19	19	19	11	104
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
TOTAL HRS	500.0	561.4	504.8	575.0	551.5	335.1	3027.8
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	496.9	561.4	504.8	575.0	551.5	335.1	3024.7
OTHER FLT HRS	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	3.1
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	496.9	561.4	504.8	575.0	551.5	335.1	3024.7
SHIP DAY HRS	333.9	353.1	378.4	396.0	338.1	259.3	2058.8
SHIP NITE HRS	163.0	208.3	126.4	179.0	213.4	75.8	965.9
SHORE DAY HRS	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	3.1
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	29.2	33.2	29.8	33.9	33.7	22.3	182.0
AVG CREW DAY HRS	19.6	20.9	22.3	23.2	20.7	17.2	123.8
AVG CREW NITE HRS	9.6	12.3	7.5	10.7	13.0	5.1	58.2
TOTAL TRAPS	250	271	247	281	274	193	1516
DAY TRAPS	157	144	175	162	149	144	931
NITE TRAPS	93	127	72	119	125	49	585
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	14	15.9	14.5	16.5	16.6	12.9	90.3
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	9	8.5	10.3	9.5	9.0	9.6	55.8
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	5	7.5	4.2	7.0	7.6	3.3	34.5
BOARDING RATE	98	97	96	95	96	99	97
DAY BOARDING RATE	98	98	97	98	99	99	98
NITE BOARDING RATE	97	96	96	92	92	98	96
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	286	279	234	278	253	162	1492
DAY SORTIES SKED	180	174	164	183	161	132	994
NITE SORTIES SKED	106	105	70	95	92	30	498
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	87	97	105	101	105	99	98
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	88	94	110	103	101	95	97
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	85	100	94	96	112	116	99
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	233	271	247	281	265	160	1457
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	143	164	181	189	162	125	964
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	89	107	66	92	103	35	492
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ATTACK SQUADRON SEVENTY-FIVE FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	9	10	8	9	9	9	
1ST TOUR 132X	10	11	11	11	11	11	
2ND TOUR 131X	3	2	2	2	2	2	
2ND TOUR 132X	2	2	2	2	2	3	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	3	3	3	4	4	4	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	3	3	2	2	2	1	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	19	21	19	19	19	11	109
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL HRS	550.8	657.0	602.3	612.1	611.7	354.7	3388.6
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	549.8	657.0	602.3	612.1	611.7	354.7	3387.6
OTHER FLT HRS	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	549.8	657.0	602.3	612.1	611.7	354.7	3387.6
SHIP DAY HRS	368.8	437.4	473.5	436.5	422.6	289.6	2428.4
SHIP NITE HRS	181.0	219.6	128.8	175.6	189.1	65.1	959.2
SHORE DAY HRS	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	36.7	43.8	46.3	40.8	40.8	23.7	225.8
AVG CREW DAY HRS	24.7	29.2	36.4	29.1	28.2	19.3	161.9
AVG CREW NITE HRS	12.0	14.6	9.9	11.7	12.6	4.4	63.9
TOTAL TRAPS	280	311	283	293	296	164	1627
DAY TRAPS	179	200	207	180	181	125	1072
NITE TRAPS	101	111	76	113	115	39	555
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	18.7	20.7	21.7	19.5	19.7	10.9	108.5
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	12.0	13.3	15.9	12.0	12.1	8.3	71.5
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	6.7	7.4	5.8	7.5	7.7	2.6	37.0
BOARDING RATE	96	96	97	95	97	96	96
DAY BOARDING RATE	99	97	97	98	98	96	97
NITE BOARDING RATE	91	95	99	92	95	95	95
BINGO AND/OR DIVERT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	302	331	286	302	295	174	1690
DAY SORTIES SKED	202	209	220	209	191	141	1172
NITE SORTIES SKED	100	122	66	93	104	33	518
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	90	94	99	97	97	93	95
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	90	96	101	99	102	94	97
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	90	91	92	94	88	91	91
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	274	311	283	293	286	162	1609
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	184	200	222	206	195	132	1139
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	90	111	61	87	91	30	470
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATIONAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

AIR ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWO TWO FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	12	12	11	11	11	11	
1ST TOUR 132X	17	17	16	16	15	14	
2ND TOUR 131X	4	4	3	3	3	3	
2ND TOUR 132X	1	1	1	2	3	3	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	22	23	19	21	20	18	123
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL HOURS	572.2	589.6	480.0	612.4	592.4	363.6	3210.2
TRAINING/OP FLIGHT HRS	572.2	589.6	480.0	612.4	592.4	363.6	3210.2
OTHER FLIGHT HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	572.2	589.6	480.0	612.4	592.4	363.6	3210.2
SHIP DAY HRS	347.9	413.8	367.6	377.7	337.6	249.9	2094.5
SHIP NIGHT HRS	224.3	175.8	112.4	234.7	254.8	113.7	1115.7
SHORE DAY HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHORE NIGHT HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	47.7	49.1	40.0	51.0	49.4	33.1	272.1
AVG CREW DAY HRS	28.7	34.5	30.6	31.5	28.1	22.7	177.5
AVG CREW NIGHT HRS	18.7	14.7	9.4	19.6	21.2	10.4	94.[illegible]
TOTAL TRAPS	196	153	139	175	194	117	974
DAY TRAPS	112	82	87	96	100	74	551
NIGHT TRAPS	84	71	52	79	94	43	423
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	10.9	9	9.3	10.9	12.1	7.3	59.6
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	6.2	4.8	5.8	6.0	6.3	4.6	33.7
AVG NIGHT TRAPS/PILOT	4.7	4.2	3.5	4.9	5.9	2.7	25.9
BOARDING RATE	93	94	95	94	96	96	95
DAY BOARDING RATE	98	91	99	98	96	98	97
NIGHT BOARDING RATE	88	96	90	89	96	92	92
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	186	155	146	182	172	122	963
DAY SORTIES SKED	101	87	94	90	82	72	526
NIGHT SORTIES SKED	85	68	52	92	90	50	437
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	94	106	95	97	108	96	99
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	93	105	93	101	107	94	99
NIGHT SORTIE COMPL RATE	93	107	100	92	108	94	99
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	175	164	139	176	185	115	954
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	96	91	87	91	88	68	521
NIGHT SORTIES FLOWN	79	73	52	85	97	47	433
TOTAL ASW HRS	107.1	195.3	161.5	441.7	364.6	165.9	1436.1
COORD ASW HRS	107.1	0	117.0	58.9	239.8	79.6	602.4
ALPHA SERVICES HRS		42.9	36.6	43.6	0	0	123.1
OPERATION ASW HRS	107.1	195.3	161.5	441.7	364.6	93.7	1363.9
LOGISTICS FLT HRS	5.9	109.1	40.5	17.5	12.5	19.3	204.8

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON ONE TWO SIX FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	5	5	5	5	6	6	
1ST TOUR 132X	6	6	6	7	7	7	
2ND TOUR 131X	4	3	3	3	3	3	
2ND TOUR 132X	5	5	5	5	5	5	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	2	1	1	1	1	1	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	22	21	19	21	20	15	118
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL HRS	224.1	300.9	281.8	272.1	272.1	160.1	1511.1
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	221.9	294.2	280.0	268.1	271.5	158.3	1494.0
OTHER FLT HRS	2.2	6.7	1.8	4.0	.6	1.8	15.3
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	221.4	300.9	281.8	272.1	272.1	160.1	1508.4
SHIP DAY HRS	132.4	208.4	208.6	190.2	170.3	104.5	1014.4
SHIP NITE HRS	89.0	92.5	73.2	81.9	101.8	55.6	494.0
SHORE DAY HRS	1.7	0	0	0	0	0	1.7
SHORE NITE HRS	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0
AVG CREW HRS	48.7	71.6	67.1	63.3	59.2	34.8	344.7
AVG CREW DAY HRS	29.2	49.6	49.7	44.2	37.0	22.7	232.4
AVG CREW NITE HRS	19.5	22.0	17.4	19.1	22.2	12.1	112.3
TOTAL TRAPS	88	82	78	79	82	44	453
DAY TRAPS	51	49	51	43	44	26	264
NITE TRAPS	37	33	27	36	38	18	189
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	8.8	9.1	8.7	8.8	8.2	4.4	48.0
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	5.1	5.4	5.7	4.8	4.4	2.6	28.0
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	3.7	3.7	3.0	4.0	3.8	1.8	20.0
BOARDING RATE	93	93	96	90	88	92	92
DAY BOARDING RATE	96	94	100	88	90	90	93
NITE BOARDING RATE	88	92	93	92	91	95	90
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	85	75	74	74	72	45	425
DAY SORTIES SKED	46	42	50	47	40	30	255
NITE SORTIES SKED	39	33	24	27	32	15	170
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	84	108	103	104	107	96	100
DAY SORTIE COMPLY RATE	85	117	102	113	115	93	104
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	82	97	104	89	97	100	94
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	71	81	76	77	77	43	425
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	39	49	51	53	46	28	266
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	32	32	25	24	31	15	159
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

HELICOPTER ANTISUBMARINE SQUADRON SEVEN FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	11	11	11	12	11	11
1ST TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0
2ND TOUR 131X	5	5	5	5	6	5
2ND TOUR 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	2	2	2	2	2	2
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	0	0	0	0	0	0

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	24	28	25	29	28	26	160
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL HRS	368.2	437.4	375.9	393.4	276.2	297.2	2148.3
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	305.7	426.5	363.6	388.3	264.5	290.8	2039.4
OTHER FLT HRS	62.5	10.9	12.3	5.1	11.7	6.4	108.9
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	334.8	437.4	375.9	393.4	276.2	297.2	2114.9
SHIP DAY HRS	219.2	327.0	299.8	283.7	216.2	238.2	1584.1
SHIP NITE HRS	115.6	110.4	76.1	109.7	60.0	59.0	530.8
SHORE DAY HRS	33.4	0	0	0	0	0	33.4
SHORE NITE HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVG CREW HRS	40.9	48.6	41.8	43.7	30.7	33.0	238.7
AVG CREW DAY HRS	28.1	36.3	33.3	31.5	24.0	26.4	179.6
AVG CREW NITE HRS	12.8	12.3	8.5	12.2	6.7	6.6	59.1
TOTAL CV LANDINGS	186	226	223	241	169	187	1232
DAY CV LANDINGS	141	179	186	191	131	165	993
NIGHT CV LANDINGS	45	47	37	50	38	22	239
AVG CV LNDGS/PILOT	11.6	12.6	12.4	12.7	8.9	10.4	68.6
AVG DAY CV LNDGS/PILOT	8.8	10.0	10.3	10.1	6.9	9.2	55.3
AVG NITE CV LNDGS/PILOT	2.8	2.6	2.1	2.6	2.0	1.2	13.3
DAY DLQ LANDINGS	10	2	0	59	11	12	94
NIGHT DLQ LANDINGS	0	0	0	34	6	0	40
DAY SLQ LANDINGS	32	12	108	6	15	20	193
NIGHT SLQ LANDINGS	0	0	8	0	0	9	17
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	119	145	109	130	104	109	716
DAY SORTIES SKED	80	104	80	94	77	86	521
NITE SORTIES SKED	39	41	29	36	27	23	195
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	99	101	99	100	100	100	100
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	99	101	99	100	100	100	100
NITE SORTIE COMPL RATE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	118	146	108	130	104	109	715
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	79	105	79	94	77	86	520
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	39	41	29	36	27	23	195
TOTAL ASW HRS	17.1	128.2	101.7	113.7	42.3	86.2	489.2
COORD ASW HRS	0	51.5	49.8	46.3	15.4	68.6	231.6
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	39.8	40.3	40.8	0	8.4	129.3
OPERATION ASW HRS	17.1	112.4	83.6	113.7	42.3	86.2	455.3

TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE SQUADRON ONE THREE EIGHT FLIGHT STATISTICS

1ST TOUR 131X	2	2	2	2	2	2	
1ST TOUR 132X	9	9	7	9	9	10	
2ND TOUR 131X	1	1	1	1	1	1	
2ND TOUR 132X	2	2	3	1	1	1	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 131X	2	2	2	2	2	2	
3RD TOUR OR PLUS 132X	2	2	2	1	2	2	
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
SHIPBOARD OP DAYS	14	19	18	19	17	11	98
SHOREBASED OP DAYS	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
TOTAL HRS	152.8	179.9	162.6	164.9	166.7	123.9	950.8
TRNG/OP FLT HRS	152.8	179.9	162.6	164.9	166.7	123.9	950.8
OTHER FLT HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SHIPBOARD HRS	136.2	179.9	162.6	164.9	166.7	114.3	924.6
SHIP DAY HRS	85.1	119.4	125.7	105.9	107.3	91.2	634.6
SHIP NITE HRS	51.1	60.5	36.9	59.0	59.4	23.1	290.0
SHORE DAY HRS	7.2	0	0	0	0	9.6	16.8
SHORE NITE HRS	6.4	0	0	0	0	0	6.4
AVG CREW HRS	30.6	36.0	32.5	32.9	33.3	24.8	31.7
AVG CREW DAY HRS	18.5	23.9	25.1	21.2	21.4	20.2	21.7
AVG CREW NITE HRS	11.5	12.1	7.4	11.8	11.9	4.6	9.9
TOTAL TRAPS	78	92	84	88	94	60	496
DAYS TRAPS	45	54	60	47	55	43	304
NITE TRAPS	33	38	24	41	39	17	192
AVG TRAPS/PILOT	15.6	18.4	16.8	17.6	18.8	12	16.5
AVG DAY TRAPS/PILOT	9.0	10.8	12.0	9.4	11.0	8.8	10.2
AVG NITE TRAPS/PILOT	6.6	7.6	4.8	8.2	7.8	3.2	6.4
BOARDING RATE	94	93	95	98	97	92	95
DAY BOARDING RATE	96	93	95	100	100	90	96
NITE BOARDING RATE	92	93	95	95	93	100	95
BINGO AND/OR DIVERTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL SORTIES SKED	96	97	84	91	89	64	521
DAYS SORTIES SKED	51	60	60	57	59	48	335
NITE SORTIES SKED	45	37	24	34	30	16	186
TOTAL SORTIE COMPL RATE	88	93	100	97	96	100	96
DAY SORTIE COMPL RATE	90	98	100	96	93	98	96
NITE SORTIE COMPLE RATE	85	84	100	97	100	100	94
TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	84	90	84	88	86	64	496
DAY SORTIES FLOWN	46	59	60	55	47	47	314
NITE SORTIES FLOWN	38	31	24	33	39	17	182
TOTAL ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COORD ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALPHA SERVICES HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION ASW HRS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

WEAPONS DEPARTMENT

1. (U) Prior to deployment

a. ~~(C)~~ Ammo shortages upon departure CONUS. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY commenced the 1982 MED/I.O. deployment in excellent condition after much planning before and during type training and ORE as far as required ordnance on board is concerned. However, due to non-availability or inability to transfer certain type ammo to the ship, shortages did occur as indicated below:

SHIPFILL

NALC	NOMENCLATURE	QTY. SHORT
G839	CTG., GRENADE RFL. 7.62 MM	230
L518	SIG. KIT, ABANDON SHIP	8
L541	SIG., ILLUM. MK 2-0 (GREEN)	6

MISSION		QTY. SHORT
A924	DUMMY CTG., 20MM	412
E821	CBU-72/B (FAE)	30 (NOT REQUISTIONED)
FW93	AIRFOIL GROUP, MXU-650/B	15 (SUB FW 95)
LW30	PIN, FLAG ASSY. F/SUU-44	7
L109	SUU-44 FLARE DISPENSER	5
L426	MK 45 PARAFLARE	80
M264	IGN. ELEMENT, M55	25
M456	DETONATING CORD	2000
M507	CTG. IMPULSE	4
M577	A/C EJECT. MTR, MK 16-0	2
M942	A/C EJECT, MTR, MK 17-1	2
M943	CTG,. IMPULSE MK 107-0	10
NW20	CHAFF, RR-129	3333
8W27	SPACER ASSY. F/MK 25 MLM	217

b. ~~(C)~~ Support equipment status upon departure. Weapons Department had a sufficient supply of weapons equipment on board with the exception of MK-49 weapons carriers and MK-101 slings. Weight tests had expired for twenty-three (23) of the forty-eight (48) MK-49 weapons carriers, and two (2) of the three (3) MK-101 slings. Only one (1) ADU-353 skid adapter was available for use.

c. ~~(C)~~ Pre-deployment reviews . The following safety reviews were conducted prior to the deployment and were very beneficial to the Weapons Department:

(1) Explosive Safety Review (ESR)
(2) Ordnance Handling Safety Assistance Team (OHSAT) visit.
(3) Mobile Ordnance Training Team (MOTT).
(4) Aviation Ordnance Review (AOR)
(5) Torpedo Readiness Assist Team (TRAT).
(6) Mine Warfare Readiness Certification Inspection Review (MRCI)

d. ~~(C)~~ Pre-deployment Suez Canal transit planning. Requested and received authorization to add four .50 caliber machine guns and mounts to the ship allowance for contingency plans to transit Suez Canal. Guns, mounts and ammunition were received pierside prior to deployment.

2. ~~(C)~~ Transit to the Mediterranean

a. ~~(C)~~ Operations enroute. Enroute to the Mediterranean, weapons evolutions consisted of striking MK-76 practice bombs to the flight deck for flight operations, and AIM-7F Sparrow and AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles for F-14 alert configuration. In addition, several magazines were rearranged to obtain maximum utilization of space.

b. (U) PQS WORKSHOP. The Weapons Department instituted a formal PQS workshop, the Non-Nuclear Explosive Ordnance Shipboard Handling and Storage Workshop. 100 percent of G division personnel completed this requirement. As a result of this PQS workshop, rating exams scores improved; there was a better understanding of the inter-relationship of the various divisions within the department and a better understanding of the individual's job. The workshop was highly successsful.

3. ~~(C)~~ INCHOP (MED). Inchop Mediterranean consisted of attending PQS workshops, weapons build-up exercises, CONLOADEX'S, preventive and corrective maintenance in the magazines and on weapons support equipment. Maximum effort was expended rectifying ammunition shortages through the regular ammo supply system. Ammunition expenditure consisted of MK-76 practice bombs, CHAFF, marine location markers and paraflares.

4. ~~(C)~~ Suez Canal transit. In preparation to transit the Suez Canal enroute to the Indian Ocean, the Weapons Department was tasked to take appropriate actions to defend the ship against a potential threat from air, surface, and sub-surface attack during the transit. The following actions were accomplished:

a. ~~(C)~~ Installed five (5) gun mounts for four (4) .50 caliber machine guns and one (1) M60 7.62 MM light machine gun.

b. ~~(C)~~ Positioned a mobile M60 machine gun on the 010 level.

c. ~~(C)~~ Gun mounts were covered for concealment and ammunition was prepositioned by gun mounts covered and out of sight.

d. ~~(C)~~ Marines snipers were located in strategic locations.

e. ~~(C)~~ EOD team was standing by for anti-swimmer services; render safe and remove underwater explosive devices, and deter swimmers with concussion grenades.

f. ~~(C)~~ All sponsons, accesses, and doors below the gallery deck walkway were secured to prevent intrusion.

g. ~~(C)~~ The Elevator doors were closed and an aircraft spot developed and executed that minimized the exposure of high value aircraft. Barriers were used (boats and yellow gear) to protect aircraft remaining on the flight deck.

The same plan was utilizied successfully during both transits of the Suez Canal. The emphasis was placed on security without precluding the majority of the crew from enjoying the transit. The southerly transit was accomplished in both night and daylight conditions and included an anchorage. The northerly transit was conducted in daylight.

5. (U) The Indian Ocean

a. ~~(C)~~ Alert Loads and Impact. Upon inchop into the Indian Ocean, the alert posture increased to four (4) F-14 aircraft loaded with one (1) AIM-54A, one (1) AIM-7F, and one (1) AIM-9L missiles; two (2) A-7 aircraft loaded with two (2) MK-20 Rockeyes, one (1) AIM-45 Shrike, one (1) SUU-44 POD, and one (1) AIM-9L Sidewinder missile; one A-6 aircraft loaded with four (4) MK-20 Rockeyes. No significant impact in the handling capabilities occurred. However, a high missile damage rate, particularly with the AIM-54A Phoenix, occurred and is directly proportional to the number of missiles loaded.

b. (U) Supply System Support

(1) ~~(C)~~ Weapons received a excellent brief and a copy of COMLOGSUPPFORSEVENTHFLT INST 8015.1A from the Ordnance Handling Officer on the USS CONSTELLATION during turnover and the CTF-73 Supply Officer during a visit on board. The problems identified were primarily no training ammunition available such as inert MK-80 series bombs, MK-76 practice bombs, CAD's, and no training missiles. Tactical Sparrows and Sidewinder missiles must come from assets in CONUS and are most difficult to get. Phoenix missiles were available on the MSLF. CTF-73 was very helpful at assisting in obtaining the majority of the ammunition required. Both CTF-73 and COMNAVLOGPAC were vere good at following up on outstanding requisitions. All PACFLT activities gave an ammunition status upon receipt or transfer of ammo enroute to USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. Exact location of incoming ammunition can be determined at all times. This is in accordance with COMNAVLOGPAC INST 8015.1C, the supply bible for weapons in the I.O.

(2) ~~(C)~~ The USS JOHN F. KENNEDY had a total of fifteen (15) ammunition underway replenishments. Ammunition received and transferred included AIM-54A, AIM-9L, AIM-7F, and RIM-7H missiles; MK-80 series bombs, 20MM aircraft cartridges, cartridge actuated devices, and LGB components.

(3) ~~(C)~~ To facilitate refueling and replenishment, 37 shot line projectiles and 34 rolls of shot line were expended. The ship went alongside for refueling replenishment 61 times. G-1 Division reduced the amount of shot line and projectiles used by starting a strict inventory control, using the MK 1 MOD 1 line rewinding machine, and by using the shot line splicing procedures outlined in SW350-A1-MMO-010. The chemical light wands used with the shot line projectiles were in short supply in the Indian Ocean. Recommend stocking up prior to departure from CONUS.

c. ~~(C)~~ Handling Equipment. G-2 Division maintained an active corrosion control and preventive maintenance program on weapons support equipment. The availability of parts and supplies is extremely limited. Long lead time is required when ordering replacements. High usage replacement parts include ADU-399/A adapter connecting assemblies, forklift hydraulic lines, and AERO-21 brake cables.

d. ~~(C)~~ Missile Problems. The ship handled a large number of missiles during the Indian Ocean cruise to support routine flight operations, alert loads, and loading exercises. Although the ship conducted lectures and briefing on ordnance safety and proper handling procedures before and during the cruise, a considerable number of missiles were damaged. The ship had a very stringent inspection criteria. Therefore, some missiles were rejected that may have been acceptable to other activities. However, the COMFAIRWESTPAC missile assist team reported, after their visit, that ship's missile training evolutions and material condition of the magazines are the best they have seen.

Missile failures, damages, and expenditures are as follows:

TYPE MISSILE	MOAT FAILURES	DAMAGES	EXPENDED
AIM-7	2	4	6
AIM-9	7	3	7
AGM-45	1	2	3
AIM-54	15	11	0

NOTE; Five (5) of the AIM-54 missiles were MOAT failures prior to the commencement of the cruise. Squadrons were late reporting the MOAT failures.

Missile corrosion was a constant problem due to the exposure of the missiles to high humidity weather conditions and the salt air environment. To combat the problem, the following actions were found to be helpful:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Use MIL-L-23378 solid film lubricant on all AIM-7F wings and fins immediately after removal from the container and at least twice a month during heavy usage. Steel wool can be used to remove rust.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Oil AIM-9 rollerons 3-4 times a week.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Use aerosol aircraft cleaner 1-2 times a week to keep missiles clean and to aid in the prevention of corrosion. After cleaning, use a light coat of VV-L-800 lubricating oil.

e. ~~(C)~~ Other ordnance problems

(1) ~~(C)~~ USS JOHN F. KENNEDY deployed from CONUS with the following amounts of inert training ordnance:

TYPE	QTY
MK-82 INERT BOMBS	288
MK-83 INERT BOMBS	22
MK-84 INERT BOMBS	10
MK-76 PRACTICE BOMBS	21,429 (3 TIMES ALLOWANCE)
MK-106 PRACTICE BOMBS	510

All inert ordnance was carried in addition to the mission load ordnance. Storage space for MK-76 practice bombs was very limited, consequently, the storage of MK-76's put constraints on other ordnance accessibility and handling. Fleet issue loads were broken down to individual boxes so they could be stacked to the overhead in the designated MK-76 magazine. A large portion of the bombs were requisitioned in domestic unit loads to allow for double stacking in the magazine and eliminate a large portion of the retrograde that is received with the feet issue loads. NALC 8W27 spacers were not available before or during deployment. We experienced long delays in getting aircraft CAD's on board during the cruise; NALC M264 was most difficult to get.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Nitrogen bottles for the LAU 7 missiles launchers were a constant problem due to the shortage of fiberglass contructed bottles which replaced the steel bottles. Strongly recommend spare bottles be stocked prior to commencement of cruise.

(3) ~~(C)~~ The ready service area (bomb farm) is not large enough to support high tempo ordnance evolutions. Constant conflicts existed with flight deck control and ordnancemen on staging ordnance to support ordnance evolutions. Upper stage weapons elevators one (1) and four (4) were seldom used because hatches were fouled by aircraft parking or taxing. This is a design problem and is not likely to be solved considering the deck multiple and PGSE required to support the mission of the CV.

(4) ~~(C)~~ MER/TER electrical safety pins were difficult to retrieve from squadrons when issued with preloaded MER's/TER's under the IRRS concept. A recommendation has been submitted to give the custody of safety pins to the squadrons and they install and remove them. Recommend a sufficient number of spares be on hand prior to deployment, if the ship is under the IRRS concept.

f. ~~(C)~~ I.O. Weapons week. Indian Ocean Weapons Week was a complete success. A total of 187.31 tons of ordnance was expended meeting all commitments. Breakdown in expenditures are as follows:

TYPE	QTY
MK-82 BOMBS	629
MK-82 BOMBS (INERT)	7
MK-83 BOMBS	29
MK-83 BOMBS (INERT)	5
MK-84 BOMBS	2
MK-83 LGB (PAVEWAY I)	4
MK-20 ROCKEYE	26
AIM-9G	3
AIM-7F	6
ATM-45A-6	3
MK-76	277
MK-106	16

6. ~~(C)~~ BATTLE GROUP TURNOVERS

a. ~~(C)~~ Weapons Department received custody of I.O. turnover material, which consist's of H-2 and H-3 ARBCC and SSQ-86 sonobouys, during the turnover with USS CONSTELLATION after inchop I.O. These items were issued to the USS WITCHITA for further transfer to USS RANGER just prior to outchop, I.O.

b. ~~(C)~~ The MOMAG DET came on board during inchop I.O. The team reconfigured all tactical mines from "BRAVO" configuration to "ALPHA" configuration. Training lectures were also conducted by the MOMAG team on mine assembly and DST training.

7. ~~(C)~~ Operations in the Mediterranean Enroute Outchop. Upon return to the Mediterranean enroute to a port visit to Haifa, Israel, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY received a change of orders to cancel the port visit due to the conflict amoung the Israelis, PLO, and Syrians. Eventually, the ship was positioned off the coast of Lebanon for possible contingency action. The alert aircraft were loaded as follows:

2 F-14 in 5 minutes alert	2/2/2/HEI FAMMO
6 F-14 in 15 minutes alert	0/2/4/HEI FAMMO
3 A-7 in 15 minutes alert	4 x Rockeyes, 1 x AGM-45 1 x SUU-44 POD
4 A-7 in 30 minutes alert	2 x LAU-10, 2 x AIM-9L
1 A-6 in 30 minutes alert	4 x Rockeyes
1 A-6 in 15 minutes alert	2 x AGM-84A

Subsequent ordnance contingency loads consisted of the following amounts of ordnance:

TYPE	QTY
AIM-9L	70
AIM-7F	32
AIM-54A	6
AGM-45-6	2
AGM-84	2
AGM-78	2
ZUNI ROCKET POD's	8
MK-20 ROCKEYE	64
SUU-44 FLARE POD	4
MK-82	200
MK-46 TORPEDO	12

The MK-82's were subsequently expended for training and all Zuni components transferred to USS EISENHOWER to enhance their contingency package.

8. ~~(C)~~ ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE CRUISE

TYPE	QTY	TYPE	QTY
MK-82	1045	AIM-7F	2
MK-82 I	279	AIM-54	1
MK-83	32	ATM-45	3
MK-83 I	29	ZUNI RKT.	156
MK-84	2	20 MM HEI	42232
MK-84 I	10	20 MM CIWS	0
MK-76 PB	13217	MK-25 MLM	239
MK-106 PB	84	MK-58 MLM	1607
MK-20 ROCKEYE	32	RR-129 CHAFF	14577
ATM-9G	3	RR-171 CHAFF	116
AIM-9L	5		
ATM-7E	1		

9. (U) EOD TURNOVER NOTES

a. (U) Unitrep. Reporting was handled through the Operations Department with no problems.

b. (U) Personnel. One individual was determined to be incompetent in the opinion of the EOD Officer-in-Charge. He was relieved, in April, and quickly replaced by EODMU TWO.

c. (U) Diving. The EOD team dove for the engineers on two occasions, once in Perth and another in mid-Mediterranean. The OINC praised the Engineering Department for their adherence to safety precautions, specifically tag-out procedures when divers were over the side. Requalification, a semi-annual process, was a problem because of the amount of time underway. This will continue to be a problem during deployments with long at-sea periods. The team was also kept out of the water in Malaga due to police restrictions and in Mombasa due to underwater demolition activities.

Duplicative

[redacted]

d. (U) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). EOD's emphasis on training for this contingency can, with hindsight, be construed as overly cautious considering actual experience. There was one hoax incident in Perth, which entailed some fruitless searching by ship's company and EOD. However, preparation is far superior to the alternative.

e. (U) Incidents at Sea

(1) ~~(C)~~ The EOD Officer kept at least one man on the flight deck whenever there was ordnance being launched, flown, or recovered. This was the crux of EOD's duties while embarked. The EOD team acted as safety observers, keeping a watch on those flight deck personnel charged with routine handling of ordnance on the flight deck. The philosophy was that if the Air Wing's AO's and ship's ABH's did their jobs safely, there would be lttle chance of EOD getting to do theirs.

(2) The actual cruise did little to excite the EOD team. Incidents were few and minor. EOD personnel were used to answer ordnance related questions, stand by for jammed 20 MM drum down loads, and assess damage done to weapons on a day-to-day basis. Work-ups were a bit more challenging, with several incidents requiring EOD analysis and resolution. These included; for example, a potentially armed Phoenix missile motor, and armed MK-376 bomb fuze in a MK-82 bomb, and several misfired MK-4 signal cartridges. The team also provided services of an EOD nature to the USS VIRGINIA (hull inspection) and USS BARNEY (.50 caliber machine gun misfire).

f. (U) Incidents Ashore. The EOD team was sent ashore to dispose of a Zuni rocket pod inadvertently jettisoned on Rubkut Range in Oman. The pod and rockets were disposed of by detonation.

g. (U) Helo Salvage. The EOD team worked closely with HS-7 to maintain a readiness to salvage any downed helicopter. The team deployed its gear and men quickly and efficiently during two crashes, but their services were not utilized due to the circumstances of the incidents.

h. (U) Recruiting. Efforts to recruit ship and airwing personnel have been hampered by lack of facilities to conduct the necessary screening tests. Orders for several men have been secured, and more will be obtained once the ship returns to Norfolk and facilities are again available.

i. (U) Training. The EOD team, while pursuing their own training have also imparted their knowledge to the ship. The EOD Officer worked with the D.C. training team on the ship's decontamination stations and with the ship's Surface Warfare Officer training program. The detachment presented numerous lectures to Weapons Department, Medical Department, MARDET, MAA force, and various squadrons on such subjects as nuclear hazards and improvised explosive devices.

(b) (3) (A)

[redacted]

(b) (3) (A)

[redacted]

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1. ~~(C)~~ General. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67) enjoyed a most successful Mediterranean/Indian Ocean deployment. All operational commitments were met safely and professionally without a major aircraft mishap, death or serious injury attributable to the flight deck. Logistics dictated operational tempo with UNREPS/VERTREPS occurring about every third day. The US-3A had priority and usually arrived daily, although not necessarily at an optimum time for efficiency of flight operations. An "Alert 5" posture was maintained during daylight hours, with launches inevitable on Tuesdays. The average Air Department day routinely exceeded 18 hours. Several contingency ops tested flight deck flexibility, and two extensive periods of continuous ASW operations (five and six days respectively) did not overtax a highly experienced crew. With over 90% of the deployment at sea, the biggest problems were maintenance related. Initial supply loadout was critical to the success of the cruise. Many items in the Indian Ocean are hard to obtain or have long lead times. Flight/Hangar Deck slickness a major problem. Try and convince Operations to set aside days for Air Department maintenance requirements. Catapult and Arresting Gear maintenance a must; the key is planning ahead and soliciting the Handler's cooperation. The decision to retain the MB-5 is a sound one. Supply support for the MB-5 is inadequate, but is almost non-existent for the P-16. With one MB-5 and two P-16's aboard we still had to tractor-mount a TAU-3 to ensure adequate flight deck mobile fire fighting coverage. Morale remained high, especially after KENNEDY's first barricade rig in 15 years commissioned service. With anticipated heavy losses of key personnel prior to next deployment, a vigorous cross-training program has been in effect to provide a solid cadre of future experience.

2. ~~(C)~~ Aircraft Handling

a. ~~(C)~~ Deck Multiple. Basic multiple throughout the deployment was 110 (20 F-14's 20 A-7's, 9 A-6's, 5 KA-6, 10 S-3's, 4 E-2's, 4 EA-6's and 6 SH-3's). For approximately two months we had a C-2 onboard and at one point 2 US-3A's and the C-2. This Air Wing composition provided tremendous flexibility and gave the Air Department the chance to pull off some near miracles - such as doing a pull forward from the "go spot", having a ready deck in 14 minutes and still sending out a 15 plane launch on time; or transitioning from flight ops to a 600-pallet RAS in an hour and a half. One change that should be considered would be trading 2 S-3's for 2 more A-7's or F-14's.

b. ~~(C)~~ Flight Schedule. Our I.O. standard was 6 cycles, 10 hours and 85 sorties per day, with forty percent of flight time at night. Only on rare occasions did the Air Wing get more. The alert package required fighters in "5 minute alert" during daylight hours but the E-2 frequently launched first. We could count on launching the alerts on Tuesdays and most Fridays, so planning a "no-fly" day on these days was not the best thinking. In addition, "no-fly" days were seldom that. Normally that phrase meant no-fly for Air Wing. There was always a C-2 or US-3A. During the 24 hour ASW evolutions, we had the luxury of two flight deck crews. Catapult 3 stayed up and two wires were kept on the line, allowing the gear people to rotate and get some sleep. Of course, Air Wing maintenance suffered during these evolutions.

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c. ~~(C)~~ Logistics. The COD's were always a pain (but welcome). Rules required the US-3A to be halfway to Diego Garcia with enough daylight remaining to be able to turn around and land aboard in the daylight.

Additionally, they could not come out too early, so frequently the US-3A landed within 2 hours of the first launch. The C-2 crew arrived with no one turn-qualified except the pilots! If they were scheduled to fly and needed a turn prior, they had to do it so the crew would get sufficient crew rest.

d. ~~(C)~~ FOD. This cruise was not a good one from the FOD standpoint. Most of the squadrons did a superb job in tracking down real causes. The Air Wing identified a serious problem with the standard F-14 maintenance procedures of pulling out rivets through the drain holes from around the intake. One V-4 worker had his cranial sucked off his head by an A-6, most other FOD's were maintenance related. We seemed unable to impress the maintenance man doing the work to "think FOD" and likewise had limited success with yellow and blue shirts in this area.

e. (U) Flight/Hangar Deck Cleanliness. The same weak housekeeping habits mentioned in the FOD paragraph presented a problem with POL on the deck. When the deployment commenced no drip pans existed in the Hangar Bay for the first three months. By the time drip pans were made available the hangar deck was like a skating rink. On the flight deck 'Coolanol' from the F-14's joined with hydraulic fluid from the A-7's and fuel from the A-6's to present a hazard. CAG created a "Fuel Spill Team" composed of one man from each squadron, whose sole job was mopping and cleaning up spills. This team helped keep down the POL build-up, unfortunately, the tendency was to rely on the spill team instead of maintenance men cleaning up after themselves.

The flight deck was scrubbed as often as possible considering the alert posture and flight operations. The goal of scrubbing a portion every night was set and contributed to reducing slickness. Most effective scrubs used both hand scrubbing plus a tractor pulling a pallet with brushes and a 55 gallon drum as a weight. With the amount of scrubbing required in the I.O. recommend 800 5-gallon pails of degreaser be planned for a 6 month cruise.

The hangar deck was scrubbed when operational commitments allowed. As the next best thing to scrubbing an entire bay, the open areas inboard of elevator wells were routinely cleaned.

The Tennant 550 Scrubber was in an up status for a total of one month. When usable, we alternated scrubbing the center line and high traffic ladder lines one cycle and portions of the bow the next. Due to its limited availability the overall impact was hard to assess. With Devoe Topping, the centerline did show up well after the Tennant 550 Scrubber worked it.

f. (U) Non-Skid. The Devoe Non-Skid on the bow was outstanding. Non-abrasive skid in the landing area was worn away after two-thirds of the deployment, with several places exposing bare metal. Once again, few ports, the alert posture and the COD schedule precluded non-skid patching in the landing area. Approximately 9,000 square feet was judiciously applied in the high traffic areas around the ladder lines. Technique used was cutting until noon, priming, then putting down the non-skid. This proved very effective, however a problem of cleaning up FOD the next day did exist.

g. ~~(C)~~ Replenishment at Sea. We had many replenishments at sea. COMNAVAIRLANT INST 3180.1 series is a must. It details where aircraft must be pulled TOD + 10 and states that if readiness posture dictates, the Captain may get a waiver from the Battle Group Commander and only pull to TOD. For proof, keep the instruction in ACHO's hands. In addition, the Air Department was required to set a starboard catwalk watch to keep people from loitering during alongside time.

For VERTREP, the ACHO, or his substitute, briefed the supply department officer and yellow shirt LSE's on procedures for the evolution. This helped eliminate confusion and increase efficiency. Standard practice was to clear Elevator 4 and aft, strip the wires and have initial lifts put on the elevator. Lifts would then shift to the fantail, working port side forward to aft, then center, aft to forward. Spotters were used in conjuction with LSE's. This minimized incoming loaded helos interfering with people on deck and fork lifts. Retrograde was staged starboard side aft. Comments from the replenishment helo crews were most positive about this sequence. Internal lifts were taken to Spot 3. "Combat off loads" landed Spot 4 and taxied forward.

The hangar deck crew had to be pushy to force supply to reduce the area used during any single UNREP. The tendency was to slow down the pace once the last pallet was aboard and to stay spread out. Naturally OPS usually wanted to start flying immediately after the last pallet was on deck; we found 2 hours an acceptable time after a major (200 plus) UNREP. Commencing a major RAS sooner than 1 + 30 after the last aircraft landed was not a good idea because of the large number of aircraft moves required from the hangar deck.

h. (U) Inport Respot. Inport spots were no problem, primarily because we didn't enter many ports. By meshing the desires of the XO with the necessary V-2 maintenance a plan was fairly easy. Respots normally took 4 hours or so to get in with arresting gear wires and wire supports routinely stripped.

i. (U) Distinguished Visitors. We had several DV visits, including SECNAV and the President of Somalia. The area around the Captain's Passage hatch in the island was cleared of people, tractors, tow bars, hoses, wires and other assorted yellow gear to facilitate access. We also vacuumed out the water in the padeyes in this area - fortunately it never rained while the DV's were inbound.

j. (U) USO Shows. We had two USO shows. The first one was in the hangar bay and caused problems because of the number of aircraft that had to be moved. Also, all maintenance had to cease in the hangar. Because it was in the I.O., everyone was quickly dripping with perspiration because the divisional doors were closed and used as the backdrop. The second show was put on the flight deck against the island. By moving only 3 E-2's we created enough space; the ship kept enough way on for a gentle breeze and the island provided shade. The performers had no complaints about this set up.

k. (U) Supplies. We were able to get some supplies such as chocks and soap. The CVW-3 Supply Officer helped on the chocks by sending out a follow up message. Unfortunately the soap was general purpose, not the degreaser we ordered.

l. (U) Summary. With good people all things are easier and fortunately KENNEDY was blessed with strong leadership and an experienced crew. The Air Bos'n and the V-2 Maintenance Officer proved to be without equals. The fuels people were so well-trained that their only miscue was a helmet FOD. CVW-3 provided a Maintenance Chief whose knowledge of Air Department limitations and squadron requirements made him an invaluable asset. Although his squadron could ill afford his absence, the wing profited as a whole. The V-1 chiefs were real pros and increased production while maintaining morale. All those, and many more made it happen.

3. (~~C~~) V-1 DIVISION Roughly mid-way through the cruise Aircraft Handlers changed. Although style changed, priorities remained to provide maximum support for Air Wing maintenance while meeting all operational commitments.

a. (U) Manning. Overlapping shifts seem to work well, providing adequate manning for flight operations, maintenance respots and replenishments. In addition, this method allowed adequate manpower for PMS, space and equipment repair upkeep and training. Manning was fairly constant at 123, which meant we were strapped for people; M+12 manning would be a help. The only solution was to work available manpower long hours.

b. (U) Air Start. Combat Air Start Hatches were a great benefit to operations with hoses and cables generally long enough to service large areas. Certain hatches, however, were inoperable for long periods requiring extensive repairs. As a result, certain flight deck locations required MD-3A "Huffers" or NC-2 electrical power units to service aircraft. Open hatches at night still constitute a safety hazard; we had a tractor run into an open hatch on the dark side of an aircraft (caused by the shadow effect from the sodium vapor lights), putting both the hatch and tractor out of commission.

c. (U) Tractors. MD-3A Tractors and air start units availability fluctuated. Tractors are old and require TLC. Tractor daily PMS was performed by V-1 personnel. Normally good availability was maintained by a 24 hour GSE trouble-shooter. A significant problem though, was that tractor wheels usually slipped both front and rear, even on a well scrubbed flight deck. A heavier tractor is required to better push/pull heavy aircraft about the deck, especially during ship list, pitch and heel conditions.

d. (U) V-1/V-3 Coordination. Coordination with hangar bay (V-3) is required for post-flight operations maintenance respots. Extensive time is required for complicated hangar bay moves, especially with minimum availability of spotting dollies. The coordination between V-1 and V-3 was excellent by insisting a senior V-3 member meet with the ACHO throughout the day and prior to the maintenance respot.

e. (U) Steel Beach. Recreational use of the flight deck is a must for morale and physical fitness, but also must be controlled. Get a firm policy and publicize it. The safety attitude of the flight deck can be maintained in concert with a recreation program, but the line is often fine.

f. ~~(C)~~ Aircraft Crunches. A goal of "zero" Aircraft crunches was not attained, although a significant reduction from the previous deployment was achieved. Aircraft Crunch Rate (ACR) is determined as follows: ACR = number of director controlled crunches divided by the number of director controlled moves. By mid-June, V-1 had 36 aircraft crunches while directing 35,245 moves. The ACR was .00102 - or one crunch per thousand aircraft moves (all crunches counted, including "paint scrapes").

g. (U) PMS/DC. Material condition of spaces and an aggressive damage control program was headed by an eager first class petty officer and three assistants. PMS and repair work was constantly in progress significantly upgrading compartment material condition and damage control readiness.

4. (~~C~~) V-2 DIVISION. The performance of V-2 Division personnel and equipment was best exemplified by over 9000 accident free launches and arrestments. Even with the alert requirements, we routinely operated all four catapults during the deployment. The successful accomplishment of the ship's first actual barricade arrestment attests to the dedication and professionalism of all hands.

a. (U) Manning. V-2 was manned near allowance most of the cruise. The greatest shortcomings were in qualifications of senior petty officers and an initial low number of PQS qualified watch standers. Aggressive training helped rectify this problem. Due to the importance of and increased emphasis on damage control, habitability and career counseling, these positions were filled by first class petty officers. One ABE1 was assigned TAD as Air Department Career Counselor. Additional assignments of senior ABE personnel to V-0 division and Brig Staff duties reduced the expertise available to the division. The most critical non-ABE shortage was lack of qualified clerical help for a 150-man division. Availability and training of catapult electricians was also a problem requiring constant monitoring. Establishment of C and E (renamed ACE-Arresting Gear and Catapult Electricians) under the Air Department reduced most of the problems normally associated with the branch, however, acquisition of replacement EM's required intervention of the Air Boss. The potential disaster of not having a divisional AK was averted by the training of an ABE. While this solution affords a "band-aid fix" it does not alleviate the necessity of an experienced AK assigned to a division with an annual budget in excess of $1,000,000.

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b. ~~(C)~~ Alert Posture. The requirement to maintain a "5 minute alert" posture during the day and "15 minute alert" at night existed during most of the Indian Ocean portion of the deployment. This hampered training and taxed catapult crews. Maintenance requirements were accomplished through close liaison with the Aircraft Handling Officer. The Handler's interest and cooperation are vital and a priority in "blue water ops". Late in the cruise a fifth PQS qualified cat crew was formed, easing the alert burden, and freeing remaining catapult crews for normal launch and maintenance evolutions. The arresting gear had an established night maintenance crew and were less affected by alert status.

c. ~~(C)~~ Equipment Readiness. Four catapults and three arresting wires were utilized for most TACAIR operations. One catapult and two wires were used for ASW operations. Equipment availability averaged 97%, a function of conscientious efforts by all work centers to make the PMS system work. The professionalism exhibited by the V-2 Maintenance Officer and Senior Chief contributed significantly to high availability.

Availability Summary

VB01 overall availability 96.6%
Catapult One 94.6% availability
Catapult Two 98.5 % availability

VB02 overall availability 95.7%
Catapult Three 96.7% availability
Catapult Four 94.8 % availability*

*Does not include 23-day CASREP

VB03 overall availability 94.5%
Engine No.1 97.8%
Engine No.2 87.9%
Engine No.3 93.9%
Engine No.4 98.5%
Barricade 100%

VB04 overall availability 100%
PLAT 100%
LENS 100% (Degraded due to SINS only)

The only operational CASREP was a water brake failure on catapult four.

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d. ~~(C)~~ Catapult Operations C13/C13-1

(1) Following are the catapult statistics for the cruise: (by mid June)

Total no-loads 1170
Aircraft launches:
Total 9116 :

Cat 1:	2828	Cat 3:	2905
Cat 2:	2058	Cat 4:	1322
Total Bow:	4886	Waist:	4227

Retraction engine rereeves: 4
Water brake jobs: 2

(2) OPTAR for the cruise averaged $250,000.00 per quarter. Barricade assembly replacement parts contributed significantly to the large expenditure.

(3) Catapult problem areas:

(a) Heavy ordnance operations on hot, calm days taxed the C-13 MOD-1 catapult (Catapult number 3).

(b) Bow Catapult rotary routinely operated on two (2) hydraulic pumps vice three. This slowed attaining a first ready and slightly increased launch cycle time.

e. ~~(C)~~ Arresting Gear Operations MK7 MOD3

(1) Following are arresting gear statistics for the cruise: (mid-June)

Engine	Arrestments
No.1	398
No.2	3242
No.3	3416
No.4	2103
Total	9159

Barricade engagements - 1 (A-7 with unsafe nose gear - successful)

Rereeves: 5
Crossdeck Pendants used: 129

(2) Some parts problem existed for:
(a) Impact pads
(b) CRO valve drive cables
(c) CRO valve packing
(d) Retractable Sheaves

(3) Number 3 engine MEC badly scored requiring six (6) repacking jobs.

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(4) PQS Training. Due to an almost constant alert posture it was almost impossible to accomplish PQS training on any kind of regular schedule, however a vigorous PQS program was maintained.

f. ~~(C)~~ Deck Space. Due to the alert posture it was crucial to plan ahead for as much maintenance as possible. Plan on doing most maintenance on days/nights other than UNREP/VERTREPS.

g. (U) Sheaves. Retractable sheaves required continuous maintenance with attendant supply support and technical problems. The chief problem was non-availability of lead screws and bearings. The sheaves did require extra maintenance effort and dedicated PMS, but the return was a 96% availability and increased flight deck flexibility.

h. (U) Plat/Lens Operations. The high availability of VLA was due to the self help efforts of assigned personnel. Because of deployment cycles formal training was not possible. We never received a senior petty officer with a proper NEC code, therefore relied totally on the new second and third class petty officers that were in house trained. A total team effort on largely antiquated equipment kept the system functioning.

5. (C) V-3 DIVISION

a. (U) Manning. Divisional manning levels permitted four crews, enabling a split shift (12/12) to easily handle intensive Indian Ocean operations. The addition of one E-7 marshalled the raw talents of inexperienced supervisory personnel into an efficient and effective team. A rigorous, comprehensive training program was instituted to lay the foundation for a smooth transition with an anticipated high turnover of experienced personnel following the deployment.

b. (C) Fire Fighting. Primary means of mobile fire fighting remained the Twin Agent Unit (TAU) mounted on an Aero 21 bomb skid. For over half of the cruise two TAU's were stationed on the bay providing blanket coverage for the entire deck. Unfortunately, the unreliability of the motorized P-16 units on the Flight Deck necessitated transfer of one TAU to V-1 to maintain an adequate fire fighting capability on the "roof". Due to non-availability of parts in the Naval Supply System, a third Twin Agent Unit was kept in reserve to provide serviceable parts for the mobile units.

c. (C) SD1D. A definite problem existed with continued use of the SD1D Spotting Dollie. Age, high tempo operational requirements, and Indian Ocean environmental factors did little to help the availability and reliability of these machines.

(1) Normal availability ran between two and three operational units, often less.

(2) Functioning SD1D dollies lack the necessary pulling power to adequately handle the demands of heavier, modern aircraft. It was repeatedly

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necessary to attach a second SD1D or a MD-3 tractor to F-14, A-6 and EA-6B aircraft to safely move them under even moderate list conditions. A policy of total prohibition of F-14 "no brake" aircraft movements with the SD1D was implemented.

(3) Major problem areas also existed in steering control, electrical, and hydraulic systems. Lead time for replacement parts accounted for poor availability (approximately two to three weeks in the Indian Ocean).

(4) Experimental, synthetic rubber tires proved a qualified success. They provided better traction on wet and slippery surfaces, and proved to have a service life 15% longer than their predecessors. One major drawback to full implementation of these tires is high cost.

(5) All of these factors point to the need for rapid introduction of the new SD1E Spotting Dollie into the fleet; every effort should be made to move up the schedule date from 1985. It was only through the careful, prudent, and skillful talents of imaginative V-3 aircraft directors that operational requirements were met and successfully completed with the present machinery.

d. ~~(C)~~ Aircraft Crunches. Aircraft "crunches" were minimal with an Aircraft Crunch Rate (ACR) thirty percent below last deployment. By mid-June ACR was .00308 per thousand aircraft moves. Most mishaps were attributable to a combination of sudden list conditions and poor SD1D performance. Forklift and weapons crunches during underway replenishments were averted by stationing the remaining yellow gear in such a manner as to create a barrier of protection for the aircraft.

e. (U) Cleanliness/FOD. Hangar Deck cleanliness and FOD prevention were full time endeavors. Daily blow-down of both bays proved the most effective means of quick clean-up for small, loose items. Division of the Hangar Bay into individual areas of responsibility provided Hangar Deck Control with a ready point of contact to correct individual discrepancies. This parceling of responsibilities was not limited to Air Wing squadrons but was extended to cover all major Departments normally involved with Hangar Deck operations (i.e. Deck, Supply and AIMD). A daily "clean-up" log was maintained requiring E-6 and above inspection and signature to ensure space cleanliness. Thrice daily scheduled sweep downs of squadron areas proved effective in controlling trash build-up. FOD bags and drip pans, noticeably missing at the beginning of cruise, provided some relief, but were never present in sufficient numbers to completely control the problem. A roving CVW-3 patrol of E-7 and above assisted in spotting trouble areas and verifying existing problems. This was a worthwhile program that provided Hangar Deck Control with a CAG contact always on the scene and enlightened many maintenance CPO's to the problems that had previously gone unnoticed in their squadron capacities. Dedicated Hangar scrubdowns employed various cleaning compounds (AFFF, Bilge Cleaner, commercial "Ship Shape"). Bilge cleaner seemed to provide the best cleaning action.

f. ~~(C)~~ Replenishment at Sea. Due to the number of underway replenishments while in the Indian Ocean, Hangar Deck space was at a premium. Lack of below deck space forced the staging of up to thirty-eight engine cans on deck. This resulted in the permanent loss of one aircraft spot and continually hindered efficient aircraft movements in Hangar Bay II. Utilization of Elevator #3 well as a storage area for pallets, oil drums, and engines somewhat alleviated storage problems, but created a poor situation with regards flexible operations of Elevator #3.

g. (U) Fire Drills. Fire-fighting capabilities improved considerably during the deployment. Regular, frequent drills brought response time up quickly. Squadrons were given a thorough indoctrination by V-3 personnel conducting training sessions in procedures and equipment utilization. Over two thousand squadron and ship's company personnel received this fire-fighting familiarization.

6. ~~(C)~~ V-4 Division

a. ~~(C)~~ Operations. During the cruise slightly over 15 million gallons of JP-5, 10 thousand, 115 gallons of Lube Oil and 100 gallons of Mo-Gas were issued.

b. ~~(C)~~ Replenishment. Tanker replenishments were excellent to outstanding, with quality of fuel the same. Fuel received contained Hi-Tec E-515 in the range of zero to 10 ppm. Pumping rates averaged 5,500 gpm for USNS ships and 7,400 gpm for AOR's with two hoses. Frequent replenishments were the norm.

c. ~~(C)~~ Lube Oil. Lube Oil was readily available on short notice from any tanker and delivered in 55 gallon drums. Scheduling Lube Oil during a major UNREP enabled V-4 to receive, pump below and remove the barrels without disrupting aircraft movement on the hangar deck.

d. (U) Electrical Continuity. Electrical continuity of aircraft refueling stations did require excessive man hours, yet was maintained in an outstanding manner. Only short periods of down time were experienced for minor ground problems.

e. ~~(C)~~ Contamination. The infamous KENNEDY "green contamination" in the fuel system remains a problem. Service filters located at refueling stations provided adequate protection during refueling operations. Hi-Tec E-515 has been used the entire cruise and was not considered a contributor to the contamination problem. High usage stations required frequent filter element changes. Varied amounts of contamination were found, but no trend could be established for analysis. Contamination found has been saved and stored for NAVSESS analysis. A vigorous fuel tank cleaning program was implemented, with 50 of 68 tanks cleaned by mid-June.

f. ~~(C)~~ Supply. Considering the length of the pipeline, logistics in the Indian Ocean were outstanding. Water detector pads and millipore filters were available from supply ships but only in small quantities. All parts ordered were received in a timely manner by maintaining close liaison with the Supply Department.

g. (U) Summary. Operationally, it was an excellent cruise for the Fuels Division. All commitments were met exceedingly well and the division enjoyed an excellent relationship with the Air Department and Air Wing.

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AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT

1. (U) OVERVIEW Nearing the end of cruise AIMD is in outstanding condition with the exception of the support equipment being cross decked to the USS Forrestal and the USS Independence. Exreps are at an all time low, production backlog is low and steadily decreasing with the only severe equipment problems experienced to date - IPTS and AN/ASN-375 IMU test stations - are both up and operating well. Support in the Indian Ocean has been excellent, but the problems we experienced are identified on the following pages and hopefully, future I. O. CVs will benifit from Super K's experience.

2. (U) GENERAL

a. Administration - As an LANTFLT CV in the Indian Ocean, CV-67 experienced a few problems adapting to new administrative requirements due primarly to lack of information. A few COMNAVAIRPAC instructions were on hand prior to departure from Norfolk but no COMFAIRWESTPAC instructions were available to us, although an extremely helpful instruction packet was provided by COMFAIRWESTPAC upon inchop to the Indian Ocean. Most programs such as Broadarrow, NAESU, Calibration, engine reporting and requisitioning, D-704 ARS reports, etc, are a little different in the Indian Ocean than they are in the Med. A good selection of key instructions and some pre-inchop study can make the transition easier. COMNAVAIRPAC and COMFAIRWESTPAC were very understanding of our situation and provided message guidance whenever it was obvious that we lacked the proper instruction. If you can capture the following instructions and do a little self-study beforehand, your inchop transition will be easier.

CNAP INST 4750.3A Aircraft Avionics Equipment and Support Equipment Corrosion Prevention and Control Program.

CNAP INST 4730.11F Aircraft and Common GSE Material Condition Inspection Program.

COMFAIRWESTPAC INST 13700.1K Aircraft Engine Support in WestPAC

COMFAIRWESTPAC INST 13720.2A BCM of Gas Turbine Engines to DOP; procedures for return of

COMFAIRWESTPAC INST 13680.1 Management of CFWP Carrier Pool

CNAP INST 4790.24 Procedures for Requesting Planner and Estimator (P and E) Services

CNAP INST 13700.9H Aircraft Engine Management, distribution and reporting system

CNAP INST 4710.11A Overhaul/Repair of Repairable Aeronautical Components

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CNAP INST 4350.1D Engineering Technical Services

CNAP INST 4790.19 Aircraft Maintenance Facilities out of service; procedures for reporting degraded Maintenance/TBOS and Broadarrow Requirements.

COMFAIRWESTPAC INST 13640.1 CFWP Calibration and Test Equipment Pool Programs.

COMNAVAIRPAC INST 13640.1 CNAP Calibration/Repair Program.

b. NAESU

(1) Short term assistance. In spite of the distance and travel problems, short term ETS assistance is available so don't hesitate if you need help. During the first half of the cruise JFK took advantage of tech assists for AN/ASM-375 IMS Test Station, D-704 ARS, AN/APX-76 IFF (O level) and the Inertial Platform Test Station. A message report evaluating short term ETS provided is required IAW COMNAVAIRPAC INST 4790.24.

(2) ETS Transporation. Unlike the Med, ETS transportation is handled via the port call route so give whoever is handling the function on the ship as much notice as possible. Getting short term ETS personnel off the ship can be a problem. Area clearance to depart through Diego Garcia is required. For short terms ETS personnel ask for area clearance upon arrival on board and with luck you may have it by the time they are ready to leave.

3. (U) IM-1 DIVISION

a. Production Control - The production control effort was greatly aided this cruise by use of the Status Inventory Data Management System (SIDMS). SIDMS operational readiness never dropped below 95 percent for any month and Production Control utilized SIDMS reports and CRT displays exclusively. The VIDS boards were maintained (you need some place to store those VIDS MAFS), but production managers found SIDMS reports and CRT displays so accurate and effective that VIDS boards have been used as a back-up. Although production volume was extremely high, exreps were kept down by knowing what to work on through SIDMS. Close scrutiny of SIDMS data base validity is easily accomplished through daily work center verifications. Once report processing and use were understood, validity was easily maintained and reports utilized effectively. The assistance provided by the COMNAVAIRLANT SIDMS/Repairables management training team during the work-ups was extremely helpful in getting a good team on the right path. Production statistics are at the end of the AIMD section.

b. Material Control - In spite of operating at "the end of the earth," support was excellent. Individual support problem areas are discussed with their respective section. The broadarrow program was administered as a joint AIMD/Supply effort making liberal use of "plain language" assistance requests with follow-up in the daily CNAP Aircraft Material Readiness message. Response to broadarrow requirements was excellent as indicated below.

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	6 MO. AVG
AVG NR REQN	8	8	7	7	8	8	7.7
AVG NR EQUIPMENTS AFFECTED	5	7	5	6	6	5	5.7

c. IMRL - At about the mid-cruise point a IMRL tailoring conference was scheduled for the last month of cruise; however, funding contraints postponed the conference until the usual time, following return to CONUS. The wall-to-wall inventory was completed prior to mid-cruise point and a detailed review with the airwing has been accomplished. AIMD is now ready for the tailoring conference.

d. Quality Assurance/Analysis

(1) Technical Publications Library - The use of the Defense Automatic Address System (DAAS) to order publications combined with ADP's cooperation in running weekly document number status reports was a great asset in our TPL follow-up program. The receipt of an IOL from NATSF to check on library content was a bit of a disappointment as several publications that had already caused BCM-6 actions were not on it. Change Entry Certification Forms (OPNAV 5070/12 Rev 6-75) were hard to come by. Make sure you have a good supply.

(2) Analysis - A close eye was kept on corrosion documentation from the start - which was a great asset when the mid-cruise corrosion control audit came around. Periodic analysis grams kept all hands up on corrosion documentation and other documentation issues and was also helpful in reducing the 3M error rate - which averaged 0.2 percent for the deployment.

(3) ICRL - Continued QA involvement in the ICRL program continues to pay dividends. Although a comprehensive review was conducted just prior to the work-ups, a retake is underway to insure maximum use of productive facilities and to reduce errors that impact SIDMS products. Each ICRL item will be reviewed prior to the deployment's end with a special QA directed task force reviewing all BCM-1 items. Increased productive capabilities and an error free ICRL are the goals.

e. Special Support Programs: One item of concern is the growing number of augment support type operations. VAST, F-14 TARPS, A-6E TRAM and

EA-6B ECM PODS have a support routine that is different than our usual business. Although effective and apparently essential, the "new wrinkles" for each new program (and some not so new) can cause problems if not controlled. Handled "off-line with special pools of spares", care must be taken to insure control of exreps (knowing when you really have one) and AWP (knowing when the LSR hot line has not worked).

4. (U) IM-2 Division: During the 1982 Indian Ocean Deployment, Power Plants has been very productive. The greatest area of difficulty is the long logistics line. Having to work around this problem through constant supply status observations and cannibalization is a must. The following discussion is divided into work centers and sub-divided into specific crews which had problem areas.

a. Work Center 410 (Jet Shop):

(1) TF-30:

(a) List of long lead time items:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
FIRST STAGE BLADES	765131
SECOND STAGE FAN BLADES	748522
THIRD STAGE FAN BLADES	748523
RTV 159	671797
VANES	667451CL24/25
COMBUSTION CHAMBER	749016
COMBUSTION CHAMBER	749017
COMBUSTION CHAMBER	749018
HEAT SHIELD	549642
NO. 5 BEARING SEAL	(See Para (4))

(b) List of IMRL not on hand (most could work around)

NOMENCLATURE	P/N	USE
STRETCH GAGE*	PWA21965	FAN FOD
TURBINE STAND	PWA21156	HSI
ADAPTER	PWA37543	HSI
FIXTURE	PWA24243	HSI
PLATE	PWA21460	HSI
BRACKET	PWA37819	HSI
SUPPORT	PWA37688	HSI
PULLER	PWA22399	HSI
CAP SCREW 16	PWA16020-20	HSI MOUNTS

* Denotes not able to work around.

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(2) T-58:

(a) List of long lead time parts:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
3RD STAGE NOZZLE	6003T3P01
RETAINING RING	RA61992
O-RING	R1369P010
BOLT	R1453P010
BOLT	R1453P008

(b) List of IMRL not on hand

NOMENCLATURE	P/N	USE
MECHANICAL PULL.	21C353G002	NO. 4 BEARING
PUSHER	21C438G01	NO. 4 BEARING
MECHANICAL PULL.	21C451G002	POLYGON COUPLING

(c) Problem Areas: Consumable items should be closely observed, i.e. Plastiseal "F" compound. At one time three T-58 engines were AWP for this item.

(3) J52P8B and J52P408:

(a) There are many long lead time consumable parts that are needed any time an engine is being built-up. A few of the specific items follow:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
SIDE MOUNT BOLTS	NAS-1307-5
BLEED VALVE (P/P CHANGE 259)	9259LKA118831EN
BLEED VALVE PINS	757592
DRILL FIXTURE	34335
FILTER	02-13729

(4) Problem Areas, in general: If not for a few outstanding squadron and ship's company people the shop could have been in real trouble. Determine within the first two weeks any personnel with skill or motivational problems and require immediate improvement. Return if necessary. Items mentioned above should be in stock prior to leaving on deployment. There were several cases of engines being AWP for over a month and one in particular for 2½ months. Emphasize close supervision of parts ordering procedures. The techs create more down time through ordering

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the wrong part, than caused through lead time delay. They must be meticulous when reading IPB's and other manuals to obtain supply data.

b. Work Center 450, Test Cells:

(1) List of long lead time items for A/W37T-1 Test Cell:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
N-1 & N-2 TACHS	BH1876-21
ANALOG EGT GAUGE	BH187R-213
P1-7 CIRCUIT CARD SET	405-100G-19

(2) Work Around Areas: Can work around inop percent gauges through the use of a trim box for percent RPM and EGT. This test cell normally has several gauges not in use that can be used when another gauge becomes non-functional.

(3) List of long lead items for T-58 Test Cell:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
SHAFT COUPLING	21C2027-715

(4) Problem areas and Work Arounds: The T-58 Test Cell was operated 3½ months with a damaged shaft coupling caused by wear on the dynomometer. A dynomometer was quickly received although a coupling shaft was not. This problem could be avoided through constant inspection of the coupling shaft. If the Test Cell is down for pressure , percent RPM, or vibration readings, it can be wired through the A/W37T-1 Test Cell.

c. Work Center 460, D-704 Aerial Refueling Stores:

(1) Organization: AIMD operates a D-704 crew composed of eight airwing and three ship's company personnel. With a 13 store pool in the Indian Ocean to work from, squadrons did only minor maintenance on stores. AIMD worked on aircraft if the ARS could be easily repaired in that fashion. Squadrons usually consulted AIMD before dropping a store. Quality personnel and as much training as possible is essential.

(2) List of long lead time parts:

NOMENCLATURE	P/N
FUEL FLOW INDICATOR	3660663
VENT VALVE	9-1254-71

HOSE CUTTER ASSY	3668033
BREECH CAP LEAD	3672055
PRIORITY VALVE	1010010-0-1
RESTRICTOR VALVE	2R1450
FUEL PUMP SHUT-OFF VALVE	131015
HYDRAULIC PUMP	AA65674L2A

(3) Problem Areas: Early in the deployment the Aerial Refueling Store Shop needed all the help it could get. This was due to old stores in bad shape, long supply lines, inexperienced crew, and lack of experience at the squadron level. The experience level improved rapidly due to constant hard work and new problems developing daily. The squadron personnel must be properly trained and informed of their responsibility in having an efficient team, attempting to keep tankers in the air. A key maintenance practice has been testing of hydraulic pumps on the HCT-10. Several pumps were discovered NON RFI - some newly issued pumps were also found NON RFI and all pumps were tested prior to installation. This greatly reduced repeat gripes and is considered a major reason for our success. The D-704 rework program has been non-existent and it is considered that the initial problems were a result of long term degradation. After the initial maintenance surge, problems have been minimal. We have achieved an outstanding plug rate of approximately 30 sweet to 1 sour and store availability has not dropped below 10 RFU in four months.

d. Work Center 470, (Oil Lab): Lab certification was rescinded at mid cruise due to low average of correlation test scores. The average was low as a result of maintenance on spectrometer during shipyard periods and as a result of compartment air conditioning problems. The program management office was not notified and consequently, scores were not adjusted. Insure compliance with section 8 of NA17-15-50.

e. Work Center 510: The following parts/components were difficult to obtain in a timely manner. The most profit could be gained from getting the work center supervisors to order small quantities of consumable parts and conscientiously manage their supply. They have to make the supply system work for them and it is difficult to get them to stay on top of this program. It does require tenacity.

P/N	NOMENCLATURE	NSN
CVC10040-8	TUBE	9C 4710-00-106-7383
CVC10040-7	TUBE	9C 4710-00-106-7382
215-40302-6	SUPPORT BUMPER (A-7 ENG. ACCESS)	1R 1560-00-106-7793
ALL SIZES	CHERRY MAX RIVETS	

Many squadrons came aboard unprepared with metal to make the numerous special project items they required (i.e. ready room mail boxes, shelves and cabinets and tool box inserts). Advance liaison with CAG Maintenance Officer to request that squadrons bring materials for these projects would be advantageous. Overall, the supply support in WESPAC is very good.

f. Work Center 51E: Effort should be made to acquire the capability to replace wheel bearing races. Currently, we do not have a press authorized on the IMRL. By using heating and cooling methods several nose wheel races have been replaced.

g. Work Center 52A:

(1) Maintaining a supply of consummable materials for hose/line build up has been a problem. Some NIS conditions have caused NMCS requisitions.

(2) A-6 Electro Hydraulic Actuator Test Set was returned form NARF Norfolk calibration lab missing certain support cables. Messages were sent and NARF traced cables to USS AMERICA. Cables still have not been forwarded to JFK.

(3) F-14A Electro-Hydraulic Actuator Test Set is critical to F-14 support. The IMRL only authorizes one and there is no onboard parts support. Efforts will be made during POM or SRA period to acquire a spare EHATS or onboard parts support.

(4) Frequency response analyzer AWP for DIODE P/N 088-16-44410, since 1 February 1982. Have been able to use one from W/C 630 when required.

(5) Unusual problem was MIARS machines (for entire division) were inop due to light bulbs. (See para 5.c. (1) and (2)).

(6) Work center personnel were well trained, TAD personnel well trained on the aircraft they supported, with few exceptions equipment was in excellent condition. HCT-10 was maintained in the best condition of last three deployments. Of notable significance was the capability to test D-704 Hydraulic Pumps.

(7) A clean room is planned in future shipalts and would greatly enhance support capability. This should be given highest priority.

(8) Work center supervisor was highly impressed with SIDMS and feels it is a most valuable tool to the work center supervisor.

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h. Work Center 530:

(1) Deployed with one NDI tech with one year of experience and one new graduate from NDI school.

(2) The work center was very well equipped upon deployment. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY was tasked to provide NDI support to the Battle Group. The following special certifications were required and received during the POM period: H-46 forward and aft rotor shaft ultrasonic and eddy current/radiographic inspection per the following:

NA 01-250HDA-6-4, CARD NR A-19-A19.17
NA 01-250HDA-6-4, CARD NR A-53-A53.10
NA 01-250HDA-6-4, CARD NR A-18-A18.4

(3) Two of the NDI operators TAD from squadrons to AIMD, required recertification. A tech assist was requested/obtained during which it was discovered that COMNAVAIRPAC policy authorizes the NAESU rep to certify/recertify personnel on specific MRC inspections, citing that inspection. Seventeen airwing personnel were certified/recertified.

(4) With three 7225 technicians onboard, overall NDI manning is excellent. Suggest taking advantage of as much NAESU training as possible during periods pierside.

i. Work Centers 81A, 81B and 81C:

(1) Lox Converters: Misuse and abuse of LOX converters has contributed to a noticeable increase in repair manhours. Primary repair was PRESSURE OPENING and CLOSING VALVES. In addition to the BCM rate could be lower, with more care in handling of converters by maintenance personnel on the flight deck. A proposed solution is to have the airframes shop manufacture foam-padded dividers for the bomb carts that the converters are transported in. Suggest well trained, motivated AME2 be assigned as the CAG LOX pool supervisor. Also suggest a formal training program for entire LOX crew and regular monitoring by CAG appointed observers. A rain shelter was also manufactured for the flight deck LOX converter storage area.

(2) CO2 Recharge Unit: AIMD uses "R" Division's recharge unit. But they do not have an authorized scale. Currently, AIMD PR's carry their scale to the "R" Division shop.

(3) S-3A Radar Waveguide Charging Unit: Mid cruise discovered a fault with the overboard discharge relief valve after we had dumped almost one-half of the cruise supply of freon 116/Nitrons Oxide over board. Some quick action by Supply saved the day. Keep a close eye on usage of this material.

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5. (U) IM-3 DIVISION

a. Work Center 60A (Avionics Corrosion Control):

(1) Recommend the following corrosion control materials be stocked in sufficient amounts prior to deployment:

(a) Avionics Cleaning Compound, MIL-C-81302
(b) Avionics Cleaning Compound, MIL-C-81964
(c) Isopropyl Alcohol, TT-I-735 in pint bottles
(d) Corrosion Preventive Compound, MIL-C-81309 Type III
(e) Corrosion Preventive Compound, MIL-C-85054
(f) RTV-3145 or any non-corrosive RTV

(2) Numerous items of corrosion control material received out of date.

(3) MIL-C-43616 Surface Cleaner - Flammable, causes respiratory problems if not used properly. Smells like JP-5, leaves a residue that attacks dirt and reacts with plastics.

b. Work Center 610 (Comm/Nav/IFF):

(1) AN/ARA-63: Experienced a high failure rate of R-1379/ARA-63 and R-1379A/ARA-63 receiver sub-assembly, P/N 395283-1, GD5767 and 01A223025-21-11. Lack of parts and extremely long lead time in delivery of replacement parts has created an excessive backlog of AWP R-1379's. Lack of "Bravo" series decoder and receiver, as GFAE equipment, created a long turn-around time on inducted items. Aircraft assets were utilized to facilitate the bench testing on non-RFI units. Recommend the initial outfitting of a "Bravo" system prior to deployment.

(2) AN/APM-341 Doppler Test Set - Experienced failure of the TS3001 microwave assy and SM586 simulator assy. Repair capability is non-existent in Indian Ocean operating area. Swap-out of entire drawers was available from Vaught Corp.

(3) Water intrusion/corrosion was directly responsible for the high failure rate of the AN/ARC-159 (V)1 radios installed in the A6E and KA6D aircraft. Most strongly recommend a 30 day inspection at "I" level be initiated for this system.

(4) Excessive damage to the fuse holder, P/N FHN42W, requires a modification be made to the power amp/power supply assy, P/N 622-1394-002, used in AN/ARC-159s, P/N 622-1524-001, 622-1524-017 and 622-1365-001. The present location of the fuse holder makes it highly vulnerable to damage during supply handling and in the aircraft.

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(5) The work center was successful in maintaining an exceptionally low awaiting maintenance/in work backlog, but the awaiting parts backlog remained 75-100 items. Extensive cannibalization was responsible for maintaining the supply backlog at as low a level as possible.

c. Work Center 62M (Miars Repair):

(1) AR-151A Reader/Printer - Recommend an accurate inventory of miars paper, NSN 6750-01-006-5584, dry silver recording type 7770 be conducted and ample supply be stocked prior to deployment.

(2) AR-163A Portable Readers - Experienced a high failure rate of the projection lamps; P/N C-0019-D053. Lamps could not be supplied in a timely manner. Recommend work center ensure a sufficient on hand quantity prior to deployment. Open purchase is the best supply channel.

(3) Recommend all Miars technicians attend MIARS repair course, C-690-3191, NAMTGD 1070, NAS Norfolk, Va. HSL-30 FRAMP is quota control.

d. Work Center 620 (Electrical/Instrument):

(1) A-6 CSDC - Experienced high failure rate of CSDCs. Recommend increasing pool allowance from six to eight units.

(2) AN/ASM-244B AFCS Test Set - Test set became unreliable during translant. Broadarrow for synchronizers, P/N 4003-20 AND P/N AY201S25T. After receipt of synchronizers further troubleshooting revealed bad Dual speed drive assy, P/N DSD4-113D. Temp loan was achieved through USS CONSTELLATION. Recommend two assets be provided prior to deployment.

(3) Due to the enviroment experienced in the Indian Ocean, suggest supply stock a larger quantity of A6 battery cells, P/N MS90321-844, FSN 6140-00-283-1311, and reducing the normal 28 day inspection to 14 days.

e. Work Center 630 (Radar):

(1) AN/AWG-9 Radar System:

(a) High failure parts:

- I.C., P/N 932260-1B, in support of the 081, A9 circuit card.
- Circuit card, P/N 3243589 in support of WRA 081.
- Capacitor, P/N 905573-1C or P/N 905544-3, in support of 461 A44/45 circuit cards.
- Draw up bolts, P/N 57790100-01 and P/N 57790700-1 in support of the Computer Test Station.

Duplicative

[redacted]

(b) Tools: Recommend ample supply of torque type screwdrivers be available to support AWG-9 and AWM-23 systems. Ensure proper removal and insertion tools are available prior to deployment.

(c) Publications: NA16-30AWG9-5-27.1 and NA16-30AWG9-5-27.2 are required to support CTS maintenance tape nr 719.

(2) AN/APS-116:

(a) High failure parts:

- CFA Tx oil section, P/N 718323-2 in support of T1203

(b) Publications:

- NA16-35SN460-1 required to support WRA SN460 (Sync Exciter)
- NA16-35T1203-1 required to support WRA T1203 (Transmitter)

(3) AN/APQ-126:

(a) High failure parts:

- Circuit card, P/N 605225-2 in support of 1A2A1 and 1A2A2 pwr supply.

(4) Coolant oil test set: Parts for support should be made readily available. Safety precautions should be published for cleaning and changing of generator solution.

(5) AN/APM-373 Transmitter test bench became contaminated and required a coolant flush. Recommend stocking sufficient amounts of coolant oil.

f. Work Center 640 (ECM):

(1) AN/ALM-106B: All problems associated with this test bench has been solved by alignment or calibration of the tape reader, receiver and the individual RF generators. Noise supressor P/N 2525 is a required item for alignment procedures, these are high failure items. Recommend having two on hand prior to deployment. Sanders rep is not necessarily needed, however, bench technician should be familiar with alignment and calibration procedures.

(2) AN/ALR-45: Water intrusion has been a major factor contributing to high failure of this system. Recommend squadrons comply with water intrusion procedures and inspect system on a continuing basis.

(3) AN/ASM-472 RFTC: No breakdown of bench circuit cards exist. One CKT card went down during beginning of deployment, fortunately, a spare card was on hand. Repair capability exists only at factory and turn-around time is three months. Recommend a Hewlett Packard HP8620C with the E91 modification be used in place of NARDA Homodyne Sweeper. Homodyne is very unstable and unrealible causing extended turn around time.

(4) COMSEC Area: Comply with SPCC INST 5511.24A when ordering parts. Kit replenishment has been in excess of 16 weeks causing excessive turn around times.

(5) AN/PM-133B: This test bench went hard down about mid cruise. Multiple problems were experienced with the A2 and A3 circuit cards. With approximately 75 percent of the integrated circuitry on the A2 card being found faulty, the self test portion and the AI functions are not operational. A workaround procedure has been developed making possible the testing of the WRAs. An A2 circuit card has been placed on order and should solve the majority of problems associated with test bench.

(6) AN/ALM-139: No major problems associated with this test bench. On numerous occasions outdated model receivers (R1764A and R1764B) were received for maintenance. These models should have been turned in for modification IAW COMNAVAIRLANTINST C13050.13.

g. Work Center 64B (VANS):

(1) AN/ALM-107C: Early in deployment band 7 water load failed. Investigation revealed the glass tube inside load had a minute leak, allowing water into waveguide area to reflect power, burning up the A11 chains and output TWT's. Replacement load was received in four weeks and must be ordered via augment support direct from Grumman.

(2) AN/ALM-117C: Have experienced numerous problems with the power supply and control circuit cards, resulting in either total or partial down bench time. Grumman Rep and technicians kept the bench as totally operational as possible utilizing every possible work-around available. One major failure was Q3 on the 28V-5V converter (A37) circuit card of the PC-2 drawer. This problem will not allow the bench to pwr up because of the missing 5VDC interlock. Workaround utlizing an external 5VDC power source was utilized.

(3) Corrosion: Recommend technicians inspect all drawers for corrosion prior to acceptance of VANS. Also, NARF should be tasked with corrosion control of drawers during phase I verification meeting.

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(4) AN/ALM-138, 142, 155 SATC BENCH: The programmable power supplies in both the 138 and 142 test benches have had numerous failures. No one common failure can be pointed out. Replaced many regulator IC's and pass transistors.

(5) P/N's 7172 and 879-12-1 coaxial connectors are being received under NSN 9N5935-00-445-6401. Although they meet electrical requirements they are not physically compatible for use in the AN/ALQ-99 transmitter bands 4 through 9. Raytheon source control drawing 154777 documents three approved vendors. The basic NSN, 9N5935-00-445-6401, has a listing of nine approved vendors and an alternate NSN. Review of three vendors show connectors to be compatible. Tru-connector P/N 7172, FSCM 92180 and Kings connector 879-12-1 are not listed as approved vendors, but according to supply they are apparently a direct substitute. For all practical purposes, the Tru-connector and Kings meet all electrical requirements, but in our application, the mechanical construction is causing additional problems. These connectors were received in identical packages containing connectors from three different vendors. A careful examination of each connector should be made before installation.

h. Work Center 650 (INS/SACE):

(1) AN/APM-375: High failure item, IC chip P/N 9620DM used in the Tone Burst Counter in support of the AN/APQ-148 Antenna P/N 3791-50000-517 and the Transmitter modulator, P/N 3791-26000-103. Encountered numerous cable problems, broken wires and pushed pins. Recommend stock replacement pins and proper insertion and extraction tools.

(2) AN/ASM-459 Mini-Flight: Encountered problem with Pump assembly, P/N 127002-1 in simulator air drawer. Workaround was accomplished utilizing a TTU-205C/E. Strongly recommend stocking a pump and belt assembly P/N 127307-18. Impact module SRAP/N 7953531-001 of the Air Data Computer, P/N 560T58-1 experienced difficulty with the alignment of gear train assembly. Many were out of alignment causing them to be BCM-7. Suggest review procedures for handling of gear train assembly.

(3) C93 Programmer: High failure items are the stepper motor, P/N 328006-00 and photo-cell assembly, P/N 201031. Recommend stocking two each prior to deployment. No other problems encountered.

(4) AN/ASQ-155 CSTC: Bench was down for a magnetic tape recorder drive belt, P/N 003843-055. Workaround was accomplished utilizing mylar tape as a substitute, very effective. Fill and verify tape E110+16 and E200+13 Harpoon tape were received from China Lake defective. Recommend verifying tapes prior to deployment.

(5) AN/ASN-91 Tactical Computer: Ensure Tac Computer load tape is updated IAW CNAL 101307Z MAR 82 (NWC-2E).

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(6) AN/ASM-375: Inertial Measurement Test Console: Beginning of cruise bench was capable of running Adapter Power Supplies and open and closed loops of IMU's. Unable to complete calibration, test bench would fail after four hours run time with excessive parameter runaway and code 21 printout. After several manhours of troubleshooting and replacing various latching relays and modules, tech assist was requested and provided from NAESU DET CUBI PT RP. Several faults were corrected including a complete swapout of the DDCP drawer, printer assembly and sequence adapter, however, a complete calibration could not be performed. At this time, another tech assist was provided from NAS Lemoore, CA. Continued on board trouble shooting discovered intermittent high resistance on twisted shielded pair in cable 1A1W11 connected to DDCP drawer J2 Pin 23 and 24. Repaired cable. Test bench has successfully calibrated IMU's and no further problems experienced. USS CONSTELLATION provided assistance in calibrating six IMU's during their stay in the Indian Ocean. Long range plans will be the deletion of the ASM-375 with the A7 Augmentation Rack and the new IMU test set during SRA-83. Recommend that all modules contained in the DDCP drawer be available onboard for troubleshooting purposes.

(7) FC-77: Three months into deployment the APS-125 WRAs experienced contamination problems in the FC-77 coolant. This was discovered during a routine maintenance function performed by test bench technicians. Maintenance manuals do not provide for contamination checks of WRA's. Further investigation revealed three of four aircraft were contaminated. Squadron was notified and a flush of the system was conducted. Recommend that Grumman Aircraft Corp. provide contamination systems checks on aircraft and the AIMD's check WRAs prior to running on test bench if contamination is suspected. Contamination was monitored using the F-14/AWG-9 AQUA Test FOUR Coolant Tester. Although test procedures were not available, comparisons were made using known good samples of FC-77 and the Navy standard for particle contamination.

(8) Inertial Platform Test Station: Bench became totally unreliable during translant and reminder for 45 days thereafter. IPTS received a SINS convertion incomplete failure. Self-test failures called for replacement for A6 I/O and/or synchro to digital converter. Troubleshooting narrowed fault to Board 13 of A6 I/O. Attempted to run board on EMTC digital adapter, but problems with adapter prevented accurate troubleshooting. Tech assist was provided from Grumman along with a request for an A6 I/O board 13. Although progress was made when new board was installed a problem still exists. After numerous hours of troubleshooting a synchro to digital converter was ordered and received 7 days later. The new S/D converter caused more failures than originally experienced. With no capability to probe internally, both a computer and a A6 I/O was ordered and received 14 days later. This did not cure the problems, however, it did eliminate the possibility of their being faulty. After several more hours of troubleshooting, the problem was isolated to the Cains I/O bucket were the following problems were discovered:

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(a) Board 18 - Bad analog to digital cnverter.
(b) Board 13 - IC nr C09 bad, control C&D displays.
(c) Board 07 - Broken wire, input from computer
(d) Board 06 - Two shorted runs, each carying computer signals.

The above problems were corrected and IPTS was fully operational. Only other problem experienced was to replace the photo-voltac head on the tape reader.

(9) AN/AWM-55 ASCU: At this time the bench is still down for several parts. There are numerous failures in the test bench caused by a shorted power supply. The following parts were replaced: Transformer, P/N 429-5073-001; Resistors, P/N RNR60H1001FR, RNR60H1000FR, RWR81S2R00FR, RWR98S10R0FR, RNR60H49R9FP, RWR78S2002FR and RNR60H49R9FR; IC CHIPS, P/N 9401-00023, 9401-00022, 9401-00018, 316-0525-001, 316-0532-001, 316-0026-001; Transistors, P/N JANTX2N706, 9316-2121-001; Tube sockets, P/N 898-4233-001, SK169; Capacitors, P/N MTP405M05PID.

(10) General: Recommend that items listed on Mini-Sace Grumman support kit report dated 24 April 79 be reviewed and items reported on benches be held on hand. These are in support of authorized repair kit P/N 128MSEK3-1. Also recommend all tapes be reviewed for latest configuration and accuracy prior to deployment.

i. <u>Work Center 64D (FLIR):</u>

(1) AN/AAM-60(V6) Electro-Optical Test Set: No major defects. Minor defects with Servo Electronics drawer, P/N 920-10293-512 have been repaired with no adverse affect on UUT turnaround time. Vacuum Service Unit, P/N 920-00006-503 experienced right hand valve failures and rough and HiVac sections at beginning of cruise, have since replaced both valves, P/N 951-5091. Vacuum service unit 100% operational.

(2) IP1214/AA Forward Looking Infrared Receiver: System has only experienced normal failures. Frequency of failures considerably less than in the past.

(a) Major SRA failures:

- Refrigerator/Detector, P/N 766704-1, three failures, two due to no power being applied in storage, one failed while in service in aircraft.
- Compressor assy, P/N 761707-1, three failures.
- Lens Switching assy, P/N 792730-1, one failure.
- Camera and Lens assy, P/N 766745-2 three failures, power distribution CKT card shorted on all three.
- Heat Exchanger assy, P/N 789580-2, four failures.

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(3) AN/AAR-42: No major problems, the following SRA failures occurred:

(a) 5A12, P/N 2014336-1
(b) 5A12, P/N 857980-1
(c) 5A14, P/N 2000942-1

All have been common assy failures.

(4) AN/AAS-33A Detecting Ranging Set: Experienced the following major failures:

(a) Outer Elevation motors, P/N 3472870, four motors burned up while in aircraft system. Engineering investigation currently underway.

(b) Compressor blower assy, P/N 3402604, six failures.

(c) Motor Drive Amplifier, P/N 3524600, several MDA failures noted. Suspect MDAs caused outer elevation motor failures, under investigation at present time. Extensive corrosion noticed with the MDAs associated with outer elevation motor failures. MDAs were treated for corrosion and QDR initiated recommending a one time inspection of all MDAs and a 28 days inspection threafter. System contamination at first presented a problem, however, greater care in handling procedures has eliminated problem.

j. Work Center 65P (VAST):

(1) VAST provided the embarked airwing with outstanding support and experienced minimal TPS down time. 95 percent (3 station) availability was maintained. Station 4 was up for short periods of time, but best served as a spare MTTU and BB source for the full production stations. VAST in an approximately 5 month period to June 11, 1982 had 2721 inductions, 2628 RFIs 93 BCMs and a 96.6 RFI percentage. SIDMS AWP report 161 was invaluable to canibalize and track/follow up outstanding requisitions. VAST contributed significantly to the ship's outstanding pool effectiveness. Increased MAMs availability and the introduction of a supply SRA module pool greatly enhanced the production effort. An extremely successful cruise with an estimate of only 60 D CODES at cruise end. Pride in workmanship by all prevailed.

(2) MAINTENANCE:

(a) PMS consisting of weekly running self check and DSS maintenance tape as well as monthly running BB01 and BB14 self test on each station enabled the maintenance crew to identify many potential problems and correct them before they could develop into a down station. This PMS program contributed greatly to high station reliability and availability.

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(b) Low power supply failures (5 in March, 2 in April and 1 in May) can be attributed to bypassing of the line voltage regulators and consistent ships 400 HZ power.

(c) Station 4 was down at the beginning of the cruise awaiting parts primarily for Miltope MTTUS. Once station 4 had its full compliment of MTTUS, self test was accomplished on BBS 14 and 01 and was operational by mid April. WRAs and SRAs were successfully repaired on station 4 in April but once again Miltope failures continued to prevent sustained station availability.

(3) MTTUS: The Miltope MTTUS most frequently required constant alignment. Snapped and stretched tapes due to worn vacuum corner pieces caused deterioration of software. Frequent tape duplication was required in order to maintain operational status. Spare deck was always down for lack of vacuum blower motor and vacuum corner pieces. The first two vacuum corner pieces received 5 months after they were ordered. Vacuum blower motor was received 4 months after ordered. Miltope MTTU supply support was poor.

(4) COMPUTERS: Tape duplication capability doubled mid cruise with the arrival of the long awaited tape handler cards enabling tape copying on Miltope MTTUS. The only major problem with computers during the cruise was when one display driver failed and caused a failure in the main frame power supply. Both the card and power supply were repaired onsite.

(5) DTU: A continuous problem with station 2 DTU exists but does not interfer with production. When the station is initially turned on, the DTU has keyboard faults or display faults that are corrected by either reseating or pushing spread pins together. It presents no problems as long as the station remains on.

(6) BB22: Difficulty in maintaining phase lock was kept under control by more frequent alignment than the cal cycle called for.

(7) BB34: This site had only one pump failure. Moisture in the Indian Ocean required change of desiccant weekly.

(8) BB63: This site was unable to perform scheduled calibration. The CCS would not load all RAM data as prescribed in section VII of the off line calibration procedure. This problem is unresolved and on-site tech rep is awaiting response from PRD.

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(9) F14A:

(a) Starting the cruise with two newly transistioned F14 squadrons and inexperienced operators, the F14 VAST support was excellent. Extensive OJT and training molded an effecient crew with minimal TPS down time.

ITEMS INDUCTED	1149
ITEMS RFI'D	1093
ITEMS BCM'D	0029
ITEMS PRESENTLY AWP	0031
TOTAL RFI PERCENTAGE TO JUNE 11, 1982	97.4%

(b) CSDC: Incorporated ECP 915 to the CSDC pallet which enables the running of 61 CSDCs accross VAST. Experienced numerous pallet SRA failures but all were efficiently repaired on board with minimal system degrade.

(c) DATA LINK: NO SUPPLY SUPPORT for DATA LINK R/T A12 module, P/N 585910-003, was received during the entire cruise.

(d) VDIG: Numerous WRAs were inducted with installed SRAs out of configuration for the present F14 deck load. Compounded by newly received pool WRA assets that were also out of configuration, VDIG support was severly impacted and pool availability remained critical for most of the cruise. Failure of D/A converter, P/N DAC-CBI-V, part of BB14 ID A1 circuit card failed and has not been received from supply. VDIG repair capability was maintained by switching the good DAC to inuse VDIG TPS. Recommend 2ea spare DACS be carried on board for VDIG TPS.

(e) All F14 TPSs are presently functional and 100% VAST repair has been maintained throughout the deployment.

(f) F14 tarps programs proved to be good. Coordination with the tarps shop to test and check a VAST run WRA gave the operators confidence in the new capability. Recommend SRA MAMs be considered for support of this system.

(10) S3A:

(a) Outstanding VAST support of the S3A was provided with a full complement of experienced and talented operators providing maximum support. Level WRA production

ITEMS INDUCTED	1076
ITEMS RFI'D	1054
ITEMS BCM'D	0029
ITEMS PRESENTLY AWP	0029

Total RFI percentage to JUNE 11, 82 97.3%

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(b) Was shortly before MID-CRUISE, the hats station had limited capability on certain SRAs. Thru the combined efforts of HATS and VAST on line SRA repair, extensive supply followups and judicious BCM actions, the number of RFI rotable pool assets increased and the number of awaiting parts was decreased.

(c) Utilizing 1 VAST station for S3A production normally less than 10 WRAs were AWP and in work. During 2 major 24 hour ASW exercises, inductions were quite heavy requiring 2 VAST stations for these periods.

(d) It is anticipated that 20 VAST supported WRAs will be D-CODED under the repair and return program. Barring unforseen circumstances the squadron will leave the ship without any D-CODE components.

(11) E2C:

(a) VAST E2C backlog has remained low throughout the deployment. New convoluted cable sets received prior to the cruise eliminated many previously encountered TPS problems. Experienced E2C operators only required 10% of available station time to support the embarked E2C ACFT.

ITEMS INDUCTED	265	
ITEMS RFI'D	250	
ITEMS BCM'D	007	
ITEMS PRESENTLY AWP	011	
Total RFI percentage to JUNE 11, 1982		97.3%

(b) IDP CODER/DECODER: Ran VAST ETE twice but failed in the aircraft. Replacement of fault monitor A303 SRA corrected discrepancy. An Engineering Investigation was requested.

(c) The only serious problem encountered was the 547 series litton power supplies from the CP I/O group TPS 32 thru 35. An unusually high failure rate put an unusual demand on the clamp system. Presently 9 of these power supplies are AWP.

(12) CAINS:

(a) Cains fault isolation was enhanced by the addition of SRA MAMs. The cains RFI rate has been heavily affected by BCMing 20 batteries for heater to cell shorts and 7 ANCUs for various chassis and broken chassis SRA mounting rails.

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ITEMS INDUCTED	253
ITEMS RFI'D	226
ITEMS BCM'D	027
ITEMS PRESENTLY AWP	003

Total RFI Percentage To JUNE 11, 1982 89.3%

(b) A heavy demand for ANCU BIT flag, P/N 972229-5, has continued throught the cruise. Recomment at least 10 be stocked in supply at all times. The CMFU has been very reliable the second half of the cruise, after being down for ICs, P/N SN7400 and P/N 74107.

(c) It is recomended that the rotable pool stock 6 ANCUs vice 3 to adequately support this high turnaround item. Supporting the 10 US3As, 4 E2Cs and the Indian Ocean Diego Garcia S3A with a pool of only 3 ANCU's drained rotable pool.

(13) A7E:

(a) This is the first deployment that VAST supported the A7E and the TPS and programs were extremely reliable. No SRA MAMS required this site to go AWP for ambiguity groups vice known SRA failures causing increased turnaround and AWP. A surprisingly small amount of A7E inductions occured:

ITEMS INDUCTED	8
ITEMS RFI'D	5
ITEMS BCM'D	1
ITEMS PRESENTLY AWP	2

Total RFI Percentage To JUNE 11, 1982 83.3%

(b) The addition of TC2A Tactical Computer SRA MAMs is most highly recommended.

k. Work Center 670 (PME):

(1) Pre-deloyment preparation: Strict compliance to CNALINST 13640-1 is necessary.

(a) Calibration of all pre-positioned code "L" TAMS within 30 days of deployment, also push calibration of all assets. Found many bad gages, torque wrenches, multimeters and common test equipment.

(b) Supported embarked squadrons must provide pre-printed meter cards and stock enough blanks for use throughout deployment. Recommend four boxes minimum.

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(c) Ensure squadrons obtain a current copy of their format 350s and update them prior to deployment.

(d) Make all efforts to have squadrons turn in broken test equipment and obtain operational replacements prior to deployment.

(e) Review squadron 350s on workups and have their tech library obtain copies of unique test equipment manuals from supporting labs stateside.

(f) A good supply of labels and stickers necessary. Processing 600 - 700 items monthly, stickers go fast.

(2) NAVCALAB Support:

(a) Med area capability list greatly improved over last deployment. A message prior to shipment of TAMS often will eliminate shipping questionable equipment to wrong lab.

(b) Med on-site cal teams still professional and responsive. Maximum support was provided during first inport period.

(c) Prior approval for induction of TAMS equipment into WESTPAC NAVCALAB not required, however, suggest that submitting activity determine the receiving activities capabilities prior to shipment. Upon in-chop forward a msg to NAVCALABs requesting capability of all TAMS requiring cal during stay in the Indian Ocean.

(d) IAW CFWPINST 13640.1, your activity may extend calibration intervals on a one time basis on all non-safety of flight/personnel TAMS equipment. Extension of calibration intervals for "I" level standards and safety of flight/personnel TAMS is not authorized.

(e) WESTPAC Calibration labs were used very little. Five to seven weeks turn-around time is expected.

(f) SRF Subic Radiac Facility has capability for AN/PDR-70 and various other types of radiacs.

1. <u>Work Center 680 (TARPS):</u>

(1) KS-87B: The main problems associated with this camera were with the shutter mechanism. High usage items were the two shutter curtains, governors and brushes. Electrical connentors on the magazines were constantly being bent or broken and numerous messages requesting tech manual NA 10-10AC-122 were sent, but no reply to date.

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(2) KA-99: Major problems were in the electronics unit, film jam and the emotion build-up. Scratches and film jams were notorious for this camera, also the exit mast has been noticed to have scratches and corrosion on these highly polished items.

(3) AAD-5: Ensure that an eight inch or longer allen wrench size 7/64 is available. It is required for alignment of the AAD-5 receiver. No reoccurring discrepancies noted during this deployment.

m. Work Center 69A/690 (Module repair/Micro-min):

(1) AN/USM-403 HATS: During first week of cruise ship's power fluctuation completely downed test bench. Several PIU ckt cards were needed and OHMS converter was not carried by CLAMP. Recommend a completed inventory of CLAMP assets be conducted prior to deployment and an uninterruptable power source be installed. Due to a highly skilled tech rep and technician the test bench is operating 90% at this time.

(2) AN/USM-429 CAT III D: Only one problem encountered, Connector, P/N 18783-1 for ID P/N A51S90180-21 had been broadarrow for 44 days. Connector is not available, CNAL provided replacement ID.

(3) AN/ASM-175 EMTC: Bench is heavily tasked, backlog is maintained consistently at 15 AWM.

(4) PACE Station: Experienced technicians are essential. Recommend three technicians per shift an average of over 200 modules are repaired weekly.

(5) AN/USM-453A DIMOTE: Test bench has been used a total of three times during this deployment. Due to lack of use recommend off load upon arrival CONUS.

(6) Numerous CKT cards for the HATS station has been received from supply improperly packaged and damaged. Recommend a thorough investigation into the handling of circuit cards at the supply level.

n. Work Center 710 (Ordnance):

(1) A corrosion control team has been set-up utilizing an additional three technicians from squadrons. Superb results as evidenced by the excellent mid-cruise corrosion control inspection.

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(2) RMK-31 Two Reel: Ensure spare parts i.e. cable assy are available for deployment.

(3) M61A1 Gun: Bearings were the hardest part to get from supply, high usage items were the shims and bolts. Recommend a sufficient amount be stocked in supply.

6. (U) <u>IM-4 DIVISION</u>

a. <u>TENNANT 550-D Deck Scrubber:</u> Apprx 21 days up status since deployment started. Unit has been down for: fuel pump P/N S1045, lift cyl P/N 56107, vacuum vane U-belt P/N 76656, starter (new P/N Ford MO CO) P/N D9JL11001A, power steering ram P/N 75364 and head gasket, P/N D5JL-6014-A, Ensure your supply has all required spare parts as listed in APL 950005074.

b. <u>Tow Bars NT-4:</u> Replacement tubes and chains require long lead time. Plenty of bent tubes. Procuring tubes thru supply system, recommend 20 spares carried on board P/Ns 62A122J2-1 and 62A122J2-2.

c. <u>P-16, TAU-3 Fire Fighting Unit:</u> Light water tank found corroded, problem procuring sealant P/N MIL-P-2326 that is not out dated. Also problems procuring pump P/N 896028 and control motor P/N 982742. Casreps created limited improvement on parts delivery.

d. <u>NAN-3:</u> Has been a highly visable area. Boost pump P/N 322AS161-1, pump motor value P/N 322AS157-1, have all given headaches during cruise. Several boost pumps have been received back to back from supply system that failed to operate longer than four days of heavy flight deck use. Beyond misuse/abuse; regulator problems are with cap screw stripping out.

e. <u>Support Equipment (QEC) Engine Repair Program:</u> Obtaining replacement QECs from the NALC GSE QEC facility, Solomons, MD., proved at first a problem but later reliable. Milstrip requisition should be sent to ASO Philadephia, PA., with information copies to type commander and NAVAVNLOGCEN Patuxent River, MD., (routing codes are as follows ASO for SCW4-433, CNAP for 7442, NALC for 3311C and CNAL for 532B2). When Solomons, MD., failed to be able to support engine requirements CNAP code 7442 took rapid action and obtained needed QEC's from NARF assets. Delivery of needed QECs was 30 days after CNAP investigation which found A/S32A-31 tow tractor QECs unavailable at Solomons, MD.

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f. COMFAIRWESTPAC Carrier Pool: Needed exchanges of equipment from COMFAIRWESTPAC carrier pool located at NAF Atsugi, JA., and NAS Cubi Point, R.P., was the best service ever seen. Entire units, as listed in COMFAIRWESTPACINST 13680.1, are exchanged. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY exchanged two TMU-70s, one AHT-64 and one SD-1D spotting dolly in the first three months. All items approved for exchange required less than twenty days for delivery. Retrograde and records will be shipped to a NARF as required in return message traffic from CFWP. Records are mailed from CFWP pool. An extremely useful program to all managers of CSE deployed.

g. AS32A-31 Tow Tractor: High failure rates included three engines, P/N 353; six transmissions, P/N 6837535; (QEC P/N 4SE00866); twelve power steering pumps, P/N 568853; and ten sets emergency brake pads, P/N 25320; even with COMNAVAIRLANT slep tractor parts list, and NA 19-40-44 manual, parts are difficult to acquire. Consumables such as filters have been less of a problem than acquiring slep starters, P/N 25490. Work around by NC2A starters P/N 1113208 and rotate nose assy. Tires and tubes have held up under normal wear, suggest a minimum of 28 rear and 28 front, plus tubes for both.

h. GCT 100-54 Turbines: Failure of five to date. Fuel controls P/N 968500-1-1. (Fuel controls had repeated failures on new turbines with a total loss of nineteen). 15 Starters, P/N 692356-1, 10 load controls, P/N 379017-5-1; 7 oil coolers, P/N 707620 and 30 hoses, P/N AD1320 should be an adequate on hand availablity to take you through the cruise.

i. NC-2A/MMG1A: NC2A drive control modules P/N 62A100-D8119 are of concern with failure of four to date. Modules are obsolete in supply system so spares should be carried if possible. Common electronic parts, 20 yr old technology, is hard to find anywhere in IM-3 or in ET shops. Lost one engine, QEC P/N 4SE0087, and 2 generator shafts, P/N 36C716277, on four NC-2A, MMG-1A lost one transformer P/N 9T55Y54G11 and one motor, P/N 634AS100-D9. With corrosion preventive compound sprayed on electrical connections and covers made for MMG-1As salt water intrusion is greatly reduced. Remounting voltage control P/N 634AS100-DS to vertical position will ensure no moisture is trapped in plug in module board P/N M21097/1-163.

j. SD-1D Spotting Dolly: Failed one engine; QEC P/N 4SE00865. Replacing of starter when worn with new P/N 113226, NSN 2920-00-679-5875 has improved reliability. Drive tires were open purchased thru Wilkerson CO INC., 206 W. VA. Ave., Crew, VA. Ph# 804-645-9641, P/N AAL 9926X-18, 89.75 ea. Tire wear is approx 90 percent of the Navy Supply System tire but will move acft up an angle and is appx. $45.00 cheaper (ea). Suggest that you plan on at least four drive tire spares per unit and one spare per unit "caster", for six month deployment.

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k. AHT-63/64: Major failures include two each AHT-64 engines P/N A0097255 and two hydraulic pressure pumps, P/N 68A4-F-205-1. Tachometer cables P/N 1584549 are impossible to procure except thru salvage.

l. HLU-196, 14C Bomb Hoists: Extremely high usage of cables i.e. HLU-196; P/N 517AS146 and AERO 14C, P/N 58A69C3. Upon departure of CONUS seven of eighteen HLU-196s were down for cables, replacement cables were unavailable through normal supply channels at NSC Norfolk. After arrival to the Seventh Fleet, cables were procured through normal channels with ease. Suggest plenty of spares are carried on board.

m. AWG-9 Coolant Cart: Very reliable. Insure supply has a sufficient amount of filters and coolant fluid.

n. 6K Forklifts: Forklifts belong to, and are operated by supply. Close liason of GSE personnel required. Ensure tires and tubes are stocked in supply. Open purchase works best.

o. Hangar Deck Crane: Due to excessive use,cables P/N 1285EME14317-13and 128SEME 14319-3 are worn. A NARF procured item; suggest carry one spare.

p. Dynamometer: Three is ideal number to carry due to inability to calibrate on board. Establish staggerd cal due dates to ensure full availability.

q. Aero 14-C Bomb Hoist: Recommend carrying plenty of lead seals, P/N 52A13D13-10.

7. (U) SUMMARY WESTPAC supply support is super. Use Para 6 of the AMR-Response by COMFAIRWESTPAC and CNAP is less than 24 hours. Plain language messages to CFWP gets immediate results. Parts mailed parcel post arrive faster in I O then MED. Liberty ports are few and far between but super.

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

* DAILY TOTALS

PRODUCTION TRENDS

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SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. (U) GENERAL. The Supply Department has recently completed a highly successful Mediterranean-Indian Ocean Deployment. This report will highlight some of the areas that warrant attention by division or category.

2. (U) ROSTER OF SUPPLY DEPARTMENT OFFICERS.

Supply Officer	Capt (b) (6) [redacted] /Cdr (b) (6) [redacted]
Assistant Supply Officer	Lcdr [redacted]
Aviation Stores Officer	Lt (b) (6) [redacted]
Stock Control Officer	Ltjg (b) (6) [redacted]
Asst Stock Control Officer	Ltjg [redacted]
Wardroom Officer	Ensign (b) (6) [redacted]
Sales Officer	Ensign [redacted]
Disbursing Officer	Ensign [redacted]
Stores Officer	CWO2 (b) (6) [redacted]
Food Service Officer	CWO2 [redacted]
ADP Officer	DPCS [redacted]

3. (U) DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE:

DATE	LOCATION	REMARKS
4 JAN 82	NORFOLK, VA	Depart Conus
4JAN-16JAN	ENROUTE MED	At Sea
16JAN-22JAN	MALAGA, SP	PVST
22JAN-18MAR	MED/IO	At Sea
19MAR-25MAR	PERTH, AUST	PVST
26MAR-1MAY	IO	At Sea
2MAY-7MAY	MOMBASA, KENYA	PVST
8MAY-20JUN	IO/MED	At Sea
21JUN-24JUN	TOULON, FR.	PVST
25JUN-27JUN	MED	At Sea
28JUN-4JUL	MALAGA, SP	PVST
4JUL-14JUL	ENROUTE NORVA	At Sea
14 JULY	NORVA	HOMECOMING

TOTALS: 190 DAY DEPLOYMENT; 160 DAYS AT SEA; 30 DAYS IN PORT.

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4. (U) LOGISTICS ASHORE: KENNEDY left an SK1 at COMNAVAIRLANT to take care of any last minute details of material turn in and space clean up as well as to expedite emergent requirements throughout the deployment. This same SK1 transitioned to the SFOMS mode near cruise-end and proved very worthwhile in keeping track of this material for pending October 1982 SRA. Additionally, one Junior Supply Officer and one SKC were positioned at Diego Garcia and one AK1 at COMFAIRWESTPAC DET Clark to manage the thousands of pounds of cargo that came through the various pipelines. Sending some the best personnel TAD hurts at first but it is the ship's advantage in the long run.

5. (U) MATERIAL: Prior to departure from Pier 12 a massive loadout of repair parts and consumables was completed. Over 5500 pallets were loaded in 21 days over the Christmas/New Years holiday season. Paper products and oil/hydraulic fluid were loaded to the maximum that space would permit. The heavy load out was a lot of work but well worth the effort. This, coupled with an aggressive Never-Out program kept us in good shape for the duration of the deployment. The frequent delivery of Fleet Freight and the availability of AFS support made it easy to stay topped off in most areas. Due to the frequency of CONREP/VERTREP we had only 5 replenishments in excess of 300 pallets. This gave us hands on training without having to "dig out" from on overwhelming amount of cargo. Transfers of very heavy lift items such as engines will occur on a routine basis via CONREP. Retrograde was usually returned via VERTREP. Retrograde cargo was pre-netted and pendants/legs attached prior to leaving the hanger bay. This helped to speed up the VERTREP and was a visual indicator to the helo crew the JFK was "ready to go". Generally, retrograde handling was not a problem except for storage. Utilizing tri-walls and stacking them in the hangar bay was a big space saver. Specific interest items as follows:

A. PALLETS JACKS: New pallet jacks were purchased prior to leaving Norfolk. The front wheels and seals needed replacing after only one month of hard usage. We were unable to get repair kits from the States prior to Perth so an additional 5 were purchased there at approximately $400 each. They were of excellent quality. Recommend sailing with sufficient repair kits for pallet jacks.

B. FAN FOLD PAPER: Fan fold paper NSN 7530-00-144-9601 was not a PAC FILL item and was used heavily by communications. We found it hard to get and had to use NSN 7530-00-800-0996 which is a PAC FILL item.

C. TRI-WALLS: Sailing with an abundance of Tri-walls for offgoing retrograde and mail is a must. We left with over 150 and saved all the good ones received during CONREP/VERTREP and experienced no shortages.

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D. PORT VISIT: PERTH: During our visit to Perth we received two C141 SAAM flights with cargo and sent retrograde off. The cargo facilities at the airport are very good. The employees at QANTAS cargo terminal were used to unload/load the C141 under the supervision of the Loadmaster. The QANTAS personnel were very professional and most helpful. However, since the C141 usually arrives in the afternoon and leaves the next morning, it is best to furnish men to load the AF pallets. This should be accomplished as soon as the offload is completed so that the cargo is netted and ready for the Loadmaster the next morning, with the ship's crew standing by for any problems that may develop. We found that using the "K" loaders for the AF pallet was not as efficient as using a fork lift with extensions or flat bed trucks with rollers. These same trucks are used to haul material to the pier for loading on the barge. Prince Elder Marine handled all of the JFK material movement from/to the airport and barge service to the JFK. They have the equipment, expertise and facilities to make easy work out of it. The CV will receive lots of cargo for the small boys who should have personnel available to pick up their material from an agreed upon point (Prince Elder Marine in our case). Good manifests are a must to trace shipments later on.

E. PORT VISIT: MOMBASA: In Mombasa we received two SAAM C141s, one the first night in port. MHE at the International Airport consists of one fork lift too large for the C141. The local husbandry agent provided a fork lift adaptable to the tail end of a C-141. Due to the night arrival of the first C141 it was necessary to leave our cargo at the airport. An open hangar was provided and we furnished watches for security. Need to provide lots of insect repellant, food and water. Most of this cargo plus that from another C141 and a load of fresh provisions was sent to the ship via H-46. However, due to the large volume and having only one helo available, it became necessary to transfer some to the USS WICHITA by truck and barge FFT to JFK at sea. Mombasa is a difficult port for logistics. Success was achieved by being flexible and having good communications with the CV and airport via hand held radios.

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REPLENISHMENT STATISTICS

CARGO ACFT	
C141 PERTH	2
C141 MOMBASA	2

RECEIPTS ACFT ENGINES	QTY
TF30	7
TF41	14
J52P8B	10
TF34	2
T58	5
T56	-
J52P408	5

CARGO TRANS(LBS)	
POM PERIOD --------------	5,500,000
FLEET FREIGHT ------------	732,177
CARGO ACFT--------------	160,000
ACFT ENGINES-------------	219,970
UNREP------------	3,933,000

TOTAL	10,545,147

DATE	SHIP	PALLETS RECV
12/11-1/4	POM(INPORT NORVA)	5,500
1/26	KZOO	200
1/27	SDGO	400
2/11	SJSE	200
2/14	SJSE	40
2/15	ROAN	40
2/17	ROAN	60
2/21	ROAN	40
2/24	ROAN	40
2/28	SJSE	400
3/3	SJSE	125
3/7	ROAN	56
3/10	SJSE/MISS	34
3/11	SJSE/MISS	44
3/18	SJSE/MISS	18

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STATISTICS CONTINUED:

DATE	SHIP	PALLETS RECV
3/27	HASS	14
3/30	NAVS	30
4/1	WHPL	357
4/4	FLNT/HASS	145
4/6	WHPL/HASS/SPIC	203
4/12	SPCA/HASS/WHPL	149
4/16	SPCA/WHPL/WICH	262
4/19	BUTTE/WICH	68
4/21	BUTTE	42
4/26	BUTTE/SPICA	165
4/30	WICHITA	114
5/16	BUTTE/SPICA	454
5/28	SPICA/BUTTE	90
5/29	WICHITA	453
6/5	WACCAMAW	21
6/10	MISS	12
6/13	MT.BAKER	45
6/15	MISS	20
6/17	RIGEL/MIL/BUTTE	575

TOTAL UNREPS: 35 TOTAL PALLETS: 4,916

6. (U) AVIATION SUPPORT: The Aviation Support Division, (S-6), enjoyed an outstanding cruise. Material demands during this Indian Ocean deployment exceeded those experienced during the 1980-81 Mediterranean cruise by 40 to 60 percent. The AVCAL demands were 60,390 with the Rotatable Pool experiencing an additional 9,813 material requests. Rotatable Pool effectiveness averaged 92.5% for the cruise with the lowest monthly average of 89% occuring in January and February. The highest monthly average was for the month of June with 96% effectiveness. Ship's Inventory Data Management System (SIDMS II) data was used as the "bible" for aviation support. SIDMS II data was the source for all Aviation Maintenance Material Readiness Report (AMMRR) supply data. All supervisors met daily to review the status of SIDMS II NMCS/PMCS listings. Average monthly NMCS/PMCS counts ranged from an initial low of 166 for January to a high of 353 for the month of May and reached a cruise-low of 153 during June Eastern Med Contingency Ops. The cruise average was 292 NMCS/PMCS requisitions. Performance statistics such as AWP counts, response times and pool effectiveness were promulagated daily to all hands, the goal being to make sure everyone knew exactly where S-6 stood in relation to established performance goals. Aviation

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Support from COMNAVAIRPAC and COMFAIRWESTPAC was superb. A very aggressive follow up and assistance request program was established to provide maximum visibility of the problem areas. COMNAVAIRPAC and COMFAIRWESTPAC usually provided same day response to all inquiries. Effectiveness was outstanding as all possible sources were tapped to maintain logistic support. An aggressive material obligation validation program is necessary to maintain effective support.

7. (U) ADP SUPPORT: During this deployment ADP has been able to provide outstanding service to its users due to an excellent 92% up-time. A major factor was the outstanding service provided from Pacific Fleet Supply Activities. The ADP Division (S-7) provided timely and accurate reports to all users, SUADPS, and Aviation 3-M being the biggest customers. SUADPS updates were more numerous than previous deployments and Aviation 3-M was processed on a daily basis, accomplishments considered well above the norm. All required reports and updates were provided well ahead of established schedules. Backlogs were non-existent on both computer and key-to-disk machines. Due to more "UP time than normal, S-7 was able to provide many utilty programs which alsor contributed to many more users on the ship/wairwing team. aong these were autopers runs for personnel, Alpha listings, Battle Bills, and Cleaning Bills. The receipt time of ordered parts was usually within four days from time of order. The only parts found difficult to obtain were compressors for the Miltope Tape Units (P/N 460773) and parts for TAB equipment not carried in the depot spares packages. Another factor which also contributed greatly to our success was the fact that the cooling coils for the A/C unit were thoroughly blown out approximately one month into the cruise. This alone caused a five degree drop in room temperature, allowing us to avoid needless shutdowns due to lack of air conditioning. Recommend that cooling coils be cleaned twice as often as on MRC Card. Some paper products were hard to come by, such as six part paper and printer ribbons. One, two, and four-part paper was carried on the AFS but required at least two weeks notice prior to major unrep. The TAB 700 equipment provided outstanding service with 96.80% up-time. The TAB machines are so much more accurate than the card type machines greatly reducing rerun time. The weak link was the 501 Keypunch machines with one machine down the entire cruise and the other down 50% of the time. The major reason for so much down time was lack of trained personnel to repair and troubleshoot the equipment. Time use figures for the cruise are as follows:

SUADPS	AV3-M	CSMP	PAYROLL	MISC.	DOWN
48.6%	24.75%	5.71%	3.86%	9.1%	8.16%

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8. (U) STOCK CONTROL: Supply Department's effort to provide ship and Air Wing repair part/consumable material requirements throughout the cruise was most successful. Never-Out items were carefully managed including review with knowledgeable users. This working relationship eliminated numerous "urgent material" requirement messages during the deployment. Beginning with work-ups and continuing throughout the cruise, a planned stock replenishment pipeline was established and maintained. COSAL and AVCAL NON-MSLF ship supported stock was reordered weekly. If a Terminal Interface Adapter (TIA) is not onboard to transmit reorders off station, it is suggested that one be obtained. It is not neccessary to order MLSF supported material to the high limit during work-ups since MLSF support is more than adequate. This will allow for more storage space of "NEVER OUT" NON-MLSF supported material. Last but not least, aggressively maintain sound inventory management practices in accordance with COMNAVAIRLANTINST 4440.11 (AFLOAT INVENTORY MANGEMENT). This instruction provides the guidance required to successfully maintain COSAL/AVCAL stock inventories at maximum supply support capacity. The following is a snap shot of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY'S Indian Ocean cruise financial and inventory data:

COSAL INVENTORY
NET EFF: 85%
GROSS EFF: 76%
MATERIAL ON HAND: 90%
MATERIAL ON HAND EQUAL OR GREATER THAN RP: 89%
MATERIAL ON HAND AND STOCK DUE EQUAL OR GREATER THAN RP: 96%

AVCAL INVENTORY

NET EFF: 80%
GROSS EFF: 74%
MATERIAL ON HAND: 91%
MATERIAL ON HAND EQUAL OR GREATER THAN RP: 89%
MATERIAL ON HAND AND STOCK DUE EQUAL OR GREATER THAN RP: 97%

COSAL FINANCIALS($THOU)
FUNDS EXPENDED: 4,859.
CONSUMABLES: 576.
REPAIR PARTS: 2,257.
REPAIRABLES(7 COG): 855.
CHARTER & HIRE: 882.
($500 ROUND TRIP SUEZ TRANSIT)

AVCAL FINANCIALS($MILLIONS)

FUNDS EXPENDED: $22
CONSUM/REPAIR PARTS: $3
JET FUEL: $19

AFM COST PER AC/FLYING HR

EA6B(4)	:	451./.540
KA6D(5)	:	166./.150
A6E(9)	:	466./.150
A7E(20)	:	1,291./.240
E2C(20)	:	349./.260
F14A(20)	:	1,391./.320

9. (U) DISBURSING: During the 1982 Indian Ocean/Mediterranean Cruise, the Disbursing office manned with 12 ship's company DK's and 8 airwing DK's provided a 24 hour workshift and 12 hour customer service to the crew for the entire cruise. This was sufficient to keep up with customer requirements. In preparation for cruise, $6,660,000.00 in cash (an amount that proved more than adequate) was brought aboard and 60,000 blank U.S. Treasury checks were procured to increase the current six month supply of checks already on hand. This eliminated the problem of acquiring cash and checks during the Indian Ocean deployment. Things to consider when planning for a deployment are the time of year, number of port calls, and time on station prior to port calls. Depending on the time of year the ship deploys, one has to cope with either the October pay raises or cashing a large number of Income Tax refund checks. Personal check cashing averaged about $2,500 daily. The regular payroll averaged $2,000,000.00 monthly and special payrolls averaged $250,000.00 monthly. Daily collections from ship's store and post office during deployment averaged about $50,000.00.

PORT CALLS:

A. PERTH. Bank representatives came aboard and sold $700,000.00. The bank arranged for payment of all dealers' bills. After the first day, the bank ran a money exchange in the Fremantle Terminal (location of fleet landing). They bought back currency from the crew until 2400 the last day of liberty.

B. MOMBASA. The disbursing officer procured $400,000.00 from Commercial Bank of Africa. Disbursing officers from the rest of the Battle Group procured their Kenyan Shillings from the KENNEDY Disbursing Officer. It is imperative that all Shillings be sold back to Kenyan officials prior to departure since none can be sold anywhere else in the world.

10. (U) FOOD SERVICE DIVISION: The Enlisted Dining Facilities on board have made a significant contribution to the overall high crew morale enjoyed during this deployment. Special meals for birthdays, Sailor of the Quarter, Reenlistments, Air Wing Landings, etc. have consisted of steak, lobster, steamed shrimp, prime rib, cornish hen, beef tenderloin, etc. To top off the atmosphere, the Enlisted Dining Facility has provided table cloths, candle light and live music using one of the ship's bands. The Mess Specialists also have managed "steel beach" picnics at sea, as well as picnics at various facilities in port. Additionally, the Food Service Division has established a soup and sandwich operation ashore in each port, either at fleet landing or in conjunction with the local USO. Another event is the "Divisional"

night. The Mess Specialists invite divisions to come with the Department Head and Division Officer to be seated together and share the meal. A special cake is also provided. The Supply Department has some of the finest cake decorators in the fleet and proudly supports various events with cakes for all occasions.

The ship has had very good response on underway replenishments with fresh, frozen, and dry items, all listed in Cargo load out. Most unrep ships carry speciality items for the private messes, such as bulk ice cream, salad dressing, ice cream toppings, king crab legs, and lamb.

Always take the opportunity to procure fresh provisions ashore, as this is a high morale factor itself. Consider the use of canned meat items, macaroni salads, canned vegetables and jello's to expand the salad bar. Fresh vegetables for the most part were of high quality except for the lettuce, which had an extremely high survey rate during the Indian Ocean portion of the cruise. During unreps, ensure that counters are spotted when receiving stores. The use of UHT Milk in strawberry, chocolate and white flavors was very successful. Served at chill temp, this item can be stowed at room temperature in dry storerooms.

11. <u>RETAIL SALES</u>: Upon departure from homeport, the Kennedy was completely topped off with a wide range of merchandise. We received our first foreign merchandise order in mid-February--a total of $250,000 worth of cameras, watches, stereo equipment, etc. Our second order was delivered during the first week of April and the third (mainly special ordered foreign merchandise valued at $250,000) during the last week of May. Timing is the key factor. Our first two orders were sold within 10 days after receipt. Although we ordered a wide variety of items, we still could have sold more! However, due to our departure from the I.O. operating area, we did not have the opportunity to get a fourth order. The procurement of local souvenir items should be watched closely as the crew quickly loses interest after departure from the visited port. AFS support was great on gedunk, sundries, and toiletries. Special emphasis should be placed on film (including B&W), batteries (all sizes), uniforms and accessories, and greeting cards. It is strongly recommended that monthly orders be placed with vendors prior to departure to ensure adequate supplies are available for the duration of the cruise. Upon entering the I.O. in February, our retail sales sky-rocketed as evidenced by the following figures:

JAN - $460,000
FEB - $680,000
MAR - $575,000
APR - $745,000
MAY - $560,000

Flower services were also offered to the crew. Holidays like Valentines Day and Mothers Day boosted our monthly sales an average of $8,000. We set up a special desk on the mess deck to avoid rushes and long lines in our retail outlets.

A. VENDING MACHINE OPERATION: Presently the Kennedy has 8 cup-type vending machines with sales figure in excess of $15,000 monthly. Sending at least 2 ship's servicemen to vending machine operator/repair class prior to departure is strongly recommended. Extra repair parts are a must! Supplies were considered a minor problem as WestPac AFS delivered syrup and cups from Singapore.

B. LAUNDRY/DRY CLEANING/TAILOR SHOP: Kennedy's laundry machines were completely serviced by Kentronics prior to departure from Norfolk. We were able to maintain 7 washers and 9 dryers on the line for most of the cruise which was more than adequate to provide twice weekly service to the crew. However, due to the heavy use during the I.O., we ended the cruise with only 5 washers and 8 dryers up. Repair parts were procured prior to departure, but still proved to be not enough. Although Engineering provided good support in keeping our machines up, some problems still existed due to lack of repair parts and in some cases, "technical know how" of the engineers. This latter problem was rectified late in the cruise when a very competent MMC reported on board. Our dry cleaning plant was out of commission for most of the cruise and can not be repaired until arrival Norfolk. We have one qualified tailor who provided an outstanding service to the crew. In addition, the capability of our tailor shop has improved tremendously when two of our Singer sewing machines were serviced during inport period in Perth. Procurement of tailor supplies, dry cleaning solvent, spotting agents prior to deployment is strongly recommended as these items are not carried by the AFS. Sufficient detergent, bleach, and alkali should be loaded during POM period and must be supplemented with AFS support during the mid-part of the cruise.

C. BARBER SHOP: Several people were sent to barber school to ensure that enough trained barbers were available during the entire period of deployment. Through S-3 Division's OJT process, we were able to meet the requirement for 21 hours of barber operation daily in the crew's barber shop and 12 hours in the officer/CPO shop. It is strongly recommended that 6 months supplies be procured and that at least 8 personnel be trained as barbers prior to leaving port.

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ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. ~~(C)~~ Maintenance Organization

a. ~~(C)~~ Commander Task Force SEVENTY-THREE is responsible for logistics and maintenance coordination for SEVENTH FLEET units. This command basically performs the same functions COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT/CTF 63 does in the Mediterranean. All liaison that occurred with CTF 73 was primarily in the area of arranging technical assistance and reporting on the movement of technical representatives, CTF 73 proved to be extremely supportive and quick in coordinating visits by tech reps.

b. ~~(C)~~ CTF SEVEN THREE is the proper addee on message traffic that is maintenance related.

c. ~~(C)~~ COMLOGSUPPFORSEVENTHFLT (XTF 73) INST 4700.1B of 15 April 1981 is the single source publication that provides maintenance related information while in the SEVENTH FLEET. This publication was used most for obtaining procedural guidance in requesting technical assistance.

d. ~~(C)~~ During the Mediterranean operating periods of this deployment, COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT/CTF 63 is the logistics and maintenance coordinator. COMSERVFORSIXTHFLTINST 4000.1L is the "bible" for any maintenance or logistics support item.

2. ~~(C)~~ Industrial Assistance and Repair

a. ~~(C)~~ The only outside repair activity that was e mployed was USS HECTOR. HECTOR was one of the repair/tender type ships that served as the Indian Ocean tender at Diego Garcia. HECTOR was used to perform small ship-to-shop jobs that exceeded ship's force capabilities and also was a source of EDTA for the battle group.

b. ~~(C)~~ The Repair Officer, if necessary, can be sent TAD to Diego Garcia to coordinate work with the deployed tender. Diego Garcia was within S-3 range for virtually all of the Indian Ocean operating period.

3. ~~(C)~~ Repair

a. (U) Boat Repairs

(1) (U) Due to the extended time between port visits, the ship's boats received relatively little usage. This resulted in two adverse effects - boats were not run frequently enough to receive good machanical check-outs and boat crews became rusty at seamanship which resulted in some structural damage. Listed below are recommended quantities of repair materials for boats. The quantities stated represent a minimum for a normal six month deployment and should be considered as more than sufficient for the Indian Ocean. Fiberglass, resin and hardners replacement proved to be not readily available in the supply system.

(2) (U) Recommended quantities of boat repair material:

Fiberglass, resin and hardner	100 gallons
Paint brushes for boat repairs	200 various sizes
Stainless steel screws for inner beading	12 boxes
Brass beading 1"	1000 feet
Brass beading 1¼"	400 feet
Wood beading (inner) oak	10,000 board feet
Wood beading (outer) oak	10,000 board feet
Fiberglass matting	2 rolls
Woven roven	2 rolls
Brass screws for outer beading (10" X 1½")	20 boxes
Caulking for wood beading	50 tubes
Brass screws for beading (8" X 1")	20 boxes
Disposable rubber gloves for fiberglass workers	150 pairs
¼" plexiglass for P boat windows	20 sheets
Wood beading (inner) teak	100 linear feet
Wood beading (outer) teak	100 linear feet
Decking (teak) Admirals barge	20 linear feet

b. (U) Miscellaneous. In general, the anticipated length of Indian Ocean deployments make it very necessary to ensure as much on board repair stock be brought from CONUS as possible to ensure repair capabilities throughout the deployment. Replenishment from CONUS can not be expected.

c. (U) Wood. There was a heavy demand for finished wood products throughout the deployment (Staff, PAO, Distinguished Visitor, Air Wing, and USO Show requirements). This placed a full work load on the carpenter shop and depleted wood supplies that proved almost impossible to replenish while in the Indian Ocean. It is recommended that the following quantities of wood be obtined prior to departure CONUS:

Plywood ¼", ½", 3/4"	30 Pieces each
Pine	2000 linear feet
Mahogany	4000 board feet
Walnut	4000 board feet
Oak	1000 board feet

The deployed tender was the only reliable, but limited, source of resupply on some wood items.

d. (U) Metal and Pipe. As with wood, the resupply of metal and pipe stock did not occur. Ensure bins are well stocked. There were frequent requests from other units of the battle group for materials in this area.

e. (U) Lagging and Insulation. It is strongly recommended to obtain as much material as possible. Heat stress conditions in the propulsion spaces were severe and can only be combatted by an aggressive lagging effort. The materials in greatest demand are paste, cloth, mus, various sized of pre-formed calcuim silicate pipe insulation, and "angel hair". Environmental conditions, emergent repairs, and the available time to perform lagging work require sufficient materials.

f. (U) Repair Support. During this deployment, units of the battle group depended heavily on the CV repair capabilities. There were numerous assists in the areas of motor rewind, boiler repair, locksmith, carpentry, machine shop, and calibration services. Our repair talents were also used during port visits as part of the goodwill effort. The aspect of an Indian Ocean deployment must be considered when preparing for deployment.

4. (U) Damage Control

a. (U) AFFF. Recommend stocking 55 gallon drums and 5 gallon pails over allowance of CNAL requirements. The 55 gallon drums proved to have a long lead time. While the onboard supply of AFFF was only slightly depleted because of PMS actions, it would have been difficult to do a major replenishment of the system had a fire occurred without the drums of AFFF that were obtained prior to departure of CONUS. The major restruction in this area was the lack of stowage space with a full air wing embarked.

b. ~~(C)~~ Radiacs. Radiac calibration facilities are available at SRF Subic Bay. Due to the normal length of an Indian Ocean deployment (in excess of six months), all portable radiacs will be out of calibration periodicity before return to CONUS. It is recommended that radiacs that are coming due for calibration be sent to SRF Subic at the earliest opportunity after airwing in the Indian Ocean. Calibration arrangements are made via message to the Naval Calibration Lab, Cubi Piont, R.P. Radiacs were returned after approximately seven weeks. Ensure MEASURE meter cards accompany any radiac sent to Cubi Point. The only problem encountered in using this facility was a lack of some spare parts. If time exist during the Mediterranean operations of the cruise, the calibration facility at Rota can complete calibration of relatively large numbers of radiacs in about 8 days.

c. ~~(C)~~ SSD Recharger. During transit from CONUS, the recharger went down. Technical assistance was obtained from COMNAVSEASYSCOM. SSD recharging facilities are non-existant in the Indian Ocean unless the deployed tender has this capability.

d. ~~(C)~~ CO_2 Transfer Pump. We developed a problem with the pump packing. Repair parts proved impossible to obtain due to a large lead time. It is recommended that all spare parts including packing and recharge hoses be acquired prior to leaving CONUS.

e. ~~(C)~~ Universal Toxic Testing Tubes. Ensure that a large supply is onboard prior to departure. A high usage rate was experienced and a long lead time exists in obtaining replacements. Some tubes were available from the battle gropu MLSF ships.

5. (U) Habitability

a. (U) Routine maintenance of ship's heads proved to the key in this area. Clogged urinals was the major problem during this deployment, but was usually corrected through flushing with firemain pressure. The water jet machine was used to blast heavy blockage of sewage piping. Six months has been determined to be the minimum periodicity for the hydroblasting of heads.

b. (U) It is recommended that an adequate supply of plumbing fixtures be procured prior to leaving on deployment. Ship's force did an outstanding job in the rehabilitation of several heads. More than sufficient time exists during this creise to undertake projects of this nature.

6. (U) Electrical

a. ~~(C)~~ Support to other units. Throughout the deployment, repair support to units in company was provided. This was primarily in the form of ship to shop work, most of which was motor rewind services. We rewound/repaired over 20 motors for units of the battle group.

b. ~~(C)~~ PMS. Due to continuous plant steaming, pre-planning of PMS is a must. PMS that required equipment to be in a cold iron status should be done prior to the deployment. Particular attention should be made towards generators, gyros, degaussing systems and ABT's. Considerable planning and coordination are required to accomplish PMS during the few inport periods during deployment.

c. ~~(C)~~ Parts and Supplies. Stock piling prior to deploying of certain critical parts is mandatory, particularly in the areas of boats, flightdeck jet services, MC units and rewind supplied. Recommend that a plentiful supply of the following be maintained:

Flightdeck	-	Bulbs and lighting fixtures.
Jet services	-	Cable heads and entire assemblies (we used over 50 cable heads and over 30 assemblies).
Boats	-	Starters, batteries, alternators, running lights, voltage regulators. A good supply of alternator diode assemblies served us well.
LVR	-	Cords.
Rewind	-	Wire, paper, sticks, varnish and bearings. We used over 30 rolls of wire and better than 55 sets of bearings.
SP Phones	-	Boxes, cable and phone repair parts.
Indicator lights	-	Gyros, MC units, alarms and switchboards.
Light bulbs	-	Incandescent and flourescent. We used well over $12,000.00 worth of bulbs.
Hand tools	-	Plenty of spares: They are in very short supply and difficuly to get.

7. (U) Auxiliaries

a. ~~(C)~~ Materials. Parts support in the Indian Ocean was a pleasant surprise. Response to casrep requisitions was prompt and accurate. Never-the-less, stocking up on high usage items prior to deployment is a wise course of action. Of particular note is the fact that HOUGHTO-SAFE (MIL-H22072A) is difficult to obtain since most west coast ships use cellulube in their aircraft and weapons elevator hydraulic systems. Take plenty of HOUGHTO-SAFE and conserve as much as possible while using it.

b. ~~(C)~~ AC&R. The high relative humidity and sea injection temperatures in the Indian Ocean will place a great burden on air conditioning and refrigeration plants. Taking plants down for maintenance while underway proved to be difficult. Night hours and inport periods were the best times to accomplish maintenance. Ice machine output throughout the ship went down requiring that the superheat on all units be reset. Carry plenty of refrigerant for small units and all the spare compressors you can obtain. It is absolutely essential that air conditioning boundaries be maintained throughout the ship. An agressive campaign that included the Commanding Officer's involvement proved to be of great benefit.

c. ~~(C)~~ LOX. The high humidity also caused lox plant production rates to plummet. Compounding the problem was the unreliability of newly installed Ingersoll-Rand HPAC's which were plauged by gross interstage water carry-over and cooler ruptures. We received an excellent tech assist from two NAVSEACENPAC reps who provided a great deal of training. A failure of the after LOX plant coupled with meager production rates required the delivery of a LOX tank to one of the MLSF ships in company. LOX carts were flown over and refilled. It is recommended that as many spare parts as possible for HPAC's, LOX plant reefer compressors and air valves reducing stations be obtained. The Onboard LOX analyzer failed once during the deployment which required a tech assist to effect repairs. CUBI PT is the closest facility in the Indian Ocean for LOX testing. It is difficult to make the arrangements for transporting sample bottles to and from CUBI. It is recommended that a ship's force representative accompany any samples that are sent off.

d. ~~(C)~~ PMS. Aircraft elevator availability for PMS was a problem due to the high state of readiness required. Constant liaison with the air department and well thought-out maintenance plans are essential in completing as much PMS as possible. Carry spare cable for sliding doors and hanger bay divisional doors. Stock up on cellulube/HOUGHTO-SAFE spill clean up items also.

e. ~~(C)~~ Boats. With only three port visits scheduled during the first five and one half months of the cruise, there were not many opportunities to accomplish water borne small boat maintenance. Mombasa, Kenya was a particularly difficult port due to the long trip to fleet landing and heavy swells at the anchorage. Quite a few overheated engines and transmission problems were experienced. Don't forget about the motor whale boats. Put them in the water during port visits and give them thorough check-outs.

f. ~~(C)~~ Machine Shop. The machine shop was one of the busiest in the division for the duration of the deployment. Round stock and billet stock is almost impossible to obtain. Ensure you have adaquate supplies before you deploy. High usage items included monel and stainless steel 1½" to 4" diameter. Billet stock in a variety of sizes for manufacturing pump wearing rings is essential. You will act as a repair facility for the small ships in company. Ensure that they send a man to accompany any major job and that they supply complete technical documentation to accomplish any other job. Insisting that you be provided the proper documentation will prevent many a headache. The USS HECTOR was very helpful in providing round stock and billet stock.

g. (U) Pumps. Fire pumps were a constant headache. Carry spare mechanical seals and repair parts for seals. A properly stocked machine ship will ensure that you have plenty of wearing rings. Plan to start testing CHT pumps during the last two months of the deployment and ensure that they are run periodically to keep the mechanical seals lubricated.

8. (U) Main Propulsion

a. (~~C~~) Maintenance. All work must be carefully planned to ensure maximum advantage is taken of the unique opportunity an Indian Ocean deployment presents in the area of maintenance - long at-sea periods with everyone's attention. The lack of plant down time proved to be a hinderance in only a few cases where leaks that could not be isolated had to be repaired. On-station "GONZO" ops consisted mostly of daytime flight ops with moderate speeds. Nothing more than four boiler operations was ever required. This provided ample time for boiler and pump maintenance. It is recommended that the boiler repair shop be completely stocked prior to deploying. A newly acquired set of strip heaters proved to be invaluable in conducting boiler repair jobs in support of the "small boys" during the deployment. Other materials that should be well stocked include EDTA, morpholin, ameroyal, 2075 TH lubricating oil, BW/FW treatment and testing chemicals, valves and valve parts, test equipment including gage comparators, pap air compressor spare parts, bilge cleaner, and a complete rotatable pump pool.

b. ~~(C)~~ Fuel. An oiler was in constant company with the battle group. Refuelings were done regularly on an every three to four day basis. The quality of fuel received in the Indian Ocean was excellent. We were prepared to shift to CINCPACFLT monthly summary reporting procedures for fuel, but after sending an initial report, CINPACFLT directed that the LANTFLT units of the Indian Ocean battle group maintain LANTFLT reporting procedures. The only new fuel report requirement was to send COMSEVENTHFLT a perfected quarterly consumption report. This report is sent in reply to COMSEVENTHFLT's message request for it that usually was received three weeks before the start of a new quarter.

c. (~~C~~) Fresh Water. Fresh water was not procured during any of the Indian Ocean port visits. This was due to the non-availibility of barge facilities and/or extremely high costs. Evaporator output was excellent during the deployment. Each evaporator was cleaned once using citric acid. Reports from NAVSSES indicated that water conditions are very alkaline in the Indian Ocean which required citric acid cleaning every 2000 hours or when output decreased by ten per cent. The one Citric acid cleaning combined with maintaining constant ameroyal injection effectively combatted scale build-up.

d. ~~(C)~~ Heat Stress. High ambient temperatures and humidity levels combined with seawater temperatures between 85-90 degrees caused severe heat stress conditions to exist continually throughout the Indian Ocean deployment. These conditions can only be combatted through maintaining completely dry bilges, an aggressive lagging effort, and staying on top of all steam leaks. Heat stress surveys served as positive reenforcement to top watches on monitoring conditions for their men. From an engineering standpoint, heat stress and the negative material conditions contributed to by using relatively hot seawater as a cooling medium are the worst aspects of an Indian Ocean deployment. A preventative measure that can be taken prior to deployment to prevent "hot" running equipment caused by high injection temperatures is to thoroughly clean all heat exchangers, condensers, and lube oil coolers.

e. ~~(C)~~ Miscellaneous. A severe fouling problem was experienced at anchor in Perth. Marine plant clogged auxiliary condensers and strainers after two days of at-anchor steaming. This was countered by shifting generators to clean condensers and frequent shifting and cleaning of saltwater duplex strainers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECK DEPARTMENT

1. (U) Underway Replenishment

a. ~~(C)~~ USNS ships have a high crew turnover and therefore are not always fully familiar with NWP-14(A). Discuss EMERGENCY BREAKAWAY procedures, station-to-station, early-on in the replenishment.

b. ~~(C)~~ TAO oilers have consistently pumped at respectable pressures of 80-100 PSI.

c. ~~(C)~~ A pre-UNREP visit to the delivery ship by your Bos'n is highly recommended. NWP-14(A) and NAVSEA 0955-026-8010 (Double Probe Fueling System) should be stressed during the visit.

d. ~~(C)~~ KENNEDY recommends that the following closing reminder be added to all RAS SILVER messages by double probe receiving capable inchoppers: "ORIG EQUPPED WITH DOUBLE PROBE RECEIVERS AT STATIONS________, _________, AND_________. REQUEST REVIEW NWP-14 REV A FIG 3-11A, 3-16 AND SECTION 3.11.2.3."

e. (U) "Flexibility" is the key word during SIXTH AND SEVENTH FLEET UNREP operations... particularly when working with USNS ships.

2. (U) Pre-deployment supplies

a. (U) It is recommended that your Bos'ns Locker be completely topped off with all required materials prior to departure from the States. Be ready for supply requests from and assists to "small boys" in the TF. An extra supply of high turnover items is highly recommended. SERVMARTS in Rota and Naples are really only set-up to support administrative needs.

b. (U) Striping of ANY color is normally not available in the Med. or Indian Ocean Boot topping items, such as haze grey, formulas 124 and 30 are normally available from Service Force ships.

c. (~~C~~) Overstock on chemical lights, in that most UNREPS are scheduled as nightime evolutions.

d. (U) Accommodation ladders will take a beating during the deployment. Accordingly, overstock on spare parts such as pins, stanchions, turnbuckles, shoes, etc., prior to deployment.

e. (U) Your boats will take a beating as well. Take a good supply of high-usage items and be ready to support the embarked Flag's barge. Recommended high-usage items are:

Three 55 gallon drums of resin
15K ft wood beading
Boat Ensigns
Battle Lanterns
Plexiglass sheets for windows
Laminating paper for boat charts
Mooring lines
Boat hooks
fiberglass repair kits
Boat fenders

f. (U) It is strongly recommended that the CV's Tire Shop save all old tires. Numerous ports have unprotected quary-walls for boat landings, and tires are good for use as fenders. (NOTE: empty sonobuoys containers can also serve as passable fenders).

3. (U) Boating. This is a very "hot", very high-visibility item in the Med. Make sure that you are up to speed on training, PQS quals, equipment, material condition of your boats, honors, and etiquette! CTF 60 will provide a boat safety instructor at inchop (BMC). This man will probably ride the CV for a few days, giving instructions to boat crews and Officers. Further, CTF 60 conducts daily, indepth boat inspections; BE READY.

4. ~~(C)~~ Towing. Be prepared for a towing exercise. USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) was involved in one with the USS HOIST on 28 Sep 79. USS HOIST 011020Z OCT 79 (PASEP) refers.

5. (U) As of 1 July 82, KENNEDY has visited the following ports:

a.(U)Perth, Australia- A 700 man and 250 man ferry were used in lieu of the ships liberty boats. They landed on a 120' barge made fast to the KENNEDY'S stern Deck house. The ferry service was more than adequate to support the liberty party.

b.(U)Mombasa, Kenya- This is by far the longest boat ride (5NM) with a 3-7 KT current by the ship and a 1-2 KT current in the channel. The ships boats were augmented by 4-20 man "K boats" and 1-150 man ferry. Due to the strong current it was difficult for boats to make the stern deckhouse. Also due to the lenght of the ride, it took about 10 hours to get the Liberty party off. Each morning during the rainy season, it would shower for about 1 hour creating zero visibility and thereby cancelling boating for a short time. The boat landing can only take 1 boat at a time and is inadequate.

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c.(U)Toulon, France- A 400 man and 3-100 man ferries were used to transport the Liberty party with the ships boats augmenting them. The boats landed at the French Naval Base which proved adequate. Some attention should be given to various unlighted bouys. However, most bouys are off the course of the boat ride and pose no problem if the boats stay on track.

d.(U)Malaga, Spain- A boat ride of under 2 miles. There were 2-100 passenger ferries, but they took twice as long to make the run as the ships liberty boats. The Fleet Landing had enough room to unload 2 boats at once. Most of the run is protected by a seawall so the boat run is usually smooth.

6. (U) Boat mooring lines. It is recommended that a large supply of suitable sized nylon for mooring lines be stocked. You may want to experiment with polyproylene mooring lines, since they float and will not foul your screws.

7. ~~(C)~~ Larne targets. It is recommended that sufficient materials be included in carpenter and metal shops to manufacture larne targets as required to replace damaged/lost ones. Additionally, adequate towing wire should be stocked for the same purpose.

Navigation Department

1. ~~(C)~~ General. The Navigation Department enjoyed a highly successful Indian Ocean Deployment. Significant accomplishments included two transits of the Suez Canal and nine anchorages. Also, during the period of 7 February - 31 May 1982, Kennedy successfully completed 34 underway replenishment evolutions which accounted for 94.3 hours of alongside time of which 35.3 percent was at night.

2. ~~(C)~~ Suez Canal Transits. Both transits were uneventful which was primarily due to the professional shiphandling of the Suez Canal Authority Pilots. Due to the large number of ships anchored in the waiting areas at Port Said and Port Suez, daylight anchorages are highly recommended. It is also recommended that an anchorage be utilized in Port Said that is close to the East By-Pass Channel in order to provide easy access to the Channel. In Port Suez, an anchorage in the vicinity of buoy number one at the entrance to the harbor channel is also recommended. The Gulf of Suez transit was conducted at night in the southerly direction and during daylight in the northerly direction. Due to insufficient navigational aids, a northerly transit of the Gulf of Suez at night is not recommended.

3. (U) Mombasa. Anchoring was extremely difficult due to low visibility and a current which was in excess of three knots that ran parallel to the coast. Boating was also hazardous because of the swells and currents in the vicinity of the anchorage and harbor entrance.

4. ~~(C)~~ Underway Replenishment. MLSF units continually shuttle between Gonzo Station and Masirah/Diego Garcia in order to support Indian Ocean forces. As a result, timely rendezvous are essential. To ensure this, the use of unrep TGO to exchange position, course, and speed information at least six hours prior to a Ras Evolution is strongly recommended.

5. Signal Division.

a. (U) Watch Rotation - Initially, a port and starboard rotation was employed underway however, it became apparent a three-section watchbill was better suited due to a minimum of traffic handling during hours of darkness. Inport, a three-section was sufficient for a sunrist-to-sunset and, occassional twenty-four hour visual guard.

b. (U) Traffic Volume - The following is a month-by-month breakdown of visual traffic handled during the cruise by each method.

MONTH	F/L	F/L TACT'L	SEM	F/H
JAN	73	88	13	8
FEB	104	238	20	57
MAR	40	173	39	10
APR	174	138	20	37
MAY	93	128	17	25
JUN	30	45	12	7
TOTAL	514	810	121	144

c. ~~(C)~~ Equipment - The need for a good sewing machine cannot be overly emphasized. During the cruise, Kennedy Signalmen used their machine to manufacture a Jolly Roger for Shellback day, three Somalia national ensigns and a Secretary of the Navy personal flag. Ships going to the Indian Ocean should strongly consider obtaining the following foreign ensigns in addition to those used on the East Coast and Mediterranean:

Australia	Mauritius	Saudi Arabia
Kenya	Somalia	Djibouti
Pakistan	Sri Lanka	

The neccessity of operable night vision sights is also a must particularly when transitting congested sea lanes. Some small vessels have very dim or no navigation lights. Ample supplies of high use items such as FOXTROT, and HOTEL flags, steaming ensigns, personal flags (RADM, VADM and ADM) is imperative. A very strong recommendation would be to obtain one each of the following personal flags; SECNAV, DEP SECNAV, UNDER SECNAV and CNO.

d. ~~(C)~~ Visual Communication Exercise/Drills - Exercises and Drills were conducted regularly in accordance with the Scheduled of Events (SOE). Challenge and Reply and, Yardarm Blinker drills should be conducted regularly to insure proficiency. Yardarm Blinker flashing light drills are preferential to directional flashing light training for strikers because the non-directional method is rarely used but, its a very important facet of the Signalman rate.

e. ~~(C)~~ Communicating with Soviet Vessels - The Soviets do on occasions, use the signals set forth in OPNAVINST 2330.1. Their procedure relates only to the International flaghoist method and does not include the use of YVpl. Hoists are usually put in the air at the time a particular maneuver is undertaken and a rapid response to their signal is therefore, ESSENTIAL. Familiarization with OPNAVINST 2330.1 and H. O. 102 and, alertness by Signalmen on watch when Soviets are in the vicinity is paramount.

6. Surface Warfare Officers Qualifications - A review of the SWO qualifications program was conducted and it was determined that although the basic foundation for a good program existed, it was, at least, mariginally effective. The following actions were initiated to enhance the program:

a. A SWO Coordination (SWOC) was designated as a collateral assignment. The SWOC reports to the Senior Watch Officer who has responsibility for all officer training and qualifications. The SWOC works closely with the Training Officer to maintain harmony between the SWO program and the total ships training effort.

b. The entire SWO lecture program was reorganized with emphasis in the following areas:

(1) A daily time for all lectures was established

(2) Lectures were organized into complete units (i.e. OOD Inport, Engineering - Main Propulsion, AAW etc) vice random or mixed lectures. This aided the officer in "seeing light at the end of the tunnel" vice feeling lost in a maze of lectures.

(3) Instructors were required to arrive 10 minutes early in order to set up and prepare for his lecture. His loss of 10 minutes is far less significant than the loss man-hours of the entire class.

(4) A qualified SWO attended each lecture. His presence aided in stimulation of discussion and questions while monitoring the quality of the instruction provided.

c. An aggressive exchange program was initiated whereby two officers each week from the JOHN F. KENNEDY were sent to a CG or DD type and they in turn sent officers to us. Valuable experience in bridge, CIC and Air Operations was gained by all.

d. The qualification program for operations and engineering was restructured to better fit the needs of a CV and carrier battle group operations.

No program, especially a dynamic qualification program, can succeed unless it is religiously pursued. Lectures must be unfarling held and regular attendance must be enforced. This has been done and a pace-setting program on board the JOHN F. KENNEDY has been established.

USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)

1982 INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYMENT

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT BRIEF

Classified by USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)
Declassified 31 October 1988

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(C)~~ Communications Officer's Brief:

Upon departure for deployment, the Communications Department consisted of 63 enlisted, an LDO Lieutenant Assistant Communications Officer, an Ensign CMS Custodian and a CWO2 Radio Officer. This manning level, although basically in line with a recently reduced NMP of 65 radiomen, is totally inadequate for a NAVMACS equipped CV. This drawdown in manning has been predicated in large part on the addition of NAVMACS and the automated Message Distribution System (SSQ-85), which collectively reduce conventional manpower requirements. Unfortunately, significant periods of Small Pipe operations (discussed in detail in Section II) and extensive XEROX maintenance, for which manning is not provided, have combined to negate much of the gain in manpower savings and, consequently, have made manning a major point of interest throughout the deployment. We have tried a number of watch rotations to optimize employment of existing manpower assets. As would be expected, most alternatives have consisted of port and starboard rotations. Unfortunately, the price in limited training and maintenance opportunities associated with such a rotation is extremely high. As a result, JFK is now using a three section watch which takes advantage of fluctuations in daily traffic loading.

Regardless of the watch organization chosen, be sure to plan ahead for equipment and antenna maintenance. Circuit requirements as on-station CV will continuously necessitate use of virtually all equipment. This will require advance planning on your part and agreement of the flag to permit rotation of equipment on priority circuits to allow consistent and timely maintenance. Especially challenging will be antenna maintenance. Almost every day will be a flying day and the few that are not will most likely be interrupted with alert launches. This makes antenna maintenance a frustrating challenge. Nevertheless, succeeding in this capacity may be your most important accomplishment since the Indian Ocean environment is notorious for degradation of antennas. We stayed ahead only by using an antenna maintenance team on every inport and no-fly day.

As everyone in communications is aware, there is a great deal of interest throughout the fleet in Limited Range Intercept Communications. You should be prepared to employ LRI at all times. This will require some extra attention as LRI is seldom used in the Indian Ocean due to the extreme isolation of the area, it is easy to grow lax in LRI awareness.

JFK has served as flagship for COMCARGRU FOUR and COMCRUDESGRU TWO. Neither staff imposed any unusual requirements and each received traffic in accordance with the same procedures used for other tennent commands. In that regard, immediate and flash messages are immediately advanced to all recipients including flag. All messages receive regular distribution with flag receiving 12-14 copies, depending on the respective staff and type of message. JFK has also served as flagship for COMDESRON THREE FIVE and COMDESRON TWO FOUR. Like the flag, each squadron staff received normal routing with a distribution of eight copies. Although, a small staff by comparison to the flag, the DESRON staff has very limited access to reproductive equipment and consequently requires special consideration in the numbers of copies provided. To enhance efficiency and timeliness of advance copy delivery, JFK has modified the TT624 high speed printers for tractor feed vice friction feed to permit use of NCR pressure sensitive 3-copy paper. This allows immediate advance of one copy to flag concurrent with traditional processing and routing for other users. This approach has proven invaluable for ensuring timely distribution of the tremendous volume of high precedence traffic associated with assignment as the on-station carrier.

Your assignment as the Indian Ocean on-station carrier brings with it unique responsibilities and a special privilege. The responsibilities are manifest in a number of circuit requirements which are addressed in detail in Sections II and III. The privilege is priority use of NCS Diego Garcia for termination support. The close proximity and superb professionalism of NCS Diego Garcia make this a privilege to be enjoyed and you should insist on it whenever you assume the on-station CV assignment.

Last but not least, be prepared to act as mother ship, tender, supply depot and CMIO for your escort ships. Patience and understanding are the keys to success. Take good care of your small boys and they will protect you. JFK's escorts, especially USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS and USS BARNEY, have been most cooperative and have unfailingly picked up the load when requirements have exceeded the CV's assets.

With respect to communications, the most significant aspect of the deployment was the unique communications associated with Indian Ocean operations. Consequently, to keep this report realistic in volume and scope, the majority of the material contained herein will concentrate on the I.O. theater of operations.

2. ~~(C)~~ Radio Officer's Comments

The springboard for USS JOHN F. KENNEDY's deployment was an SRA period which completed August 1982. During this maintenance period the entire UHF/HF communication suite, including antennas, received an extensive tune up. This effort included the installation of a complete LOS AN/WSC-3 package and minor overhaul of the aging URT-23A HF suite. This new UHF installation plus the AN/URT-23's being overhauled resulted in minimum circuit downtime during this deployment. An aggressive antenna maintenance program conducted by ship's force during the SRA period has resulted in our being able to keep up by conducting routine PMS during our "No-Fly" days and port visit periods. This has proven to be a big plus since antenna maintenance periods during Indian Ocean operations are rare. REFTRA, TYPE I, II, III Training and finally ORE were followed by the traditional workup of a communication loading exercise. All phases provided excellent training but the pace restricted maintenance time and emphasized the importance of optimizing maintenance preparation time prior to commencement of the training cycle. The success of our Indian Ocean deployment is a direct reflection of a successful workup/training cycle. Highlights were consecutive small-pipe exercises (Atlantic 1-82,Med 1-82 and WPAC/IO 82-2) plus being the first carrier to participate in a total HF environment during Refresher Training. These exercises provided JFK communicators an excellent opportunity to develop into a working team ready for the challenges of Indian Ocean operations. The two and a half weeks prior to deployment proved to be an experience in "getting it together". Preparation for overseas movement (POM) can be a Radio Officer's nightmare if not properly planned/worked out. A IMAV during POM with the USS PIEDMONT proved very beneficial for those last minute jobs prior to deployment. NAVELEX Norfolk accomplished a most professional job in two major installations: Facilities Control's QMS package (AN/SSQ-88) and hook up of the AN/WSC-3 satellite modems to audio transfer boards. To support Comm Department during the early months of the deployment a massive supply on-load was accomplished. All supporting Xerox parts for the ship's copiers plus many boxes of paper and teletype parts were all on loaded. A tremendous amount of work was accomplished during this two and half week Christmas holiday period. We even managed to give all UHF/HF antennas a final inspection and complete PMS. A very productive one-on-one with CWO3 [redacted] (b) (6) the NAVCAMS LANT CAT Officer, resulted in an excellent brief on Indian Ocean Comm requirements and assistance in obtaining WPAC/IO publications and instructions. The JFK/IKE Dual CV Battle Group Atlantic transit began on 4 January 1982. The JOHN F. KENNEDY's HF/CUDIX termination with NAVCAMSLANT Norfolk shifted at 6 degrees west to NAVCOMMSTA NEA MAKRI/NAVCAMS Med Naples on 17 January 1982. The Med Transit was an eventful period with JFK being one of three carriers to participate in National Week 82. JFK plus escorts transited the Suez Canal on 3 February 1982. The INCHOP to the Indian Ocean COMMAREA was a smooth transition which occurred on 7 February 1982 at 50 degrees east. The CUDIX/FM/FDM termination and HF VFCT termination shifted to NAVCAMS WESTPAC and NAVCOMMSTA Philippines respectively. Thus began JFK's Indian Ocean deployment 82.

SECTION II

CIRCUIT REQUIREMENTS

1. ~~(S)~~ Ship to Shore.

a. ~~(C)~~ HF Termination/Small Pipe HF Contingency Test. The HF VFCT termination shifted to NAVCOMMSTA Philippines upon INCHOP to SEVENTHFLT 070001Z FEB 82 at 50 degrees east. Due to the extremely long distance involved, the termination proved to be marginal for both ship and shore stations. NAVCOMMSTA Philippines was only able to maintain reliable receive connectivity during periods of ideal propagation. The USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64), being the on-station CV, was VFCT terminated with NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia. Due to transmitter limitations, NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia can only support one CV VFCT termination at a time. The off-station carrier is therefore assigned to either NAVCOMMSTA Philippines or NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt. Through the use of high frequencies (20-26 MHZ) and extensive employment of the chirpsounder ionosperic sounder, the termination with NAVCOMMSTA Philippines was approximately 75 percent effective during the daylight hours. However, due to poor propagation, frequencies faded rapidly and circuit outages were extensive during the evening hours. While orderwire connectivity was achievable, traffic quality communications were seldom available. Upon KENNEDY's assumption as the on-station carrier on 14 February 1982, the HF VFCT termination shifted to NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia. The entire termination period with NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia was excellent with term reliability around 95 percent. At approximately 66 degrees east and at 060001Z MAR 82, JFK was relieved by CONNIE as on-station CV and the termination was shifted to NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. HOLT. To maintain reliable communications was extremely difficult. The situation was complicated by the commencement of WPAC/IO Smallpipe 82-2 Phase III at 070800z March 1982. Whether terminated with NCS H. E. HOLT or NCS Philippines, inadequate available frequencies in the higher portions of the HF spectrum prevented reliable communications. Our chirpsounder continually indicated that frequencies from 20-30 MHZ were most desirable for this geographical area during the daylight hours. (It should be noted there are no available frequencies listed in WESTPAC CIB 2A above 26.7 MHZ.) We remained terminated with NCS H. E. HOLT for the remainder of March and through our Perth, Australia port visit. (By the way, you won't believe Perth. The stories are unbelievable but true.) Upon our return to Gonzo Station at 73 degrees east on 020001Z APR 82, JFK again relieved CONNIE and the termination was shifted to NCS Diego Garcia. USS CONSTELLATION shifted to NAVCOMMSTA Philippines and began her transit home. The termination with NCS DGAR has been consistently nothing less than excellent. They have been super to work with and practice the motto "Service to the Fleet" with style. Prior to WPAC/IO Small Pipe 82-2 the Indian Ocean deployers have customarily been exempted form WPAC HF contingency tests. The Indian Ocean is notorious as an area of poor HF communications reliability. This is due to the great distances involved and a general paucity of HF assets. The communication facility at NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia is the only Naval Communication Station in the Indian Ocean. Additional communications connectivity is available to a much lesser extent from NAVCOMMSTA Philippines, NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. HOLT and NAVCOMMSTA NEA MARKI Greece but stay with DGAR every chance you get. During SMALL PIPE 82-2, JFK's termination with NCS H. E. HOLT offered the ultimate challenge in Indian Ocean/ WESTPAC HF frequency management and equipment operation. JFK is probably the only CV to communicate in an Atlantic SMALL-PIPE, Med SMALL-PIPE and WPAC/IO SMALL-PIPE all within a six month period. The terminations with NCS H.E. HOLT proved to be very challenging for JFK communicators. The previously mentioned lack of high frequencies in the HF spectrum was the main problem plaguing the termination. As a result, termination outages occured regularly and several requests for additional VFCT/RFCS support from NCS Philippines/NCS DGAR were required. During Phase II of WPAC/IO SMALL PIPE 82-2, NAVCOMMSTA Nea Makri, Greece provide PMUL coverage for the JFK Battle Group. As time progressed, broadcast rekey from NCS DGAR provided the best copy. Frequencies keyed from NCS PHIL were seldom used due to multipath interference and severe fading. PMUL support frequencies were promulgated by NAVCAMS WPAC in a timely fashion and specific support, was made available when requested. Enclosures (1) and (2) refer.

All CV's are required to maintain a backup HF VFCT termination. No channels are extended from the terminating COMMSTA to NAVCAMS WPAC. In the event of a loss of satellite assets or during SMALL-PIPE exercises all traffic is carped to the terminating COMMSTA for HF restoral to the ship. Enclosure (3) refers. As always, the rule of thumb is that the carrier assigned on Gonzo Station will term with NCS DGAR and the off-station carrier will either term with NCS PHIL/NCS HEH depending on ship's schedule.

b. ~~(C)~~ Satellite Communications - Fleet Broadcast. NAVCAMS MED and NAVCAMS WESTPAC provide satellite communication support to SIXTH Fleet and SEVENTH Fleet units via shared GAPFILLER F-2 and FLTSATCOM II accesses. There are adequate satellite accesses available to suppport up to four CVBG's simultaneously. The close proximity of F-2 and FSC -II satellites permitted both to be easily copied simultaneously when required. JFK's communication circuits (CUDIX, TACINTEL, FLTSEVOCOM, FM/FDM) were primarily assigned to FSC-II; however, the F-2 satellite was utilized occasionally with no problems encountered. The UHF communication satellite has replaced HF as the primary medium for the fleet broadcast, HF transmitters are maintained in standby status for immediate activation when requested by ships experiencing problems with the satellite broadcast. SEVENTHFLT ships are required to copy the WESTPAC Fleet Support Broadcoast (FSB). In order to support a maximum of four battle groups, the shore send (FSB) channels are shared by CV's, normally an FSC-II channel two (off set low) or F-2 WB-19. NAVCAMS WESPAC satellite channelization advisories (Enclosure (4) refers) and weekly HF restoral advisories were very beneficial and continually outlined WESTPAC/IO configuration. JFK was assigned to FSC-II Channel two (off set low). FSB has been extremely reliable except for minor periods of satellite scintillation. Broadcast satellite control advisories (Olympia codes) are used frequently by NAVCAMS WPAC to inform fleet units of satellite PMUL status and irregularities. These codes were passed over FLTSEVOCOM. Enclosures (5) and (6) refer.

c. ~~(C)~~ Satellite Secure Voice. Fleet secure voice access is maintained on FSC-II Channel 05 or F-2 gapfiller channel 12. Except for one period when non-participants of Team-Spirit 82 were required to guard GAPFILLER F-2 channel 12, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY has maintained continuous and highly reliable communications on FSC-II channel 05. The WPAC/IO FLTSEVOCOM is a free net, that can be accessed by afloat units at anytime when it is not in use by other parties. FLTSEVOCOM provides a rapid and secure means of communications between afloat and shore commands. The circuit has been extremely reliable throughout the deployment. The free net concept is thought to be more effective than the controlled net we are familiar with in the LANT COMMAREA and the circuit is used extensively.

d. ~~(C)~~ FM/FDM Termination. NAVCAMS WESTPAC assigns all carriers an FM/FDM (ship send) termination with the alignment configured to facilitate patching at the NAVCAMS WESTPAC Tech Control Facility. This termination has proven to be invaluable during our IO deployment. It has provided all required CVBG circuitry, less traffic channels which were assigned spare slots for activation during extensive periods of CUDIX/HF termination outages. Although the primary traffic channels were on the HF termination the Facilities Control orderwire was configured in channel one of the FM/FDM termination hubbed with NAVCAMS WESTPAC and the terminating COMMSTA. This provided 100 percent reliability for coordination of all circuit outages/restorals. Other circuitry configured in the FM/FDM termination were: Charger Horse, Fleet Flash Net (FFN), SOSAT, VP Shore Hop, Zulu, Press and required broadcast. JFK's FM/FDM termination was assigned to FSC-II channel 23 slot 18. This type of termination was unique to JFK communicators and was well received. Similar support is recommended for the LANT/MED COMMAREAS for carrier battle groups.

e. ~~(C)~~ HF/Satellite Parkhill. JFK is outfitted with two independent Parkhill systems which are capable of either HF or satellite communications. The satellite Parkhill system was installed during the POM period prior to deployment. The system has been used extensively during this IO deployment, especially with the E-3A/TF-70 interface (ELF-1). To date, no problems have been experienced. Additionally, HF Parkhill was used operationally on a daily basis among battle group primary and alternate warfare commanders. It is significant to note that the FM mode position of the WSC-3 is utilized while operating Parkhill via satellite. It also should be noted that due to to excessive Modem requirements, one of the escorts had to maintain comm guard for JFK on either the FLTSEVOCOM or the ELF-1 circuit. Our total AN/WSC-3 Modem requirements during on-station (Gonzo) operations was five. JFK has only four SATCOM transceivers . The HF Parkhill system provides excellent long range secure voice capability provided that clear frequencies are available. The voice quality is sometimes degraded to some degree during periods of signal fade and atmospheric noise. The satellite Parkhill secure voice is customarily of excellent quality with only minor degradations during periods of satellite scintillation. JFK had the occasion to use both installed Parkhill systems (one HF system and one satellite system) during TF 70 interface evolutions. It is imperative that both systems are maintained in top condition. This requires frequent and sometimes inovative application of routine PMS and corrective maintenance procedures. To date JFK's EC Division has maintained both systems superbly.

f. ~~(C)~~ Fleet Flash Net (FFN). All Task Force 77 Group Commanders are required to guard the FFN. Inchopping/Outchopping SEVENTHFLT CV's will submit requests for entering and securing the FFN in accordance with CINCPACFLTINST C2600.1 (PACFLT CEI). FFN procedures and instructions are also contained in PACFLT CEI. The primary path for the FFN was the FM/FDM/FSB termination. Flag communications maintains the guard on this circuit.

g. ~~(C)~~ TACINTEL. The TACINTEL system provides a full term, high speed, computer controlled, satellite communications capability for delivery of certain types of compartmented record traffic and tactically significant information of a perishable nature. SSES maintains guard.

h. ~~(C)~~ Charger Horse. The Charger Horse net is a modified full duplex, 100WPM Orestes (USKAY 7205) circuit. This circuit is normally terminated with the Southeast Asia Tactical Information Communications Center at NAVCAMS WESTPAC Guam when the carrier is operating south of 22 degrees north and with the Northeast Asia Tactical Information Communications Center at Naval Security Group Detachment Kamiseya JA when operating north of 22 degrees north. CV's will maintain this circuit as part of the FM/FDM/FSB termination. SSES maintains the guard.

i. ~~(C)~~ ZULU. The Zulu circuit is established for contingency purposes. In the event that TACINTEL is not available, it will be used for operational and administrative record traffic between the CV and Naval Security Group Department/NAVCAMS WESTPAC Guam. This circuit is normally extended by a full-period multi-channel termination. The effective keylist is USKAY 7688. The ZULU has been activated only one time for a period of 48 hours. During JFK's IO deployment this circuit has been maintained as part of the FM/FDM/FSB termination.

j. ~~(C)~~ Operations Intelligence (OPINTEL) Broadcast. All CV's will copy the OPINTEL broadcast on the assigned channel of the satellite PMUL Broadcast. Effective keylist for the OPINTEL broadcast is UAKAY 2000. JFK has copied the OPINTEL broadcast via Fleet Support Broadcast (FSB) (PMFF) FSC-II channel 02 (off set low) slot six.

k. ~~(C)~~ Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH)/SSN/OTC Tactical ORESTES Net (SOSAT). A 100 WPM ORESTES covered (USKAY 7360) circuit used primarily for coordiantion between the Submarine Operations Authority, the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), who is frequently represented by the submarine element coordinator (SEC), and the direct support submarine. The net control station (NECOS) is the OTC or SEC if assigned. Submarine directives can be passed to the SSN(DS) direct, if the SSN(DS) is at communications depth, or they can be passed from the OTC/SEC to the SUBOPAUTH for relay via the sub broadcast. This circuit is most frequently operated in the satellite SOSAT mode. In this configuration direct support submarines having a satellite term capability can access the circuit directly. This circuit provides the most rapid path to the OTC/ASWC/SEC. Early detection and over the horizon positioning generally preclude UHF voice comms, thus making SOSAT a necessity for contact reporting. The circuit is guarded in Flag Communications and is configured in the FM/FDM/FSB termination.

l. ~~(C)~~ PSBI Submarine Broadcast. PSBI is the general service sub broadcast for the Indian Ocean area. This broadcast is keyed at 67WPM (50 BAUD). Non-submarine units are required to obtain authorization for entry into the circuit from the Broadcast Authority (BCA). Request to copy PSBI should be addressed action to CTF SEVEN FOUR, info COMSEVENTHFLT. Currently PSBI data is provided as follows:

HF freqs: NCS HE HOLT - 4259KHZ, 6481KHZ
NCS D GARCIA - 14655KHZ 16305KHZ
Jason Keymat: USKAY 2054/0001Z

All CV's in the Indian Ocean are required to copy PSBI. Ensure at least one (1) KWR37 is strapped for 67WPM and associated teletype gear is converted to the 67WPM requirement prior to INCHOP SEVENTHFLT. JOHN F. KENNEDY activated the PSBI broadcast on 090001Z FEB 82 and patched to TT-176 equipment located in the Flag Communication space. The two frequencies provided by NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia have varied in reliability and occasionally activation of PSBI via the HF VFCT termination to curtail long outages has been required.

m. ~~(C)~~ VP Shore Hop. Provides secure teletype between the CV and CTG 72.8 for coordination of VP tasking. The circuit is configured into the FM/FDM/FSB termination utilizing USKAY 7146. Due to teletype equipment limitations in TSC Module, VP shore hop is not activated when VP CRATT is activated.

n. ~~(C)~~ VP/CVBG Communication Support. A number of methods are used to coordinate surveillance and ASW efforts between supporting VP ACFT and the OTC.

(1) ~~(C)~~ VP Communications in an HF environment - the IO Maritime Patrol Net is currently being utilized to support VP aircraft. This support is via two way covered radioteletype (CRATT) and HF non-secure voice circuits during BG ops. CRATT communications will be established with the VP aircraft homebase at Diego Garcia to provide direct command and control of the direct support VP aircraft.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Command and control communications may be established between the Battle Group and VP aircraft through the employment of shore hop communications procedures. Message traffic between the OTC and VP aircraft is delivered via the normal aircraft to ASW operations center (ASWOC) circuit (VP ASW Patrol Net) and ship to shore circuit (shore hop) extended to the ASWOC. Message traffic is torn tape relayed directly between these two circuits. For the shore hop configuration, the CV activates a simplex KW-7 covered (USKAY 7146) 100WPM circuit for extension to the selected ASWOC via the FM/FDM termination. NAVCAMS extends the shore hop circuit to the selected ASWOC as requested by the OTC. The ASWOC activates and extends a SIMPLEX KW-7 covered (USKAY 7146) circuit to NAVCAMS Guam for insertion into a designated spare channel of the Fleet Support BCST (FSB). This is the CV's receive side for the VP shore hop circuit.

o. ~~(C)~~ Secure Satellite Communications Net (ELF-1). CV/AWACS/USAFE ELF 1 CMD Saudi Arabia - This is a single channel Parkhill covered secure voice net utilizing channel 8 of the 72 degree fleet satellite (FSC-II). Uplink frequency is 308.05 MHZ and downlink frequency is 267.05MHZ, receiver offset position four. Parkhill is keyed using AKAW216. This circuit will be utilized to initiate and coordinate all contingency operations. To ensure availability of this circuit, radio checks between the ELF-1 guard station and the on-station CV (TG 70.0 Guard Ship) will be conducted at least every four hours. During JFK 's on station period, USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27) maintained communication guard on the ELF-1 circuit. This was required due to equipment limitations with WSC-3 satellite modems. JFK was required to be able to join the net within ten minutes of notification by the guard ship. USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS reported the results of ELF-1 radio checks via daily OPSUM messages. This configuration proved to be very reliable.

p. ~~(C)~~ HICOM/IOCN. HICOM is not available in the Indian Ocean COMMAREA. However, NCS Diego Garcia maintains an Idian Ocean Coordination Net (IOCN). This net is primarily utilized by ships maintaining HF termination with Diego Garcia. EAM's, Olympia codes / Sierra codes, and OPREP reporting exercises are not passed via IOCN. The IOCN was utilized extensively by JFK air operations to coordinate with the aircraft tower control at Diego Garcia. The current IOCN freqs are:

TIME	FREQ
0200Z-1300Z	23316..5KHZ (USB)
1300Z-0200Z	11262.5KHZ (USB)

Ships deployed in the Indian Ocean are exempt from HICOM responsiveness tests. However, east of 105 degrees east, SEVENTHFLT ships must maintain a continual and attentive HICOM guard. Periodic unscheduled HICOM tests are made to assure the ability of the CINCPACFLT Center to contact designated fleet units.

q. ~~(C)~~ HF coordination circuit, Oman - guard frequency, Primary 6220KHZ/2.8A3F; Secondary 12822KHZ/2.8A3F: This circuit utilizes selective calling (SELCALL) devices that have been adapted for use with standard U.S. Navy shipboard HF, SSB transmitters. By selecting the proper codes, the unit can be used to page an individual or a group of stations on the net. This device is one of the items in the Indian Ocean Battle Group material turnover. On JFK the circuit is guarded in the Flag Warroom. The carrier will have two SELCALL devices with one located on the PIRAZ ship. Radio checks are conducted at 1200A and 2200A each day. The "net" normally consists of the on station carrier, PIRAZ ship, and USDAO Oman, Muscat.

r. (~~C~~) American Embassy Muscat, Oman-USN HF Parkhill Circuit: This circuit utilizes Parkhill (KY-75) between AMEMBASSY Muscat, Oman, and the on station carrier (CTG 70.0). Radio checks are made twice daily at 0500Z and 0900Z during normal embassy working hours, Saturday through Wednesday. Communications after working hours will be for emergencies only. Comm guard frequencies and SOP are a turnover item to the CV assuming CTG 70.0 duties.

s. ~~(C)~~ Special Interest Communications Procedures (SPIC). Direct two-way secure communications between separated commanders are often desirable for special situations such as SAR, surveillance operations or emergencies. SPIC procedures are contained in PACFLT CEI Chapter three. This circuit has not been activated since INCHOP to SEVENTHFLT.

t. ~~(C)~~ GFAX. GFAX support via FSC-II is available in the FM mode whenever modems are available. To date we have utilized the HF GFAX rekey from Diego Garcia. This rekey has been highly reliable during our on-station ops. Currently GFAX rekey from NCS DGAR is on 15564KHZ.

u. UMLA (Universal Multi-Line-Adapter) - Formerly ICSB. There is no UMLA coverage in the Indian Ocean. This is in part due to the lack of adequate frequencies and the long distances between terminating stations.

2. (~~C~~) Ship to Ship.

a. (~~C~~) Task Group ORESTES (TGO). The battle group TGO is an HF full-duplex circuit with the carrier as net control on the control frequency and all other units on another frequency. TGO advisory messages are sent to subscribers whenever problems arise. These TGO advisories utilize the COMMSPOT format and give a short description of the problem. These have worked especially well for frequency shifts. The CV can expect to receive an abundant amount of traffic for relay to the beach. It is recommended that hourly channel checks be conducted, especially after a heavy volume of traffic has been exchanged. To enhance circuit operation, an accurate QRY order must be maintained. All TG 70.9 units were required to maintain comm guard on TGO. In addition to the BG TGO, a special dedicated TGO was activated between JFK and HMAS Perth. HMAS Perth joined the TG upon our departure form Perth, W. A. This has required extra attention to ACP 127 procedures.

b. (~~C~~) French TGO. Guard frequency 8542 (8540) KHZ, emission is 1.24F1, CRYPTO material AKAY 7683: The on station CVBG Commander is required to maintain a HF teletype circuit with CTG 623.1. Communication checks are made every four hours. There are long periods without contact. During the early weeks of the deployment JFK maintained excellent two-way comms with French DDG KERSAINT and DDG LA CHARENTE. This circuit was guarded in the Message Center.

c. (~~C~~) Special Intelligence Task Group ORESTES (SITGO). The SITGO circuit is utilized for coordination, intelligence dissemination and technical exchanges between signal exploitation space (SSES) equipped units within the Task Force/Task Group. The SITGO is a frequency shift keying (FSK), SIMPLEX operated, 100 WPM ORESTES covered circuit using HF frequencies. The effective keylist is AKAK 9664. Present guard frequencies are 17445KHZ (DAY FREQ), 7385KHZ (NIGHT FREQ).

d. (~~C~~) Unrep Common Circuit. Customer ships will join the Unrep ORESTES circuit four hours prior to the Unrep. The senior MLSF ship will assume duties as net control. This procedure will be followed at all times unless precluded by equipment limitations or operational necessity. All MLSF ships will follow the requirements of the BG TG EMCON condition in effect. The Battle Group TGO may be substituted for Unrep common during Task Group operations to reduce circuit requirements on the carrier. To alleviate the requirement for an additional circuit, all service force ships operating with TG 70.9 were requested to maintain comm guard on Battle Group Task Group ORESTES. This procedure has worked quiet well for all concerned. It has permitted coordination of refueling/unrep evolutions while allowing JFK to relay MLSF ship/shore traffic.

e. (~~C~~) Submarine Direct Support (SSN(DS)) Primary Tactical PRITAC. This is an alternate UHF voice net over which direct support submarines (SSN(DS)) tactical information is passed to/from the ASWC and submarine element coordinator (SEC). This net may be direct path but airborne relay is normally used. Submarines in direct support will use ASCONNET (see para 3.D) as their primary voice net with the ASWC and other ASW forces. PRITAC is very effective as an alt ASCONNET.

f. (~~C~~) Task Force Command Net. This circuit has proven to be very effective for intra-battle group and inter-battle group communications. It is KY-75/Parkhill covered and is utilized extensively by CIC/Flag spaces and the pilot house. To date JFK has experienced no problems with KY-75 equipment and circuit reliability has been excellent.

g. ~~(C)~~ PIRAZ. The positive indentification radar advisory zone (PIRAZ) circuit is used by radar picket ships in the TG to pass advisory information. USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG-27) conducted PIRAZ operations for TG 70.9.

h. ~~(C)~~ Standard Tactical Circuits. The standard tactical circuits for JFK during our Indian Ocean deployment have consisted of the following: Taskforce command net (KY-75 Parkhill); task force tactical UHF; ASUW C/R UHF; EW C/R UHF; task group ORESTES (TGO); ASCONNET; AAW C/R HF; TF AAW RPTG/Link Coord; ASW; IOCN; HELO/VERTREP Control; Navy Red (secure voice common) (KY-8 covered); SITGO; Fleet Satellite secure voice; IO ASW/Maritime patrol net; Link 11; Link 14; Strike/Airwing Common; FAD; CGI Common and Attack.

3. ~~(C)~~ Air to Ground.

a. ~~(C)~~ Raspberry. Aircraft ship/shore movement coordination (Raspberry) circuit is used to pass flight following information between CV's and Naval Air Stations. In WESPAC there are two raspberry circuits: Bravo (primary) and Alfa (secondary). Raspberry Bravo is operated as a 100 WPM ORESTES covered teletype circuit which is incorporated into a spare channel of the FM/FDM termination. Activation/Deactivation of the circuit must be coordinated with NAVCAMS WESTPAC and NAVCOMMSTA Philippines. NAS Cubi Point serves as net control for the Philippines/South Chna Sea Area, Kadena AB for Okinawa Area, and NAF Atsugi JA for the Japan/Korea Area. Raspberry Alfa is a secondary uncovered voice circuit and is used only as a backup circuit. The raspberry Bravo circuit is accessible in the FSB. To date JFK has not activated Raspberry Bravo, due to the high reliability of the Diego Garcia tower net. The DGAR tower net (commonly called Raspberry) is guarded continuously by Diego Garcia and CV air operations) to coordinate flights. This circuit has been very reliable throughout the deployment. Currently the DGAR Raspberry frequencies are aligned with the DGAR IOCN frequencies: 0200Z-1300Z (23316.5K) 1300Z-0200Z (11262.5K)

b. ~~(C)~~ VP CRATT (ASW Maritime Patrol Circuit) - Primary Frequency 17983.5KHZ (17982)/ Secondary Frequency 8973.5KHZ (8972), CRYPTO Material CCY-10. Provides both USB voice and secure teletype between the CV/on-station P-3/CTG 72.8. Teletype segment is guarded in TSC module. USB voice guarded by embarked DESRON Commander and TSC Module. ASCONNET covered voice CCK 1012 is guarded by DESRON Commander and TSC Module while the P-3 is on station.

c. ~~(C)~~ Swap Net. Swap nets are secure UHF circuits used for providing required information to a ship or aircraft relieving on station or to a relieving Scene of Action Commander (SAC). A Swap net will be used to execute swap regardless of the types of platforms conducting swap. The purpose of the Swap net is to permit an effective relief of the SAC without tying up the ASCONNET for exchange of swap information. However, tactically important information which has not already been passed on the ASWC should never be exchanged on a Swap net. The Swap net may also be used for air control operations away from the scene of action and for relieving procedures between submarine direct support (SSN(DS)) communications relay aircraft.

d. ~~(C)~~ SW Control Net (ASCONNET). ASCONNET is a UHF voice net normally operated in secure mode. the net consists of the anti-submarine warfare commander (ASWC), Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC), ASW Surface Ships, ASW aircraft and submarine direct support (SSN(DS)) units. If difficulty is encountered with the secure mode, the ASWC will direct a shift to a clear mode. A secondary HF clear voice ASCONNET is also provided in the coordinated ASW communications plan. The JFK TSC maintains Comm Guard on ASCONNET circuitry.

e. ~~(C)~~ SACNET. This clear UHF voice net subscribed to by the Scene of Action Commander (SAC) and all surface ships and aircraft assigned to the SAC for contact prosecution. This circuit is used for detailed tactical direction from the SAC and for continuous exchange of tactical information required for effective coordinated contact prosecution. Circuits for SACNET are numbered/assigned to facilitate establishment of communications at the scene of action. SACNET replaces three nets customerily in use: SAU TAC, SAU reporting and SAU AIR. Strict circuit discipline must be maintained to preclude circuit saturation.

f. ~~(C)~~ pecial Reporting and Coordination Net (SPRAC). The SPRAC net is a covered UHF Nestor Voice Circuit used for coordination, intelligence dissemination, and technical exchange among surface direct support elements (DSE) of the Task Force/Task Group and VQ aircraft when assigned. The effective keylist is AKAK 8060. SPRAC COMM guard is maintained in SSES.

SECTION III

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS/INFORMATION

1. ~~(C)~~ Equipment:

a. ~~(C)~~ Teletype. Teletype repair has not been a significant problem during this deployment. It is strongly recommended that major repair parts for teletype equipment be ordered early in sufficient quantities. Experience shows that it is advantageous to be well stocked with parts prior to departing CONUS. Teletype parts are generally received 60/90 days after the order date. During POM we managed to stock a large supply of teletype parts and as result have been able to maintain all equipments in spite of the long lead time for parts. On occasion, the small boys will request parts and teletype repair assistance. We brought enough parts to cover most contingencies. On-call repair service was provided to the requesting small boys. We have also provided successful technical assistance via TGO on three occasions to ships who were having difficulties accomplishing repairs. This should be your first approach to solving emergent problems since it is easy to get your people stranded on a small boy. As a general rule, if you think a part will be needed on deployment, ensure you order/stock it early, as the logistic pipeline to the IO is extremely long.

b. ~~(C)~~ Xerox Copiers. All reproduction onboard JFK is done with a battery of 38 XEROX machines. Message reproduction is accomplished with a Model 9400 copier with a Model 3600 as backup. This combination works well as long as the 9400 is fully operable. However, experience has shown that during periods of repair or planned maintenance on the 9400, a single 3600 copier is not sufficient to maintain reliable service.

The criticality of keeping these XEROX machines on the line has made logistic support a major concern throughout the deployment. In anticipation of this situation, we conducted an extensive parts loadout prior to deployment. Despite these efforts we have found logistic resupply to be a significant problem. The minimum time for receipt of requisitioned replacement parts has been six weeks from time of request. Unfortunately, this is characteristic of the logistic pipeline to the I.O. and most likely will not change until a XEROX supply depot is established at Diego Garcia.

We also have found that well planned XEROX PMS scheduling and a high accomplishment rate have maintained our photocopiers at a high standard of readiness and have substantially reduced the requirement for demand maintenance. Nevertheless, watch this area. You can get in trouble quickly.

c. ~~(C)~~ Chirpsounder. JFK's HF Chirpsounder/Monitor (AN/TRQ-35) was installed 22 October 1981. Indoctrination and training of operators was conducted by a Barry Research communications specialist during the Norfolk/Puerto Rico OPAREA predeployment transit period. This equipment has played a vital role in indentifying and selecting optimum HF frequencies. Additionally, the chirpsounder provides a visual display of frequency trends, signal fading, signal strength, frequency usage, and surrounding spectrum characteristics of a particular frequency. The chirpsounder is considered far superior to the classic NTP-6 frequency preditions due to the accuracy and real time aspects of its predictions. The chirpsounder significantly improves HF operations and should be permanently installed aboard all CV's. Additionally, use of the chirpsounder produced increased operator interest in working long haul HF communications, thus adding an intangible contribution to the quality of these operations. Enclosure (7) refers.

d. ~~(C)~~ IO Turnover Equipment

(1) ~~(C)~~ CV-3510. The CV-3510 is designed to improve long haul HF single channel communications. It was designed as a replacement for the URA-17 and appears to have excellent regenerative qualities. It is easily installed by removing an existing URA-17 and inserting the CV-3510 in the same position. The unit utilized existing cables plus one special adapter for the DC output. This adapter is transferred with the CV-3510 during the IO turnover. COMNAVAIRPAC controls replacement of this equipment and requires a message acknowledgement to CTF 70. Thus far we have used one CV-3510 on TGO and one on the PSBI broadcast.

(2) ~~(C)~~ AN/URC-101. This equipment is used primarily for CV/BEACH Det Communications during Beacon Flash exercises by the Range Safety Officer (RSO) at the Rubkut Range near Thumrait, Oman. The insufficient battery life of these radios was a recognized problem during Beacon Flash 82-4 and 82-5. This problem is being rectified by the addition of two power supplies (110/120 AC Voltage).

(3) ~~(C)~~ SSR-1/WB-19. With the positioning of FSC-II at 72 degrees east, IO units have the option of using the F-2 GAPFILLER and/or the FSC-II satellite. Shifts from F-2 to FSC-II require only a change in frequency. The WB-19 Module can assist in reducing the effect of scintillation. All ships transiting to the IO are required to have a WB-19 Module for the SSR-1 for contingency purposes. WB-19 Modules are available from CTF 73 in Subic Bay, RP on a temporary loan basis. In the event modules are obtained from CTF 73, they must be returned prior to OUTCHOP SEVENTHFLT. JFK received WB-19 Modules via registered mail during our Med transit. Enough modules were received to also supply the escorts in company.

e. ~~(C)~~ Antennas. Due to the Indian Ocean fast paced operational tempo, special emphasis must be placed on antenna maintenance. When feasible, special periods should be promulgated in the schedule of events (SOE) for antenna maintenance. During certain months of the year antennas will pick up Gonzo mud and Arabic sand. This is in addition to the normal salt spray and wind damage. Your normal PMS will not be adequate for maintenance and equipment can easily suffer degradation due to dirty antennas and loose connections. Normally the CV will not get adequate inport periods to perform antenna maintenance so it must be done at sea. The inport periods should not be depended on for antenna maintenance due to the need to get the troops ashore. JFK has done its maintenance on inport days, stand-down days and no-fly days. Stand-down means men working aloft. Your antenna crew must clean, inspect, and oil connectors more frequently than you are accustomed to. Increase the periods of PMS when feasible. In addition, you must monitor the equipment daily to ensure corrosive build up does not take place. Unusual conditions in the Indian Ocean require this additional attention. Remember the local mixture of salt, humidity, extreme heat/dust can short out antennas over night. A good rule is to take advantage of the EEB and WCAP teams for antennas prior to deployment. They assisted us in processing hard to get maintenance items and were a tremendous asset in finding the easily overlooked items. Prior to deployment an all out effort was undertaken to ensure all UHF/HF antennas were in top condition. This included ensuring all antennas were properly sealed. JFK thus far has been fortunate having not experienced the mud or red sand that is common to the North Arabian Sea operation area.

f. ~~(C)~~ Communications Equipment Report. In accordance with CTF 77 OPORD 201, Annex Kilo, it is a requirement to submit to CTF 77/COMCARGRU FIVE a complete communication equipment report prior to INCHOP to the Indian Ocean COMMAREA. This equipment report is to be sent to CTF 77 info COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRPAC, NAVCAMS EASTPAC and NAVCAMS WESTPAC.

2. ~~(C)~~ CMS Custodian's Brief. Preparation for your MED/I.O. deployment should begin as soon as possible, preferably during predeployment work-ups. Ensure all spare cryto equipement and repair kits are complete and in working order. Establish a training program and routine inspection of all local holder and responsible user spaces. A training visit was very helpful to evaluate administrative procedures and have all questions answered concerning CMS matters. CMS requirements will be increased considerably for support of MED/I.O. committments. Early coordination with your CONUS CMIO is a must. They are well accustomed to the needs of deploying CVs. With regard to JFK's deployment, both CMIO Norfolk and DCMS were very responsive. Contact your CMIO and DCMS as early as possible if any doubt or discrepancy arises. The following is a list of COMSEC material held by JFK during the first half of her deployment.

a. (~~C~~) Material Specific for MED OPAREA:

ITEM	QUANITY
AKAI 1	2
AKAI 3	1

AKAC 318	1
AKAK 8338	1
AMSC 622	45
AMSC 670	10
AKAY 7693	2
AMSK 1215	5
USKAK 5502	5
AMSY 1152	8
AMSY 1194	4
AMSY 4007	2
AMSY 4018	2
AMSY 4038	2
KAO 150	1
USKAC 155	1
USKAY 2002	2

Note: Airwing usage of AMSC 608 and AMSA 1601 is extensive; JFK BG required 80 copies

B. ~~(C)~~ Material Specific for I.O. OPAREA:

ITEM	QUANITY
AKAA 283	10 *
AKAC 125	12 *
AKAC 130	12
AKAC 132	30 *
AKAC 874	80 *
AKAI 6	12 *
AKAI 11	10
AKAK 3662	2 *
AKAK 8060	1
AMSC 622	10
AMSH 1707	12
AMSI 10	1 *
AMSK 1215	10
AMSY 1152	4
CCK 16	3
CCK 1012	3
CCY 10	2 *
USKAK 8094	3
USKAK 8098	3 *
USKAK 8281	1
USKAT 217	2
USKAY 2000	2 *
USKAY 2025	2 *
USKAY 3065	2
USKAY 3067	2
USKAY 3079	2
USKAY 3082	2
USKAY 3084	2
USKAY 3085	2
USKAY 3090	2 *

ITEM	QUANITY
USKAY 3094	2
USKAY 397	2
USKAY 3103	2 *
USKAY 3108	2
USKAY 3115	2
USKAY 2034	2 *
USKAY 2056	2 *
USKAY 2061	2 *
USKAY 2075	2
USKAY 2078	3
USKAY 3054	2
USKAY 3056	2
USKAY 3057	2
USKAY 3058	2 *
USKAY 3059	2 *
USKAY 3122	2
USKAY 3126	2
USKAY 3551	2
USKAY 3592	2
USKAY 7146	6 *
USKAY 7205	2
USKAY 7340	12 *
USKAY 7360	20
USKAY 7400	4
USKAY 7688	4 *
USKAY 7725	4 *

Note: Material annotated with an asterisk(*) will be required in handling Genser and SI communications

c. (~~C~~) Material Specific for your Security Group Detachment:

ITEM	QUANITY	ITEM	QUANITY
AKAK 8060	1 *	USKAY 2061	2
AKAY 9664	1	USKAY 3064	2
USKAK 4062	1 *	USKAY 3065	2 *
USKAK 4069	1 *	USKAY 7205	4
USKAK 4250	1 *	USKAY 7688	4
USKAY 2000	2 *	USKAY 7725	4
USKAY 2002	2 *	USKAY 7340	1
USKAY 2056	2	USKAY 7146	1

Note: Material annotated with an asterisk (*) will be required in handling Genser and SI communications.

d. (~~C~~) Supplies which should be acquired early include: CMS-17, CMS-25, SF-153, running inventory, portable labels, bubble wrap, fiber tape, mailing envelopes and tape, shredder accessories, and general office supplies.

e. (~~C~~) good rule is to contact CMIO at least two months prior to deployment concerning CMS Reserve on Board (ROB). COMSEVENTHFLTINST C2000.1C will be a good aid in determining what is required for COMSEC support. Be sure to request automatic distribution of ROB IAW CMS 4J Art 1005.

f. (~~C~~) ncreasing ROB level to 4 months was unnecessary. Likewise, there was no need to request early shipment of CMS 2-1 or CMS 16-1.

g. (~~C~~) ARFCOS stations used in the MED were Naples and Rota. Diego Garcia was used exclusively while operating in the I.O. It is very important to ensure squadrons have spare KIT-1A, KIR-1A, KYK-28, KIK-5 and KY-28. Prior to deployment they can request assistance for additional equipment or replacements to COMNAV-TELCOM. The closest CRF is in Subic and will require a 30-35 day wait for resupply.

h. (~~C~~) Have all spare crypto equipment and repair kits certified by CRF for up to date MODS and operability. Particular attention should be given to KG-40, KY-75, and KW-7 since these will be under constant usage. For additional equipment/kits (KYK 28, KIK-18, etc) COMNAVAIRLANT/COMNAVAIRPAC can provide assistance (contact code 526B).

i. (~~C~~) AKAC 132 will be used as a Ops Code by airwing squadrons. Authorization can be obtained from the operational controller to produce kneeboard extracts if desired. (Be sure to info DCMS and the Chain of Command)

j. (~~C~~) USKAK 5503 and USKAK 8098 have a changeover time of 1601Z.

k. (U) You will be required to transfer material to units in company so become familiar with Art 1255, CMS 4J.

l. (U) All administrative reports will be sent to DCMS by registered mail so appropriate logs should be kept.

m. ~~(C)~~ USKAY 2054 was a turnover item along with PACFLT SAS material. For LANT deployers, LANTFLT SAS will be retained on inventory. It's a good idea to get current ALCOMPAC and ALCOMPAC PAPA's during turnover for your separate PACFLT general message file. You will also need current spare line assignments for AKAI-6.

n. ~~(C)~~ KAC 874 is a primary pub for use by the airwing. Ensure you have 80 copies. They will serve as authenticators and numeral cipher operating codes.

o. (~~C~~) Stay ahead of the game by thoroughly reviewing CMS 4, Oporders, LOI's and schedules and take timely action to ensure efficient CMS support.

3. (U) MARS/Amateur radio. MARS and Amateur Radio operations are extremely important for a deployed carrier. JFK used Amateur Radio extensively during the Atlantic transit and in the Med. Virtually no problems were encountered in reaching the east coast and mid-America on any given night. Frequencies in the 20 meter band were usually the most successful.Although Amateur Radio operations are not permitted when operating in the Indian Ocean, MARS operations are permitted subject to the approval of the on-scene commander. Enclosures (8), (9) and (10) provide the current guidance. Under this guidance, the most significant impediment to operating MARS in the Indian Ocean is adherence to EMCON policy. The JFK Battle Group has continuously operated in EMCON ALFA or BRAVO, thus restricting communications to essential emissions only. As a result no MARS operations have been conducted.

4. (~~C~~) LRI (Limited Range Intercept). Because of the close surveillance by soviet vessels and the distances between battle groups, LRI communications are not frequently used in the Indian Ocean. Although you may not use this communications concept extensively, you will be required to have the LRI kits installed prior to departure. Additionally, your remote users and communications personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated in LRI procedures. LRI does work and has proven to be a very beneficial way of operating if it is operated properly in accordance with the procedures in COMSECONDFLT TACMEMO 531-1-79. During this deployment LRI was utilized once during our LANT/MED transit on TF CMD Parkhill and Link 14 and was considered to be successful.

5. ~~(C)~~ Frequency Plans. IO deployed carriers will utilize the standard tactical frequency plan and aircraft channelization plan assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT in chapter 15 of COMSEVENTHFLTINST C2000.1 (CEI). Sections two and three of this chapter provide the standard task organization frequency plans, SEVENTHFLT transit and special purpose frequency blocks, and a list of SEVENTHFLT circuits in order ascending frequencies. COMSEVENTHFLT assigned TG 70.9 COMMPLAN Bravo in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLTINST C2000.1 (CEI) and augmented with temporary squadron common frequencies. Air navigation aids (TACAN/UHF Homer) and land launch frequencies are assigned quarterly by COMSEVENTHFLT and promulgated by ALSEVENTHFLT messages. This procedure is required due to freq limitations in SEVENTHFLT for TACAN/UHF Homer/Land Launch frequencies. It should be noted that secure voice common (Navy Red) CKT 200Z2 (240.8MHZ) was utilized continually for a wide spectrum of uses ranging from admin traffic exchange to the conduct of CIC drills. In situations when the OTC did not designate Navy Red for a specific purpose, the circuit was used as a common voice net and was guarded by all units. For TG 70.9 this was an extremely high priority circuit.

6. ~~(C)~~ Exercises. From the day we departed NORVA on 04 JAN 82, there have been a steady series of fleet exercises. These have ranged from a three carrier battle group (National Week) exercise in the Med to a dual CV exercise with the CONSTELLATION BG in the IO. Circuit requirements have remained heavy, requiring the utilization of all HF/UHF assets. Not one piece of gear escaped. If it had not been for the great support of EC Division in maintaining our comm gear in an excellent state of readiness, the successful completion of these fleet exercises would have been impossible. To date we have participated in the following fleet exercises since departing NORVA: MED/NATWK 82(USS JOHN F. KENNEDY BG, USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER BG, USS NIMITZ BG); Gonzo 82-2; ADEX 82-6; Beacon South 82-2; Beacon Flash 82-4; Beacon Flash 82-5; ASWEX 82-4; ASWEX 82-5; ASWEX 82-6; Weapons Week and numerous PASSEXs with foreign navies. As you can see, your equipment will be taxed to the maximum limit. Normally no spare equipment will be available. It is imperative that all of your equipment remain in top operating condition. Plan your PMS well.

7. ~~(C)~~ Seat of Government (SOG) Communication Test. Operations involving units of the SIXTHFLT and SEVENTHFLT have demonstrated the requirement for immediate and secure communications between the on-scene commander, the Fleet Commander, and CNO. In order to effectively evaluate this contingency communication requirement, Seat of Government (SOG) tests are conducted without prior notice by COMSIXTHFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT. The goal for establishing a conferencing circuit with the Fleet Commander and CNO is 30 mins from TOR of the tasking message: COMSIXTHFLT will exercise activation of secure voice or teletype circuit conferencing with the deployed unit, CINCUSNAVEUR and CNO.

a. ~~(C)~~ COMSEVENTHFLT will conduct at least one SOG test each month. The test will be conducted via secure voice or secure

Duplicative

[redacted]

12. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67)
INDIAN OCEAN
COMMUNICATION CIRCUIT MATRIX (~~C~~)

CURCUITS	REMARKS
SATCOM VFCT FM/FDM TERMINATION	FSC-II CHNL 23 SLOT 18 UPLINK: 2096.075 SWITCH POSIT 4 DB 19
CVBG FLEET SUPPORT BCST (FSB) NOTE: CHECK NAVCAMS WPAC WEEKLY SATELLITE CHANNELIZATION ADVISORY FOR ASSIGNMENT CHANGES.	SSR-1 F003 MOD WB-19 SWITCH POSIT 6 FSC-II CHNNL 02 (OFF SET LOW SLOT — USE 01 — JFK ORDERWIRE 02 — JFK/DANIELS CHARGER HORSE (SSES) 03 — PMCC (MAIN COMM) 04 05 06 — PMFF (OPINTEL) (SSES) 07 08 — PMHH (AERO) 09 — FFN (W) (FLAG COMM) 10 — SOSAT (FLAG COMM) 11 12 — VP SHORE HOP (TSC) 13 — RAZZY BRAVO 14 — PRESS 15 16
CUDIXS	FSC-II CHNL 06 SID 09 UPLINK: 299.65 SWITCH POSIT 4
TACINTEL	FSC-II CHNNL 03 SID 05 UPLINK: 294.85 SWITCH POSIT 4
FLEET SATELLITE SECURE VOICE (FLTSEVOCOM)	FSC-II CHNL 05 OR GAPFILLER F-2 CHNNL 12 UPLINK: 298:15 SWITCH POSIT 4

ELF-1 SATCOM C-2	FSC-II CHNNL 8 PARKHILL/KY-75 SECURE VOICE USKAT2045/0001Z UPLINK: 308.050
HF VFCT TERMINATION	GONZO STATION NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA OFF-STATION NAVCOMMSTA HAROLD E. HOLT NAVCOMMSTA PHILIPPINES
VP/CVBG SUPPORT COMMUNICATION	I/O ASW MARITIME PATROL NET: PRIMARY-17983.5 K SECONDARY-8973.5 K (CRATT/USB VOICE) (CCY-10) ASCONNET - COVERED 326.9M (KY-8)
PSBI BROADCAST CTF-74 SUB BCST GUARD; GONZO STA OPS	JASON/KEYMAT USKAY 2054/0001Z KEYED RATE: DGAR - 16305K/14655K 50BAUD FREQS: HEHOLT - 4259K/6481K
FRENCH TGO GUARD; GONZO STA OPS	FREQ: 8542K(8540) 100WPM/ORESTES AKAY 7638/0001Z
NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA INDIAN OCEAN COORDINATION NET (IOCN) (NOTE: UTILIZED TO COORD FLIGHTS TO/FM DGAR/JFK GUARD: AIR-OPS)	USB VOICE DGAR NECOS/FREQS: TIME / FREQ 0200z-1300z 23316.5K 1300z-0200z 11262.5K

13. COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE IN INDIAN OCEAN

BACKGROUND: ~~(C)~~ KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE FOR CVBG'S IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THEATRE IS REQUIRED FOR ALL COMM PERSONNEL

INTRA TASK GROUP CIRCUITRY : COMBINATION OF HF/UHF

GREAT DISTANCES BETWEEN ON-STATION CVBG AND NAVCOMMSTAS DIEGO GARCIA/H.E.HOLT/PHILIPPINES NOT CONDUCIVE TO CON- CONSISTENT AND DEPENDABLE HF COMMUNICATIONS.

CVBG SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS : COMBINATION OF SATELLITE/HF

SHIP/SHORE CIRCUITRY : PRIMARILY SATELLITE

SATELLITE CIRCUITRY : DEPENDENT UPON AVAILABILITY OF WSC-3 SATELLITE TRANSCEIVERS. NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS MAY REQUIRE SMALL BOY ASSIST TO GUARD EXCESS CIRCUITS.

DISCUSSION: ~~(C)~~

1. STANDARD TG 70.9 CIRCUIT REQUIREMENTS

A. HIGH FREQUENCY (HF)

(1) TF CMD (PARKHILL) CWC NET (SECVOX)

(2) TG AAW COORD/LINK COORD/PIRAZ (VOICE)

(3) ASUW/EW/ASW OTC C/R, "AS" NECOS (VOICE)

(4) TG ORESTES (SIMPLEX/OR DUPLEX) (TTY)

(5) LINK 14

(6) LINK 11

B. ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY (UHF)

(1) TG TACTICAL/FLT TAC-WARNING (OTC NECOS) (VOICE)

(2) ASCONNET (SECVOX)

(3) EW COORD (SECVOX)

(4) NAVY RED (ADMIN CIRCUIT) (SECVOX)

(5) ASW AIR/HELO CONTROL (VOICE)

(6) CV TACAIR/ASW AIR CHANNELIZATION (VOICE)

(7.) SPRAC (SI) (SECVOX)

C. SATELLITE (UHF)

(1) CUDIXS/SHORE-SHORE (TTY)

(2) FLTSECVOX (SECVOX)

D. VERY HIGH FREQUENCY (VHF)

(1) BRIDGE TO BRIDGE (CHNL-16)

2. SPECIAL ON-STATION CVBG COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

A. SATELLITE TWO-WAY CIRCUITS:

(1) EMPLOYMENT: CAN USE WITH EITHER IO SATELLITE FSC-II OR F-2

(2) CUDIX - (HIGH DATA RATE) (HDR) SHIP/SHORE TTY

(3) TACINTEL - (HDR) NETTED SI TTY

(4) FM/FDM TERMINATION / VFCT /UCC-1 - INCLUDES:

(a) COMM COORD O/W
(b) SOSAT (CVBG CDR/CTF 74)
(c) FLEET FLASH NET (FFN) IO/WPAC CDR'S NET
(d) VP SHORE HOP
(e) CHARGER HORSE (SI)

(5) FLEET SECURE VOICE (HDR VOICE)
(6) ELF-1 C-2 SATCOM: SAUDI ARABIAN/USAF CONTINGENCY
(7) PARKHILL KY-75 COVERED. GUARD ASSIGNED CG/DDG.

B. SATELLITE RECEIVE ONLY - BROADCAST (AN/SSR-1) - 16 CHANNELS

(1) PMCC - FLT BCST (CV/ESCORT COMMON)
(2) PMBB - FLT BCST (ESCORTS COPY)
(3) PMDD - FLT BCST (MSLF'S COPY)
(4) PMHH - WEATHER
(5) PMFF - OPINTEL SI BCST
(6) OTHER BCST AND OVERLOAD CHNNLS AS RQD.
(7) RECEIVE SIDE OF FM/FDM TERMINATION COPIES:
- SOSAT
- VP SHORE HOP
- CHARGER HORSE
- TERM ORDERWIRE
- FLEET FLASH NET (FFN)

C. HF SPECIAL CVBG CIRCUITS ;

(1) FRENCH TGO - CVBG CMDR/CTG 623.1 (HF TTY)

(2) IO SITGO - CVBG CMDR/CTG 321.1/EP-3
(3) NO HICOM IN IO WEST OF 105 DEGREES
(4) VP CRATT HF VOICE/TTY (ASWC/VP CVBG SUPPORT ACFT)
(5) PSBI - INDIAN OCEAN CTF 74 SUB BCST.

SECTION IV

SIGNAL BRIDGE NOTES

1. ~~(C)~~ Indian Ocean Ops.

a. ~~(C)~~ Traffic. During the period JFK has been in the Indian Ocean, 11 February - 15 May 1982, the Signal Bridge traffic load has been significant. Not including drill traffic, the Signalmen handled 103 flaghoists, 66 semaphore, 308 tactical flashing light and 542 non-tactical flashing light messages. The visual traffic is broken down by period and method used, as follows:

	F/H	SEM	TACT'L F/L	NON-TACT'L F/L
11-28 FEB	44	16	85	183
01-31 MAR	11	24	42	173
01-30 APR	33	21	164	150
01-15 MAY	15	5	17	36
TOTAL:	103	66	308	542

b. (U) Drills. Drills were conducted throughout this Indian Ocean deployment. Of particular signifcance, it is recommended that flaghoist, other than tactical maneuvering, and semaphore drills be conducted during UNREP/VERTREP evolutions. Challenge and reply drills could be scheduled during the rendezvous for those evolutions as well, with the T-AO, T-AFS, AFS OR AE assigned as OCE. Non-directional flashing light procedure, using yardarm blinkers, is a facet of visual communications not often used by Signalmen. Visual drills employing this method are highly recommended during hours of darkness, using either visible or infrared light.

c. ~~(C)~~ US/USSR Signals. Soviet vessels operating in the vicinity do use these signals, although infrequently. Watch personnel on the Signal Bridge and in the Pilot House should be thoroughly familiar with the procedures for their use.

ENCLOSURES

(1) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY/SMALL PIPE 82-2 SUMMARY

(2) NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM/SMALL PIPE 82-2 SUMMARY

(3) NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM SHIP/SHORE TERMINATIONS RESTORAL PLAN

(4) NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM WEEKLY SATELLITE CHANNELIZATION ADVISORY

(5) NAVY TACTICAL UHF SATELLITE (SIERRA) ADVISORY CODES

(6) BROADCAST SATELLITE CONTROL (OLYMPIA) ADVISOR CODES

(7) OPERATING CONCEPT FOR THE AN/TRQ-35 CHIRPSOUNDER

(8) MARS OPERATIONS AFLOAT

(9) CINCPACFLT/AMATEUR RADIO/MARS OPS

(10) CINCPACFLT/COMSEC MONITORING OF MARS OPERATIONS

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R 160759Z MAR 82
FM USS JOHN F KENNEDY
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO CTF SEVEN ZERO
ZEN/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ZERO
NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM
NAVSECGRUDEPT KAMI SEYA JA
NAVSECGRUDEPT GUAM
NAVCOMMSTA HAROLD E. HOLT EXMOUTH AS
NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA
TG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ //N02700//
SUBJ: SMALL PIPE 82-2 SUMMARY (U)
A. COMSEVENTHFLTINST C2000.1C (CEI)
B. CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ZERO 220200Z FEB 82
1. (C) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IAW REFS A AND B.
(A) PERIOD OF REPORT: 280700Z FEB 82 - 142359Z MAR 82
(B) 20-09.56N. 61-16.38F/23-47.75S. 98-40.5E
(C) TERMINATED WITH NAVCOMMSTA HAROLD E HOLT EXMOUTH AS
(1) RECEIVE OUTAGE PERIODS EXCEEDING 15 MINUTES;
070001Z-070146Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
070306Z-070529Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
071205Z-071338Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
071805Z-172135Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
080010Z-080147Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
080225Z-080308Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
081509Z-081901Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
082210Z-082359Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
090001Z-090143Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
090315Z-090415Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
090644Z-090955Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
092215Z-092359Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
100001Z-100145Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
100731Z-100945Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
101359Z-101459Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
101730Z-101820Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
102228Z-102257Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
110105Z-111335Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
111618Z-111642Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
112214Z-112359Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
122018Z-122120Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
122204Z-122359Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
131410Z-131439Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
131905Z-131930Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE/SIGNAL DISTORTION
(2) TERMINATION CONTINUITY: 73.15 PERCENT
(3) ROUTINES - 519
PRIORITIES - 11
(4) 010003Z-010412Z MAR 82 - RFO: PATH PROBLEMS BETWEEN NPN/NKW
021007Z-021157Z MAR 82 - RFO: LOSS OF TONES ON ALL FREQS
040115Z-040200Z MAR 82 - RFO: FREQ FADE
050705Z-050847Z MAR 82 - RFO: LOSS OF KEYSTREAM BETWEEN
NPN/NKW

(5) BSR-26
TOTAL MISSED BCST NR'S - PMCC/486
SI OPINTEL - 25 MSG'S ZFX'D
(6) (A) DROPPED SATELLITE TERMINATION AT 070001Z MAR 82. RECEIVED FIRST MESSAGE VIA HF TERMINATION AT 070213Z MAR 82
(B) DROPPED SATELLITE BROADCAST AT 280700Z FEB 82. RECEIVED FIRST COMPLETE MESSAGE (PMCC/07607) VIA HF BCST AT 280721Z FEB 82.

(D) N/A

(E) COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHASE II: OUTAGES INCURRED INDICATE ORIGINATOR EXPERIENCED GOOD TO EXCELLENT PMUL BROADCAST RELIABILITY. FREQUENCIES KEYED FROM NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA WERE USED THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME WITH AUGMENT FREQUENCIES FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AND NAVCOMMSTA PHILIPPINES UTILIZED MAINLY DURING THE DAY. ORIG TOOK SEVERAL ACTIONS TO ASSIST UNITS IN COMPANY COPYING PMUL. "HF PMUL SUPPORT INFORMATION" MESSAGES WERE TRANSMITTED VIA TGO INDICATING WHAT THE BEST PMUL FREQUENCIES WERE AT THAT TIME AND WHAT ONES WERE BEING COPIED. BROADCAST SUPPORT WAS ALSO PROVIDED VIA THE SHORE SEND OF ORIGINATOR'S VFCT TERMINATION WITH NCS DIEGO GARCIA. THIS SUPPORT WAS TAILORED TO "SMALLBOY" UCC-1 LIMITATIONS. TERMINATION FREQUENCIES AND CHANNELIZATION WERE INCLUDED IN THE SUPPORT INFORMATION MESSAGES ALONG WTIH CURRENT CHIRPSOUNDER DATA. SUPPORT INFORMATION MESSAGES WERE SENT AS TERMINATION FREQUENCY CHANGES OCCURRED. INITIALLY A PMCC REKEY WAS ACTIVATED FOR SHIPS IN COMPANY. AFTER INITIATION OF TAILORED TERM SUPPORT, THIS CIRCUIT WAS CHANGED TO A MISSING NUMBER BROADCAST; UNITS COORDINATED AND ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT FOR NUMBERS VIA TGO. ALSO THE BROADCAST WAS COPIED ON BOTH NAVMACS AND TELETYPE AND MONITOR ROLLS WERE PROVIDED TO THREE UNITS WHO WERE MISSING A LARGE VOLUME OF BROADCAST NUMBERS.

PHASE III: PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF PHASE III TO FACILITATE OPERATOR TRAINING, 1581 MESSAGES WERE TRANSMITTED VIA THE HF TERMINATION WITH NCS DIEGO GARCIA. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PHASE III PERIOD ORIGINATOR WAS ASSIGNED AN HF VFCT TERMINATION WITH NCS HAROLD E. HOLT. THE VAST DISTANCE SEPARATING ORIG AND TERMINATING STATION, LIMITED FREQUENCIES AVAILABLE AND THE EXTREMELY POOR FREQ PROPRAGATION, AS VERIFIED BY THE AN/TRQ-35 CHIRPSOUNDER SYSTEM, INITIALLY MADE THE TERMINATION VIRTUALLY UNUSABLE. DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS USABLE FREQUENCIES WERE FOUND IN THE 20-30 MHZ RANGE. AFTER THE EVENING TRANSITION, THE LOWEST USABLE FREQ (LUF) VARIED FROM 9 MHZ TO 18 MHZ. MAXIMUM USABLE FREQUENCY (MUF) WAS OBSERVED TO BE ANYWHERE FROM 20 MHZ TO A HIGH OF 26 MHZ. OUR POOREST TERMINATION RELIABILITY WAS EXPERIENCED DURING THE TRADITIONALLY POOR EVENING AND EARLY MORNING HOURS. THESE FACTORS HELD TRUE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXERCISE PERIOD FOR FREQUENCIES KEYED FORM NCS HAROLD E. HOLT WITH SUPPORT PROVIDED BY NAVCOMMSTA PHILIPPINES. TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS, AN RFCS SUPPORT CIRCUIT WAS ACTIVATED WITH NCS DIEGO GARCIA 7-14 MAR. 596 MESSAGES WERE TRANSMITTED TO DIEGO GARCIA VIA THIS CIRCUIT AND DURING TERMINATION OUTAGE PERIODS WITH NCS H.E. HOLT, THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDED THE TASK GROUP'S ONLY LINK ASHORE. A SIMULTANEOUS KEYING OF ALFA AND BRAVO TRAFFIC CHANNELS (SHIP RECEIVE) WAS ACTIVATED 8 MAR AS WELL AS VFCT

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SUPPORT FROM NCS PHIL. ORIG ALSO ACTIVATED A THIRD SHIP TRANSMITTER AND A SEND RFCS SIMO OF ALFA AND BRAVO TRAFFIC CHANNELS UPON REQUEST. DESPITE THESE ACTIONS ORIGINATOR SENT TWO PIGEON POST RUNS (8 AND 10 MAR) TO DIEGO GARCIA THAT TOTALLED 320 MESSAGES. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS EXISTED UNTIL ORIGINATORS PROXIMITY TO NAVCOMMSTA HAROLD E HOLT PERMITTED SOLID RELIABILITY ON THE HF VFCT TERMINATION WHICH WAS NOT UNTIL THE LAST TWO DAYS OF PHASE THREE. DESPITE THIS, A 73.15 PERCENT RECEIVE RELIABILITY WAS MAINTAINED ON THE VFCT TERMINATION. THE MAIN INHIBITING FACTOR THAT DEGRADED HF TERMINATION RELIABILITY IS THE INADEQUATE NUMBER OF COMMUNCATION SUPPORT FACILITIES WITHIN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. THIS PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE DEFINATE LACK OF AVAILABLE USABLE FREQUENCIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE HIGHER END OF THE SPECTRUM THAT ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS.
DECL 16 MAR 88
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R 190609Z APR 82
FM NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM
TO ALL SHIPS WESTPAC NAVCOMMAREA
RULSWCA/COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUWFAAA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
RUWDTAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
MIDEASTFOR
RUHGPBA/CTF SEVEN ZERO
RUWNGAA/CTF SEVEN FIVE
RUMRABA/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUHGPNA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FOUR
RUHGPTA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
INFO RUHPSAA/NAVCAMS EASTPAC HONOLULU HI
RUFRSAA/NAVCAMS MED NAPLES IT
RUQKSAA/NAVCOMMSTA NEA MAKRI GR
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ //N02304//
SUBJ: PAC SMALL PIPE 82-2
A. CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 230414Z FEB 82

1. PAC SMALL PIPE 82-2 WAS CONDUCTED 22 FEB - 15 MAR 82 IN THREE PHASES. NAVY-WIDE MINIMIZE WAS IMPOSED ON ALL RECORD TRAFFIC TO/FROM PACFLT AFLOAT IN SUPPORT OF THE EXERCISE.

PHASE I (24-28FEB) - DURING THIS PERIOD GAPSAT F-2 WB-19 FLEET SUPPORT BROADCAST OPERATED IN THE FM/FDM MODE TO ALLOW AFLOAT UNITS THE OPPORTUNITY TO VERIFY AN/UCC-1 ALIGNMENT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, SATCOM PSK OPERATIONS WERE MAINTAINED ON FSC CHANNELS ONE AND TWO. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PHASE I WAS TO PREPARE SHIPBOARD VFCT SYSTEMS (AN/UCC-1) FOR EXERCISE PHASES II AND III. ALL FLEET SYSTEMS WERE ASSUMED OPERATIONAL AT COMMENCEMENT OF PHASE II, AS NO MESSAGES TO THE CONTRARY WERE RECEIVED.

PHASE II (28FEB-06MAR) - WESTPAC PMUL SHIFTED FROM FM/FDM/PSK TO HF MODE. ALL OTHER SHIP/SHORE/SHIP CIRCUITRY REMAINED AVAILABLE VIA SATELLITE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF PHASE II WAS TO DOCUMENT AND EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTPAC NAVCOMMAREA AND INDIAN OCEAN HIGH FREQUENCY SUPPORT. AT VARIOUS STAGES THROUGHOUT PHASE II, SIX EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS REQUESTED TRAFFIC ALTROUTES TO COMMON CHANNEL BCST BECAUSE OF REPORTED INABILITY TO COPY TYPE CHANNEL IN AN HF ENVIRONMENT. A SUBSEQUENT QUERY REQUESTING REASONS FOR ALTROUTES PROVIDED RESPONSES WHICH INDICATED A GENERAL ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE SHIPBOARD QUALITY MONITORING. ULTIMATELY, THIS APPROACH RESULTED IN DEGRADED SHIPBOARD COMMUNICATIONS AS OPERATING PERSONNEL VIEWED THE CIRCUIT AS EITHER IN OR OUT. THE BENEFITS OF QUALITY MONITORING WHEN CIRCUITS ARE IN ALLOW SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TRENDS TO BE ESTABLISHED AND EVALUATED, THEREBY PERMITTING EARLY INDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION OF SYSTEM DEGRADATION BEFORE OUTAGES OCCUR. COMPREHENSIVE AND FREQUENT TRAINING IN THIS AREA IS REQUIRED.

THE DECLARED SUCCESS OF PAC SMALL PIPE (PHASE II) AS REPORTED BY NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA AND SELECTED INDIAN OCEAN UNITS THUS SUPPORTED IS AGAIN OVERSHADOWED BY CONNECTIVITY MEANS. ENTHUSIASM OVER SUCCESSFUL NAVCOMMAREA HIGH FREQUENCY SUPPORT SHOULD BE RESTRAINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS BCST KEYING CAN BE ADEQUATELY PRO-

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VIDED TO NCS DIEGO GARCIA BY OTHER THAN SATELLITE OPERATIONS, PHASE II OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT BEEN MET. WE CANNOT DETERMINE THE AGGREGATE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIAN OCEAN HIGH FREQUENCY SUPPORT UNTIL A VIABLE OPTION TO DSCS SATELLITE CONNECTIVITY EXISTS.

PHASE III (07-15MAR) - ALL SHIP/SHORE/SHIP SATELLITE CIRCUITRY LESS SSIXS AND FLTSECVOX SHIFTED TO HIGH FREQUENCY MODE. WESTPAC PMUL BCST REMAINED AVAILABLE VIA PSK. THIS PHASE MEASURED THE ABILITY OF PARTICIPANTS TO PROCESS SHIP/SHORE/SHIP TRAFFIC VIA HIGH FREQUENCY. ADDITIONALLY, IT COMBINED THE OBJECTIVES OF PHASE II IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE PROFICIENCY OF ASHORE/AFLOAT OPERATORS IN MAINTAINING HIGH FREQUENCY SYSTEMS WITH A GREATER DEGREE OF RELIABILITY. SECGRU SHIP/SHORE CIRCUIT RELIABILITY DECREASED PERCEPTIBLY WITH A RESULTANT INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT IN COORDINATION EFFORTS REQUIRED TO ENSURE TIMELY COMMUNICATIONS. ALTHOUGH MANY OUTAGES IN EXCESS OF TWO HOURS OCCURED, A TOTAL OF ONLY FOUR COMMSPOTS WERE RECEIVED FROM THE AFLOAT UNITS INVOLVED. ISOLATION OF SHIP/SHORE EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS AND SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION EFFORTS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY LENGTHENED DUE TO NON-UTILIZATION OF PROPER COMMSPOT PROCEDURES. THIS SITUATION WILL BE ADDRESSED BY FLEET ADVISORY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING FUTURE EXERCISES.

OWING TO SCHEDULED CONTRACTOR WORK IN PROGRESS, NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE HF PRIMARY SHIP/SHORE COVERAGE TO INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYED FORCES DURING PHASE III. SEVERAL UNITS REQUESTED EXEMPTION OF THIS BASIS. ALL SUCH REQUESTS REQUIRED READDRESSAL TO CINCPACFLT FOR REPLY. THIS ACTION ACCOUNTS FOR THE DELAY IN RESPONSE EXPERIENCED BY SOME REQUESTING UNITS AND THE SEEMINGLY LAST MINUTE PLANNING ACCOMPLISHED ASHORE.

THE LACK OF NCS DIEGO GARCIA HF SUPPORT WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL TO EIGHT MIDEASTFOR UNITS IN THE ARABIAN GULF/RED SEA WHO WERE INVOLVED IN TURNOVER OPERATIONS. ALL EIGHT UNITS REPORTED INABILITY TO PASS SHIP/SHORE TRAFFIC TO NCS NEA MAKRI OR ANY WESTPAC COMMSTA. ULTIMATELY, THEY REVERTED TO SATELLITE SHIP/SHORE WITH NCS NEA MAKRI OR SIMPLY RETAINED OUTGOING TRAFFIC UNTIL USEABLE TRANSMISSION DISTANCE PERMITTED COMMUNICATIONS WITH ASU BAHRAIN/COMIDEASTFOR VIA TGO.

THIS PHASE OF PAC SMALL PIPE PROVIDED A VALUABLE LESSON REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA HIGH FREQUENCY INDIAN OCEAN SUPPPORT. THE ABSENCE OF SUCH SUPPORT LEFT MIDEASTFOR UNITS WITHOUT A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. COMIDEASTFOR PREPLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED GUIDELINES CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE OVERALL SUCCESS OF THE INTRA TASK FORCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. A MAJOR FACTOR IN FUTURE EXERCISE PLANNING SHOULD BE CONSIDERATION OF THE ABILITY OF PRIMARY SUPPORT STATIONS TO COMMIT TO TOTAL PARTICIPATION.

MINIMIZE:

SUCCESSFUL ACHIVEMENT OF MINIMIZE WAS A MAJOR GOAL OF PAC SMALL PIPE 82-2 AND A CONTINUING OVERALL OBJECTIVE. ENFORCEMENT WAS ATTEMPTED BY ASSIGNING VARIOUS COMMANDS BCST MONITORING AND REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS PROCESS ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY MESSAGES WHICH DID NOT MEET MINIMIZE TRANSMISSION CRITERIA. ORIGINATORS OF SUCH MESSAGES WERE NOTIFIED ON A DAILY BASIS IN AN EFFORT TO CONTROL THE CONTINUING FLOW OF NON-CRITICAL MESSAGES TO THE FLEET. RECOMMEND THAT FUTURE BCST MONITORING AND REPORTING

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TASKING BE ASSIGNED TO SHORE COMMANDS AS UNDERWAY UNITS EXPERIENCED PERIODIC DEGRADED COMMUNICATIONS LIMITING THEIR ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT OFFENDING MESSAGES TO ORIGINATORS.

ALTHOUGH NON-NAVY MESSAGES ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY THREE PERCENT OF THE TRAFFIC VOLUME, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MINIMIZE WAS IN EFFECT FOR U.S. NAVAL ORIGINATORS ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, MINIMIZE HAD NO EFFECT ON SI COMMUNICATIONS AS DIRNSA DID NOT IMPOSE IT. OTHER MESSAGE CATEGORIES, BY VOLUME, EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES; WERE ADMIN (12), SUPPLY (23), COMM (16), OPERATIONAL (46). A TOTAL OF 416 TRANSMITTED MESSAGES DID NOT MEET MINIMIZE CRITERIA. SEVERAL FLAGRANT AND REPEATED ABUSES WERE NOTED; HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF OFFENSES WERE ATTRIBUTED TO MESSAGE LENGTH, PRECEDENCE ABUSE AND INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECT MATTER.

WHILE THE NUMBER OF MESSAGES VIOLATING MINIMIZE CRITERIA DECREASED AS THE EXERCISE PROGRESSED, THE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC INCREASED. ALTHOUGH THE REASONS FOR MINIMIZE FAILURE ARE IMPALPABLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INTENDED PURPOSE WAS NOT SERVED. IF WE CONTINUE TO IMPOSE MINIMIZE WE MUST REMOVE OURSELVES FROM THE HALCYON ACCEPTANCE OF ITS FAILURE AND PROCEED TO IDENTIFY ITS CURRENT WORTH. MINIMIZE HAS, PERHAPS, AND UNDERSTANDABLY, LITTLE RELEVANCE AMONG MODERN COMMUNICATORS WHO DEAL IN BITS, LINE BLOCKS AND BAUD RATES. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND MODERN TERMINOLOGY HAVE SEEMINGLY RELEGATED MINIMIZE TO AN INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL WHEN IMPOSED. IF THE CONCEPT DOES WARRANT SURVIVAL AND POTENCY, IT ALSO DEMANDS RE-EDUCATION, FIRM COMMAND LEVEL ATTENTION AND PRACTICE. SHOULD THESE, OR COMPARABLE CATALYSTS FAIL, AND THE CONCEPT SURVIVE, WE MAY BE FACED WITH EMPOWERING INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION ELIGIBILITY DURING PERIODS OF MINIMIZE. THIS IS A QUANTUM LEAP FROM PRESENT POLICY BUT A SMALL STEP TOWARD THE NEEDED CONTROL. THE PRESENT "MINIMIZE CONSIDERED" REQUIREMENT IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN INVETERATE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN TO TOO MANY MESSAGE DRAFTERS.

COMMSPOTS:

NEARLY EVERY COMMSPOT, EXERCISE CRITIQUE AND LESSONS LEARNED MESSAGE CONCERNING SMALL PIPE OPERATIONS REQUESTED ADDITIONAL FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE HIGHER END OF THE SPECTRUM. AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF CIB-2A FREQUENCY ASSETS HAS RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETED BY NAVCAMS WESTPAC FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE, ADDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF FREQUENCIES TO THE POOL AND INCREASING AUTHORIZED USERS ON MANY EXISTING ASSIGNMENTS. FREQUENCY PROPOSALS FOR HIGH BAND FREQUENCIES (ABOVE 23MHZ) ARE CURRENTLY PENDING BEFORE THE JOINT FREQUENCY PANEL, WASHINGTON D.C., AND UPON APPROVAL WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO CIB-2A. THE MARITIME MOBILE FREQUENCY BAND IS A LIMITED SPECTRUM INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING INEXHAUSTIBLE ASSETS.

CHIRPSOUNDERS:

IN RETROSPECT, THE CAMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE BETTER USE OF CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT REPORTS IN PROVIDING OPTIMUM BROADCAST SUPPORT. FUTURE EXERCISES WILL EMPLOY REVISED PROCEDURES AIMED AT ACCOMPLISHMENTS THIS GOAL.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS:

BROADCAST TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE IN LIGHT OF REPEATED MINIMIZE FAILURES. PMUL CONNECTIVITY TO NCS DIEGO GARCIA (ELEVEN CHANNELS) LIMITS DESIRED MANAGEMENT OPTIONS.

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THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED SEPARATELY. RECOMMEND THAT NEAR-TERM PMUL AND SHIP/SHORE HF OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN CAN BE CONDUCTED ON A SELECTIVE TG/TF BASIS. MEANINGFUL TRAINING AND ANALYSIS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY ESTABLISHING SEPARATE HF EXERCISE BROADCASTS WHICH DO NOT DISRUPT NORMAL SATELLITE OPERATIONS. THIS SCENARIO ALSO PROVIDES THE NAVMACS WITH SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO EXERCISE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OPTIONS IT CANNOT EMPLOY DURING A FULL SCALE SMALL PIPE. (E.G., RFCS TYPE CHANNEL SUPPORT). NAVCAMS WESTPAC WILL SOLICIT COMSEVENTHFLT SUPPORT IN THIS REGARD FOR FUTURE SMALL PIPE EXERCISES.
DECL 19 APR 88
BT

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P 090402Z APR 82
FM NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM
TO ALL SHIPS WESTPAC NAVCOMMAREA
MIDEASTFOR
INFO COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
NAVCAMS MED NAPLES IT
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
CTF SEVEN ZERO
STF SEVEN FIVE
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ //N02010//
SUBJ: WESTPAC SHIP/SHORE TERMINATIONS RESTORAL PLAN EFFECTIVE 090001Z APR 82 (U)
A. FTP PAC/I.O. ART 0300.0161
1. (~~C~~) IN THE EVENT OF SATELLITE FAILURE OR PROLONGED CUDIXS OUTAGE SHIP/SHORE TERMINATIONS WILL BE RESTORED AS FOLLOWS:

COMMAND	RESTORAL	REMARKS
USS BLUE RIDGE	NAVCAMS WESTPAC	VFCT
USS MIDWAY	NAVCAMS WESTPAC	VFCT
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY	NCS DIEGO GARCIA	VFCT (NOTE 3)
USS CONSTELLATION	NCS PHILIPPINES	VFCT (NOTE 2)
USS CORONADO	NAVCAMS MED	NOTE 1
USS TRIPOLI	NCS PHILIPPINES	VFCT
USS WHITE PLAINS	PMDD	NOTE 4
USS OLDENDORF	PMAA	NOTE 5

NOTE 1: USS CORONADO COORDINATE RESTORAL IAW CURRENT NAVCAMS MED SHIP/SHORE TERMINATIONS RESTORAL PLAN.
NOTE 2: USS CONSTELLATION: (A) COORDINATE RESTORAL OF SI TRAFFIC WITH NCS PHILIPPINES UTILIZING HF VFCT. (B) ESTABLISH/ACTIVATE SITGO WITH USS TRUXTUN FOR RESTORAL OF SI CIRCUIT.
NOTE 3: USS JOHN F. KENNEDY: (A) COORDINATE RESTORAL OF SI TRAFFIC WITH NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA UTILIZING HF VFCT. (B) ESTABLISH/ ACTIVATE SITGO WITH USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS FOR RESTORAL OF SI CIRCUIT.
NOTE 4: SUBMIT IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATIONS SHIFT MESSAGE REFLECTING RHMPMAA (PMAA) BROADCAST CHANNEL ONE AS PRIMARY ROUTE.
2. (~~C~~) IN THE EVENT OF A CATASTROPHE, NATURAL OR MANMADE, WHICH NECESSITATES NAVCAMS WESTPAC TO SECURE THE F-2 GAPFILLER CUDIXS SYSTEM (F-2 WB-17) AND SHIFT NECOS OF THE FSCII CUDIXS SYSTEM (FSC-II CHNL-6) TO NAVCAMS MED. THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL SID ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE EFFECTIVE COMMENSURATE WITH THE SHIFT:

SPECIAL SID	USER	SPECIAL SID	USER
01		06	USS WHITE PLAINS
02	USS TRIPOLI	07	USS BLUE RIDGE
03	USS CORONADO	08	
04	USS CONSTELLATION	09	USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
05	USS MIDWAY	10	USS OLDENDORF

FOR ALL F-2 GAPFILLER SUBSCRIBERS: UPON NOTIFICATION OF WESTPAC'S CUDIXS NECOS SHIFT TO NAVCAMS MED. ACCESS FSC-II CUDIXS CHANL 6. PRIMARY SID ASSIGNMENT WILL REMAIN THE SAME.
DECL 09 APR 88
BT

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P 050553Z APR 82
FM NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM
TO COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
MIDEASTFOR
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
ALL SHIPS WESTPAC NAVCOMMAREA
INFO NAVSECGRUACT CHARLESTON SC
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ //N02801//
SUBJ: WEEKLY SATELLITE CHANNELIZATION ADVISORY (U)

A. NAVCAMS WESTPAC/EASTPAC 092135Z JUL 80 (CIB-2D 02/80)
B. NAVCAMS WESTPAC GUAM 120425Z MAY 80 (CIB-6A 02/80)
C. NAVCAMS MED NAPLES II 240937Z DEC 80 (JOINT CIB-3 01/80)
1. ~~(C)~~ THE F-2 GAPFILLER/FSC-II SATELLITE ALIGNMENT EFFECTIVE 040001Z APR 82 WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

F-2	ASSIGNED	FSC-II	ASSIGNED
02	UNASSIGNED	01	FSB
03	UNASSIGNED	02	CVBG FSB
04	UNASSIGNED	03	TACINTEL
06	POWER CAL	04	SSIXS
07	CTG 71.6 FFN	05	FLTSECVOX
08	PRI S/S	06	CUDIXS
09	UNASSIGNED	07	UNASSIGNED
10	TFCC	08	F3A (CINCPACFLT)
12	FLTSECVOX	09	COMNAVTELCOM
14	FFN-W	10	COMUSKOREA
15	UNASSIGNED		
17	CUDIXS		
19	FSB		

FSC-II 500KHZ WIDEBAND CHANNEL-23

SLOT	ASSIGNED	SLOT	ASSIGNED
05	USS CORONADO FDM	14	USS BLUE RIDGE FDM
08	UNASSIGNED	16	USS J.F. KENNEDY FDM
09	UNASSIGNED	18	USS MIDWAY FDM
10	USS NASSAU C/H	19	USS CONSTELLATION FDM
12	NPO PRI S/S		

2. ~~(C)~~ FLEET SUPPORT BROADCAST (FSB) CHANNELS ALIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) FSC-II (CHNL-ONE)

SLOT	ASSIGNED
01	PMAA
02	PMBB
03	PMCC
04	PMDD
05	OPEN
06	PMFF
07	USS DANIELS/TRUXTON SPRUANCE C/H
08	PMHH
09	FFN
10	PRI S/S
11	POBB
12	USS PROTEUS BRAVO

(B) FSC-II CHNL-TWO (OFFSET LOW)

SLOT	ASSIGNED
01	USS J.F. KENNEDY O/W
02	USS J.F. KENNEDY/ USS CONSTELLATION C/H
03	PMCC
04	PRESS
05	A1185 AUSSIE BCST/SUPPORT FOR HMAS PERTH
06	RMFF
07	OPEN
08	PMHH
09	FFN-W
10	PRI S/S
11	USS CONSTELLATION O/W
12	OPEN

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13	OPEN	13	VP SHORE HOP
14	NASSAU C/H	14	RAZZY BRAVO
15	USS PROTEUS ALFA	15	SOSAT
16	SYNC	16	SYNC

(C) F-2 WIDEBAND 19

SLOT	ASSIGNED	SLOT	ASSIGNED
01	USS MIDWAY O/W	09	FFN
02	USS MIDWAY C/H	10	PRI S/S
03	PMCC	11	USS CORONADO C/H
04	RAZZY BRAVO	12	VP SHORE HOP
05	USS CORONADO O/W	13	PMNN
06	PMFF	14	SOSAT
07	PRESS	15	OPEN

3. ~~(C)~~ FDM SHIPS SEND ALIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

CHNL	USS BLUE RIDGE	USS CORONADO	USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
01	O/W	O/W	O/W
02	ALFA	ALFA	OPEN
03	OPEN	FFN	OPEN
04	OPEN	OPEN	C/H
05	OPEN	OPEN	FFN
06	BRAVO	OPEN	OPEN
07	FOXTROT	OPEN	OPEN
08	OCC/TTCC	OPEN	OPEN
09	TFOC O/W	OPEN	SOSAT
10	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
11	FFN	C/M	OPEN
12	25WB	OPEN	OPEN
13	25WB	OPEN	OPEN
14	25WB	OPEN	OPEN
15	25WB	OPEN	OPEN
16	25WB	OPEN	OPEN

CHNL	USS MIDWAY	USS CONSTELLATION
01	OPEN	O/W
02	OPEN	OPEN
03	FFN	OPEN
04	OPEN	FFN
05	C/H	OPEN
06	BRAVO	OPEN
07	FOXTROT	OPEN
08	OPEN	OPEN
09	ALFA	OPEN
10	O/W	OPEN
11	OPEN	VP SHORE HOP
12	OPEN	C/H
13	VP SHORE HOP	OPEN
14	OPEN	OPEN
15	R/B	OPEN
16	OPEN	OPEN

4. ~~(C)~~ REQ THIS MESSAGE BE POSTED IN A CONSPICUOUS AREA ADJACENT TO COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUIT STATUS BOARDS. UPLINK/DOWNLINK FREQS AND EQUIPMENT TUNING PROCEDURES ARE CONTAINED IN REFS A, B, AND C.
DECL 04 APR 88

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

0300.0162 (U) NAVY TACTICAL UHF SATELLITE ADIVISORIES

The following unclassified list of advisories (SIERRA Series) will be utilized to inform fleet units via HICOM, primary satellite ship/shore, fleet broadcast and tactical satellite ship/shore/ship termination accesses/channels of action required concerning satellite accesses/channels. The first word identifies the action required, and where applicable the third word identifies the satellite affected. A list of advisories (OLYMPIA series) to inform fleet units of action required concerning the Pacific PMUL Broadcast components is contained in Article 0500.1420 of this instruction.

ADVISORY	MEANING
SIERRA ALFA	Increase power.......Access.......(DBW)
SIERRA ALFA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA ALFA TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA ALFA THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA ALFA FOUR	GAPFILLER FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA BRAVO	Decrease power.......Access.......(DBW)
SIERRA BRAVO ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA BRAVO TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA BRAVO THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA BRAVO FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA CHARLIE	Meet 75BPS......On Access.....for calibration (GAPFILLER)
SIERRA DELTA	Your EIRP is erratic, take corrective action and advise (GAPFILLER)
SIERRA ECHO	You have exceeded your authorized power level access....reduce power....(DBW) access...(NR). (GAPFILLER)
SIERRA FOXTROT	You are below authorized power level. Increase power to....(DBW) access....(NR). (GAPFILLER)
SIERRA GOLF	Continuous carrier on time shared access/channel...all subscribers to this access/channel check for locked key condition.
SIERRA GOLF ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA GOLF TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA GOLF THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA GOLF FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA HOTEL	All users cease transmission. Satellite malfunctioning. Amplifying information will follow:

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

SIERRA HOTEL ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA HOTEL TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA HOTEL THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA HOTEL FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA INDIA	All users cease transmission at...for priority "A" sole access. All users reaccess at....(If this left blank, NECOS will supply amplifying information via this net or other means.)
SIERRA INDIA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA INDIA TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA INDIA THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA INDIA FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA JULIETT	All users reaccess at.........
SIERRA JULIETT ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA JULIETT TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA JULIETT THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA JULIETT FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA KILO	All uers....access/channel....cease transmission at.......
SIERRA KILO ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA KILO TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA KILO THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA KILO FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA LIMA	All users...access/channel.....reaccess at....
SIERRA LIMA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA LIMA TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA LIMA THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA LIMA FOUR	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA MIKE	Units called cease transmission on...........
SIERRA MIKE ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA MIKE TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA MIKE THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA MIKE FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA NOVEMBER	Units called commence transmission on......
SIERRA NOVEMBER ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA NOVEMBER TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA NOVEMBER THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA NOVEMBER FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA OSCAR	RFI being experienced on...access/channel.... all users check their equipment. Report to NECOS if source of RFI is determined.
SIERRA OSCAR ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA OSCAR TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA OSCAR THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA OSCAR FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

SIERRA PAPA	Units called shift to.....access/channel....
SIERRA PAPA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA PAPA TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA PAPA THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA PAPA FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA QUEBEC	Units called have a secure voice call on access/channel...Observe directed/free net procedure
SIERRA QUEBEC ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA QUEBEC TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA QUEBEC THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA QUEBEC FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA ROMEO	Secure voice is now operating at a simplex net on access/channel....
SIERRA ROMEO ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA ROMEO TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA ROMEO THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA ROMEO FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA SIERRA	NECOS for...access/channel...will shift to... at....
SIERRA SIERRA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA SIERRA TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA SIERRA THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA SIERRA FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA TANGO	Unit(s) called commence transmission on CUDIXS ....access/channel...SID Nr....
SIERRA TANGO ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA TANGO TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA TANGO THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA TANGO FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA UNIFORM	Unable to maintain communications on.... access...(EIRP normal). Check your system (satellite terminal, secure voice, IXS, TTY equipment, etc.)
SIERRA UNIFORM ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA UNIFORM TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA UNIFORM THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA UNIFORM FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA VICTOR	Scintillation commenced on.....at.....
SIERRA VICTOR ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA VICTOR TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA VICTOR THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA VICTOR FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
SIERRA WHISKEY	Scintillation ceased on.....at.....

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

SIERRA WHISKEY	FLTSATCOM-I
SIERRA WHISKEY TWO	GAPFILLER F-2
SIERRA WHISKEY THREE	GAPFILLER F-3
SIERRA WHISKEY FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

0500.1420 ~~(C)~~ BROADCAST SATELLITE CONTROL ADVISORY CODES

The following list of advisories will be utilized to inform units via HICOM, primary ship/shore and tactical ship/shore/ship termination accesses/channels of action required concerning PMUL broadcast satellite component. The first word of each advisory identifies it as a satellite broadcast advisory, the second word identifies the action required/taken, and where applicable , the third word identifies the specific satellite.

ADVISORY	MEANING
OLYMPIA ALFA	Standby for PMUL BCST restoral on current satellite area.
OLYMPIA ALFA ONE	FLTSATCOM-I
OLYMPIA ALFA TWO	GAPFILLER (F-2)
OLYMPIA ALFA THREE	GAPFILLER (F-3)
OLYMPIA ALFA FOUR	FLTSATCOM-II
OLYMPIA BRAVO	PMUL BCST is shifting to....
OLYMPIA BRAVO ONE	FLTSATCOM One Channel Two. Set AN/SSR-1 local oscillator module (F002/F003) channel selector switch to position four (4).
OLYMPIA BRAVO TWO	GAPFILLER (F-2) WB-19 Set AN/SSR-1 local oscillator module (F003) Channel selector switch to position three (3).
OLYMPIA BRAVO THREE	GAPFILLER (F-3) WB-20, Set AN/SSR-1 local oscillator module (F001/F002) channel selector switch to position three (3).
OLYMPIA BRAVO FOUR	FLTSATCOM II Channel One. Set AN/SSR-1 local oscillator module (F001/F003) channel selector switch position to (F001) position six//(F003) position three
OLYMPIA BRAVO FIVE	FLTSATCOM II Channel Two. Set AN/SSR-1 local oscillator module (F002/F003) channel selector switch to position six.
OLYMPIA CHARLIE	(RESERVED)
OLYMPIA DELTA	PMUL BCST shifting to FDM-FM (AN/SSR-1-AN/UCC-1) mode of operation.
OLYMPIA DELTA ONE	FLTSATCOM I
OLYMPIA DELTA TWO	GAPFILLER (F-2)
OLYMPIA DELTA THREE	GAPFILLER (F-3) (R)
OLYMPIA DELTA FOUR	FLTSATCOM II
OLYMPIA ECHO	PMUL BCST shifting to TDM/PSK (AN/SSR-1) mode of operation
OLYMPIA ECHO ONE	FLTSATCOM I
OLYMPIA ECHO TWO	GAPFILLER (F-2)
OLYMPIA ECHO THREE	GAPFILLER (F-3)
OLYMPIA ECHO FOUR	FLTSATCOM II

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NAVCAMS EASTPAC/NAVCAMS WESTPAC
INST C2000.3A

OLYMPIA FOXTROT	PMUL BCST HF frequencies activated, further instructions follow by COMMSPOT.
OLYMPIA GOLF	Satellite failure. (GAPFILLER/FLTSATCOM I/II) PMUL BCST shifting to HF/LF configuration using HF FDM/VFCT (AN/USS-1) mode of operation.
OLYMPIA GOLF ONE	FLTSATCOM I
OLYMPIA GOLF TWO	GAPFILLER (F-2)
OLYMPIA GOLF THREE	GAPFILLER (F-3)
OLYMPIA GOLF FOUR	FLTSATCOM II
OLYMPIA HOTEL	PMUL BCST address reset for all EASTPAC/WESTPAC components will be accomplished immediately.
OLYMPIA HOTEL ONE	PMUL BCST address reset for EASTPAC component will be accomplished immediately on FLTSATCOM I only.
OLYMPIA HOTEL TWO	PMUL BCST address reset for WESTPAC (F-2/NB-A) offset will be accomplished immediately.
OLYMPIA HOTEL THREE	PMUL BCST address reset for WESTPAC (F-3/WB-20) component will be accomplished immediately.
OLYMPIA HOTEL FOUR	PMUL BCST address reset for WESTPAC component will be accomplished immediatley on FLTSATCOMM II satellite (Channels One/Two) only.
OLYMPIA INDIA	NAVCOMPARS malfunction. PMUL BCST on test. Standby for further instructions.
OLYMPIA INDIA ONE (Z) TIME	PMUL BKS shifting to ALT-BKS at standby for further instuctions.
OLYMPIA INDIA TWO (Z) TIME	PMUL BCST first run traffic commences at Z.
OLYMPIA JULIETT (NUMBER)	Cryptographic equipment failure on channel. (number).
OLYMPIA KILO	PMUL BCST is functioning properly in all respects.

Example: OVERWORK THIS IS DUNKIRK...OLYMPIA ALFA I SAY AGAIN OLYMPIA ALFA...OUT/OVERWORK THIS IS DUNKIRK...OLYMPIA HOTEL THREE...OUT. WHEN ACTION COMPLETED. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE TRANSMITTED: "OVERWORK THIS IS DUNKIRK...OLYMPIA HOTEL THREE COMPLETE...OUT."

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Operating Concept for the AN/TRQ-35 CHIRPSOUNDER High Frequency Tactical Frequency Management System

1. The Army, Navy, Air Force and DCA are installing AN/TRQ-35(V) CHIRPSOUNDER Tactical Frequency Management Systems (TFMS) to help maintain reliable High Frequency communications. Other commands are buying TFMS to support contingency operations. Widespread use of the TFMS calls for close coordination to avoid redundancy and mutual interference from installed systems. Unified Commanders promulgate policies for sounder operations for their respective areas of responsibility; USMCEB Joint Frequency Panel promulgates CHIRPSOUNDER clock and start times for world-wide operations.

2. Several Naval Communication Stations and Navy ships have AN/TRQ-35 (TFMS) to support High Frequency ship/shore/ship communications. The whole system consists of the TCS-4B CHIRPSOUNDER Transmitter (T1373/TRQ-35(V)), an RCS-4B Receiver (RR2081/TRQ-35(V) and an RSS-4 Spectrum Monitor (R2093/TRQ-35(V)). Shore installations currently have the CHIRPSOUNDER transmitter and spectrum monitor; ships have the CHIRPSOUNDER receiver and spectrum monitor installed. For the most part, Navy CHIRPSOUNDER installations use existing antennas. Shipboard CHIRPSOUNDER installations may be cross-decked in order to meet operational requirements.

3. The Navy has installed the TFMS ashore and afloat as indicated below. CINCPACFLT normally cross-decks two additional RCS-4B Receivers and RSS-4 Spectrum Monitors between deploying CV's and/or LHA/LPH's to concentrate sounder assets in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Similarly, CINCLANTFLT directs that TFMS systems be installed onboard Atlantic Fleet CV's or other ships, as necessary.

PACFLT	LANTFLT	EUR
NAVCOMMSTA Philippines	* NAVCAMS LANT	NAVCOMMSTA Nea Makri
NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia	* NAVCOMMSTA Roosevelt Roads	
NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt	USS Mt Whitney	
USS Blue Ridge		

*Also have CHIRPSOUNDER receiver installed.

Additional Navy sounder systems, including receivers for shore activities, are planned for NAVCAMS WESTPAC, NAVCAMS EASTPAC, NAVCOMMSTAs Japan, Rota, Stockton, Thurso, and NAVCOMMDET Sigonella, Italy. Shipboard installations will total 41 when program/budget actions are realized by FY 87.

4. Unlike Line of Sight and satellite communications, High Frequency radio communications require constant management to select operating frequencies that are propagating well and interference free. The CHIRPSOUNDER system determines such frequencies as follows:

a. The TCS-4B CHIRPSOUNDER transmitter emits a CW signal which sweeps upward in frequency at a constant linear rate between 2-16 or 2-30 Mhz in 4 minutes and 40 seconds. The sweep rate is 50 Khz/second between 2-16 Mhz and 100 Khz/second for a 2-30 Mhz sweep. The TCS-4B outputs up to 100 watts of power for transmission by a broadband antenna, or the signal can be diplexed onto the same broadband antenna being used to support a user's communication circuit (up to 2.5 KW PEP) using a diplexer assembly which is part of the TCS-4B. In the diplexed mode, only 2 percent of the TCS-4B power (2 watts) is coupled onto the user's antenna; the remaining power (along with 2 percent of the communication transmitter's power) goes to an internal dummy antenna. When used in this manner, the propagation data obtained in the sounding at the recieve terminal takes into account all the radiation characteristics of the user's communications transmit antenna. The RCS-4B reciever receives any of the radiated signal the ionosphere permits to propagate over the path. Ionospheric soundings can be be performed as often as every 5 minutes, but are normally sounded at 15 minute intervals to allow for multiple reciever sychronization.

b. The RCS-4B CHIRPSOUNDER reciever tunes through the HF spectrum between 2-16 Mhz or 2-30 Mhz. When synchronized with a TCS-4B transmitter, it will receive only those signals which are propagating, thus providing a measurement of ionospheric propagation conditions for the path on a real-time basis. An internal clock in the RCS-4B starts the reciever tuning from 2 Mhz through the HF spectrum in synchronization with the sweeping transmitter. Radio energy propagates over a path in one, two or multiple hops (modes), each recieved at a given point with different phase and propagation delays. At the RCS-4B receiver, each relative time delay of recieved signals corresponds to a frequency offset from the receiver's sweeping local oscillator (either 50 or 100 Hz for each millisecond of delay), resulting in a tone in the receiver's demodulated output. The tones are converted from the amplitude vs time domain to the frequency vs time domain by a spectrum analyzer in the receiver and, because any instant in time corresponds to a tuned frequency of the receiver, the output of the spectrum analyzer can be displayed on a CRT showing the individual received modes (hops) vs tuned frequency. The result is an ionogram which displays the received propagating modes vs frequency. In addition, as radio energy at various levels is received, the reciever gain is automatically adjusted to provide a constant level output to the spectrum analyzer. The automatic gain control voltage vs radio frequency provides a measure of received signal strength vs frequency which is simultaneously protrayed on the ionogram with the different HOP modes. Thus the RCS-4B receiver, operating in association with the TCS-4B transmitter, provides a real-time measurement of all propagating conditions in terms of signal strength for received signals and a display of the various received HOP modes (those caused by the relative density of the E and F layers of the ionosphere). The ionogram thus permits fan operator to determine the maximum usable frequency for a given path as well as an indication of multi-path distortion that can be expected, depending on the signal strength of the multi HOPS at the receive terminal. The RCS-4B receiver is designed to be synchronized with up to three different TCS-4B transmitters and can receive transmissions from one of 3 transmitters as often as every five minutes. The latest ionogram and received signal levels vs frequency data for each of three paths is stored in memory within the receiver and can be displayed at any time by an operator be determine the best propagating path. Information portrayed on the RCS-4B receiver is accurate and gives the operator early warning of circuit deterioration. It can also be used to improve or restore communications in the event a primary communications path is lost.

c. The RSS-4 Spectrum Monitor is an HF receiver, processor, and display system which portrays occupancy information (active frequencies) in the HF spectrum in a convenient and comprehensive manner. This unit scans the entire HF spectrum every 10 seconds, continuously updating spectrum occupancy statistics (Histogram) in 5 minute and 30 minute time blocks. The RSS-4 has been designed especially for use in locating clear, interference free, channels within large frequency bands and is capable of separately storing and displaying data for 9333 6 Khz wide channels in the 2-30 Mhz frequency range. Features of the RSS-4 which contribute to simple and rapid operation are a digital readout of a center frequency on a CRT spectrum data display and controls to continuously increase or decrease the displayed center frequency. The center frequency may also be slipped across the CRT at a fast or slow rate, or in one-channel at-a-time steps. Display widths of 100 Khz or 500 Khz may be selected. Although intended principally for use in the scanning mode, the RSS-4 includes a capability for audio monitoring of the displayed center frequency. LSB, USB, AM and FM detecting can be selected. Used in conjunction with the TCS-4B transmitter and the RCS-4B receiver, the RSS-4 spectrum monitor gives an indication of clear interference free channels within the measured propagating frequency band that can be selected for establishing reliable, or restoring deteriorating, communications circuits.

5. The USMCEB and Unified Commanders have promulgated the following world-wide DoD CHIRPSOUNDER allotments and procedures to maintain compatibility between operational and planned CHIRPSOUNDER systems:

a. A common-user concept will be used to the maximum extent to satisfy overall CHIRPSOUNDER theater requirements. The USMCEB Joint Frequency Panel will issue CHIRPSOUNDER frequency and start time assignments within the United States and Possessions (US & P). Specified commanders will coordinate requirements within the US & P with the JFP using the 00-01 time increment allotted below. Specified Commanders will coordinate requirements outside the US & P with assignment authorities indicated below and use the allotted start time increment. All other DoD requirements will be forwarded to the cognizant service frequency management offices for resolution on a case-by-case basis. CHIRPSOUNDER frequency and start time assignment will conform to the rules of the USMCEB and ACP 190 US Supp-1.

b. CHIRPSOUNDER allotments are based on one minute increments of the available five minute window predicted on the four (4) minute and forty (40) second minimum required sweep time of the AN/TRQ-35 transmitter. Clock times are defined as the specific time in minutes and seconds that the sounder will begin sweep relative to the assigned clock time. All start times will be assigned a minimum of two second intervals within the one minute increments allotted below.

Start time increments and assigning authorities:

Minute Increments	Assigned Authority
00-01	Joint Frequency Panel
01-02	CINCLANT (JFMO LANT)
02-03	USCINCEUR
03-04	CINCPAC
04-05	USCINCSO

c. Clock times assigned, relative to the above increments, shall be in accordance with the operational requirements of the requesting user, subject to the approval of the assignment authority. CHIRPSOUNDERS should operate four sweeps per hour at fifteen minute intervals, i.e., 00, 15, 30, 45, to permit optimum use of CHIRPSOUNDER receivers where multiple radio propagation path conditions are encountered. Because CHIRPSOUNDER transmitters have no station indentification on the carrier, CHIRPSOUNDER transmitters located in the same geographic area (less than 2500 Km) should be separated by more than 2 seconds to avoid confusion by the receiving station or unit.

d. User activities will propose CHIRPSOUNDER sweep start times to either the University Commander or the USMCEB-JFP for approval to maintain a homogeneous intertheater sounder operational environment. Requesting user shall indicate desired clock time intervals and start times in item 502 of the ACP 190 US Supp-1 standard message format, unless otherwise specified by the area CINC. Assignment authorities are responsible for maintaining current records of all CHIRPSOUNDER sweep start time assignments. Frequency assignment authorities will enter fixed location CHIRPSOUNDER frequency assignments into the Frequency Resource Record System (FRRS).

e. Users are responsible to operate CHIRPSOUNDERS in such a manner as to preclude harmful interference to other authorized services. Normal operating power, after system is synchronized, is ten (10) watts in order to reduce interference potential. Submit requests for higher operating power, if required, to the cognizant FLTCINC on a case-by-case basis. Identification of frequencies, as propagating over a given path by a CHIRPSOUNDER, does not constitute frequency authorization for other purposes. Only those frequencies assigned by appropriate authority to support a specific operation or facility will be used for communications over a given path. If existing assignments are insufficient, and frequency support is required to improve existing communications system reliability for crisis or other operations, operators are required to coordinate with appropriate area frequency managers for additional frequency assignments.

f. CHIRPSOUNDERs will not be radiated on the ITU standard frequencies of 2182, 2500, 3024.4, 5000, 8364, 10000, 13360-13410, 15000, 20000, 25000, (all KHZ) and associated guard bands. (The signal blanking capability of the CHIRPSOUNDER transmitter will be used for this purpose.)

6. The following procedures, designed to improve High Frequency circuit reliability and increase operator expertise in HF communications, will be used to establish and maintain Navy HF communications circuits.

a. NAVCAMS wil manage CHIRPSOUNDER assisted communications under the Fleet Telecommunications Operations Concept in concert with the above directives and those issued by the FLTCINC, COMNAVCOMTEL, COMNAVELEXSYSCOM and other competent authorities. NAVCAMS will reflect area CHIRPSOUNDER procedures in Communications Information Bulletins (CIBs). Normal power output for CHIRPSOUNDER transmitters is 100 watts for synchronization and ten watts for normal operations. However, when supporting ship circuits over 2000 kilometers, or for contingency/exercise operations when path lengths exceed 2000 km, recommend use 100 watts, subject to FLTCINC concurrence.

b. NAVCAMS will activate a full period HF ship/shore/ship circuit with each sounder equipped ship when it is underway, operations permitting. As a minimum, the circuit will be a single channel termination. Depending on NAVCOMMSTA loading, the ship should be terminated with a shore station which has a CHIRPSOUNDER installed to enhance frequency selection for circuit operation.

c. If operations permit, all routine precedence traffic to/from CHIRPSOUNDER supported ships will be passed via HF to develop operator proficiency in HF circuit operation and HF related message handling procedures. Ship and shore circuit operators will exchange radio checks at least twice per hour in the absence of routine traffic. The checks will be made within a 5 minute period immediately following a sounding transmission from the terminating shore station. If a ship has not initiated a check within a half hour, both participants may assume the circuit is out and will initiate restoration actions.

d. Ships can best determine what frequency bands are propagating and the frequencies of least interference within the propagating bands using the CHIRPSOUNDER receiver and spectrum monitor. The terminated ship is responsible to interpret the sounding data displayed on its sounder equipment and provide the shore station with propagation information required for selection of shore receive frequencies. The shore station is responsible for receive frequencies and shifts; however, frequency selection is dependent on the propagation data available at, and provided by, the afloat unit. The shore station will notify the ship of unacceptable interference on the in-use frequency and request new propagation information. Ther terminated ship will determine the best frequency for his receive side of the circuit.

e. In order to maintain communications reliability, both terminals will monitor circuit and signal conditions and advise the distant terminal to shift frequency well in advance of circuit deterioration. Afloat units will identify the specific frequency (selected from CAMS CIBs) when a shift is needed. Broad recommendations should not be made as they will delay the shift due to additional required coordination. To avoid possible total loss of capability of the ship to pass propagation information and coordination on frequencies, the ship's transmit frequency should normally be lower than its recieve frequency. The NAVCOMMSTA and the ship will agree to all recommended frequency shifts to avoid the possibility of lost communications.

f. The NAVCOMMSTA and ship will designate primary and secondary frequencies for circuit operation. Under normal conditions (periods of good propagation), the secondary frequency is that designated for alternate use, but is not on the air. For SIMPLEX circuit operation, the ship will make recommendations for primary or alternate frequencies based on CHIRPSOUNDER/interpretation of propagation and interference conditions. The shore station will quickly approve or disapprove such recommendations, based on analysis of frequency use or interference using own spectrum monitor. Operators will make maximum use of the AN/TRQ-35 spectrum monitor 30 minute frequency occupancy feature to prevent mutual interference.

g. If circuit continuity is lost, the ship will send a COMSPOT advising the shore station of the frequency he is listening on. Any available transmission media will be used, i.e., Secure Voice, Primary Ship/Shore, HICOM, etc. The shore station will use whatever means is available, including broadcast channels, to coordinate circuit restoration when circuit continuity is lost.

h. Operational units have frequently reported that the CHIRPSOUNDER indicated propagation in unexpected frequency ranges, i.e., low frequencies during daylight hours and high frequencies at night, with subsequent reliable use of predicted frequencies. The sounder defines with precision, the suitable band of frequencies for successful HF communications. Having solved the search for appropriate frequencies with the CHIRPSOUNDER, successful HF communications will depend on rapid transmitter tuning, receiver tuning, antenna selection and terminal equipment set-up. The procedure of clearing all High Frequencies through the FTOC prior to activation of ship/shore circuits causes undue delay in circuit restoration. For a CHIRPSOUNDER supported circuit, frequency shift requests form ships will be made on a real-time basis, based on CHIRPSOUNDER receiver and spectrum monitor readings. The ship will use the 30 minute memory of the spectrum monitor to determine whether a frequency has been in use for the last 30 minutes and if so, find another frequency in the propagating range from the applicable CIB. When it determines that a frequency is clear, the ship will request a frequency shift from the terminating NAVCOMMSTA. The NAVCOMMSTA will also look at the proposed frequency, using its spectrum monitor, to determine if the frequency is in use by another user which the ship might not have been able to detect. When the shore station and ship determine that a proposed frequency is not in use, the terminating NAVCOMMSTA will comply with the ship's request for a frequency shift and notify FTOC via the Navy Department Orderwire (NOWS) of the new frequency in use and that which was vacated. If FTOC is aware of immediate requirements for the frequency which may result in mutual interference, FTOC will advise the terminating NAVCOMMSTA immediately so a new frequency may be found. Although the terminating NAVCOMMSTA will grant frequency shifts on a real time basis, the FTOC may later direct the NAVCOMMSTA to change the assigned frequency due to prior assignment or reported interference. The foregoing procedures will be also used anytime transmitter/receiver support is being provided by a CHIRPSOUNDER equipped NAVCOMMSTA regardless of which NAVCOMMSTA is assigned the termination.

i. The terminated ship should pass propagation information to the shore station by a CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT report every six hours. When necessary, during sunrise/sunset time periods and at any time the ship detects severe changes in propagation conditions, the ship may pass informal reports more frequently to the shore station via the circuit, or the circuit control orderwire. Reporting format is indicated in para 3 of the "CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT Report" shown below. In the event of interference, or if communications are lost on the HF path for over 30 minutes, the ship will transmit an immediate CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT Report via any means available, including secure voice, other acitve ship/shore circuits, and HICOM. An example of a CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT Report follows.

```
IMMEDIATE
FM  (ORIGINATING UNIT)
TO  NAVCAMS LANT NORFOLK VA (OR TERMINATED STATION)
INFO (AS APPLICABLE)
BT
(CLASSIFICATION) //N02180//
SUBJ: CHIRPSOUNDER COMMSPOT REPORT (U)
1.  ( ) SHIPS POSITION
2.  ( ) TERMINATION LOGGED OUT RECEIVE 2025Z.  RFO (AS APPLICABLE)
3.  ( ) GROUND/SURFACE WAVE: NONE
        SPORADIC "E" 2.3 TO 3.4 MHZ (STRONGEST AGC 3.1 MHZ)
        F-LAYER: 13.9 TO 20.3 MHZ (STRONGEST AGC 16.1 MHZ)
        MULTIPATH: 13.9 THRU 15.3 MHZ
4.  (C) ORIG CURRENTLY TRANSMITTING ON 15580 KHZ.  REQUEST YOU QSY
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TO 16590 KHZ QLH 3258 KHZ.
(DECLASSIFICATION)
BT

In addition to the above, the terminating shore station will transmit an Immediate termination advisory to the ship requesting new propagation data.

j. NAVCOMMSTAs and afloat units will report CHIRPSOUNDER equipment failures in accordance with CASREPT procedures outlined in NWP-7; inlcude FLTCINCS, COMNAVTELCOM, COMNAVELEXSYSCOM, and other appropriate activities as addresses.

k. NAVCAMS will indicate those ships that are CHIRPSOUNDER supported by adding the name of the ship supported and the word "CHIRPSOUNDER" after the reliability statistics in the NAVCAMS area daily summary.

7. NAVCAMS are requested to provide an AN/TRQ-35 effectiveness report on 1 Jul 82, 30 Dec 82, and 1 Jul 83 which compares termination reliability for the previous 6 months between AN/TRQ-35 equipped units and other units. The purpose is to determine usefulness of the AN/TRQ-35 to ascertain what, if any, spillover effects that AN/TRQ-35 data may have COMMSTA operations.

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R 170321Z JUL 81
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
TO ALCOMPAC P
INFO COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
CIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE SAN DIEGO CA
CIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION SEVEN SEATTLE WA
CIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION EIGHT HONOLULU HI
CHNAVMARCORMARS WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS //N02200//
ALCOMPAC P 016/81
SUBJ: MARS OPERATIONS AFLOAT
A. COMNAVTELCOMINST 2371.1
B. NTP 8
C. CINCPACTFLTINST C2000.1B
1. THIS ALCOMPACT P REITERATES PACFLT POLICY REGARDING MARS OPERATIONS AFLOAT.
2. MILITARY AFFILIATE RADIO SYSTEM (MARS) OPS PROVIDE A BOOST TO MORALE BY ENABLING THOSE PERS SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES A TIMELY, INEXPENSIVE MEANS OF CONFERRING WITH FAMILY MEMBERS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT MARS OPS FROM AFLOAT COMDS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES ARE AUTHORIZED.
3. MARS COMMS ARE TOTALLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERCEPTION BY FOREIGN INTEL ORGANIZATIONS AS THEY ARE TRANSMITTED IN THE CLEAR VIA LONG HAUL HIGH FREQUENCIES AND IN MOST INSTANCES INTERFACE WITH FOREIGN AND/OR U.S. COMMERCIAL PHONE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EQUALLY EXPLOITABLE. ADDITIONALLY, THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING DETECTED AND TRACKED BY HF/DF IS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WHEN AN ALOAT UNIT IS INVOLVED IN MARS OPS. THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING AT THE COMMAND LEVEL, THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE MADE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL SECURITY HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH AFLOAT MARS OPS IS AN ONGOING REQUIREMENT.
4. MARS OPS AFLOAT ARE AUTHORIZED THROUGHOUT PACFLT UNDERWAY AND INPORT UNDER NORMAL, ROUTINE PEACETIME CONDITIONS, UNLESS:
   A. OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMD INTERPOSES OBJECTIONS.
   B. EMCON IS IMPOSED.
   C. REGULATIONS DO NCT PERMIT IN FOREIGN PORTS.
   D. USE OF MARS WOULD SUPPLANT OR REPLACE OFFICIAL COMM CHANNELS (I.E., ICSB TERMINALS OR OTHER RECORD OR VOICE CIRCUITS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF HANDLING OFFICIAL COMMS) EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY CINCPACFLT.
5. COMDS AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE AFLOAT MARS STATIONS MUST HAVE AN ACTIVE SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT MARS USERS TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFO.
6. AN AFLOAT MARS STATION IS CONSIDERED A "STATION UNDER MILITARY AUSPICES" AND THEREFORE DOES NOT REQUIRE A LICENSED AMATEUR RADIO OPERATOR. HOWEVER, UTILIZATION OF PERS WITH AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIENCE IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
7. UNITS DESIRING TO OPERATE A MARS STATION WILL SUBMIT MSG REQ TO CINCPACFLT IN THE FOL FORMAT:
"SUBJ: MARS AFLOAT OPS
   1. UNODIR INTEND CONDUCT MARS OPS.
   2. (COMD MARS OFFICER)
      A. (AMATEUR AND/OR MARS CALL SIGN, IF APPLICABLE)
      B. (EXPIRATION OF LICENSE)

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3. (MARS CHIEF OPERATOR)
   A. (AMATEUR AND/OR MARS CALL SIGN, IF APPLICABLE)
   B. (EXPIRATION OF LICENSE)"

PROVIDE INFO COPY TO FOL COMDS: COMTHIRDFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, APPROPRIATE TYCOM AND OPERTIONAL COMMANDERS, CHNAVMARCORMARS WASHINGTON DC, AND DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE SAN DIEGO CA. IF NO OBJECTION IS INTERPOSED BY THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMD WITHIN TEN WORKING DAYS, DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE WILL MAIL STATION'S LICENSE (CALL SIGN ASSIGNMENT), NTP-8 AND OTHER PERTINENT INFO TO THE SHIP. ADDITIONAL PAPERWORK (IAW REF B) FOR MARS AFLOAT MEMBERSHIP IS NOT REQUIRED. OPERATIONAL COMDRS OBJECTING TO MARS AFLOAT OPS SHOULD INFORM CHNAVMARCORMARS AND DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT LICENSING OF AN AFLOAT UNIT.

8. TERMINATION PERIODS, FREQUENCIES AND AVAILABLE STATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED THE REQUESTING UNIT BY DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE OR EIGHT. FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED WILL COMPRISE THE PACIFIC MARS AFLOAT SPECIALTY NETWORK AND ARE TO BE USED BY ALL ALFOAT UNITS. THE USE OF OTHER MARS SPECIALTY NETWORK FREQUENCIES IS NOT AUTHORIZED. SHIPS PARTICIPATING IN THE MARS PROGRAM ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE AN ACTIVITY REPORT TO DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGIONS FIVE AND EIGHT NOT LATER THAN THE 26TH OF EACH MONTH IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT: ACTIVITY REPORT (MONTH AND YEAR) IN SIX COLUMNS, FREQ, CALL SIGN OF STATION WORKED, NUMBER OF CALLS NOT COMPLETED, NUMBER OF CALLS COMPLETED, MSG TRFC, AND TOTAL TRANSMIT HOURS, INCLUDE REMARKS AS APPROPRIATE.

9. SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IS VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MARS AFLOAT PROGRAM IN PACFLT, THEREFORE COMDS SHALL PROMULGATE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON OPERATION OF MARS STATIONS. SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO INDIVIDUALS ON PROCEDURES TO BE EMPLOYED WHEN UTILIZING MARS TO PREVENT INADVERTANT DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFO. THE CO RETAINS THE PREROGATIVE TO CONTROL MARS OPERATIONS WITHIN HIS COMMAND. HOWEVER, THIS CONTROL MAY NOT EXTEND FOR COMSEC PURPOSES TO THE RECORDING, IN MARSGRAM MESSAGES MAY BE SUBJECTED TO AFLOAT COMMAND REVIEW FOR SECURITY MATTER PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION, HOWEVER, AS A MEASURE OF COMMAND CONTROL OF MARS AFLOAT USE. IN ADDITION, IT IS PERMISSIBLE FOR THE COMMAND TO HAVE THE MARS OPERATOR PRESENT DURING TRANSMISSION. HE MAY SCREEN THE CONVERSATION FOR SECURITY VIOLATIONS AND TAKE SUCH ACTIONS AS TERMINATING THE CALL IF IT APPEARS A BREACH IS TAKING PLACE.

10. THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED HEREIN SUPERSEDES THAT CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN CHAPTER 4 OF REF C AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT REVISION THEREOF.

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R 212327Z JAN 82
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
TO USS JOHN F KENNEDY
INFO CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMSEVENTHFLT
BT
UNCLAS //N02200//
SUBJ: AMATEUR RADIO/MARS OPS
A. USS JOHN F KENNEDY 170037Z JAN 82
B. CINCPACFLTINST C2000.1 (CEI)
C. CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 170321Z JUL 81 (ALCOMPAC P 16/81)
D. CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 180004Z AUG 81 (ALCOMPAC P 18/81)
1. IRT REF A, AMATEUR RADIO OPS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED WEST OF 180 DEGREES IAW PARA 4001 REF B. HOWEVER MARS OPS ARE PERMITTED IAW REFS C AND D.
2. REFS C AND D ARE BEING FORWARDED FYI BY SEP COVER.
BT

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R 180004Z AUG 81
FM CICPACLFT PEARL HARBOR HI
TO ALCOMPAC P
INFO COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION FIVE SAN DIEGO CA
DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION SEVEN SEATTLE WA
DIRNAVMARCORMARS REGION EIGHT HONOLULU HI
CHNAVMARCORMARS WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS //N02343//
ALCOMPAC P 018/81
SUBJ: COMSEC MONITORING OF MARS OPERATIONS
A. CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 170321Z JUL 81 (ALCOMPAC P 016/81)
B. COMNAVTELCOMINST 2371.1
C. NTP-8
D. CINCPACFLTINST C2000.1B (CEI)
1. REF A PROVIDED GENERAL GUIDANCE ON MARS OPERATIONS NOTING PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY TO COUNTER POTENTIAL SECURITY HAZARDS. AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS CONTROLLING SECURITY LEAKS DURING MARS OPS, DOD GENERAL CONSEL HAS RESOLVED ISSUE OF MONITORING OFFICIAL/UNOFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND GRANTED NAVY AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN CONSENSUAL MONITORING OF MARS COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMSEC PURPOSES.
2. THIS AUTHORITY DOES NOT ALTER MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MARS ORGANIZATION DELINEATED IN REFS B AND C AND SHOULD NOT REDUCE MORALE VALUE OF THE SYSTEM. IT IS NOT THE INTENT OF THIS AUTHORITY TO JEOPARDIZE PRIVACY OR CIVIL LIBERTIES OF PRIVATE CITIZENS USING MARS NETWORK. GRANTING THIS AUTHORITY ALLOWS CONSENSUAL COMSEC MONITORING OF MARS TRANSMISSIONS TO ASCERTAIN AND REDUCE ITS SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND ENSURES CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF THIS SIGNIFICANT MORALE ENHANCEMENT DEVICE.
3. TO SATISFY "CONSENT REQUIREMENTS" AT LEAST ONE PARTY TO EVERY MARS COMMUNICATION MUST BE AWARE THAT USE OF THE SYSTEM CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO MONITOR. TO ENSURE THERE IS NO QUESTION IN THIS REGARD, MARS STATIONS UNDER MILITARY AUSPICES WILL HAVE ALL USERS SIGN A CONSENT FORM WHICH STATES "I CERTIFY THAT BY MY SIGNATURE I UNDERSTAND THAT PERIODIC COMSEC MONITORING OF MARS CONVERSATIONS WILL OCCUR AND THAT USE OF MARS EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THAT MONITORING." A CONSENT FORM SHALL BE RETAINED WITH MARS CIRCUIT LOGS AND AFFORDED THE SAME PROTECTIVE/RETENTION. ADDITIONALLY, A SIGN STATING "MARS COMMUNICATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MONITORING AT ALL TIMES. USE OF MARS CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MONITORING" SHALL BE DISPLAYED IN FULL VIEW OF MARS USERS.
4. COMSEC MONITORING OF MARS WILL BE CONDUCTED ONLY AS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY CINCPACFLT. THIS MONITORING WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A ROUTINE, APERIODIC BASIS BY PACFLT SIGNALS SECURITY COMPONENTS SUBSEQUENT TO 1 SEP 81. COMMANDS CONDUCTING MARS OPERATIONS ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH PARA 3 ABOVE PRIOR 1 SEP. COMSEC MONITORING RESULTS WILL BE PROVIDED TO APPROPRIATE COMMANDS.
5. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT PACFLT OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS RETAIN AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW OR MODIFY MARS AUTHORIZATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS OR FOR SPECIFIC UNITS FOR OPSEC VIOLATIONS.
6. THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED HEREIN IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN NEXT REVISION TO REF D.
BT

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. CAPTAIN'S OFFICE.

a. Officer Personnel Movement: The movement of officers destined for CONUS must be scrutinized very closely to avoid crisis management situations in requesting Passenger Reservation Requests (PRP's) on short notice. All flights destined for CONUS originate from Rota, Spain or Diego Garcia. The following guidelines are provided to assist in this area:

(1) Administrative personnel involved with the movement of officers should be extremely knowledgeable with the contents of COMSERVFORSIXTHFLTINST 4000.1L, Chapter XII.

(2) Identify officer movements at the earliest possible date. Strict compliance with established guidelines of submitting Passenger Reservation Request (PRR) 45 days in advance is necessary to ensure timely movement of personnel. BUPERSINST 4650.14F is the guideline to be followed in submitting PRR's. OPNAVINST 4650.1D provides the details in requesting area clearance request normally required for travel to Diego Garcia. Confirmed PRR's are normally received within 5 working days from the date the request is submitted.

(3) PRR's should be submitted via priority message. Short notice PRR's for emergency leave, unforeseen TAD assignments, etc., should be submitted via immediate message.

(4) Prepare a Military Travel Authorization (MTA) for flights from Rota, Spain and Diego Garcia to CONUS. BUPERSINST 4630.2A provides in detail all information necessary for the preparation of an MTA.

(5) In the case of personnel destined for CONUS that will be returning to the command, two MTA's are required to be prepared. One MTA will be utilized for the trip each way.

(6) Ensure that all personnel have an up-to-date immunization record in hand when reporting to Rota, Spain and/or Diego Garcia for MAC flights.

b. Officer Leave/Transfer: NATO Leave Papers should be issued to all personnel taking leave in NATO countries or taking leave in CONUS and returning to the command. BUPERSINST 4632.5 provides guidelines for reduced commercial air fare for both military members and dependents. Sample reduced air fare eligibility statements should be made available for all personnel and their dependents. Additionally, MILPERSMAN, Article 3020420 provides specific guidelines for personnel taking leave in foreign countries. The contents of this article should be closely followed when preparing leave papers for personnel taking leave overseas. NATO Travel Orders should be issued to all personnel traveling within the Mediterranean area or to CONUS on official orders.

(1) The following statement should be included in the remarks section of the NAVCOMPT 3067 on all transferring officers for PCS but will be traveling back to the ship's homeport for movement of dependents, etc:

"Authorized to travel to the hompord of USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, Mayport, FL, in accordance with JTR, M4156, Case 13."

(2) The following statement should be included on the Part 3 of NAVCOMPT 3065 for those personnel desiring to take leave in Spain or travel through Spain:

"LA PERSONA MENCIONADA ENESTOS DOCUMENTOS HA SIDO AUTHORIZADA POR EL COMMANDANTE DE LA UNIDAD A LA QUE PERTENENCE PARA DESPLAZARSE A ESPANA."

c. Word Processing Equipment: Word processing equipment in the Captain's Office has been utilized to the maximum throughout the cruise. It is strongly recommended that all Word Processing units and typewriters be serviced by the respective technical representative prior departure from CONUS to ensure the equipment is in top working condition. Technical representative, maintenance and parts availability for these units in the Indian Ocean/Mediterranean are very difficult to obtain.

d. Supplies. Stock piling of all supplies before departing CONUS, particularly those that are essential, is strongly recommended. Availability of most all types of forms and related administrative office supplies for fleet units are particularly non-existent in the Indian Ocean/Mediterranean.

2. PRINT SHOP.

a. Printing/Drafting Requirements: The requirements placed on the JFK Print Shop from the ship, embarked air wing, and Flag Staff have been awesome. Printing requirements have included Change of Command packages and Family Grams for the embarked squadrons, Port Brochures and Tour Handouts for each port of call, plus numerous everyday items required when in an operational status in the Indian Ocean/Mediterranean. Drafting projects have included the layout work for the projects as described above plus numerous engraving jobs.

b. Equipment/Supplies. Availability for supplies and spare parts for equipment in the Indian Ocean/Mediterranean is virtually non-existent. An adequate 6 to 9 months supply of all types of materials, including inks, plates, various chemicals, films, prior to departure from CONUS. Additionally, strongly recommend that all equipment, particularly the presses and platemakers, be serviced by the various technical representatives and are in top working order prior to departing CONUS. The comments in this paragraph cannot be over-emphasized.

c. Recommend an official memorandum be mailed to embarked unit's Administrative and Public Affairs Officers at least one month prior to departure informing them of specific guidelines to be followed for submission of Family Grams and Change of Command packages. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY limited Family Grams to not exceed 8 pages with a maximum of 5 black and white photographs. Additionally, the ship required all squadrons to purchase and supply their own blank change of command invitations, envelopes and cover stock for printing change of command programs and other related items included within the package.

STATISTICS:

TOTAL IMPRESSIONS: 4,502,153 TOTAL JOBS LOGGED: 2,672

NOTE: The above figures do not include daily jobs that are not logged, i.e. Daily Green Sheet - 800 impressions; Plan of the Day (based on 8 pages) - 5000 impressions; Air Plan - 600 impressions; Bird Farm News (based on 12 pages) - 7200 impressions; and Card of the Day - 800 impressions.

3. Personnel Office

a. Transportation (MED). COMSERVFORSIXTHFLTINST 4000.1L, Chapter XII provides the guidance and examples for port call requests and intra-Med transportation. For CONUS port call request, a 45 day lead time and 10 days availability window is required. NAVPTO Rota will normally send a confirmation message within 72 - 96 hours. Transportation to Rota is a function of ASCOMED and their monthly aircraft support messages list all the different types of air logistic support available. During this short Med deployment, support from ASCOMED and VRC-24 was excellent notwithstanding the four CVBG's in the Med at the same time. A constant liaison with ATO is critical to an efficient operation. We made it a practice to avoid movement from EastMed ports when possible as transportation is usually more limited and less reliable.

b. Transportation (IO). Transportation from and to the IO is not hard to manage if advance planning is properly carried out. Port calls to NAVSUPPFAC Diego Garcia are submitted in accordance with BUPERSINST 4650.14F approximately 30-45 days prior to desired movement date. From Diego Garcia, almost daily flight are available to Clark AFB, Philippines and twice weekly flights are available to Norfolk. A PRR must be submitted to NAVPTO Clark as onward transportation is desired from the Philippines to CONUS. We tried to avoid use of this channel as the scheduling requirements of flights became extremely complex and usually required the traveler to spend 10-15 days at Diego Garcia and/or Philippines. Use of the Norfolk channel is preferred and is much easier to manage. Transportation to and from Diego Garcia is worked through the embarked Flag Air Ops Officer and ATO. Two modes of transportation are available while at sea: the almost daily US-3A and the more or less weekly replenishment ships. The US-3A proved to be unreliable and was, for the most part, used for emergency leaves, and urgent TAD requirements. The easiest movement plan was to helo the departing members to the replenishment ship in company as it prepared to head back to Diego Garcia for replenishment. Again, the job is made easier with a very close liaison with Flag Air Ops. It was our norm to plan the member's movement date approximately 35-45 days prior to EAOS. This afforded us leeway to allow for the unforseen schedule changes. We had port visits to Perth and Mombasa and two C-141's were available at each port for movement of personnel. Either the Personnel Officer or a CPO or First Class Petty Officer needs to be at the airport when the plane arrives and should stay until departure. As a final note, all requests for movement of personnel, tech reps, etc, were processed through the Personnel Office at Flag direction. Movement of air wing personnel was processed through the CAG Admin Office. This arrangement worked well and ensured that inputs to Flag for manifest preparation came from only two sources on the ship. Insist on this.

c. TEMADD. Again, constant liaison with Flag Air Ops/ATO is a necessity to ensure the timely movement of TAD personnel. While overseas, all TEMADD is under cost orders and "No-Cost" orders should not be used. Movement of prisoners is a headache and requires many messages to determine if brig space is available and then PRR's, etc. Do not allow transfer of prisoners and escorts until each step of their itinerary is set in concrete as there is little or no brig space available enroute. It is recommended that each person going TEMADD, regardless of reason, carry all records. This will make your life a lot easier. We set up a tickler system on the Word Processor to "keep track" of all personnel off the ship. This proved to be most valuable when no notification was obtained that member was returning in an appropriate time frame. The CV acts as the "Battle Group Hotel" and we frequently hand 10-15 personnel on board from other units. The control of these personnel was a function of the CMAA and the onward movement a function of the Personnel Office. Good relations with the CMAA ensures that no one gets lost in the "system."

d. TEMADD OPTAR. Dedication and attention to detail is required to keep the books up to date. The embarked squadrons should be maintaining a TAD log similiar to your own, and weekly cross checks between the squadrons and TEMADD clerk ensured that our OTA's were kept at a very low level. Liquidation of orders was monitored on a daily basis and we maintained about a 95%

liquidation communication with AIRLANT, especially Ms. Laura Hill, either by message or personal letter, helped us in our efforts. TEMADD funds management is a high visibility item and a great deal of effort was expended to keep the logs current and up to date. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized.

e. Emergency Leave. Since emergency leave is now funded centrally through COMNAVAIRLANT, the drain on TEMADD funds has ceased. During our IO deployment, each emergency leave cost about $1,800 round trip to and from CONUS. Emergency leave from OUTCONUS requires standard TEMADD Orders and two MTA's. All records should accompany personnel departing on emergency leave. Return transportation is arranged by the traveler by calling NAVPTO Washington, DC upon arrival CONUS. A brief sheet was attached to each leave paper that gave the member instructions and important phone numbers.

f. Forms. Forms are difficult to obtain in the Med and IO. We sailed with approximately one years supply of OCR forms and nearly ran out. They can be ordered through the normal supply system with a high priority if you anticipate running out. We were always talking with our ships in company and constant trading of forms became the order of the day. Also, we took about 2,500 ID cards with us and expended most of them by providing support to the ships in the battle group. We took about 10,000 lamination packages with us and ordered 5,000 more immediately upon sailing. We received the lamination order about four months after ordering it and we used it all. Based on the amount you have available, you can decide to laminate shellback, liberty, and security cards or decline to do so.

4. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE.

a. Visitors. This is the highest area of visibility for the office, and probably the single most important operation. Advance planning and flexibility are essential key elements, prior to and during the deployment, for successful handling of the numerous visits by distinguished visitors. During the KENNEDY's deployment, visitors included groups such as American and foreign embassy personnel, journalists, political leaders, military officers, and government figures such as the Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., and the President of the Somali Democratic Republic, Mohamed Siad Barre. The little details are important and can be crippling to any concerted effort if not given proper forethought. This includes souvenier photo booklets, giveaway such items as ballcaps, information for publication by jounalists such as histories, biographies, and background data. Ensure there is a stocked supply of items such as ballcaps, plaques, picture frames, and ensure that the photo lab has plenty of color paper and color negative and slide film, as these materials are in high demand. Begin work on the 5050 notice as soon as possible and make every attempt to obtain proper names of the guests as far in advance as possible. Close communication with the embarked Staff is a must. Interface with the Flag Secretary, Aide, and PAO is an absolute necessity to smooth coordination of efforts. The expenditure of manpower and material is great in the overall coordination of VIP events, but one "bad visit" cannot be afforded. Commander Sixth Fleet Public Affairs Policy and Procedures: A Guide to Public Affairs is an excellent reference. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY has been successful in using a Commander from the ship's company as a visit coordinator to work with the Flag PAO in writing 5050 notices and coordinating events. Lieutenant Commanders have worked out very well as underway visit escorts, while the ship's PAO has handled film crews and journalists. The advance Beach Liaison Officer is responsible for prearranged visiting in foreign ports. Each day while inport, escort officers from the embarked air wing were available to the ACDO as guides. The list of escort officers was provided in advance to the Admin Officer.

b. Publications. A suggeston is to have welcome aboard pamphlets translated into the native languages of the countries planned to be visited. The translations may be done through the Naval Intelligence Support Center, 4301 Suitland Road, Washington, DC, ATTN: NISC62. The autovon is 293-3563. It takes about 30 days to obtain a translation. During the deployment the ship prepared welcome aboard brochures in Spanish, French and Hebrew. A "Dependent's Handbook" was published and distributed prior to deploying. This booklet covered assistance available through the Red Cross and Navy Relief; base housing; base auto decals; legal matters; a variety of useful information and a checklist of things to do before the ship deploys. Do not rely solely on port directories for making crew port guides for foreign port visits. Information on pamphlets and films available may be obtained from the "Overseas Diplomacy Manual." Civilian travel agencies can also be a helpful source of information. In the past, the ship was successful in filming, editing, and presenting its own videotaped port brief programs for ship's CCTV. The PAO, cameraman, and soundman is generally all that is needed to be sent with the advance party ashore. The timely nature of these films, presented over ship's TV, has been well received. Opportunities to film port briefs were not presented this deployment, but is highly encouraged for future operations. The ship's newspaper "Bird Farm News," published daily at sea, was an excellent means of keeping the crew informed of shipboard and worldwide events. For the daily newspaper, ensure that there is an ample stock of paper, drafting and graphic supplies to sustain any extensions or a lengthy deployment. Many of these supplies are hard to get while deployed, and very expensive to obtain by open purchase in foreign ports.

c. General. To enhance communications with families back home, the ship established a telephone recording and answering service in the home of one of the Ombudsman. Called the "Care Line", it is an excellent means of communication by which to get important and timely messages out to family and friends.

5. SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICE. Special Services provides a myrid of crew services. Sporting activities, parties and tours were all handled and scheduled through the Special Services Office. Additionally, Special Services coordinated or assisted in all USO shows brought onboard for entertainment of the crew. Almost all of the ashore activities that were scheduled for the crew were most effectively arranged by sending in the Special Services/Tours Officer prior to the ship's scheduled port visits. LOGREQ inputs, requesting local sports competition and other special requests (tours, etc) were unproductive and/or unsatisfactory and in some ports, protocol necessitated direct, in-person only liaison. The recommended advance liaison methodology is to inform via naval message the authorities of the port to be visited of the intended visit itinerary of the advance Special Services Liaison Officer. The local USO representatives, military special services personnel and the local civilian tour companies soliciting tour business should all be notified of the impending arrival of the Special Services Officer. Ideally, the Special Services Officer should be sent in, schedule permitting, approximately 15 days in advance of the ship's arrival. He should plan on spending a minimum of 5 days in the port concerned with only one day allowed on each end for travel. This necessitates 7 days of initial TAD. The advance Special Services Liaison Officer is thus able to return to the ship approximately one week before the ship pulls into port. This one week period is rather critical. When shortened, problems tend to arise and tours and sports arrangements are less than effectively handled. Upon return, all tour and general port visit information is disseminated by well laid out posters, Plan of the Day notes and personal interviews on ship's CCTV. The Special Services Liaison Officer also coordinated liberty transportation, arranged sports events, ship's bands engagements, and collected general port visit information.

a. Sports Events. Sporting events were scheduled in almost every port visited. Information concerning competition and practices arranged in order of the ports visited follows:

(1) Malaga, Spain: Ms Barbara Thursby, USO Malaga Representative was very instrumental in organizing sporting activities. Ms. Thursby is well organized and has the contacts to make any and all sporting arrangements that are within the local community. Available sports when ship visited Malaga was limited to basketball and soccer. No boxing, softball or baseball competition was available.

(2) Perth, Australia: There is no USO facility in this beautiful port city, however there was the AMCONSULATE (Ms Carbone) who is very knowledgeable and very helpful. Mr. Jon Hedges from the Western Australia Government Travel Center is the point of contact for all tour arrangements. He deals with all the tour companies and is thus in a position to work out tour packages that meet the needs of any crew from the regular sightseeing tours to the involvement/sport tours such as softball, diving, water skiing etc. The Royal Yacht Club permitted use of their facility by our sailing club and arranged for competition racing. Our ships band performed nightly in a hotel ballroom for the entertainment of battle force sailors. A battle force Enlisted Party was arranged with Fremantle caterers at the Fremantle Passenger Center (Fleet Landing) which in conjunction with the Officers Party held at the Parmalia Hilton made a lasting goodwill impression on the Australians. The local tennis buffs made an invitation that was accepted, for an all day officers versus local men and women tennis enthusiast competition.

(3) Mombasa, Kenya: The AMCONSULATE is of great help and must be consulted before embarking on any arrangements. Chief [redacted] is the U.S. Navy representative assigned and he has the points of contacts necessary to make a port visit successful. Chief [redacted] can contact the Kenya Navy who will assign an officer for liaison duty. This Kenya Liaison Officer can and will arrange for boxing, soccer and basketball on request. The Kenyan's protocol calls for face-to-face meetings and they are very accommodating. There is no softball or baseball available. Sailing can be arranged through direct liaison with the Mombasa Yacht Club Commodore. Tennis can also be arranged through direct contact with the major hotels that have tennis courts.

(4) Toulon, France: Personnel from the French Navy activity and the French aircraft carrier, CLEMENCEAU, were most helpful in organizing band engagements for the ship's band. No other events were scheduled due to lack of advance liaison and short inport period. Buses were made available from Fleet Landing to the USO and beach areas.

b. Entertainment: The USO/DOD sponsored two outstanding shows on board while underway. The "Kemeny Sisters" and "Miss Black America" shows were both smashing successes that were enjoyed by the entire crew both live and on later broadcasts via CCTV.

c. Tours: It is quite common that many personnel never venture beyond walking distance from the various boat landings. Unfortunately, walking distances usually only encompass the area known in almost every port as "the gut". In order to get the most out of their money, see some beautiful areas, meet representative people, make the port visits worthwhile adventures and have remembrances, and to make the Navy and deployment in general more attractive, it is necessary and highly desirable to make direct efforts towards organizing worthwhile and desirable tours.

(1) The USO is well known for their tour packages and their ability for indirectly putting together a tour package. All agents, including the USO, are extremely competitive and desirous of carrier tour business. Various itineraries and costs are available and presented by the agents. However, one should not hesitate to put together a tour itinerary of which one believes the crew would enjoy, utilizing an agent as a provider (example: Relaxation Tour - an overnight in a hotel located in a young tourist area with meals, tips, fees and transportation included in the price). Again, conducting advance liaison for tour arrangements is imperative and the key to effective and efficient planning.

(2) Tour advertising is very time consuming, but well worth the many efforts required. After an advance liaison trip, there is plenty of information, pictures, and handouts available to describe the tours of the intended port visit. The USO is usually the best source of local information, however the tourist information centers and Bureau of Commerce can also supply valuable information. Use of CCTV and radio time is effective in getting information disseminated. In addition to Print Shop produced posters, which are extremely effective, the POD, and encouragement of tours over the 1MC by the Special Services Officer and, in particular, the Executive Officer and the Captain are especially effective for promoting tours.

(3) Tours sales involve many thousands of dollars (for Mombasa tours sales exceeded $76,000). Accurate accounting and safeguarding of sales money and receipts can't be overemphasized. Special Services personnel handle 95% of the tour ticket sales with a few involved department/squadron representatives handling the other 5%. Accounting sheets and individual two-part tickets (one for retention by Special Services and one side for issue) included the following information; tour, date, cost, name, rate, division, phone, sellers initials, ticket number and muster time and location. Tour monies were a direct responsibility of the Special Services Officer. Special Services Officer paid the respective tour agencies involved. Refunds for tours were made only if enough notification was given to the Special Services Officer so he could have sufficient time to cancel without charge or in cases of operational necessity. Refunds are not normally a good practice on a large aircraft carrier combatant unless under extenuating circumstances because the tour agents often times require a firm commitment of the number of personnel attending the tours. Hence in some cases, tour fees were still being charged even for personnel not attending, as was the case in Malaga,

Spain and Mombasa, Kenya, especially for two day tours where restaurant and hotel arrangements have to be made. A few types of tours to be avoided are those having many stops (either there is not enough stop over time or its just added as fill), and points of interest that take a good deal of enroute time to drive to. Tour posters stating the times for musters, loading of boats, departure from Fleet Landing and return, plus direct memorandums to the key players responsible (ie., CDO, OOD, etc.) were used as a means of informing duty personnel of their responsibility in movement of tour personnel.

(5) Ports Visited in Order.

(a) Malaga: Tours were arranged through the USO. Ms Barbara Thursby, Director of the USO Malaga Center was the point of contact. The tour agency used by the USO offered many tours from cultural to sporting events. The local USO is only open during ships visits since it is housed in a hotel lobby/lounge area. Tours available included: Granada, Rota, Ronda, Sevilla, Donkey Safari, Gilbraltar, Flamenco Barbecue, Malaga, Nerja Caves, Ceuta and an African tour. Tours can be sold till date of arrival, however an advisory message must be sent at least three working days for planning and estimation purposes. Minimums are imposed and adhered to. Message traffic did not contain US dollar equivalent of Spanish Peseta prices. Messages for Malaga USO can be sent via USDAO MADRID SPAIN.

(b) Perth: There was no USO in Perth, however the NOCWA provided, as well as through direct correspondence with the Western Australian Government Travel Center, the tours information needed. Tours offered included: El Caballo Blanco and Vineyards, City Sights, Yanchep Park and Caves, Swan Scenic Drive, Atlantis Marine and Yanchep, Sun City, Cohuna Wildlife Park, Sun City, El Caballo Blanco, Wave Rock, Pinnacle two day tour, Mardi Gras at El Caballo Blanco and Rottnest Island. There was also available the following sports tours: Softball, horseback riding, water skiing, yacht sailing and scuba diving. These tours sold very well, however they had maximum limits imposed in which this command was under the impression, as well as the other commands in the battle group that they were already distributed to them equally. This was not the case as was found out upon arrival, that the numbers received applied to the entire battle group, thus this resulted in many overbookings. The point of contact of tours is Mr. Jon Hedges from the Western Australia Government Travel Center. He deals with all the major tour agencies and can set up special charters on request. Messages for tours and other arrangements can be sent to NOCWA.

(c) Mombasa: Coast Car Hire and Tours Ltd. offered several tours, including: Tsavo East Park, Tsavo East and West, Tsavo West and Amboseli, Mombasa City tour, air safari to Amboseli, Masai Mara and Tsavo and Malindi. These tours included the budget option (no meals included) and the regular tour which included everything. The prices were very reasonable even though it was during the off season. The tour agent was more than accommodating to any and all special tour requests and was personally available for tour departures at Fleet Landing. All the tours were conducted in 7-9 passenger vans except the budget tours which utilized 25 passenger mini-buses. Accommodations in the safari lodges were outstanding and the meals were equally good. The safari tours were an excellent change from the ordinary as evidenced by the outstanding response from the crew where over $76,000.00 dollars worth in tours were sold. Point of contact was Michael Kirkland, President Coast Car Hire and Tours Ltd. Contact can be made via USDAO Nairobi, Kenya.

(d) Toulon: Tours were arranged through the USO with Voyages Wasteels, Mr. Jacques Chelelekian representing. Josette Martin, the Director for the French Fleet Centers was the local point of contact. The local USO is open only during ship visits. Tours available included: Marseille, Nice and Monte Carlo, and Avignon. Minimums are imposed and adhered to. At least five working days notification is required for all tours during in-season visits. The value of an advance liaison visit by the Special Services Officer could answer many of the questions he has from the crew and have the up-to-date information regarding the port visit, including the capabilities and limitations of those who are working with/for the ship. Message traffic for Toulon USO can be sent via Marine Toulon, France or USO Mediterranen Fleet Centers Naples, Italy.

(6) Lessons Learned: Some of the difficulties experienced during the deployment in setting up tours and other events have been a lack of advance liaison by the Special Services Officer. In the ports of call that the Special Services Officer was permitted to go in advance the tours and sporting engagements went on as scheduled. The ports of call that the Special Services Officer was not allowed to go in as advance liaison there were many problems that arose upon arrival that because of communications problems from ship to shore other members of advance liaison are not able to address prior to arrival of the ship at which time it maybe to late. The lack of advance liaison has resulted in the unnecessary cancellation of several tours and lack of sports events for ships teams and confusion for others due to lack of information and negatively effected crew morale. It is necessary, and of paramount importance, for the Special Services Officer to proceed into ports-of-call approximately 15 days prior to ship's arrival in order to further organize tours, athletic events, ship's parties, etc. The Special Services Officer should have approximately 5 days to perform his tasks and then return to the ship 4-5 days prior to the ship's port entry days in order to distribute the

necessary information and finalize tour sales. The crew expects the Special Services Officer to make arrangements for them (since that comes with the job) for all sorts of engagements ranging from tours, games, bands, hotel reseravtions, tickets for special events, etc.

6. MASTER AT ARMS

a. Drugs-Availability

(1) Med ports. Most types of drugs are readily available including prescription drugs.

(a) Malaga, Spain. An abundance of hashish from street vendors in the bar areas, valium, librium, and qualudes are available without prescription at most pharmacies.

(b) Toulon, France. Hashish is the most prevalent drug followed by valium, librium, and qualudes. Supply is limited however, street vendors can provide hashish in small quantities.

(2) IO ports. Types of drugs are limited in as indicated below:

(a) Perth, Australia. Limited amounts of marijuana of medium quality is available in many of the discos and bars. Some chemical drugs are available in very limited amounts, most noted is PCP.

(b) Mombasa, Kenya. Very limited types of drugs are available. Low quality marijuana is in abundant supply from street vendors; other types of drugs are extremely rare.

b. Drug Detection and Suppression

(1) Searches Conducted

(a) Brow searches of returning liberty party E-5 and below were submitted to a complete search, packages of E-6 and above were randomly searched in each liberty port.

(b) Mail inspection of all packages received by O-3 and below were made after delivery. This had a very positive psychological effect and resulted in eighteen drug finds of which six cases were taken to mast. Numerous finds of liquor and beer were made. Very few items of contraband were found after the first two months of the deployment. A total of 126 inspections were made, totaling 9,501 packages.

(c) Dog searches. The drug detection dog has proven to be both an actual and psychological deterrent to drug abusers.

306 searches of spaces utilizing the dog were conducted, all new arrival's baggage were screened by the dog. The dog was sent to the escort ships to conduct searches.

(d) Locker searches conducted for probable cause totalled 179.

(2) Suppression Tactics

(a) Assignment of at least two Ship's Investigators to permanent Shore Patrol unit for liaison with local detectives/law enforcement units would be an extremely effective effort to obtain information which would be invaluable to the onboard MAA's for drug detection.

(b) Urinalysis testing was conducted on probable cause, medical emergencies, and random screens.

(c) Adequate urinalysis testing supplies presented some problem early in the deployment. Early resupply ordering is required to ensure timely receipt. Close liaison with Supply Officer while in the IO is required to ensure these supplies remain refrigerated while in transit.

(d) 30 cubic feet of refrigeration was required for storing urinalysis testing supplies.

(e) At least six spare lamps for the portable test kit should be procurred prior to deployment.

(f) A total of 2020 tests were conducted: 556 for Cannabinoids, 299 for Amphetamines, 30 for Barbituates, 282 Benzodiazepine, 296 Opiates, and 286 (PCP) Phencyclidine.

(g) The urinalysis testing is a major deterrent to drug abusers.

(h) In accordance with COMNAVAIRLANT guidance, enough urine sample bottles should be on hand to screen command twice.

(i) Drug Test Kits. Although these are in the supply system, a six month supply should be aboard prior to deployment.

c. Police Related Supplies

(1) Shore Patrol/Beach Guard required a minimum of six sets of handcuffs and keys.

(2) To expedite processing of crime scenes, and assault cases, a Polaroid camera should be purchased.

(3) Enough fingerprint supplies for the deployment should be obtained prior to the deployment.

(4) Forms are hard to obtain while deployed, all forms should be stocked prior to leaving CONUS.

(5) An APPLE II Computer was obtained to facilitate records, searches, documenting offenses, this is a definite asset.

d. Thefts

(1) 173 thefts were investigated during the deployment. Many thefts were unreported until the crew was educated about the crime prevention program instituted.

(2) The crime prevention program was well publicized on the CMC's CCTV "Fathom Show" and in the ship's daily newspaper. The program was well received by the ships crew.

(3) Many items that were stolen, it is believed were mailed off the ship, it is recommended that a Flouroscope be obtained similar to the ones used in airports to screen both off-going and incoming mail for drugs and contraband.

e. Blackmarketing. To reduce temptation for blackmarketing, radios and tape players were not allowed off the ship in any port.

7. LEGAL. In order to prepare for deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, the Staff Judge Advocate should become thoroughly familiar with the following references:

A. JAG Manual, Chapter XIII
B. JAG Manual, Chapter XXIII
C. SECNAVINST 5820.4E
D. COMSIXTHFLTINST 5800.1A (Legal Manual)
E. CINCUSNAVEURINST 5820.8F
F. U.S. Air Force Europe, Judge Advocate General, Foreign Jurisdiction Deskbook
G. COMSIXTHFLT Deployment Manual
H. COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201, Appendiz 3 to Annex E (Legal and Discipline)
I. CINCPACFLTINST 5440.3G
J. USDAO Instruction #1, #2 and #3 (Australia)

a. Conduct Ashore:

(1) Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

(a) The key to avoiding the assertion of foreign criminal jurisdiction is liaison with authorities ashore prior to the necessity to negotiate for the release of an individual.

(b) In the Mediterranean Sea, particular attention must be paid to the reporting requirements of chapter 4 of reference D, and the Commanding Officer's responsibilities as outlined in paragraph 404 of that chapter.

(c) Similar reporting requirements are imposed in the Indian Ocean by reference H.

(d) Peculiar to Indian Ocean operations is the special reporting requirement established by Commander Seventh Fleet for drug abuse incidents in Seventh Fleet ports. Reference H provides that all Seventh Fleet units visiting ports within the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility are directed to submit a message report within 48 hours of departure reciting the unit's drug abuse experience during the visit.

(2) Foreign Claims

(a) See references B, D, and J, USDAO Instruction #2.

(b) Be sure to check reporting requirements of the embarked staff, which are in addition to those contained in reference D.

(c) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY's program of having a squadron duty officer function as Foreign Claims Officer for each day during an inport visit has functioned very well. In view of the enormous demands on the SJA, he is frequently unavailable to serve as a foreign claims officer but should coordinate the program. Advance briefing of claims officers and advance coordination with the disbursing officer is important to insure that claims officers are able to act independently and have sufficient funds in their possession prior to going ashore to permit on-the-spot settlement of claims. A regular routine of having the claims officer go ashore each day to establish contact with the beach guard and shore patrol worked much better than having the claims officer remain on the ship and await a phone call. Substantial delays were frequently encountered when beach guard or shore patrol officers sought to summon a claims officer from the ship. It may also proved helpful to have the Staff Judge Advocate designated as a paying agent and supervise advancement of funds to the claims officer.

(3) Liberty Risk

(a) Reference G provides for the liberty risk program the ship utilized the program as prescribed by reference H except that prior to entering port, the Executive Officer screened all liberty risk recommendations. Once the ship had entered port, members of the Liberty Risk Board reviewed shore patrol liberty cancellations and liberty risk recommendations on a daily basis. An effective liberty risk program is critical to minimizing misconduct ashore. The program is both preventive and remedial, but is most effectively utilized as a preventive measure.

b. Courts-Martial

(1) The trial team visit of the Navy Legal Service Office, Norfolk, Virginia, was extremely successful. This team got underway from Norfolk with USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69), cross-decked in mid-transit, and rode USS JOHN F. KENNEDY into its initial port of Malaga, Spain. While on board, the team tried 10 Specials and 7 Summary Courts-Martial.

(2) A second trial team visit from Navy Legal Service Office, Subic Bay, was equally successful. The Staff Judge Advocate acted as liaison for a trial team request to try cases for the 8 ship battle group. The Transportation Officer of Commander Carrier Group FOUR provided liaison for the transportation arrangements through Clark AFB and Diego Garcia.

(3) As a general rule, the trial team should be embarked in the CV and any cases from other battle group ships should be brought aboard the CV for trial. The key to a successful trial team visit is advance preparation, including preparation of charge sheet, referral, and service of charge sheets in advance to eliminate any potential delays. It is also necessary for the Staff Judge Advocate to investigate the cases and thoroughly review the charge sheets which are prepared by other members of the battle group, which generally do not have legal expertise available. Advance clearance from Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Philippines, can be obtained to permit the Carrier Group Commander to act as OEGCMJ for the purpose of granting other than honorable conditions discharge in lieu of court-martial.

c. Nonjudicial Punishment

(1) Appeals of nonjudicial punishment should generally be directed to the Officer Exercising General Court-Martial Jurisdiction for administrative purposes over the battle group. In the Mediterranean this will be Commander Fleet Air, Mediteranean (COMFAIRMED); in the Indian Ocean this will be Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Philippines (COMUSNAVFORPHIL).

d. General Military Justice Policy

(1) The Commanding Officer should clearly define the cases of which he will assume cognizance, and those cases he will delegate to the respective squadron commanding officers. (See JAG Manual, Section 0101.b.3 and 0107.c.) The following policies have worked well on board:

(a) The Commanding Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, will process all drug cases, all cases arising from misconduct ashore, and all cases involving personnel from more than one squadron or involving squadron and ship's company personnel.

(b) Squadron Commanding Officers process all other cases, principally intra-squadron cases.

e. Special Notes on Particular Ports

(1) Malaga, Spain. The various Spanish police forces generally enforce firm but even-handed discipline. They are willing to turn minor incidents over to the shore patrol and beach guard, but will not tolerate the slightest resistance. Spanish jails should be avoided at all costs. One relatively significant incident in Malaga, Spain, during the first port visit cost a civilian technical representative $6,500.00 in posted bond in order to obtain a trial in absentia and release from Spanish jurisdiction.

(2) Perth, Australia. Perhaps the most hospitable port anywhere in the world for a visiting U.S. Navy ship, the Perth police sought to turn every possible case over to the shore patrol for internal handling. Nevertheless, 7 cases appeared in local Australian courts. The key to smooth handling here is liaison with Mr. John Henshaw, who under the auspices of references C and J, USADO Instruction #3, represented U.S. individuals tried before Australian courts. In this case the Staff Judge Advocate functions as Trial Observer. The Australian court system is eminently fair and a fair trial was had by all. Punishment for drunk and disorderly and minor drug offenses generally equated to fines of $50.00 to $150.00.

(3) Mombasa, Kenya. Arrest by Kenya police and trial within the Kenyan judicial system is to be avoided at all costs. Although persons arrested were released upon their own recognizance and allowed to return to court the following day, the court experience was hair-raising for all concerned. Once again the Staff Judge Advocate functioned as Trial Observer.

(4) Toulon, France. This French Navy port is generally tolerant of U.S. Navy sailors and their sometimes inebriate conduct ashore. Although keeping shore patrol and beach guard

contingents relatively busy, our visiting sailor avoided clashes with French police.

8. CHAPLAIN DEPARTMENT:

a. Sunday Services at sea by a Chaplain:

(1) 1700 Saturday - Catholic Mass - Crew's Lounge
0830 Sunday - Catholic Mass - Crew's Lounge
1700 Sunday - Catholic Mass - Crew's Lounge

(2) 0930 Sunday - Protestant Worship - Crew's Lounge
2000 Sunday - Protestant Worship - Crew's Lounge
2100 Sunday - Protestant Prayer Service - Ship's Chapel

b. Sunday Services in port: The morning services remain at the same time and location, however, the evening service is cancelled.

c. Services at sea led by Lay Leader:

(1) 1030 Sunday - Mormom/Latter Day Saints - Ship's Chapel

(2) 0830 Monday - Navigators - Ship's Chapel

(3) 0830 Wednesday - Navigators - Ship's Chapel

(4) 1800 Wednesday - Mormom/Latter Day Saints - Ship's Chapel

(5) 1300 Friday - Islamic Lay Leader Service - Ship's Chapel

(6) 1900 Friday - Jewish lay Leader Service - Ship's Chapel

(7) 2015 Friday - Officer Christian Fellowship - Ship's Chapel

(8) 0900 Saturday - Jewish Lay Leader Service - Ship's Chapel

(9) 2100 Saturday - Navigators - Ship's Chapel

d. Special Services:

(1) Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Service was held in the Crew's Lounge.

(2) A special joint Catholic and Protestant Easter Sunrise Service was held on the flight deck.

(3) Gospel Music Concert held in Crew's Lounge.

(4) Monthly Prayer Breakfast conducted in the Crew's Lounge.

e. Weekly Services/Activities

(1) Catholic Mass is held daily at 1100 in the Ship's Chapel. Catholic Instructions are held in the Ship's Chapel on Thursday at 1930 while at sea.

(2) Protestant Bible Study is conducted in the Ship's Chapel on Monday and Wednesday at 2000 while at sea.

(3) Christian Brotherhood hour is conducted at 2200 each evening in the Ship's Chapel while at sea. Daily Devotions are held each morning except Sunday in the Ship's Chapel at 0800 while at sea.

(4) Catholic pre-marriage classes held 0830 Wednesday in Ship's Chapel and 2000 Sunday in Classroom 4 during latter part of cruise.

(5) Protestant Chapel Steering Committee meets each Wednesday at 2100 in the Chapel.

(6) Christian Film Ministry: Each Thursday at 2000 a Christian Film was shown in the Crew's Lounge.

f. Task Force Services: Services were offered and conducted aboard ships in company. A Holy Helo availability message is sent by Wednesday of each week. There have been occasions where a Chaplain has been assigned TAD for a couple of days to assist in counselling and pastrol duties aboard these "Small Boys."

g. Staff Relations: The embarked staff has been very cooperative in working relations. The Senior Chaplain is ADDU to Staff. Many staff members attend services regularly.

h. Publicity: All Worship/Lay Leader Services are published daily in the POD, Welcome Aboard pamphlets, posted outside the Ship's Chapel and published periodically in the Sunday Bulletin. Additionally, services are announced over the 1MC.

i. The Ship's Chapel/Crew's Lounge: The Ship's Chapel accommodates approximately thirty (30) people comfortably. The Crew's Lounge accommodates approximately one hundred fifty (150) comfortably.

j. Religious Education: Adult Christian Education, Baptism, Confirmation, Communion, and Marriage preparation classes have been conducted by all Chaplains.

k. General Chaplain Services: The Chaplains alternate in providing the Evening Prayer over the 1MC and the Wardroom Evening Prayer. One Chaplain has the primary responsibility of visiting Sick Bay and the Correctional Facility daily. All Chaplains visit various work centers throughout the week and arrange their schedules so to visit day and night.

l. Memorial Service: A Memorial Service was conducted in the Crew's Lounge on 29 April 82 honoring Boiler Technician Chief David Wilburn BAILY, USN.

m. Red Cross Messages.

(1) The Chaplain's assistants pick up all messages at the Communications Message Center. Periodic pick-ups are conducted throughout the day; however, the message center will notify the Chaplain's Office by telephone. All messages are logged and the service member is notified. Division Officers and Department Heads take action to help respond. Squadron CO's, XO's, and Duty Officers will take action on all squadron related AMCROSS messages. The Chaplain will assist the squadron if necessary. A brief sheet is prepared for all AMCROSS messages which may require emergency leave. The Chaplains are responsible for drafting all replies. The squadron messages should all be routed through the Chaplain to ensure a response is made. Thus far, 1378 AMCROSS messages have been received.

(2) Messages received requiring emergency leave have been handled with a special "yellow" folder so that immediate action can be taken by the appropriate department or squadron. The folder, which contains a brief sheet and a copy of the message, is routed back through the Chaplain for his "chop". The ship's Executive Officer has final approval. Prior to hand delivering the folder to the Executive Officer, the ATO and Personnel Office are notified in advance in order that they can make preparations for the anticipated emergency leave.

(3) The Ham Radio Shack also provides assistance to personnel who may have an emergency need to call CONUS, except when operating under 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean due to EMCON conditions imposed.

n. Navy Relief. The Navy Relief Branch Office has assisted numerous emergency leave cases. Highly recommend this office be utilized to the fullest. If a Navy Relief Office is aboard, ensure they obtain a copy of an Airline Transportation Cost guide to assist in making loans.

o. Dependents Allotments: This is one area that cannot be overemphasized. Many Navy Relief and Red Cross messages have been received pertaining to service member's allotments to wives. Some of the messages stated no allotment was received by wife. however, upon interviewing the service member it was discovered that the service member had not started an allotment or he had a pay mixup. Recommend publishing this information daily in the POD, newspaper, dependent briefs, and divisional quarters.

p. Administrative Support:

(1) Supplies: Ensure you hae a good stock of all supplies on board prior to departing CONUS. Many items used in religious services are difficult to obtain through local supply channels. Recommend all commercial companies be notified to use priority mail to send Missalettes and other materials received monthly via mail.

(2) Personnel Support: At present, all of the Chaplain spaces are located in one general area. (Library/Chapel/Offices/ Crew's Lounge and Command Master Chief's Office) Personnel support consist of an RP1, RP2, RPSN, SN, two AN, and a SA. Hours of
operation of the various spaces are: Ship's Chapel 24 hours; Library and Crew's Lounge 24 hours except for cleaning and special group meetings at sea.

q. Local Project: Thus far, three projects have been undertaken to assist local churches and an orphanage in Spain, Australia, and Kenya. Support from Chapel Funds and Navy/Marine volunteer workers has proved very successful. The servicemen enjoy helping others.

r. Newspapers: The library has the responsibility of receiving and distributing all the newspapers for staff, departmental, and squadron offices. Recommend, if tasked with the responsibility, that priority mail be used in delivery; however, delays will be experienced due to mail routing. One hundred twenty-two (122) copies of the Stars and Stripes, (2) copies of the New York Times, (2) copies of the Washington Post, plus hometown papers of squadrons embarked are received.

9. POSTAL

a. Transit to MED: Departed Norfolk, Virginia on 4 JAN 82, with operations off VACAPES for 3 days. Didn't receive any mail during that time, however, dispatches were made. On 8 JAN we dispatched mail to NAS Bermuda using the USS EISENHOWER's COD.

b. Inport Malaga, Spain: Received all incoming mail directly from NAVSTA Rota. Mail was received either via H-53 directly to the ship or C-130 at Malaga's commercial airport. Dispatches were made via commercial airlines because logistic flights were not flying on a set schedule. MATT team from Rota was assigned, mail service was good.

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c. OPS in MED: While operating in the MED, all mail was received and dispatched through FMC Sigonella via COD logistic flights. Encountered no problems.

d. Indian Ocean OPS: All incoming mail was flown from Norfolk to Diego Garcia via C-141 three times per week. All letter mail was flown from Diego Garcia to KENNEDY via US-3A. Air Parcel Post and Space Available Mail was normally transported to the ship by either UNREP ships or by C-141 flying from Diego Garcia to Masirah, Oman. Mail was transported from Oman to the ship via C-2's and UNREP ships. Outgoing mail was dispatched utilizing the US-3A and UNREP ships. We used two gateways for our dispatch, Norfolk, via C-141 and AMF San Francisco. Norfolk for East coast mail and San Francisco for west coast mail. Mail service was outstanding. Transit time for letters was 4-8 days and parcels was 8-20 days.

e. Fremantle, Australia: Received mail daily except Saturday from Perth Post Office. Due to the small size of Fremantle's Post Office, mail was delivered directly to fleet landing from Perth. Mail was dispatched at the Fremantle Post Office utilizing AV-7's. The AV-7's were manifested to APO SF 96209 Sydney, Australia via TAA FLT 15. The APO in Sydney would in turn be redispatched to CONUS. The Fremantle Post Office was open until 2200 to receive dispatches. Point of contacts: Postmaster, Fremantle Post Office and Mr. Milligan, GPO Perth. Phone number 326-5375. We had two military (C-141) flights from Diego Garcia which delivered registered mail. Cooperation was excellent and service was outstanding.

f. Mombasa, Kenya: While inport Mombasa, military aircraft were used to receive and dispatch mail. We received our mail from Diego Garcia via C-141 and dispatched directly to Norfolk on same aircraft. USS JOHN F. KENNEDY was mail coordinator for the battle group, and made all pick-ups and deliveries to the small ships. We had good transportation to and from the airport and encountered no problems. The C-141 provided good logistics.

g. Toulon, France: Received incoming mail at the commercial airport at Marseille. A MATT team was provided to assist with the military flights. Military flights came from FMC Sigonella and used the French Airfield at Hyeres. Dispatched all outgoing mail to military flights. Ship received letter mail once while inport Toulon. Mail service was fair.

*STATISTICS.

Mail dispatched ....202,973 lbs
Mail received ....362,081 lbs
Money orders sold.......................................38,481
Money orders sold (value)........................$4,586,524.00
Postage used $150,837.14
*From 4 Jan 82 - 30 Jun 82

10. Career Counseling: Needless to say, the supply inventory is diminished in the Indian Ocean and efforts should be taken to ensure reenlistment memorabilia and supplies are ordered well in advance of the deployment. Retention efforts are hampered by the lack of suitable communications with the detailers. To this end, message traffic (and speedletter correspondence during MINIMIZE) is frequently the only means. However, the following items have proven successful:

a. Counselor Liaison (CONUS): USS JOHN F. KENNEDY arranged for one counselor to remain in Norfolk and function in this capacity. By doing so, situation report (SITREP) messages could be sent to and from the command to allow for questions pertaining to orders, "A" school requests, GUARD III confirmations, etc. The counselor liaison worked closely with the COMNAVAIRLANT Force Retention Office and handled all retention liaison to support the CV/CVW concept.

b. Counselor Liaison (CONUS): There were those times where placing a counselor ashore to make telephone calls stateside was advantageous.

(1) Diego Garcia: AREA CLEARANCE IS REQUIRED. Excellent AUTOVON capability; berthing facilities are primitive at best; counselors should take extra padlocks for security measures; surcharges are placed on all meals in addition to the normal per diem rate and counselors should travel on full-cost per diem orders.

(2) Rota: Liaison support will be rendered to counselors by the Rota Career Counseling Office; outstanding AUTOVON capability; berthing facilities above average to excellent, however a surcharge is placed on all berthing (cost or no-cost orders); surcharge placed on all meals in addition to the normal per diem rate and counselors should travel on full-cost per diem orders.

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TRAINING DEPARTMENT

1. (U) Educational Services Office. The Educational Services Office has provided the normal services associated with the Navy advancement system; applications for officer programs, Navy Functional Skills Program, as well as administered the PACE program. The programs are listed below with descriptions and recommendations.

a. (U) NCFSP, This is the only on-duty education program available on naval ships. We deployed with 1 civilian instructor and completed 6 classes of English and 6 classes of Mathematics. It is suggested you request courses approximately 4-6 weeks in advance.

b. (U) PACE (Vocational). The following courses from City College of Chicago were taught: Real Estate Principles (6 cycles), Real Estate Practice and Procedures (2 cycles), Law Enforcement (2 cycles LE-101, 2 cycles LE-102, 2 cycles LE-201 and 2 cycles LE-202) and Emergency Medcical Technician (1 cycle). Again order courses 4-6 weeks in advance to allow for timely arrival of books.

c. (U) PACE (Academic). The following courses from Florida Junior College were taught: Personal Finance (10 cycles), Introduction to Business (5 cycles), General Psychology (4 cycles), Introduction to Composition (5 cycles), English Composition I (5 cycles), English Composition II (2 cycles) and U.S. History (4 cycles). Order courses 4-6 weeks in advance to allow for timely arrival of books.

d. (U) Training courses. A good supply of BMR, AN, FN, SN and MRPO 3&2 as well as the various professional courses should be onboard prior to deployment. Keep a close check on supply of all courses and order well in advance. It can take up to 3 months to get materials.

e. (U) Supplies. A supply of PQS materials, advancement certificates, page 10's and page 4's should be onboard prior to deployment.

f. (U) ESWS and EAWS. The Indian Ocean deployment has provided a good opportunity for enlisted personnel to qualify in these areas. Suggest a large supply of ESWS and EAWS PQS books be onboard prior to deployment.

2. (U) Human Resource Management

a. (U) Leadership and Management. The primary effort continued to be oriented around conducting the COMNAVAIRLANT Management Skills Course for Petty Officers and junior officers. An average of two classes a month were conducted with 150 personnel receiving training. A Petty Officer First Class conducts the training. Petty Officer indoctrination

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training for all newly advanced Third Class Petty Officers commenced in January 1982. Instructors are volunteers (E7, E8 & E9) from various departments. Classes are conducted twice a month. Approximately 272 newly advanced petty officers received this training during the deployment. The coordinator for the program is the command's Equal Opportunity Program Specialist.

b. (U) Human Relations Council. The Human Relations Council meets once each month and is chaired by the Executive Officer.

c. (U) Affirmative Action Plan (AAP)/Command Action Plan (CAP). The AAP and CAP were updated and forwarded to the ISIC for approval. In addition a ship's instruction covering the entire Human Resource Management Support System was drafted to provide a working document for the Human Relations Council. Human Relations Council members are being assigned various action items to report out on at each HRC meeting.

d. (U) Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators. The Command Equal Opportunity Program Specialist prepared the semi-annual EOQIs for submission to the ISIC in January and July 1982. The results of the EOQI's were very encouraging and reflected the high degree of professionalism that exists aboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.

e. (U) Command Training Team. Instructors are assigned on a collateral duty basis. The Command Training Team is structured to have seven two-man teams. The teams conduct CEN & MRR workshops during the ship's Indoctrination Training to all newly arriving personnel.

f. (U) Substance Abuse Control/Prevention.

(1) (U) The Counseling and Assistance Center (CAAC) provided screening, referral actions, and counseling services for ship's company, air wing, and ships of the battle group. There were 1,119 office vbisits and 310 drug/alcohol screenings conducted.

(2) (U) The Substance Abuse Prevention Education (SAPE) program was replaced with Navy Alcohol Safety Action Plan (NASAP) and Navy Drug Safety Action Plan (NDSAP). A total of three NASAP and one NDSAP classes were conducted with 55 individuals attending.

(3) The DAPA conducted monthly meetings with all CODAA's passing out the latest information and collecting training reports. The CODAA's, in conjunction with ship's TV, accomplished 14,725 hours of drug/alcohol related General Military Training.

SAFETY DEPARTMENT

1. (U) SAFETY REVIEWS. Ship and Airwing Safety Standdowns should be scheduled on a regular basis.

a. COMSIXTHFLTINST 5100.1J (Deployment Manual), Chapter 3, contains requirements for an inchop safety standdown/safety review within 30 days after inchop. It involves the entire ship and embarked Air Wing and requires a comprehensive report within 2 days following completion.

b. Follow on reviews should be included in monthly reports.

2. (U) REPORTS. The monthly safety statistics reports must be submitted in a timely fashion.

a. CTF 60 OPORD 4000 contains monthly reporting requirements while attached to the Sixth Fleet.

b. CTF 77 OPORD 201 contains monthly reporting requirements while attached to the Seventh Fleet.

c. COMCARSTKFORSEVENTHFLT/COMCARGRUFIVEINST 4790.2A details the requirements for FOD reporting in Seventh Fleet.

3.(U) FOD. A tremendous amount of interest and attention is devoted to this problem due to its adverse impact on operational readiness and logistics requirements in the Indian Ocean. The organization should be established at the start to generate awareness of the problem.

4.(U)SLIPPERY DECKS. POL spills combined with condensation from the humid air produces some very hazardous conditions. The many continuous days of Indian Ocean operations can cause this problem to get out of hand unless strong measures are taken to enforce cleanup immediately.

1. (U) Senior Medical Officer's Report

a. MEDICAL SUPPLY. At the end of the cruise, Medical Supply has experienced few problems with the exception of budget constraints. Supply usage was increased by long at-sea periods experienced in the Indian Ocean which depleted stock at a higher rate than was anticipated. At the end of the cruise, KENNEDY finds herself NIS or low on stock of some high usage items, but our overall AMAL stands at 75%.

2. (U) Medical Administrative Report

a. HEALTH RECORDS. The use of the terminal digit system has proven to be both good and bad. It was difficult to maintain consistancy in record-keeping. Quality assurance proved difficult because the new jackets are not in use yet, although the records are being placed in the proper order to insure easier transistion.

b. NON-FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE. Mail service proved to be the major problem. Civilian facilities should be made aware that payment for services will be unavoidably delayed. An accurate record-keeping system is a must.

c. GENERAL CLERICAL. Typing ability is almost a must, although not a necessity. With the tremendous amount of correspondence generated by the admin office, it is highly recommended that more than one person be able to type.

d. CONSULTATIONS AND MEDEVACS. Consultations should be handled as expeditiously as possible. If a medevac is necessary, the individual in charge should maintain an accurate system to achieve results when requests are forwarded to other medical facilities for action. There has been little problem with medevacs during this deployment.

3.(U)X-RAY. The equipment should be maintained properly. Any problems encountered should be referred to a medical repairman for correction. Rigid adherance to cleaning of the processor and cassettes is a must to insure superior performance. Special studies such as barium swallows, oral cholecystograms, and intravenous pyelograms should be thoroughly screened by the technician.

4.(U)TREATMENT ROOM. The Treatment Room underwent a beneficial reorganization to streamline and refine areas of visible deficiency.

a. A complete restowage of all supplies was undertaken. Each cabinet/ drawer was clearly and boldly labeled to insure rapid accessibility by all staff personnel. Only NEEDED items were stocked and all extraneous gear was returned to either Medical Supply or the Pharmacy.

b. Equipment was inspected and a daily log was created to check on operability. All items were arranged to provide ease of accountability.

c. A draw curtain was fabricated and installed to permit patient privacy during exams and procedures which required same.

d. A change was initiated whereby patient waiting time was minimized and precious man-hours restored simply by exerting an effort to employ a secondary triage system whereby simple follow-ups and dressing changes proceeded directly to the Treatment Room followed by more time-consuming maladies. In most cases, minor surgery/elective procedures were rescheduled after designated sick-call hours.

e. Keenly aware of the first impression adage, the Treatment Room and adjacent waiting areas were always maintained in a neat and clean state of readiness at all times reflecting the pride of its staff. Everything was in its proper place thus emanating a noticable air of professionalism.

f. To recapitulate, an experienced staff, eager and well-equipped to render prompt, courteous competent medical/surgical care proved to be the key to success.

g. As this system proved to be the best, most effective SOP, the Treatment Room staff incorporated into its teamwork a rotation program for the designated strikers to rotate through this work center to gain valuable experience under careful supervision. Absolute cooperation, harmonious teamwork and constructive utilization of spare-time by conducting in-service training for the respective strikers proved worthwhile.

5. (U) OPERATING ROOM. With no actual mass casualties (ie, burns, major fractures, missile wounds, etc that can be presented at any time), the operating room was occupied with hernia repairs, appendectomies, and various lesser routine procedures such as vasectomies, circumcisions, I & D, etc. Adequate supplies (qualitative and quantitative) should be carefully planned in advance to meet both emergency and routine demands where replenishment channels cannot be guaranteed. To this extent, caution should be exercised in selecting items that best serve shipboard needs without eating up the budget. Major equipment should be in good working order before deployment. Autoclaves should be serviced immediately before a major deployment, such as an I. O. deployment.

6. (U) ENVIRONMENTAL/PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

a. Shipboard Application - The field of environmental health and preventive medicine is probably the most diversified and challenging area within the Medical Department. The PMT's responsibilities include surveillence of the entire ship to control its environment. Since departing Norfolk on 4 January 1982, KENNEDY's Preventive Medicine Service has been kept busy. During the cruise, we experienced two cases of FALCIPARUM MALARIA and one case of Amoebic Dysentary out of Mombasa, Kenya, as well as many cases of venereal disease with the number of cases for each port visited listed as follows:

Malaga, Spain	6 NGU	35 GC	2 Syphilis	4 Chancroid	2 Herpes
Perth, Australia	2 NGU	16 GC	2 LVG	1 Chancroid	1 Herpes
Mombasa, Kenya	38 NGU	210 GC	3 PPNG	12 Syphilis	2 LVG
	4 Chancroid	1 Herpes	37 venereally acquired Staph		
	1 Granuloma Inguinale				

b. Immunizations - We conducted mass immunizations of the crew and airwing personnel on the TRANSLANT, TRANSMED and Indian Ocean at-sea periods. Many problems were encountered in gaining the compliance of a large portion of the crew although every effort was made to schedule immunizations on no-fly days, overlapping shifts and providing lists of personnel to Department Heads and Division Officers.

c. Quarantine Declarations - Preventive Medicine has an up-to-date quarantine declaration for all ports visited in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Port authorities have not asked to see them with the exception of Perth, Australia.

d. Food Service - Food Service inspections were conducted bi-monthly for each facility with reports submitted to the Commanding Officer via the Supply Officer and the Executive Officer. Problems with refrigerated storage spaces were encountered due to breakdown and unavailability of repair or replacement parts. After the arrival of the new Food Service Officer, changes were instituted in the administration and training of the Mess Specialists and FSA's resulting in an improved operation of the dining facilities and increased sanitation. Close liaison was maintained and daily walk-through inspections by the Food Service Officer corrected many discrepancies prior to any problems occuring.

e. Potable Water - The potable water system is checked daily for chlorine residual and weekly for bacteria. The emergency water tanks in the battle dressing stations are also checked.

f. Reporting Requirements - There are several reports which are required while deployed. Any reports such as venereal disease control reports are sent to the Naval Hospital, Rota, Spain, for translation and distribution in Spain and to EPMU-7, Naples, Italy for translation and distribution in Mombasa and other Mediterranean ports. HMAS LEEUWIN receives all reports for Perth, Australia.

1.(U) Supplies. Exhaustive inventories and stocking of dental supplies before the deployment prevented all shortages during the cruise. Some items on order before departing CONUS arrived after shipping delays similar to those experienced on Mediterranean deployments.

2.(U)Repairs. Liberal preventive maintenance was accomplished before the cruise. Several major breakdowns of essential equipment nevertheless occurred, and all were repaired with departmental resources. The presence of a dental technician who is unusually competent at equipment repair proved mission vital in the Indian Ocean.

3.(U)Treatment. All types of dental treatment except orthodontics were accomplished during the cruise. This included but was not limited to approximately 3218 sickcall exams, 2746 restorations, 1130 extractions, 1080 oral prophylaxes, 160 units of crown and bridge, 60 removable appliance and 108 mouthguards. Several jaw, facial and skull fractures were diagnosed and treated. More than 60 emergency patients from off-ship were treated, including 11 from HMAS PERTH.

4.(U)Recall. Patient recall for annual examination and fluoride application continued to be particular success. Offering a custom approach to encourage the full cooperation of individual departments, this evening program processed 13 departments with an unprecedented 100% compliance during the cruise. 611 recall patients were seen and Class Four status patients declined from 33% to 10% despite constant turnover of personnel.




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




USS JOHN F KENNEDY
CV-67
PAY TO NAVY RELIEF SOCIETY
THE SUM OF $105,360.57








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